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Recent Decisions
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
I.

A.

AIroRNEY

MALPRACTICE

Assessing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel as it Pertains to an
Attorney's Failure to Subpoena the Defendant's Witness

In In re ParrisW, 1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether the defendant's counsel's failure to subpoena five corroborating alibi witnesses for the correct trial date constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.2 The court correctly found ineffective assistance
of counsel according to the standard set in Strickland v. Washington,3
holding that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.4 The court correctly
did not presume prejudice as discussed in United States v. Cronic.5 Additionally, the court's conclusive holding of ineffectiveness was correct
despite its misapplication of supporting case law. 6 However, the court
failed to look to the Compulsory Clause of the Sixth Amendment,7
under which it would not have been constitutionally unfair to the defendant had the witnesses not testified on his behalf.
1. The Case.--On April 27, 1999, Trenton Anton Morton, a student at Thurgood Marshall Middle School in Temple Hills, Maryland,
stood outside his school's bus stop and prepared to get on the bus.'
Allegedly, Parris W. approached Morton from behind and punched
him on the right side of the face.9 The assailant immediately ran
away, and Morton chased after him, but stopped when he was unable
to catch him. t ° On July 28, 1999, the State filed a juvenile delin1. 363 Md. 717, 770 A.2d 202 (2001).
2. Id. at 720, 770 A.2d at 203.
3. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
4. Parris,363 Md. at 730, 770 A.2d at 209-10.
5. 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984).
6. See Paris,363 Md. at 730-36, 770 A.2d at 210-14.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
tight... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor ....").
8. Parris, 363 Md. at 720, 770 A.2d at 203. Although the State never established the
time at which the assault on Morton occurred, the parties seemed to have agreed that it
occurred at 3:45 p.m. Id. at 728, 770 A.2d at 208.
9. Id. at 720, 770 A.2d at 203-04.
10. Id.
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quency petition against Parris in the Circuit Court for Prince George's
County for assault and trespass in connection with this incident."'
During the second adjudicatory hearing scheduled on December
23, 1999, the defendant's attorney asked for a continuance on the
grounds that the State had provided the incorrect offense date in its
discovery responses. 12 Defendant's counsel contended that he discovered the actual date of the offense on the morning of the hearing, a
date for which the defendant claimed to have an alibi defense, and
thus was unprepared for trial.1" Defendant's counsel requested the
continuance so that he could summon alibi witnesses and provide notice of alibi witnesses to the State. 4 The hearing was continued until
January 20, 2000; however, the court sent a notice to defendant's
counsel rescheduling the hearing forJanuary 21, 2000.15
On January 21, 2000, defendant's counsel again requested a continuance, stating that he had incorrectly believed that the hearing was
still scheduled for January 20th and had subpoenaed a number of alibi witnesses in the case for the previous day. 6 Counsel told the court
"we would like to make the request for a continuance due to an error
on counsel's part. That is me." 7 Counsel requested the continuance
in order for the witnesses to be present.' 8 These witnesses would have
supplied statements corroborating and supplementing the defendant's alibi that he was elsewhere on the day of the assault. The State
immediately objected to the continuance because all of its subpoenas
were issued for the correct trial date and all its potential witnesses
were present.1 9 The court denied the continuance on the grounds

11. Id., 770 A.2d at 204.
12. Id.
13. Id. Parris did not appear at the first adjudicatory hearing scheduled on October
21, 1999. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 721, 770 A.2d at 204.
16. Id. Defense counsel further told the court:
I got the date wrong for today's hearing. I thought it was yesterday.
I issued a number of subpoenas for yesterday to witnesses in this case. These
folks, the one's we've been able to contact, are not able to come today. They were
prepared to come yesterday. We would request a continuance so we can get those
people in.
Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. Three of the six witnesses, Tracy Robb, Florence Garrett, and Mr. W., the defendant's father, were employees at Faith Office Products in Washington, D.C. Id. Two others
were Mr. W's friends, Jeffery Taylor and Diane Cary. Id. The sixth witness was a customer
to whom Mr. W. made deliveries on the day of the assault. Id.
19. Id.
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that the matter had been scheduled several times and had been con20
tinued on a prior occasion.
At the adjudicatory hearing, the State called Morton, the victim
of the assault, to the stand as its sole witness. 2 ' Morton testified that
he knew Parris and identified him as the assailant. 22 Morton also testified that, although he did not see Parris's face at the time of the assault, he did see the back of Parris's head while on the run and he
could identify him because the side of his face was visible to him as he
turned the corner.23 Furthermore, Morton testified that the clothing
that Parris wore was familiar to him because he has seen Parris previously wearing it during the school year.24
Parris's attorney only called one witness as well-Parris's father,
Anthony W. 2 5 Mr. W. testified that he brought Parris to school at 9:00
a.m. on the day of the assault for a meeting regarding the termination
of his three-month expulsion. 26 Mr. W. stated that the vice principal
of the school did not allow Parris to return to school as scheduled
because Mr. W. had failed to fill out particular community service
paperwork.27 Mr. W., therefore, took his son with him on his delivery
rounds. 28 After making his delivery rounds, Mr. W. said that he and
his son went to the apartment of a friend, Diane Cary, in Greenbelt,
where they arrived at approximately 2:15 p.m. 2 Ms. Cary was not at
home when they arrived, but Mr. W. stated that they entered the
house. While he talked to Ms. Cary on the phone, Parris was playing
video games."0 Ms. Cary eventually arrived at her home at approximately 4:30 p.m., and the three of them stayed at her home the rest of
the day, until 11:00 p.m.3" In concluding his testimony, Mr. W. stated
that there was no time in which he could not see his son during their
20. Id. at 721-22, 770 A.2d at 204.
21. Id. at 722, 770 A.2d at 204.
22. Id., 770 A.2d at 204-05. Indeed, Morton testified that Parris had been in a few of
his classes, and that a few months before the incident Parris had pulled a knife on him. Id.
23. Id., 770 A.2d at 204.
24. Id., 770 A.2d at 204-05.
25. Id., 770 A.2d at 205.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. Mr. W. further testified that he and Parris went to his office in Northwest Washington, D.C. from approximately 10:00 to 10:30 a.m. and then proceeded to load several
cases of copy paper into his van. Id. The two of them then delivered the copy paper to
Northeast Washington, D.C. and, immediately thereafter, went to the house of a friend,
Jeffery Taylor, in Southeast Washington, D.C. where they stayed from approximately 11:00
a.m. to 1:45 p.m. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 722-23, 770 A.2d at 205.
31. Id. at 723, 770 A.2d at 205.
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stay at Ms. Cary's apartment. Furthermore, he stated that his son was
unable to drive a car and that he did not drive his son to Thurgood
Marshall Middle School, which he believed was approximately thirty
miles away and would take about thirty to forty minutes to reach by
car. 2 During the cross-examination of Mr. W., and later in closing
argument, the State stressed that Mr. W. was a biased witness, emphasizing that Mr. W. had an incentive to provide Parris with a false alibi
for the assault because he was the defendant's father. 3
The circuit court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Parris
had committed the assault as alleged. 4 The court found that Morton's testimony was credible based upon his recognition of the defendant from the side and of his clothing. Furthermore, because the
court believed that there was no reason for Morton to have lied about
the occurrence of the assault, it found that there was no reason to
disbelieve his testimony.35 The court placed Parris under the supervision of the Department of Juvenile Justice, released him into the care
and custody of his father, and ordered him to serve five successive
weekends at a juvenile correctional institute. 6
Parris appealed, and the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari before the case could be heard in the Court of Special Appeals in
order to determine whether Parris was denied effective assistance of
counsel due to his attorney's failure to subpoena the five alibi wit37
nesses on the correct date.
2.

Legal Background.a.

The Established Standardof Review for Claims of Ineffective As-

sistance of Counsel.-The Supreme Court has long recognized that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists and is necessary to protect
an individual's fundamental right to a fair trial.38 Additionally, "[i]t
has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. The court also addressed the question of whether claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised on direct appeal from a finding ofjuvenile delinquency. Id.
The court affirmatively chose to review the claim, explaining that although it is a general
rule that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised in a post-conviction proceeding, the rule is not absolute. Id. at 726, 770 A.2d at 207.
38. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees an accused the right to the assistance of counsel in all criminal
prosecutions); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (holding that the right to
counsel is a fundamental right and a necessary element of due process).
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effective assistance of counsel."3 9 In Strickland v. Washington,4" the Supreme Court formulated the modern standard to evaluate claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Writing for the majority, Justice
O'Connor stated that the main purpose of the constitutional requirement of effective assistance of counsel is to ensure a fair trial.4 To
further develop this notion, the majority created a two-pronged test
for determining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.4 2 First,
"the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient." " Second, the defendant must demonstrate that the deficient

performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant so as to deprive
him of a fair trial.44 To properly succeed on an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, a petitioner must satisfy both45the "performance portion" and the "prejudice portion" of the test.

To satisfy the performance portion of the test, the Strickland
Court required that the defendant show that counsel's representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, which was to be
measured by evaluating counsel's performance against prevailing professional norms. 46 Additionally, the Court held that judicial scrutiny
of counsel's performance should be highly deferential, noting that a
fair assessment of the performance portion necessitates that "every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to
evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time."4 7 Due
to the intrinsic complexity of this evaluation, the Court stated that the
defendant must overcome the presumption that the attorney's performance was part of a reasonable trial strategy.48 Furthermore, when
39. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
40. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
41. Id. at 686. The Court stressed:
A number of practical considerations are important for the application of the
standards we have outlined-the principles we have stated do not establish
mechanical rules. Although those principles should guide the process of decision, the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding whose result is being challenged.
Id. at 696.
42. Id. at 687.
43. Id.
44. Id
45. Id.
46. Id. at 687-88. The Court stated, "As all the Federal Courts of Appeals have now
held, the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance." Id. at 687.
47. Id. at 689.
48. Id. at 690. The Court instructed lower courts to presume that counsel has "rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment." Id.
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objectively assessing the reasonableness of an attorney's performance,
the reviewing court should recognize that counsel's primary function
is to effectuate the adversarial testing process.4 9
With regard to the required showing of prejudice-the second
prong of the test-the Court relied on Strickland's companion case,
United States v. Cronic,50 to give more specific instructions. 51 The
Court in Cronic explained that there are certain "circumstances that
are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their
effect in a particular case is unjustified." 2 Accordingly, the Cronic
Court recognized three specific situations in which a presumption of
prejudice is appropriate. The foremost example when prejudice is
presumed is when the defendant is completely denied counsel. 51 Second, the Court explained that prejudice occurs if there has been a
constructive denial of counsel. 54 According to the Court, constructive
denial of counsel arises when an attorney "entirely fails to subject the
prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing," thus making
"the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable."'5 Finally, the
Court explained that there are certain instances when counsel's assistance is available to aid the accused during trial, but surrounding circumstances make it so unlikely that any lawyer, even a competent one,
could provide effective assistance, that prejudice should automatically
be presumed without inquiry into actual performance. 56 The Court
identified Powell v. Alabama as an example of when surrounding circumstances make it unlikely that any lawyer could have provided effec57
tive assistance.

Absent these narrow circumstances of presumed prejudice under
Cronic, defendants must show actual prejudice under Strickland. According to the Strickland Court, actual prejudice requires the defen49. Id. Additionally, to be efficient, the attorney cannot fail in his or her "duty to bring
to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process" or the "overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause." Id. at 688.
50. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
51. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (discussing the Strickland Court's explanation of the
holding in Cronic).
52. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658.
53. Id. at 659.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 659-60.
57. Id. at 660. In Powell, the defendants were several African-American men who faced
the death penalty for allegedly raping a white woman. 287 U.S. 45, 49-50 (1932). The
defendants in Powell were not asked "whether they had, or were able to employ, counsel, or
wished to have counsel appointed." Id. at 52. Also, the trial court decided that an out-ofstate lawyer would represent the defendants, but that lawyer was given no opportunity to
prepare nor any time to familiarize himself with local law. Id. at 53-56.
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dant to demonstrate that there is a "reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would

have

been

different.

'5'

The

Court

defined

reasonable

probability as a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
59
outcome."
b. Alibi Witnesses and the Strickland Standard in the Federal
Courts of Appeals. -In Griffin v. Warden, Maryland CorrectionalAdjustment
Center"' the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel
when his attorney failed to contact his witnesses or provide the state
with notice of alibi. 6 In the case, Donald Griffin, the defendant, had
been identified by two security guards as being involved in an armed
robbery that occurred on July 24, 1983 at 3:45 in the afternoon.62
Griffin provided his trial attorney with a list of five alibi witnesses to
63
testify regarding his whereabouts on the afternoon of the robbery.
However, Griffin's counsel failed to contact the witnesses or provide
the State with notice of alibi. 4 Applying the Strickland standard, the
court found that Griffin's attorney's performance was clearly deficient
and concluded that there was no reasonable excuse for failing to notify the state of his client's alibi and to secure the attendance of alibi
witnesses.65 The court also found that Griffin had been prejudiced by
his counsel's deficient performance.6 6 Specifically, the court rejected
the district court's conclusion that the evidence would not have established an alibi because it did not cover the period of the robbery
based on the full chronology that the witnesses established and the
distance between Griffin's friend's house and the scene of the
67
robbery.
58. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). The Court emphasized that
"[i]t is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect
on the outcome of the proceeding" because this would be too inclusive. Id. at 693.
59. Id. at 694.
60. 970 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1992).
61. Id. at 1358.
62. Id. at 1356.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1358. The court continued: "Indeed, [defense counsel's] statements at the
bench conference are unambiguous admissions of unpardonable neglect." Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1358-59. The court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that
the result of Griffin's trial would have been different. Id. at 1359. The court explained:
"Our confidence in the outcome is very much undermined. Eyewitness identification evidence, uncorroborated by a fingerprint, gun, confession, or coconspirator testimony, is a
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Similarly, in Montgomery v. Petersen,68 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant's counsel
ineffectively assisted his client when he failed to call a disinterested
witness who could have corroborated the defendant's alibi testimony.69 In that case, the defendant, Montgomery, was convicted of a
burglary that was committed in Moultrie County, Illinois."' At trial,
Montgomery's wife testified that she and her husband had spent the
afternoon of the robbery shopping in Springfield, Illinois, and that
her husband was home the rest of the day and evening.7 ' Twelve
other witnesses, all relatives or close friends of Montgomery, also testified to observing him in Springfield on the day of the robbery.7 2 The
defendant's trial counsel failed, however, to call the single disinterested witness, a Sears clerk that remembered selling a child's bicycle
to the Montgomerys, who could have placed him in Springfield on the
day of the burglary.7 3 Employing the two-pronged standard, the court
found that counsel's inadvertent failure to investigate the potential
alibi witness was deficient due to its unreasonableness. 4 Moreover,
the court believed that the attorney's failure to call the single disinterested witness to the stand prejudiced the defendant because there was
a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different if
75
the Sears clerk had testified.
In Grooms v. Solem, 7 6 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
also held that the defendant's trial counsel had been constitutionally
ineffective because he failed to investigate the defendant's alibi or request a continuance for further investigation. 77 The defendant,
Grooms, was convicted of selling stolen Native American artifacts on
the basis of the testimony of a police informant.78 At the time of the
transaction in question, Grooms claimed to have been waiting at a
repair shop while his pickup truck transmission was being repaired.79
thin thread to shackle a man for forty years. Moreover, it is precisely the sort of evidence
that an alibi defense refutes best." Id.
68. 846 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1988).
69. Id. at 411.
70. Id. at 408.
71. Id. at 409. Montgomery's wife's testimony was in direct contradiction to testimony
by Montgomery's alleged coconspirators, who claimed that they had spent the day committing burglaries. Id. at 408-09.
72. Id. at 409.
73. Id. at 409-10.
74. Id. at 414.
75. Id. at 414-16.
76. 923 F.2d 88 (8th Cir. 1991).
77. Id. at 91.
78. Id. at 89.
79. Id.
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The repair shop was fifty miles from the place where the transaction
occurred. 0 Because Grooms's trial counsel did not check with the
repair shop to establish whether anyone recalled repairing his truck
on May 15th, the court found his performance deficient under the
Strickland standard.81 Furthermore, Grooms's ineffective assistance
claim was justified when the court found that the defendant was
prejudiced because the testimony of the two disinterested mechanic
8 2
witnesses could have reasonably changed the outcome of the trial.
In Tosh v. Lockhart, 5 the Eighth Circuit found that the defendant's counsel's failure to call two corroborating alibi witnesses violated the petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.8 4 In that
case, the defendant, Tosh, was convicted of aggravated robbery and
theft of property for two campground robberies that took place at approximately 2:00 a.m. on July 5, 1981.85 At trial, Tosh contended that
he was with his girlfriend during the time of the robberies, and that
he had been confronted by his girlfriend's neighbor, David Nelson, at
approximately 2:00 a.m., which was witnessed by two other individuals.8" Nonetheless, Tosh's trial counsel did not call the two witnesses
of the confrontation to testify.8 7 The court found that Tosh's counsel's performance was deficient because counsel did not make reasonable efforts to produce the corroborating witnesses or ask for a
continuance to ensure their presence.88 Furthermore, the court held
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant because
three of the four disinterested witnesses that could have testified did
not testify, and their testimony could have changed the outcome of
the trial.8

9

80. Id.
81. Id. at 90-91. The court stated that the two employees of the repair shop could have
corroborated Grooms's story by testifying that they had finished the transmission installation at approximately 7:00 or 7:30 p.m. Id.
82. Id. at 91.
83. 879 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1989).
84. Id. at 414.
85. Id. at 413. Following the robberies, two victims identified Tosh as a member of the
group of five to seven robbers. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. Tosh's counsel relied solely on Tosh's girlfriend, Becky Lumpkin, to provide
Tosh's alibi. Id. Only at Tosh's habeas corpus hearing did Nelson corroborate Tosh's story
regarding the fight. He also testified that no one could drive to or from Lumpkin's residence without being heard, and that he had not heard anyone drive in or out during the
time in question. Id. Two other members of the Nelson family also testified at the habeas
corpus hearing in a manner consistent with David Nelson's testimony. Id.
88. Id. at 414-15.
89. Id.
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In Johns v. Perini,
a Sixth Circuit decision, the defendant had
been convicted of selling marijuana in a tavern on November 30, 1964
after 11:00 p.m.9 1 Two of the State's witnesses identified the defendant as the seller of the marijuana.9 2 The defendant claimed that he
was working that night, and that his attorney failed to investigate his
alibi.93 At trial, the prosecutor had no objections to the defendant's
alibi testimony; however, he defiantly resisted any attempt to substantiate the alibi claim with favorable employment records that defense
counsel had readily available. 9 4 Although these records did not indicate which specific days of the week the defendant worked, they did
indicate that he had worked twenty-four hours over three days the
week of the alleged drug sale, and that his work schedule required
him to be at work at 11:00 p.m. on the days that he worked.9 5 The
Sixth Circuit held that counsel's failure to investigate and present the
defendant's alibi deprived him of his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel.9 6

c. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Maryland.--Soon after
the Supreme Court established the standard for ineffective assistance
of counsel, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Haris v. State,9 7 applied and clarified the standard. In Harris,the defendant was imprisoned in the Maryland Penitentiary under a sentence of death. 98 The
Circuit Court for Baltimore County accepted Harris's pleas of guilty to
first-degree murder, two counts of armed robbery, and a handgun violation and consequently found him guilty on all counts.9 9 The guilty
pleas were entered on behalf of Harris because his attorney, Russell,
10 0
determined that the evidence against Harris was overwhelming.
90. 462 F.2d 1308 (6th Cir. 1972).
91. Id. at 1309-10.
92. Id. at 1310.
93. Id. at 1309-10. The defendant claimed that he was at work by 11:00 p.m. Id. at
1310.
94. Id. at 1310.
95. Id. at 1311.
96. Id. at 1313-14. It is important to note that Johns was decided before Stricklands twopronged standard was established. Instead, the court in Johns employed a harmless error
analysis in finding that defense counsel's failure to investigate the claimed alibi was unconstitutional. See id. at 1315.
97. 303 Md. 685, 496 A.2d 1074 (1985).
98. Id. at 690, 496 A.2d at 1076.
99. Id, After a sentencing hearing, the trial judge imposed the death penalty for the
first-degree murder conviction and consecutive sentences of imprisonment totaling twenty
years for the other offenses. Id.
100. Id. at 706-07, 496 A.2d at 1084-85. A participant in the robbery testified after a plea
bargain that it was Harris who had committed the murder. Id. at 703, 496 A.2d at 1083.
Furthermore, the police searched Harris's home and recovered ammunition, which
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On subsequent remands from various appeals, Harris contended that
the trial 'judge erred in finding that he had not been denied the effective assistance of counsel with respect to the convictions and, therefore, the denial of the motion to withdraw his guilty plea was
erroneous."'' Specifically, Harris's allegation of error concerned his
counsel's alleged unreasonable professional conduct in tendering a
plea of guilty to first-degree murder as well as his failure to limit the
plea on the murder charge to felony murder." 2 With regards to Russell's tendering of the plea of guilty, the court found that Harris voluntarily agreed to abide by his attorney's trial strategy, which was
reasonable and therefore not indicative of deficient performance."" 3
Additionally, in examining Russell's failure to limit the plea on the
murder charge to felony murder, the court found that even if Russell
had been successful in restricting Harris's guilty plea to felony murder, the denial of the motion would still be proper and therefore not
prejudicial.'0 4 Thus, after making an independent constitutional appraisal of Harris's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the totality
of the circumstances taken from the trial court's record, the court determined that there was an insufficient showing of ineffective assis0 5

tance of counsel.1

In Bowers v. State,'0 6 the court ruled on another ineffective assistance of counsel case in the context of a first-degree murder. In Bowers, the court held that the defendant, Bowers, was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 0 7 In reaching its
conclusion, the court noted that Bowers consistently asserted that he
had nothing to do with the murder of the victim, and therefore
claimed ineffective assistance based on his counsel's failure to press
his theory of defense in a reasonably competent manner. 0 8 In support of Bowers's contention, the court agreed with the trial court's
matched cartridge casings found at the crime scene. Id. The court noted that "[t]he evidence ... , when adduced by the State at a trial, would be sufficient in law, if believed, to
prove, directly or by rational inference, beyond a reasonable doubt, the corpus delicti of
each of the offenses charged and to establish Harris's criminal agency." Id. at 704, 496
A.2d at 1083.
101. Id. at 692, 496 A.2d at 1077.
102. Id. at 704, 496 A.2d at 1083. Harris made four other allegations of error; however,
they are not relevant to this discussion. Id. at 704, 496 A.2d at 1084.
103. Id. at 710, 496 A.2d at 1086. Russell's advice to plead guilty was proposed to Harris,
and Harris voluntarily and knowingly followed it because of the overwhelming evidence
against him, including his confession to being the triggerman. Id. at 706, 496 A.2d at 1084.
104. Id. at 712, 496 A.2d 1087.
105. Id.
106. 320 Md. 416, 578 A.2d 734 (1990).
107. Id. at 418, 578 A.2d at 735.
108. Id. at 420-21, 578 A.2d at 736.
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holding that his counsel was ineffective when he failed to introduce
evidence that a "Negroid" hair from a person other than Bowers had
been found on the murder victim's head.1 °9 Furthermore, the court
found that Bowers's attorney was also deficient for not examining a
witness who could have testified to the race of Bower's companion,
with whom he allegedly checked into a hotel after the murder.1 1 0 Applying the Strickland standard, the court held that Bowers's counsel's
assistance was not reasonably competent under "prevailing professional norms," and was therefore deficient "1 Additionally, the court
found that Bowers was prejudiced because, had the evidence been admitted, the jury may have sufficiently doubted his involvement in the
murder, and the result of the sentence may have been different.'12
Therefore, the court held that Bowers's counsel's performance was
ineffective because he failed to appropriately introduce key evidence
to the jury, and thus deprived Bowers "of the ability to bolster a poten13
tially viable defense."'
In Oken v. State," 4 the Court of Appeals held that Oken, the defendant, was not denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to investigate his history of drug abuse and inadequately
5
prepared two defense psychiatrists for the sentencing hearing.'1
Oken had committed two murders in Maryland and one murder in

109. Id. at 427, 578 A.2d at 739. The State produced evidence that Peterson, who Bowers insisted was the actual killer of McNamara, had been in prison in another state on the
day of the murder. Id. The court noted:
It was of critical importance to the defense that doubt be cast upon this evidence,
and the presence of the Negroid hair was a way of doing so, for that would have
permitted an argument that the hair did not belong to Bowers, but instead belonged to some other person, and that the other person was Peterson.
Id. at 427-28, 578 A.2d at 739.
110. Id. at 428, 578 A.2d at 740.
111. Id. at 428-29, 578 A.2d at 740 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688
(1984)).
112. Id. at 430-31, 578 A.2d at 741. The court stated:
Had the Negroid hair evidence been presented to the jury, it might well have
believed that Bowers had a companion on the fatal night. Had it believed that
portion of Bowers's statement, it might well have found credible the other portions in which Bowers depicted Peterson as the prime mover of the entire incident and the sole killer of McNamara. Based on those beliefs, it follows naturally
that the jury might well have concluded that Bowers had not possessed the requisite mens rea for premeditated murder. The jury, therefore, might well have
found him to be an accessory to second degree murder ... or perhaps guilty of
second degree murder. At the very least, the jury might well have harbored reasonable doubt as to the premeditated murder charge.
Id. at 430, 578 A.2d at 741.
113. Id. at 430-31, 578 A.2d at 740-41.
114. 343 Md. 256, 681 A.2d 30 (1996).
115. Id. at 286, 290, 681 A.2d at 45, 47.
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Maine.' "1 After he was convicted for the Maine murder, he was returned to Maryland where he was convicted of murder and sentenced
to death.' 17 Oken contended that his counsel should have "investigated and presented additional readily available evidence of substance
abuse" at key points of his trial."1 ' Oken claimed that this evidence
could have mitigated his conviction to second degree murder, making
him ineligible for the death penalty.1 1 9 However, the court ruled that
substantial evidence of substance abuse was already given through the
testimony of Oken's ex-wife, father, mother, acquaintances, and three
medical witnesses, and any additional evidence would have simply
been cumulative. 120 The court also rejected Oken's contention that
his lawyer was ineffective because the lawyer failed to prepare the two
psychiatrists to not make statements that were prejudicial to his
case. 12 ' The court found the lawyer's actions to be reasonable trial
strategy not rising to the level of ineffective assistance under the Strick122
land standard.
d. The Compulsory Process Clause.-In 1967, the Supreme
Court, in Washington v. Texas,1 23 held that a Texas law violated the
Sixth Amendment because it arbitrarily denied the defendant an opportunity to present a defense witness. 124 In Washington, during the
defendant's murder trial, the court refused to allow the defendant to
present the testimony of a certain witness on the ground that participants in the same crime were prevented from testifying for one another by a Texas statute. 12' The Supreme Court reversed the state
court's decision and ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to compul116. Id. at 265, 681 A.2d at 34.
117. Id. at 266-67, 681 A.2d at 34-35.
118. Id. at 285, 681 A.2d at 44.
119. Id. Alternatively, Oken argued that counsel's failure to interview four lay witnesses
and to perform testing of hair samples collected by the Maine police fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. Id.
120. Id. at 287, 681 A.2d at 45.
121. Id. at 290, 681 A.2d at 47. Oken's lawyer's strategy was to "present evidence of a
mental disorder as a mitigating circumstance" through the testimony of two doctors, despite the fact that the diagnosis included a prior murder committed by Oken. Id. at 289,
681 A.2d at 46. Oken's previous lawyer, who was also accused of ineffective assistance of
counsel, explained that a diagnosis of sexual sadism would have reinforced the contention
that Oken was really sick and not dangerous in the future. Id.
122. Id. at 290-91, 681 A.2d at 47.
123. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
124. Id. at 23. Specifically, the Court held that the defendant was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses by Texas statutes providing that principals, accomplices, or accessories involved in the same crime cannot be introduced as witnesses for each other. Id. at 16 n.4.
125. Id. at 15.

20021

COURT OF APPFALS OF MARYLAND

sory process for obtaining witnesses in a defendant's favor was so fundamental to a fair trial that it was applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. 1 26 Specifically, the
Court stated that the defendant's right to compulsory process was violated in this case because he was arbitrarily denied the "right to put on
the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed, and whose testimony.
would have been relevant and material to the defense."'1 27 The
Court's ruling established that the right to offer the testimony
of wit'1 28
nesses is a "fundamental element of due process of law."
More than a decade later, the Supreme Court had a chance to
enhance its definition of "materiality" as it pertained to a defendant's
right to the compulsory process of obtaining defense witnesses. In
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,129 the defendant entered the United
States illegally and drove himself and five other passengers to Los Angeles.'3 ° Eventually Border Patrol agents at a checkpoint caught the
defendant. 1 Two of the other passengers were deported before the
defendant's trial because an Assistant United States Attorney concluded that the two passengers possessed no evidence material to the
prosecution or defense in the defendant's trial for transporting illegal
aliens.13 2 The defendant appealed his subsequent conviction, claiming that the deportation of the two passengers violated his Sixth
Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining favorable witnesses.13 3 The Supreme Court focused on whether the deported witnesses could have provided testimony "material" to the defendant's
defense.13 4 The Court reasoned that the defendant must at least have
a "plausible theory" as to how the testimony of the missing witnesses
would be helpful to the defense. 3 5 In addition, the Court looked to a
succession of cases that dealt with the constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence and explained that "materiality," as it pertains to the
126. See id. at 23 ("The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile
act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony
he had no right to use.").
127. Id.
128. Id. at 19.
129. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
130. Id. at 860.
131. Id. at 861.
132. Id.
133. Id. The defendant "claimed that the deportation had deprived him of the opportunity to interview the two remaining passengers to determine whether they could aid in his
defense." Id.
134. Id. at 872.
135. Id. at 867, 871.

MARYLAND LAV REVIEW

[VorI- 61:798

withheld testimony of witnesses, is determined by whether it may have
affected the outcome of the trial if it had been introduced. 13 6 After
making these distinctions, the Court held that the defendant could
not establish that there had been a violation of his right to compulsory
process without making some plausible explanation of the assistance
he would have received from the testimony of the deported
witnesses. 137
3.

The Court's Reasoning.-In In reParrisW., the Court of Appeals

of Maryland, in determining ineffective assistance of counsel, held
that defendant's counsel's performance was deficient when he failed
to subpoena the five corroborating witnesses for the correct trial date,
and that as a result of the deficient performance, the defendant was
prejudiced.'
In arriving at this conclusion, Judge Raker, writing for
the court, initially established the legitimacy of a defendant's right to
claim ineffective assistance of counsel, even in juvenile delinquency
cases. 139 Next, the court proceeded to dictate the standard of review

that it would apply in its assessment of ineffective assistance claims. 4 0
Drawing from Strickland and its Maryland progeny, the court stated
that a petitioner must affirmatively prove both the "performance portion" and the "prejudice portion" of the established standard to propt41
erly demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.
The court determined that counsel's performance was deficient
under the Strickland standard. 4 Defendant's counsel acknowledged
4
that he alone failed to subpoena the witnesses for the correct date.' 1
The court explained that this mistake did not constitute the exercise
of reasonable professional judgment. 4 4 Also, the court found that
the attorney's failure to subpoena the witnesses on time was not consistent with counsel's primary function of effectuating the adversarial

136. See id. at 867-71.
137. Id. at 872.
138. Pars, 363 Md. at 730, 770 A.2d at 209-10. The court also held that ineffective
assistance claims could be appropriately addressed on direct appeal; however, this is not a
topic of discussion for this Note. Id. at 726-27, 770 A.2d at 207.
139. Id. at 724, 770 A.2d at 206. Judge Raker was joined in full by Judges Eldridge,
Wilner, Cathell, Harrell, Battaglia, and Rodowsky.
140. Id. at 725-26, 770 A.2d at 206-07.
141. Id. at 725, 770 A.2d at 206.
142. Id. at 727, 770 A.2d at 208.
143. Id. In addition, defendant's counsel did not deny receiving the notice rescheduling the hearing that was sent to him by the court. Id.
144. Id.
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process.14 5 Therefore, the court found counsel's performance
146
deficient.
The court then explained that, in addition to establishing deficient performance, the defendant must establish prejudice.' 4 7 In order to prove prejudice, the court required the defendant to show that
there was "a substantial possibility that, but for counsel's error, the
result of his proceeding would have been different."' 4 8 The court had
to determine whether there was a substantial possibility that the five
other witnesses' testimonies, which corroborated a substantial portion
of Mr. W.'s alibi testimony, would have been sufficient, along with the
other evidence, to create a reasonable doubt as to Parris's involvement
149
in the assault.
Ultimately, a unanimous court determined that there was a substantial possibility that had the circuit court heard the testimonies of
the five other subpoenaed witnesses, it might have found a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's involvement.1 5 ° The court reasoned that,
although three of the witnesses could not verify the defendant's
whereabouts in the afternoon when the assault was committed, they
could all have strengthened Mr. W.'s claim that the defendant was
with his father the entire day.15 ' In addition, the court stressed that
Diane Cary's testimony could have significantly changed the disposition of the hearing by demonstrating to the court that it would have
been a physical impossibility for the defendant to have been present
at the crime scene.' 5 2 Furthermore, the court stressed that the necessity of admitting the corroborative evidence was substantially important to elicit reasonable doubt from the trial court as to Parris's
involvement, especially "in a case such as this where the evidence link153
ing [defendant] to the crime was solely the victim's identification."'
Therefore, the majority was convinced that the attorney's failure to
subpoena the five corroborating witnesses for the correct trial date
54
prejudiced the defendant.

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 727-28, 770 A.2d at 208.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 729, 770 A.2d at 209.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 729-30, 770 A.2d at 209. The first two witnesses that the defendant intended
to call were Tracy Robb and Florence Garrett, Mr. W's coworkers, and the third witness was
Mr. W.'s customer. See supra note 18 (detailing the six witnesses that the defendant attempted to call on his behalf on the day of the hearing).
152. Parris,363 Md. at 730, 770 A.2d at 209.
153. Id. at 729, 770 A.2d at 209.
154. Id. at 730, 770 A.2d at 209-10.
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At the end of the decision, the court provided a discussion of
cases that it viewed as similar to the facts in Parris.'5 5 A strikingly similar case, the court noted, is Griffin v. Warden, Maryland CorrectionalAdjustment Center, in which the defendant presented his lawyer with a list
of witnesses to testify regarding his alibi, but his attorney failed to contact every one of those witnesses. 156 The court in Griffin found that
the defendant's attorney's representation was ineffective. 15 The
court in Parris also noted that the defendant's case was similar to
Montgomery v. Petersen, Grooms v. Solem, and Tosh v. Lockhart, where the
respective courts ruled that the defendants' counsels' performances
were ineffective because the attorneys failed to call specific alibi witnesses that were disinterested in the outcome of the trial and could
have furnished appropriate alibi testimonies. 5 ' Finally, the court
concluded by referring to Johns v. Perini, in which the Sixth Circuit
held that the defendant's counsel's failure to investigate and present
his client's alibi, which was substantiated with positive employment
records, amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.'
4. Analysis.-In Parris,the court correctly held that defendant's
counsel was ineffective when it determined that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the
outcome of the trial.' 60 However, the court failed to consider a significant issue that would have been dispositive as well as instructive in
setting a future standard in resolving difficult ineffective assistance of
counsel claims regarding an attorney's failure to subpoena witnesses.
By looking to the Compulsory Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which
insures an accused in all criminal prosecutions the fundamental right
to obtain witnesses in his or her favor, the court could have explained
that not allowing the witnesses to testify on the defendant's behalf
would have gone against the crux of the Strickland analysis, namely
determining the overall fairness allotted to the defendant.
This analysis will first explain that the Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled correctly. The court correctly determined that counsel's
performance was deficient.' 6' The court was also correct not to pre-

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 730-36, 770 A.2d at 210-13.
Id. at 730-31, 770 A.2d at 210.
Id. at 731, 770 A.2d at 210.
Id. at 732-36, 770 A.2d at 210-13.
Id. at 736, 770 A.2d at 213.
Id. at 730, 770 A.2d at 209-10.
Id., 770 A.2d at 209.
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sume prejudice according to the Cronic standard.' 6 2 Additionally, the
court was correct in determining that the defendant was actually
prejudiced under the second prong of the Strickland analysis by weighing the probative value of the witnesses' testimonies when it considered the ultimate focus of the analysis, fairness. The second part of
this analysis explains why the federal circuit court cases that the court
in Parrisreferred to after its holding were irrelevant despite the fact
that the cases aid in the determination of simpler cases of ineffective
assistance. Finally, the second part of this analysis also considers the
pertinence of the Compulsory Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the
case at hand and its ability to help future, difficult cases of ineffective
assistance of counsel as they pertain to an attorney's failure to subpoena witnesses.
a.

The Court of Appeals Ruled Correctly.(1) Determining Deficient Performance Was a No-Brainer.The court correctly ruled that the attorney representing Parris was
deficient in his performance.1 6 3 Counsel's inadvertent forgetfulness
of the correct trial date clearly fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.' 64 Despite the deferential nature of the first prong of
the Strickland test, which presumes reasonable representation, Parris's
counsel's performance did not conform to prevailing professional
norms.

165

Clearly, counsel's concession that the scheduling error was completely his fault cannot be said to have been a form of trial strategy of
any kind. The Court of Appeals has consistently held that a lawyer's
decision to act in a particular way is often considered reasonable trial
strategy, even if that strategy is not successful. For example, in Harris
v. State, the attorney made a conscious choice, to which his client
agreed, to plead guilty to first-degree murder and to throw himself at
the mercy of the court.16 6 This, the court determined, was considered
sound trial strategy, despite the outcome of the trial.' 6 7 Similarly, in
Oken v. State, the court found reasonable an attorney's choice not to
introduce the testimony of two psychiatrists whose testimonies, he believed, could have negatively affected the outcome of the trial.1 68 Par162. See supra notes 50-57
prejudice as explained by the
163. Parris,363 Md. at 727,
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 303 Md. 685, 707, 496
167. Id. at 710, 496 A.2d at
168. 343 Md. 256, 290, 681

and accompanying text (discussing the presumption of
Cronic court).
770 A.2d at 207-08.

A.2d 1074, 1085 (1985).
1086.
A.2d 30, 47 (1996).
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ris, however, is more like Bowers v. State, where the court ruled that the
attorney's unexplained failure to both introduce evidence that hair
other than the defendant's had been found on the murder victim and
examine a key witness did not amount to trial strategy.' 69 In Bowers,
the attorney never explained at the post conviction hearing why he
did not introduce the evidence, so the court could not ascribe the
behavior to trial strategy.' 70 Similarly in In re Paris, counsel openly
admitted to his memory lapse, and therefore his failure to properly
subpoena the witnesses could not be considered a form of trial
strategy. 171
Furthermore, it cannot be said that counsel's failure to subpoena
the witnesses on time, irrespective of the quality of their testimony,
consistently encouraged the adversarial process. 1 72 The court correctly stated that "counsel's single, serious error of failing to subpoena
the witnesses for the correct trial date . . . was not consistent with
counsel's primary function of effectuating the adversarial testing process in this case." 173 This conclusion is consistent with previous Court
of Appeals rulings. For example, in Bowers, the court did not believe
that counsel was effectuating the adversarial process as required by
prevailing professional norms when he failed to press his client's desired defense by not presenting specific evidence. 174 Failing to introduce physical evidence, like a hair linking another person to the scene
of a crime, or testimonial evidence, like the witnesses' testimonies in
Parrisand Bowers, makes the trial process unreliable and hinders the
advocacy of the defendant's cause. Accordingly, the court correctly
ruled that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
1 75
reasonableness when compared with prevailing professional norms.
(2) The Court Was Correct in Staying Off the Cronic Standard.-With regards to the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard,
the court was correct in not presuming prejudice as outlined in
Cronic.17 ' First, Parris was not completely denied counsel; rather, his
counsel represented his interests incompetently.177 Second, the facts
169. Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 427-29, 578 A.2d 734, 73940 (1990).
170. Id. at 428, 578 A.2d at 740.
171. Parris,363 Md. at 721, 770 A.2d at 204.
172. Id. at 727, 770 A.2d at 208.
173. Id.
174. Bowers, 320 Md. at 428-29, 578 A.2d at 73940.
175. Panris, 363 Md. at 727, 770 A.2d at 208.
176. See supra notes 50-57 (discussing the Cronic holding and standard).
177. See Parris,363 Md. at 720-23, 770 A.2d at 203-05 (detailing the legal steps taken by
counsel on behalf of Parris); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984)
(stating that the complete denial of counsel amounts to per se prejudice).
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of the case in Parrisdo not suggest that there was a constructive denial
of counsel whereby counsel's efforts entirely failed to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing in such a way as to
make the adversary process itself unreliable. 7 In fact, counsel seemingly fulfilled all of his representative duties except for one. For example, he contacted potential witnesses, asked for multiple
continuances, cross-examined the State's sole witness, made an opening and a closing statement; the list goes on until his single yet substantial error of failing to subpoena the witnesses for the correct trial
date.1 79 Finally, there was no reason for the court to have believed
that the surrounding circumstances made it so unlikely that any lawyer could have provided effective assistance that the court could presume prejudice without inquiry into the actual performance of
counsel at trial.1 8 ' Not only was there no evidence that Parris's attorney did not have every resource readily available for his client's representation, but he was granted a continuance to extend his preparation
time, thereby proving that the circumstances did not make it unrea81
sonable to expect that counsel could adequately prepare for trial.'
Because the case did not meet any of the three prongs of the Cronic
standard for finding per se prejudice, the court in Parris correctly relied solely on an analysis of counsel's actual performance and did not
1 82
presume prejudice.
(3) Proving Actual Prejudice Was Tough, But the Answers
Rested in the Strickland Text.--Accordingly, the court scrutinized the
facts of the case by strictly adhering to the prejudice analysis as outlined in Strickland and determined that counsel's failure to subpoena
the five corroborating witnesses prejudiced the outcome of the defendant's trial. 8 To show prejudice a defendant must show that there
178. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 648.
179. Parris,363 Md. at 720-23, 770 A.2d at 204-05. This case was not one where the
lawyer literally slept through the State's case or otherwise might as well have been absent
from the proceedings.
180. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60.
181. Parris,363 Md. at 720, 770 A.2d at 204.
182. Additionally, it is important to note that although Parris's counsel failed Stricklands
test of objectively reasonable performance, not every case of deficient performance under
Stricklandrepresents a constructive denial of the right to counsel. In fact, it will be the rare
claim of ineffective assistance that is tantamount to a constructive denial of counsel when
determining the prejudice portion of the standard. Strickland remains the norm for ineffective assistance claims, and the Supreme Court has made clear that it will not tolerate a
per se prejudice exception that will swallow the Strickland rule. See, e.g., Roe v. FloresOrtega, 528 U.S. 470, 478 (2000) (rejecting a per se rule as inconsistent with Strickland's
circumstance-specific reasonableness requirement).
183. Parris,363 Md. at 730, 770 A.2d 209-10.
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was a reasonable probability that but for counsel's error the result of
his proceeding would have been different.' 8 4 In Parris,the question
the court faced was whether the five corroborating witnesses' testimonies, in addition to the other evidence, was substantially sufficient to
create a reasonable doubt as to Parris's involvement in the assault.'" 5
In determining whether the testimonial evidence of the five witnesses would have created a reasonable doubt to the fact finder, had it
been heard, the court had to overcome a huge obstacle: how does one
accurately determine where to draw the line between which testimonial evidence would be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt and
which would not? This question forces a court to use an outcomedeterminative test that assumes the court can ascertain what the result
would have been had effective assistance been provided."8 6 However,
to overcome this obstacle, the court took heed of the Strickland
Court's instructions that in adjudicating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, "the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being
challenged."' 8 7 Hence, the court overcame the outcome-determinative nature of Strickland's prejudice prong by subtly analyzing
prejudice in this case to be inherently dependent upon whether the
proceeding in its entirety was fair to the parties. It is seen in the
court's analysis that Parris's counsel's deficient performance disadvantaged him because it would not have been inherently fair for Parris to
be punished without allowing him to tell his entire story through the
testimonies of his witnesses. 8 This type of inherent unfairness is especially evident in a case such as this one, in which testimonial evidence was the only type of evidence employed by both parties.'8 9
Therefore, the court was correct in concluding that the lack of evidence other than the testimonial evidence procured by both parties
supports the conclusion that there is a reasonable possibility that the
fact finder would have come to a different conclusion had the five
corroborating witnesses testified. 9 °

184. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
185. Parris,363 Md. at 729, 770 A.2d at 209.
186. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that "it is often very
difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted after a trial in which he was ineffectively
represented would have fared better if his lawyer had been competent").
187. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696.
188. Parris,363 Md. at 730-31, 770 A.2d at 209-10.
189. Id. at 729, 770 A.2d at 209 ("This is particularly true in a case such as this where the
evidence linking Appellant to the crime was solely the victim's identification.").
190. Id.
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However, had the withheld testimonial evidence been heard, it
would have simply reiterated large portions of Parris's alibi, which was
already admitted into evidence via Parris's father's testimony. 9 1 That
corroborative testimonial evidence from the five unsubpoenaed witnesses would have been cumulative to the testimony that Mr. W. gave
indicating that Parris was with him on the day of the assault. 9 2 Therefore, the court had to overcome yet another obstacle; namely, how
does one determine when to draw the line in admitting cumulative
testimony when deciding whether that testimony would be sufficient
to create a reasonable doubt? Again, the answer lies within the text of
Strickland: "Most important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we
have stated do not establish mechanical rules."' 9 3
Having been granted this discretionary mandate, the court in Parris accounted for the negative effect the cumulative testimony would
have had on the likelihood of introducing the five witnesses by focusing on the probative value of the withheld testimonies.19 4 Essentially,
the court found the withheld testimony's probative value more than
sufficient to prove that if heard it might have elicited a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the fact-finder.' 9 5 Whether the court's explanations that the witnesses' withheld testimonies were necessary to
strengthen Mr. W's testimony that he was with his son all day, or that
Ms. Cary's possible role in providing proper alibi testimony was compelling enough to show reasonable doubt is difficult to verify. However, the flexible Strickland standard, which could not possibly predict
every case of ineffective assistance of counsel beyond its inception in
1984, allowed this court to properly reach its conclusion by deferring
to the reviewing court's discretion of what is "fair" representation.
b.

Observation and Improvement.-

(1) The Circuit Court Cases.-In adhering to the federal
circuit court cases in its opinion, the court in Parrispointed out interesting variations of ineffective assistance claims, but in doing so did

191. Id. at 728, 770 A.2d at 208.
192. Id.; see also Oken v. State, 343 Md. 256, 287, 681 A.2d 30, 45 (1996) (rejecting
ineffective assistance of counsel claims where evidence would have been merely
cumulative).
193. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984).
194. Parris,363 Md. at 729-30, 770 A.2d at 209-10.
195. Id. The court found that there was a "substantial possibility" that the missing witnesses' testimony would have created reasonable doubt about Parris's involvement in the
assault. Id.
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not support its analysis and holding. 1 96 For instance, in Griffin, the
attorney completely failed to contact all of the defendant's witnesses. 19 7 These witnesses would have given alibi testimony, unheard
by the court through any other witnesses' testimonies.198 Thus, the
court in Griffin ruled that totally withholding all witnesses amounted
to actual prejudice.' 9 9 In Paris,however, the court dealt with a much
more complicated scenario in which counsel's partial failure to contact specific witnesses left the court to determine actual prejudice in
terms of the sufficiency and necessity of the withheld testimonies. Although Parris's counsel failed to subpoena certain witnesses for the
correct trial date, alibi testimony was still heard by the court through
111
Mr. W.'s statements. 2°
This, unlike in Griffin, allowed the defendant
to tell his side of the story to refute his opponent's version of the facts.
Therefore, the court's use of Griffin did not advance its analysis and
holding because the issue was not whether an attorney completely
failed to contact his or her client's witnesses.
Similarly, the court's use of Montgomery, Grooms, and Tosh did not
adequately support its analysis and holding. In all of these federal
circuit court cases, the attorneys failed to call completely disinterested
witnesses.2 °1 In Parris,however, almost every single one of the unsubpoenaed witnesses had some relation to Mr. W. and his son Parris,
thus making their testimony relatively biased.20 2 For example, it is obvious that Jeffrey Taylor and Diane Cary were not disinterested because they were good friends with the Parrises.2z 3 Comparably, both
Tracy Robb and Florence Garrett, Mr. W.'s co-workers, were not disinterested such that a court could conclude that they did not regard the
defendant and his father with some favoritism.20 "
196. See id. at 730-36, 770 A.2d at 210-13 (discussing similarities between Parrisand various circuit court cases).
197. Griffin v. Warden, Md. Corr. Adjustment Ctr., 970 F.2d 1355, 1356 (4th Cir. 1992).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1378.
200. Parris,363 Md. at 722, 770 A.2d at 205.
201. See Montgomery v. Petersen, 846 F.2d 407, 410-11 (7th Cir. 1988) (indicating that
counsel failed to call a Sears clerk that could have substantiated his client's alibi); Grooms
v. Solem, 923 F.2d 88, 90 (8th Cir. 1991) (explaining that counsel did not verify his client's
alibi although he could have contacted two employees of a repair shop who could have
corroborated the alibi); Tosh v. Lockhart, 879 F.2d 412, 413 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that
Tosh's counsel did not call a man that his client argued with during the alleged robbery to
confirm alibi testimony).
202. See Parris,363 Md. at 721, 770 A.2d at 204 (listing the witnesses involved in the case
and their relationship to the defendant).
203. Id. at 730, 770 A.2d at 209.
204. Id. at 729, 770 A.2d at 209.
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The only witness not called that could be considered completely
disinterested, assuming that he was not a regular client, is the Faith
Office Products customer who would have verified that Parris was accompanying his father on his delivery routes.2 °5 However, despite his
or her neutral disposition to the case, that unbiased testimony alone,
if admitted, would not have had any impact on the court's ruling. The
crime was committed at approximately 3:45 p.m., and Parris could
have committed the assault well after accompanying his father on his
delivery route to the unidentified Faith Office customer.20 '
Therefore, the court's suggestion that the Montgomery, Grooms,
and Tosh cases were similar to the case at hand is not convincing support for its decision.20 7 The significant point that they make-that
ineffective assistance of counsel occurs if counsel fails to identify the
single disinterested witness that could offer alibi testimony previously
unheard by the court-does not pertain to Parris.
(2) Consider Compulsory Clause Cases.-In resolving future cases of ineffective assistance that involve an attorney's failure to
subpoena witnesses, the Court of Appeals of Maryland should consider the Compulsory Clause of the Sixth Amendment in analyzing
actual prejudice under the Strickland standard. The Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Clause insures an accused in all criminal prosecutions the fundamental right to obtain witnesses in his or her favor. 21.8
In Parris, the court ruled in a manner consistent with Compulsory
Clause case law, despite the difference in subject matter, when it determined that the defendant's attorney's performance was deficient
and that performance prejudiced the defendant. 2 0 In ruling in such
a manner, the court unintentionally created a supplemental standard
that should be considered in the court's future assessments of ineffective assistance claims that involve counsel's failure to subpoena
witnesses.
When a court is at an impasse and struggling with the difficult
determination of whether improperly subpoenaed testimonial evidence could have changed the outcome of a proceeding had it been

205. Id. at 729-30, 770 A.2d at 209.
206. Id. at 728, 770 A.2d at 208.
207. The court also referred to Johns v. Perini. See Parris,363 Md. at 736, 770 A.2d at 213.
The Perini court ruled on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the Strickland
standard had been adopted. Therefore, analyzing Perini adds nothing to the court's analysis in Parris. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and disposition in Perini).
208. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
209. Parris, 363 Md. at 730, 770 A.2d at 209-10.
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heard, the court should step back and ask itself a simple question: If it
rules against the defendant by finding counsel's assistance to have
been effective, would the court be trampling on the defendant's fundamental right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor? By posing this question and accordingly applying the facts of a
specific case, the court will guard the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights and also insure that the ultimate focus on the ineffective assis2 t
tance inquiry, as stressed in Strickland, will be fundamental fairness. "
Using Parrisas an illustration, it is likely that the Court of Appeals
would affirmatively rule, in retrospect, that it would have been a violation of Parris's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process had it
determined that counsel's performance was not ineffective. According to the Supreme Court in Washington v. Texas, in determining
whether an individual's right to compulsory process was violated, a
court must establish that the defendant was arbitrarily denied the
right to put on "the stand a witness who was physically and mentally
capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed, and
whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense.""1 1 "Materiality," as defined in United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,
necessitates that the defendant at least have a "plausible theory" as to
how the testimony of the missing witnesses would be helpful to the
defense. 2 12 There is no indication that any of the alibi witnesses in
Parriswere not physically and mentally capable of testifying that they
saw Mr. W. and his son the day of the assault. Furthermore, their
testimonies would have been relevant and material to support Parris's
alibi that he was with his father on the day of the assault. Their testimonies would have provided a "plausible theory" and demonstrated
that it would have been a physical impossibility for Parris to have committed the alleged assault given the time sequence described in court
and the distance of the school to Diane Cary's home where he temporarily resided. 213 Therefore, had the court concluded that counsel in
Parrisperformed effectively and not allowed the testimony from the
five alibi witnesses, the court would have trampled on the defendant's
right to compulsory process.

210. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (explaining that the main
purpose of the constitutional requirement of effective assistance of counsel is to ensure a
fair trial).
211. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) (discussing the requirements the
Court looks to when determining whether a defendant's right to compulsory process was
violated).
212. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 871 (1982).
213. See Parris,363 Md. at 730, 770 A.2d at 209.
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5. Conclusion.-In Parris, the Court of Appeals correctly held
that counsel ineffectively assisted the defendant when he failed to subpoena the five corroborating witnesses for the correct trial date.21 4
The court was correct in its analysis of counsel's deficient performance as well as in its determination of prejudice under the Strickland
standard. Despite referring to numerous circuit court cases whose rulings were not completely analogous to the fact pattern in Parris,the
court correctly ruled on the evidentiary facts, weighed their probative
value, and found ineffective assistance. However, the court failed to
consider whether not allowing the defendant's witnesses to testify
would have resulted in an infringement of the defendant's right to
compulsory process as provided by the Sixth Amendment. When evaluating difficult ineffective assistance of counsel cases in which testimonial evidence is at issue, the court should look to the Compulsory
Process Clause and the rulings in Washington and Valenzuela-Bernal to
ensure that the fairness standard in Strickland is upheld.
AMIR EYAL

214. Id. at 730, 770 A.2d at 209-10.

II.
A.

COMMERCIAL LAWr

Wage Garnishment in Maryland: New Burdens are a "Handful"
for Garnishees

In Shanks v. Lowe,' the Court of Appeals held that under Maryland's wage garnishment law a garnishee must aggregate its employee's tips and salary before applying the mandatory exemptions.'
By requiring garnishees to include tips when calculating an employee's total wages, the court changed the longstanding rule that a
garnishee is only responsible to account for the wages in its possession.3 The court made a significant shift away from established wage
garnishment law by moving the focus from an evaluation of the garnishee's liability to an assessment of the debtor's liability.4 Because
the court in the past has declined to uphold garnishments not explicitly authorized by statute,5 such a shift is a departure from precedent.
Furthermore, although the court intended to increase the likelihood
that judgment creditors will be repaid, 6 the decision may increase the
administrative burden for garnishees by complicating the garnishment proceeding. For these reasons, the Shanks court should have
placed the ultimate decision of whether tips should be included in the
total wages calculation in the hands of the General Assembly.
1. The Case.-In 1998, the District Court of Maryland issued a
wage garnishment on the respondent, Kibby's Restaurant and Lounge
(Kibby's), at the request of the petitioner, Laura Shanks. 7 The garnishment order was to recover a judgment of $6000 against Susan
Dolle entered in 1995.8 Susan Dolle worked as a waitress at Kibby's at
the time of the garnishment. 9
1. 364 Md. 538, 774 A.2d 411 (2001).
2. Id. at 548, 774 A.2d at 417.
3. Id. at 543, 548, 774 A.2d at 414, 417; see also Bendix Radio Corp. v. Hoy, 207 Md.
225, 229, 114 A.2d 45, 47 (1955) (laying out the traditional test of the garnishee's liability
as being "that [the garnishee] has funds, property or credits in his hands, the property of
the debtor, for which the debtor would have the right to sue").
4. Shanks, 364 Md. at 554, 774 A.2d at 420 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
5. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Hooper, 312 Md. 378, 392-93, 539 A.2d 1130, 113738 (1988) (holding that attachments cannot reach allowances such as disability payments
or similar benefits unless there is an authorizing statute).
6. Shanks, 364 Md. at 548, 774 A.2d at 416-17 (stating that "a contrary holding would
present an unjustifiable unfairness to judgment creditors").
7. Id. at 540, 774 A.2d at 412.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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The writ of garnishment instructed the restaurant to withhold
Dolle's "attachable wages" until the judgment was satisfied." The writ
included a method to calculate what parts of Dolle's wages were exempt from garnishment based on section 15-601.1(b) of the Commercial Law Article. 1 The writ exempted "the greater of (1) the product
of $154.50 multiplied by the number of weeks in which 'the wages due
were earned,' or (2) 75% of 'the disposable wages due.'" 12 Disposable
wages are the portion of wages remaining after any deductions required by law are withheld. 3
Kibby's responded to the writ with a hand-written note to the
court stating that Dolle's wages were exempt from garnishment because her weekly disposable income was approximately $35 to $40 and
thus fell within the $154.50 exemption.14 Kibby's requested that the
garnishment action be dismissed. 1 5 Approximately five months later,
Shanks served another wage garnishment on the restaurant.' 6 Kibby's
again responded, stating that Dolle's gross wages averaged only $95
per week and thus it could not garnish her wages.' 7 In response,
Shanks filed a motion to cite Kibby's for contempt.1 8 The district
9
court then issued a show cause order on Kibby's.1
Kibby's moved to suppress the order. 2' The restaurant maintained that it did not hold Dolle's attachable wages because they were
less than the allowable exemption amount. Although Dolle earned
tips, Kibby's argued that Dolle's attachable wages included only her

10. Id.
11. MD. CODE ANN., COM. Lkw II § 15-601.1 (b) (2001); Shanks, 364 Md. at 540 n.1, 774
A.2d at 412 n.i. The court noted that, "for reasons that are not clear," there is a discrepancy between the figure of $154.50 that was included as exempt on the writ and the
amount of $145 included in the statute. The parties, however, agreed that the $154.50
amount was correct for the purposes of this action. Shanks, 364 Md. at 541 n.1, 774 A.2d at
412 n.1.
12. Shanks, 364 Md. at 540, 774 A.2d at 412.
13. Id. at 540-41, 774 A.2d at 412.
14. Id. at 541, 774 A.2d at 412.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id., 774 A.2d at 413.
18. Id.
19. Id. Maryland Rule 2-646(f) provides that the court may order the garnishee to
explain why the garnishee should not be held in contempt, if the garnishee fails to file a
timely answer. Mn. R. 2-646(f). Although Kibby's responded to the second writ, the Court
of Appeals presumed the trial court found Kibby's response inadequate because Kibby's
neither withheld wages nor sent a copy of its answer to the judgment debtor and the judgment creditor. Shanks, 364 Md. at 541 n.2, 774 A.2d at 413 n.2.
20. Shanks, 364 Md. at 541, 774 A.2d at 413.
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hourly wage and not her tips.2 Kibby's further argued that Dolle's
tips were not attachable wages for the purposes of the wage garnishment law.22 The restaurant alleged that, even if tips were considered
attachable wages, it could not withhold the tips because it never had
possession of the tips.23 The district court agreed and suppressed the
garnishment order, holding that Kibby's was "not responsible for the
collection of any tips paid directly to its employee ....

""

On appeal, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County affirmed,
holding that tips did not constitute wages under section 15-601 because the employer did not have control over them.2 5 The Court of
Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to consider whether tips and
salary can be aggregated for the purposes of Maryland wage garnish26
ment law.
2. Legal Backgound.--Garnishmentenables a judgment creditor
to recover a portion of the debtor's wages as a means to enforce the
judgment.2 7 In wage garnishment proceedings, the general rule in
Maryland is that the garnishee is liable for any property or wages in its
possession for which the judgment debtor would have the right to
sue.2 8 A third party, usually the debtor's employer, is ordered by the
court to serve as a garnishee by withholding a portion of its employee's wages for the judgment creditor.29 This allows a judgment
21. Id. In response to receiving a writ of garnishment, the Maryland Rules allow the
garnishee to "assert any defense that the garnishee may have to the garnishment, as well as
any defense that the debtor could assert" in its answer. MD.R. 2-646(e).
22. Shanks, 364 Md. at 541, 774 A.2d at 413.
23. Id. at 542, 774 A.2d at 413.
24. Id. Both the district and circuit courts reasoned that, because tips are neither paid
nor controlled by employers, they do not constitute wages for the purposes of wage garnishment. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 543, 774 A.2d at 414.
27. Bendix Radio Corp. v. Hoy, 207 Md. 225, 229, 114 A.2d 45, 47 (1955).
28. Id.
29. Parkville Fed. Sav. Bank v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 343 Md. 412, 418, 681 A.2d 521,
524 (1996). The court described the procedural process for wage garnishment:
A judgment creditor may obtain a writ of garnishment by filing a request for a
writ with the clerk of the circuit court. The request must include: (1) the caption
of the action in which the judgment was obtained; (2) the amount owed under
the judgment; (3) the name and last known address of the judgment debtor; and
(4) the name and address of the party holding the property (the garnishee).
Upon the filing of the request, the clerk is required to issue a writ. The writ is to
contain all of the information in the request, including the name and address of
the judgment debtor, as well as the name and address of the person requesting
the writ, and the date of issue.
Id. at 418, 681 A.2d at 524 (internal citations omitted).
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creditor to "reach the assets of a judgment debtor in the hands of a
third party, the garnishee."3 °
The Maryland Commercial Law Article authorizes the attachment
proceeding.3" Maryland courts' authority in attachment proceedings
was based on a "special and limited statutory power"3 2 for more than a
century.3 3 For this reason, courts have generally interpreted the wage
garnishment statute narrowly, preferring to defer to the General Assembly when an attachment is not authorized by statute.3 4 Numerous
Maryland courts have addressed the general definition of attachable
wages provided in the statute, even if none specifically considered
whether tips should be deemed wages for the purposes of garnishment. When interpreting the statute, Maryland courts have endeavored to balance the often-conflicting interests of the debtor, the
creditor, and the garnishee.
a. The Development of the Definition of Attachable Wages.-The
Court of Appeals has generally limited wage garnishment to disposable wages, unless a statute authorized otherwise.3 5 While wages are
"all monetary remuneration paid to any employee for his employment," 6 disposable wages are the amount of wages remaining after all
deductions and exemptions required by law are applied.3 7 An attachment serves as a lien against all "disposable wages" due when the at30. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Weatherall, Inc., 267 Md. 378, 384, 298 A.2d 1, 5
(1972).
31. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II §§ 15-601 to -607 (2001); see also Hoffman Chevrolet,
Inc. v. Washington County Nat'l Sav. Bank, 297 Md. 691, 698-99, 467 A.2d 758, 762-63
(1983) (describing the history of Maryland's garnishment law).
32. Fico, Inc. v. Ghingher, 287 Md. 150, 159, 411 A.2d 430, 436 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
33. See Coward v. Dillinger, 56 Md. 59, 61 (1881) (explaining that "attachment proceedings must upon their face show affirmatively, that the requirements of the statute have
been substantially complied with, otherwise the court issuing the attachment would be
acting without jurisdiction, and the judgment thereupon rendered would be void").
34. See Mayor of Baltimore v. Hooper, 312 Md. 378, 380, 539 A.2d 1130, 1131 (1988)
(explaining that the Court of Appeals' "historic pattern" has been to allow attachment only
when the statute expressly authorizes it).
35. See id. at 387, 539 A.2d at 1135 (holding that allowances such as disability payments
or similar benefits cannot be attached in part because there is no authorizing statute); see
also Hoffman Chevrolet, 297 Md. at 697, 467 A.2d at 762 (explaining that a retirement check
sent to the debtor's employer was not subject to garnishment because it did not represent
an obligation the garnishee owed the debtor).
36. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 15-601(c).
37. Id. § 15-601.1 (a); see also In re Fishbein, 245 B.R. 36, 38 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000) (explaining that by "subjecting disposable wages to attachment, C.L. § 15-601.1 (a) clarifies that
the attachment calculation is to be applied only to funds that the debtor actually has in
hand, as opposed to his or her 'gross' wages from which other deductions must be made").
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tachment is served and continues to be so until the judgment is
satisfied."8
In United States v. Williams,39 the court further determined that
federal military retirement pay constituted wages for purposes of enforcing wage garnishment.4" The court found that Maryland law regarded wages as "compensation for services rendered" and that
military retirement pay fell within this definition. 4 The court also explained that wages not actually due on the attachment date are not
subject to attachment because "the employee's right to sue the garnishee has not matured."4 2 Additionally, prior to 1979, the wage garnishment statute provided that only wages due at the time the writ was
served could be attached.4" This resulted in creditors having to issue a
new writ of attachment for each pay period.4 4 The General Assembly
then amended the statute to include all wages that become due at the
date of attachment.

45

This amendment expanded the statute in two ways. First, the
creditor now only has to file one writ of attachment because the attachment includes all wages "which become payable. ' 46 All wages that
come into the garnishee's hands after the writ is served are garnishable until the judgment is satisfied.4 7 Second, by including wages that
"become due" at the date the writ was issued, the garnishee now must
attach the wages in its possession as soon as the writ is issued, even in
instances where a debtor appeals the judgment. 48 By requiring the
garnishee to hold the debtor's assets during the time period the judgment is on appeal, the attachment prevents "the garnishee from prematurely disposing of any of the judgment debtor's assets."'4 9
38. MD. CODE ANN., COM. Lxw II § 15-602(a); see also id. § 15-604 (providing that the
attachment ends if the employee is dismissed or has resigned and is not reinstated within
90 days).
39. 279 Md. 673, 370 A.2d 1134 (1977).
40. Id. at 678, 370 A.2d at 1137.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citations omitted).
43. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw § 15-602(a) (1975); Fico, Inc. v. Ghinger, 287 Md. 150,
161 n.6, 411 A.2d 430, 437 n.6 (1980).
44. MD.CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 15-602(a); see also Cox v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. (In re
Cox), 10 B.R. 268, 270 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981) (discussing the old and new wage garnishment statutory schemes).
45. MD. CODE ANN., CoNI. LAw II § 15-602 (2001).
46. Id. § 15-602(a).
47. Id.; see also Lewis v. State Employee Credit Union (In re Lewis), 116 B.R. 54, 56
(Bankr. D. Md. 1990) (describing how the statutory change allowed for a "continuing
lien").
48. See Fico, 287 Md. at 162 n.6, 411 A.2d at 437 n.6.
49. Id. at 162, 411 A.2d at 437.
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In 1982, the Court of Appeals decided two garnishment cases on
the same day. Both upheld the principle that attachments were
proper only when the garnishment statute expressly authorized garnishment. In Mass Transit Administration v. Household Finance Corp.,j

the Court of Appeals found that an MTA employee's wages were not
subject to garnishment by a federal creditor under the longstanding
policy that public officials were not subject to garnishment proceedings.5 ' Likewise, in Mayor of Baltimore v. Comptroller of the Treasury,52 the
court found that the Comptroller could not attach a City of Baltimore
employee's wages for the same reason: The court explained that the
wage garnishment statute did not provide such "special authorization. '54 Consequently, because "[t]he historic pattern has been one
of exclusion by construction in the absence of clear statutory inclusion," the wage attachment sought by the Comptroller was invalid.55
In response to these decisions, the General Assembly amended
the statute in 1982 to broaden the scope of garnishable wages to include wages paid by the state or a political subdivision.5 6 In Maycr of
Baltimore v. Hooper, a case subsequent to the 1982 amendment, the
court explained how the General Assembly "got the message" from
57
Mass Transit and Mayor of Baltimore v. Comptroller of the Treasury
and

amended the statute to include government entities. 58 The Hooper
court then declined to find that disability payments paid by the city
50. 292 Md. 313, 439 A.2d 1104 (1982).
51. Id. at 318, 439 A.2d at 1107.
52. 292 Md. 293, 439 A.2d 1095 (1982).
53. Id. at 311, 439 A.2d at 1104. The court explained that this policy had been established in 1855 in Baltimore v. Root.
Great public inconvenience would ensue if money could be thus arrested in the
hands of officers, and they be made liable to all the delay, embarrassment and
trouble that would ensue from being stopped in the routine of their business,
compelled to appear in court, employ counsel, and answer interrogatories, as well
as take care that the proceedings are regularly carried on, and bail to return duly
given. If a precedent of this kind were set there seems no reason why the State or
county treasurer, or other fiscal officers of the commonwealth, or of municipal
bodies, may not be subjected to the levying of attachments, which has never been
attempted nor supposed to come within the attachment law. We do not, therefore, think this is such a debt as is contemplated by that law.
Id. at 299, 439 A.2d at 1098 (quoting Baltimore v. Root, 8 Md. 95, 101 (1855)).
54. Id. at 311, 439 A.2d at 1104.
55. Id.
56. MD. CODE ANN., CoNI. LAw II § 15-607 (2001).
57. Mayor of Baltimore v. Hooper, 312 Md. 378, 382, 539 A.2d 1130, 1132 (1988).
58. See id. at 382 nI, 539 A.2d at 1132 n.l. The court cited a letter by counsel for the
House Judiciary Committee explaining that the attachment mechanism did not reach
wages paid by government entities, and that amending the statute "might be the answer."
Id. In this way, the court emphasized how the legislature understood that it was up to it,
not the court, to expand the wage garnishment statute.
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were subject to attachment because the statute did not expressly include disability payments in its definition of wages.5 9
In In re Lewis,6 ° the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland distinguished between payable and earned wages,
finding that attachment occurs when wages are payable to the employee and not at the time the wages are earned. 61 The Lewis court
explained that when the General Assembly amended the statute in
1982 it replaced "actually due" with "payable" and "which become payable. ' 62 The court found "payable" to be a more precise term because
"it describes a particular moment, generally payday; and it focuses not
on whether the wage obligation is owed, but whether there is a right
to immediate payment of the obligation. '63 Similarly, in In re Smoot,64
the bankruptcy court defined wages for the purpose of wage garnishment as an amount the debtor is "entitled" to receive.6 5
In conclusion, Maryland courts have consistently deferred to the
General Assembly as it defined, explained, and clarified the wage garnishment statute. The courts developed a definition of wages for the
purposes of wage garnishment that focused on the moment the employee was paid to determine what amount the employee was entitled
to receive. Any other method was deemed "imprecise" because the
employee's right to payment has not matured.
b. Defining Tips as Wages in Other Contexts.-In Maryland,
whether tips are considered wages depends on the context. For the
purposes of workers' compensation and unemployment insurance,
tips are wages. 66 Maryland courts have explained that the statute includes tips and other payments such as room and board because its
purpose is to protect workers. 67 By including tips as wages, the total
59. Id. at 385-87, 539 A.2d at 1134-35.
60. 116 B.R. 54 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990).
61. Id. at 57; see also Cox v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. (In re Cox), 10 B.R. 268, 270
(Bankr. D. Md. 1981) (explaining that the transfer of wages garnished pursuant to a writ of
garnishment cannot occur until the judgment debtor has earned the wages to be
garnished).
62. In re Lewis, 116 B.R. at 56; see also MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 15-602 (2001).
63. In re Lewis, 116 B.R. at 56.
64. 237 B.R. 875 (Bankr. D. Md. 1999).
65. Id. at 880.
66. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-602(a)(2)(i) (2001).
67. SeeWestinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Callahan, 105 Md. App. 25, 36, 658 A.2d 1112, 1117
(1995) (explaining that tips are wages for the purposes of calculating unemployment benefits); see also Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Pennel, 133 Md. App. 279, 292, 754 A.2d 1120,
1127 (2000) (explaining that the purpose of workers' compensation is to protect the claimant and thus its provisions should be construed liberally to favor the employee).
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benefit entitlement due the injured or unemployed worker is
increased.6
Under the Wage Payment and Collection Act,6 9 however, tips are
not included when calculating the wages due an employee on termination of employment.7 ° Rather, "wage" is defined as "all compensation that is due to an employee for employment."7 1 Wage includes:
"(i) a bonus; (ii) a commission; (iii) a fringe benefit; or (iv) any other
remuneration promised for service."72 In Whiting-Turner Contracting Co.
v. Fitzpatrick,7 3 the Court of Appeals found that an employee was not
entitled to a bonus offered by his employer in return for not resigning
from the job. 74 The Fitzpatrickcourt explained that this list should be
read to include payment "the employee was promised in exchange for
his work."7 5 The court emphasized that bonuses and commissions are
properly included within the definition of wages if the employee negotiated for them as part of a total "compensation package." 7 6 Otherwise, the bonus "is merely a gift, a gratuity, revocable at any time
77
before delivery."
c. Balancing the Interests of the Debtor, Creditor, and the Garnishee.--Maryland courts have attempted to balance the interests of
the garnishee, the judgment debtor, and the judgment creditor in
wage garnishment proceedings. 7' By narrowly defining a garnishee's
68. See Pennel, 133 Md. App. at 292, 754 A.2d at 1127.
69. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-505.
70. See Admiral Mortgage, Inc. v. Cooper, 357 Md. 533, 540, 745 A.2d 1026, 1029
(2000).
71. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-501.
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. 366 Md. 295, 783 A.2d 667 (2001).
74. Id. at 299, 783 A.2d at 669.
75. Id. at 303, 783 A.2d at 671.
76. Id. at 306, 783 A.2d at 673.
77. Id. See generally Emmanuel S. Tipon & Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Validity,
Construction, and Effect of State Laws Requiring Payment of Wages on Discharge of Employee Immediately or Within Specified Period, 18 A.L.R. 5th 577, § 25(a)-(b) (2001) (describing how
courts have reached different conclusions on whether tips are wages due to the terminated
employee from the employer).
78. See generally Anderson v. Anderson, 285 Md 515, 524-25, 404 A.2d 275, 280 (1979).
Explaining that both the Maryland General Assembly and the United States Congress have
limited wage garnishment, the Anderson court noted that one of the purposes when Congress enacted the Consumer Credit Protection Act was to "strike a balance between the
needs of creditors, who favored liberal wage garnishment, and the needs of debtors, whose
financial problems were leading to growing numbers of defaults, non-business bankruptcies and loss of jobs." Id. at 524, 404 A.2d at 280. The court explained that the more
debtor friendly Maryland garnishment law applied because the Consumer Credit Protection Act established that "the statute which protects a greater amount of a debtor's earnings from garnishment will be controlling." Id. at 525, 404 A.2d at 280.
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role in the wage garnishment process to only collect the amount of
wages for which the employee-debtor could sue, Maryland courts have
limited garnishees' liability.7 9 This rule is designed to prevent the garnishee from being liable for more than the amount he owed his employee in salary in the first place.8"
Maryland courts have also limited the garnishee's role in other
ways. The garnishee, for example, is not expected to be a debt collector."' The garnishee is also not responsible to pay the creditor if
other parties establish a superior right to the debtor's wages before
the creditor does.8 2 Furthermore, it is the creditor who carries the
burden of establishing proof of the garnishee's liability.8 3 A garnishee
is also not required to volunteer information to the creditor beyond
admitting or denying that it employs the debtor or that it has possession of the debtor's property.8 4 These restrictions show the court's
desire to limit the garnishee's role to that of a discrete "tool" responsible for no more than that of allowing a creditor to reach the debtor's
5
assets.8
In addition to protecting the interests of the garnishee, Maryland
courts have endeavored to protect the judgment debtor. In 1955, the
Court of Appeals emphasized, in Bendix Radio Corp. v. Hoy, 6 that the
wage garnishment statute should be interpreted in the debtor's
79. Messall v. Suburban Trust Co., 244 Md. 502, 507-08, 224 A.2d 419, 421 (1966). In
Messall, the court stated:
There is nothing in the attachment law of this State to justify the conclusion that
it was designed, by allowing garnishment to be made, to place the garnishee in a
worse position, in reference to the rights and credits attached, than if he had
been sued by the defendant ....
Any other rule would, in many cases, work gross
injustice, and might, moreover, be subject to great abuse.
Id. (quoting Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Franklin Bank, 31 Md. 404, 412-13 (1869)).
80. Id. at 508, 224 A.2d at 422 (citations omitted).
81. Shanks, 364 Md. at 544, 774 A.2d at 414 (stating that a garnishee is "under no
obligation to collect anything from the judgment debtor, or anyone else, in order to satisfy
ajudgment").
82. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Weatherall, Inc., 267 Md. 378, 387, 298 A.2d 1, 7
(1972).
83. Parkville Fed. Sav. Bank v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 343 Md. 412, 422, 681 A.2d 521,
526 (1996). In Parkville, the court held:
A garnishee should not be required to engage in a questionable interpretation of
a particular writ to determine whether the property of a particular judgment
debtor is or is not to be garnished. The face of the writ should clearly and unambiguously identify any and all judgment debtors whose property is to be garnished. To hold otherwise would place an unfair burden on the garnishee.
Id.
84. Flat Iron Mac Assocs. v. Foley, 90 Md. App. 281, 297, 600 A.2d 1156, 1163 (1992).
85. Weatherall, 267 Md. at 384, 298 A.2d at 5.
86. 207 Md. 225, 114 A.2d 45 (1955).
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favor.8 7 The court quoted a 1929 decision stating that the "better and

almost universal rule" is to favor the debtor "in order to advance the
human purpose of preserving" the debtor's means of livelihood.8 8

Twenty years later, in United States v. Williams, the Court of Appeals
emphasized this policy again.8 "
Although Maryland courts and the General Assembly have
worked to protect the debtor, they have also been mindful of the fact
that the judgment creditor has a right to be paid. For this reason, a
garnishee must hold the debtor's property once served with a writ of
garnishment.9" Failure to do so will result in the garnishee being liable to the creditor for the amount released.9 In addition, the General Assembly has amended the wage garnishment statute several
92
times to widen the scope of attachment.
Maryland courts have been willing to tip the balance in favor of
the creditor when the creditor is dependent upon another family
member for support. In Blum v. Blum,9 3 the Court of Appeals held
that wage garnishment exemptions do not apply to court-ordered
spousal or child support.9 4 Although the court declined to consider
whether spousal and child support liens constituted an attachment
under of section 15-601.1 of the Commercial Law Article,9 5 the Blum
court's decision reflects an instance where the court privileged the
creditor's rights (the ex-wife in this case) over the debtor's right to the
exemptions. The Blum court followed the reasoning previously set
forth in United States v. Williams, in which the court stated that the
exemptions did not apply because the "underlying obligation is for

87. Id. at 232, 114 A.2d at 48.
88. Id. (quoting Hickman v. Hanover, 33 F.2d 873, 874 (4th Cir. 1929)).
89. See United States v. Williams, 279 Md. 673, 678, 370 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1977) (holding that "the very purpose of the statutory exemptions is to protect a family from being
deprived of all support by attachment proceedings brought by an outsider").
90. Parkville Fed. Sav. Bank v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 343 Md. 412, 419, 681 A.2d 521,
524 (1996).
91. Hunt Valley Masonry, Inc. v. Fred Maier Block, Inc., 108 Md. App. 100, 105, 671
A.2d 47, 49 (1996).
92. See Fico, Inc. v. Ghinger, 287 Md. 150, 161 n.6, 411 A.2d 430, 437 n.6 (1980) (explaining that the 1979 amendment to the wage garnishment statute expanded attachment
to include wages that have not yet become due but will become due after the attachment
date); Mayor of Baltimore v. Hooper, 312 Md. 378, 382-83, 539 A.2d 1130, 1132-33 (1988)
(explaining the General Assembly's 1982 amendment allowing wages due from a political
subdivision to be garnished).
93. 295 Md. 135, 453 A.2d 824 (1983).
94. Id. at 141-42, 453 A.2d at 828.
95. Id. at 142 n.4, 453 A.2d at 828 n.4.
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intra-familial support and the very purpose of the statutory exemptions is to protect a family from being deprived of all support ....96
In summary, Maryland courts have preferred to defer to the General Assembly when the wage garnishment statute does not explicitly
authorize attachment. Under the general definition of attachable
wages provided in the statute, Maryland courts have primarily focused
on the date of payment to determine the amount of garnishable wages
due. Balancing the often-conflicting interests of the debtor, the creditor, and the garnishee has often led Maryland courts to consider policy goals, such as easing administrative burdens on the garnishee and
protecting debtors' livelihoods.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Shanks v. Lowe, the Court of Appeals held that tips and salary should be aggregated to determine the
mandatory deductions under Maryland's wage garnishment law.9 7
The court, however, included a caveat: Although a garnishee must aggregate tips and salary for the purposes of applying the exemption, a
garnishee is not required to garnish tips that are not in its possession.9" In so doing, the court introduced a new rule that requires
garnishees to include tips when calculating an employee's total wages,
but also reaffirmed the longstanding rule that a garnishee is only required to garnish wages or property in its possession.9 9
Judge Wilner, writing for the majority, 100 began the discussion by
addressing the argument that its decision would result in a garnishee
"paying over to the judgment creditor money that was never in its possession."' ' The court distinguished the garnishee's new responsibility of accounting for tips from its well-established obligation to only
garnish wages in its possession."0 2 The court explained that accounting for tips results only in establishing an aggregate wage against
which the statutory exemptions would be applied." 3 Once the total is
96. United States v. Williams, 279 Md. 673, 678, 370 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1977).
97. Shanks, 364 Md. at 548, 774 A.2d at 417.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Chief Judge Bell and Judges Raker and Harrell joined Judge Wilner in the
decision.
101. Shanks, 364 Md. at 543, 774 A.2d at 414.
102. Id. at 544, 774 A.2d at 414. Specifically, the court stated:
A garnishee is under no obligation to collect anything from the judgment debtor,
or anyone else, in order to satisfy a garnishment; nor is it responsible for turning
over any funds or property of the judgment debtor that it does not have in its
possession. It must report and, subject to allowable exemptions, withhold only
property in, or coming into, its possession during the period covered by the writ.
Id.
103. Id. at 544, 774 A.2d at 414-15.
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calculated, the garnishee's responsibility is to garnish the wages in its
' °4 The garnishee will not be
possession from the employee's10 salary.
5
responsible for garnishing tips.

The effect of this rule is to raise the amount of total wages that
are the basis for the calculation of the exemption.'0 6 Consequently,
because fewer employees will fall below the exemption limit if tips are
included as part of the total wage calculation, the court reasoned that
this increases the likelihood that a judgment creditor will be paid by
the judgment debtor.' 7
The court supported its decision to include tips in its definition
of wages by examining the meaning and treatment of wages and tips
in other statutes. '0 8 The court first noted that section 15-601 (c) of the
Commercial Law Article defines wages as "all monetary remuneration
paid to any employee for his employment" for the purposes of Maryland wage garnishment law.10 9 Finding no legislative history or intent
to either limit or extend this general definition to tips, the court ex-

104. Id., 774 A.2d at 414.
105. Id. The majority declined to consider whether the garnishee should garnish tips in
its possession left on credit cards because the issue was not raised. Id. at 544 n.3, 774 A.2d
at 415 n.3.
106. See id. at 544, 774 A.2d at 414.
107. See id. at 548, 774 A.2d at 416-17. Examining the waitress's situation in this case
makes this point clear. If tips are not included as part of her total wages, Dolle's total
wages do not exceed the exemption limit provided by the statute. Thus, her salary would
not be garnished. If tips are included as part of her total wages, however, she exceeds the
exemption limit; her salary from Kibby's would then be garnished. If the garnishment
calculation exceeds her salary from Kibby's, the restaurant is obligated to garnish only up
to the amount it would have paid out to her and no more. As a result, Shanks, the judgment creditor, collects at least a portion of what she is entitled to receive from Dolle, the
judgment debtor. See id. at 544, 774 A.2d at 414-15.
108. Id. at 545-47, 774 A.2d at 415-16. The court relied heavily on a Colorado opinion
regarding this same issue. Id. at 547-48, 774 A.2d at 416-17 (citing United Guar. Residential Ins. Co. v. Dimmick, 916 P.2d 638 (Colo. 1996) (holding that "tips" constitute earnings
for the purposes of wage garnishment)). The court followed the Colorado court's reasoning closely and seemed particularly persuaded by the Colorado court's policy reasons for
its decision, concurring in its conclusion that "a contrary holding would present an unjustifiable unfairness to judgment creditors." Shanks, 364 Md. at 548, 774 A.2d at 416-17. The
Colorado court explained that "a judgment creditor garnishing the wages of an employee
whose earnings included tips would not be able to collect on a judgment to the same
extent as a judgment creditor of an employee earning the same salary but with no tips."
Dimmick, 916 P.2d at 641.
109. Shanks, 364 Md. at 544, 774 A.2d at 415; MD.CODE ANN., Com. LAW II § 15-601 (c)
(2001).
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and workamined wage and hour laws,1"' unemployment 1insurance
1 1I and income tax laws. 12
ers' compensation laws,
In each instance, the court found that tips were regarded as
wages unless provided otherwise.' 13 The court reasoned that the definition of wages in section 15-601 was broad enough to include tips
because the General Assembly would have made it clear if the scope of
the statute was intended to be limited to periodic payments." 4
Judge Eldridge filed a dissenting opinion, in which Judges Battaglia and Cathell joined.' 15 He argued that the majority's decision was
"unsound and contrary to previous opinions by this Court."" 6 Judge
Eldridge refused to accept the majority's conclusion that its new rule
of including tips within the definition of wages did not conflict with
the longstanding rule that a garnishee is only required to garnish
wages in its possession." 7 Rather, he argued that the method to calculate the garnishment amount rested solely on the amount "which
presently is, or in the future will be, in the hands of the garnishee."' "8
110. Shanks, 364 Md. at 545-46, 774 A.2d at 415. The court examined the portion of the
Maryland Labor and Employment Article that requires employers to pay employees the
minimum wage. Id.; seeMo. CODE ANN., LAB. & E,iPL. § 3-413(1) (2001). Section 3401 (e)
defines "wage" as "all compensation that is due to an employee for employment," a definition, the court found, that is similar to the definition of wages found in the wage garnishment statute. Shanks, 364 Md. at 545, 774 A.2d at 415; see also Mo. CODE ANN., Com. LAW II
§ 15-601(c) (defining wages as "all monetary remuneration paid to any employee for his
employment"). The court then noted that section 3-419 includes tips as wages for the
purposes of federal minimum wage laws. Shanks, 364 Md. at 545, 774 A.2d at 415.
111. Shanks, 364 Md. at 546, 774 A.2d at 415-16. The court explained that section 8101 (w) of the Labor and Employment Article defined wages to include tips for the purposes of calculating unemployment benefits. Id. The court then pointed to section 9602(a) (2) (i) of the Labor and Employment Article, which includes tips as part of the average weekly wage for the purposes of calculating workers' compensation benefits. Id. at 546,
774 A.2d at 416.
112. Id. at 546-47, 774 A.2d at 416. The court noted that tips are included for the purposes of calculating state and federal income tax. Id. at 546, 774 A.2d at 416; see also I.R.C.
§ 61 (2001) (defining gross income to include tips for income tax purposes); id. § 6053(a)
(providing that employees "shall report all such tips in one or more written statements
furnished to his employer on or before the 10th day following such month" for income tax
purposes).
113. Shanks, 364 Md. at 547, 774 A.2d at 416.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 549-54, 774 A.2d at 417-20 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 549, 774 A.2d at 417.
117. Id. at 549-50, 774 A.2d at 417-18.
118. Id. at 551, 774 A.2d at 418. Judge Eldridge maintained:
The majority cites to no Maryland cases, and there are none of which I am aware,
that have upheld a garnishment with regard to property that is not in the hands
of the garnishee and will not come into the hands of the garnishee. Today's
decision is the first to sustain a garnishment involving money or property that is
not, and never will be, in the possession of the garnishee.
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Furthermore, Judge Eldridge disputed the majority's analogy between the wage garnishment statute and several other Maryland statutes, including wage and hour laws, unemployment insurance and
workers' compensation laws, and state and federal income tax laws.'' "
He did not dispute the fact that tips are wages for the purposes of
wage and hours laws; rather, he found the analogy not applicable in
the context of wage garnishment.12 1 Judge Eldridge maintained that
a wage garnishment proceeding is "plainly different" because, unlike
the tax and benefit collection purposes of wage and hour and income
tax laws, wage garnishment is a "tool" that ajudgment creditor can use
to reach the judgment debtor's assets that are possessed by the gar12
nishee, a third party. '

According to Judge Eldridge, garnishment should therefore be
focused on the wages in the garnishee's possession, rather than the
total amount of wages a debtor earns.' 2 2 He asserted that Maryland
courts have repeatedly stated that it is the garnishee's liability to the
23
judgment creditor that is at issue in a garnishment proceeding.'
The courts have done so because the garnishee, not the debtor, is
responsible for the garnishment.

124

Judge Eldridge also disagreed with the majority for policy reasons, stating that the General Assembly created the wage garnishment
Id. at 551, 774 A.2d at 419.
119. Id. at 551-52, 774 A.2d at 419.
120. Id. at 552, 774 A.2d at 419.
121. Id. (quoting, in part, Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Weatherall, Inc., 267 Md. 378,
384, 298 A.2d 1, 5 (1972)). Judge Eldridge also maintained that the fact that the General
Assembly included tips in the statutes cited by the majority undercut the majority's argument. Id. The statutes including tips show that the General Assembly would have included
tips within the definition of wages for the purposes of garnishment if it intended for them
to be included. Id.
122. Id. at 552-53, 774 A.2d at 419. Judge Eldridge found the majority's decision to
consider wages outside of the wages in the garnishee's possession to have "troubling" implications. Id. at 553, 774 A.2d at 419. For example, he argued that "[u]nder the Court's
reasoning, if an individual works two part-time jobs ... neither of which pays a wage rising
above the exemption amount, the wages could be aggregated for the purpose of garnishment." Id.
123. Id. at 549, 774 A.2d at 417.
124. Id. judge Eldridge wrote:
The opinions of this Court have accordingly emphasized the principle that the
creditor merely steps into the shoes of the debtor and can only recover to the
same extent as could the debtor.
In the instant case, the debtor-employee could not maintain an action against the
garnishee-employer for payment of these tips because the employer is not liable
to the employee for cash tips paid directly to the employee by her customers.
Id. at 549-50, 774 A.2d at 417-18.
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proceeding "in favor of the employee."12' 5 He first maintained that
the exemptions in the wage garnishment law itself "embod[y] a compromise to accommodate both the principle that a debtor should not
abandon his or her obligations and the principle that a debtor should
not be deprived of every means of obtaining life's necessities. ' 26 He
then argued that the court in the past followed the principle that statutes creating exemptions do so to protect persons least able to protect
themselves and thus should be given "a liberal and not a technical
construction." 127
Finally, Judge Eldridge argued that the court has historically de28
clined to uphold garnishments not explicitly authorized by statute. 1
Rather than imposing its own "notions of fairness" onto the statute,
Judge Eldridge maintained that the court should refrain from "engag[ing] in judicial legislation" and defer to the General Assembly's
resolution of the issue.'

29

4. Analysis.-In Shanks, the Court of Appeals moved the focus of
wage garnishment law from an evaluation of the garnishee's liability to
an assessment of the debtor's liability by requiring the garnishee to
include tips in its calculation of total wages."' 0 This signals a significant departure from the established wage garnishment law. While this
departure from precedent may be compelling in addressing what appears to be a loophole in wage garnishment law,' 1 ' the court did not
125. Id. at 552, 774 A.2d at 419.
126. Id. (citation omitted).
127. 1d. at 553, 774 A.2d at 420 (quoting Wilmer v. Mann, 121 Md. 239, 248, 88 A. 222,
225 (1913)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 554, 774 A.2d at 420.
130. Shanks, 364 Md. at 548, 774 A.2d at 417.
131. Although courts are mindful of the creditor's interest in repayment, Professor Letsou argues that regulations over the past several decades have restricted the creditor's ability to acquire property from defaulting debtors. Peter V. Letsou, The PoliticalEconomy of
Consumer Credit Regulation, 44 EMORY L.J. 587, 590 (1995). The Federal Trade Commission's Credit Practices Rule, for example, limits consumer borrowers from using contractual devices to ease creditor access to remedies such as wage garnishment if they default.
Id. at 606. Professor Letsou maintains that such restrictions harm consumers who repay
their loans. Id. at 641. These consumers would pay less for credit if creditors had greater
ability to collect from consumers who default on their loans. Id. Further, for example, in
an article in the Daily Record about the ruling, Ronald Abramson, an attorney from Wolpoff
& Abramson ("one of the largest debt collection firms in the state") called the decision
"fantastic." Earl Kelly, Divided Court of Appeals Says Tips Are Wages Under Garnishment Law,
DAILY REC., June 26, 2001, at IC. He explained that many employees in the restaurant
industry are young people who "tend to live with a higher margin of debt" and that much
of their income comes from tips. Id. But see In re Smoot, where the bankruptcy court
seemed to suggest that the statute itself addressed such loopholes by noting that the "treatment of wage attachments apart from the general exemptions prevents a debtor from con-
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give due attention to how the new rule might increase a garnishee's
administrative burden by both blurring a well-established, bright-line
rule and complicating the garnishment proceeding. Furthermore,
the court did not address the new rule's potential to open up the garnishee to increased liability for tips that do come into its possession,
such as tips left on credit cards.1" 2 Consequently, the issue of whether
tips count as wages for garnishment purposes should have been left to
the General Assembly, as it is in a better position to evaluate and address the problem, especially because in the past the court has deferred to the Assembly on garnishment matters.'
a. A Departurefrom Precedent.-The Court of Appeals distinguished between a garnishee's duty to calculate an employee's total
wages for the purposes of garnishment and its duty to garnish the actual wages in its possession.1" 4 This distinction allowed the court to
accomplish two things. First, by requiring garnishees to include tips
when calculating an employee's total wages, the court introduced a
new method to obtain a more accurate figure to determine a debtor's
ability to pay off ajudgment. Second, by reaffirming the longstanding
rule that a garnishee is only required to garnish wages in its possession, the court also attempted to protect the garnishee from being
13 5
liable for more than the wages in its actual possession.
In holding that a garnishee is responsible for including tips in the
calculation of total wages, however, the Shanks court changed the nature of the garnishment proceeding itself. Before Shanks, the purpose
of the garnishment proceeding was "to determine whether the gartinually claiming the full amount of wages as exempt upon each garnishment. Such a
practice would effectively defeat a judgment-creditor's ability to realize the benefits of the
wage garnishment [process] and thereby nullify the remedy." 237 B.R. 875, 880 (Bankr. D.
Md. 1999).
132. Shanks, 364 Md. at 544 n.3, 774 A.2d at 415 n.3. The majority noted this issue but
declined to address it as it was not raised in the underlying case. Id.
133. Id. at 554, 774 A.2d at 420 (Eldridge,J., dissenting). Judge Eldridge noted that the
court has "consistently refused to uphold garnishments which were not specifically authorized by statutory provisions and rules." Id. at 553, 774 A.2d at 420.
134. Shanks, 364 Md. at 544, 774 A.2d at 414.
135. Id. at 548, 774 A.2d at 417; cf Catholic Univ. of Am. v. Bragunier Masonry Contractors, Inc., 139 Md. App. 277, 294, 775 A.2d 458, 468 (2001). In Bragunier,the court stated:
For this reason, in a garnishment proceeding, the rights of the plaintiff/judgment creditor against the defendant/garnishee, cannot rise above the rights of
the judgment debtor:
The liability of the garnishee to the attaching creditor in respect of property
or credits in his hands is determined ordinarily by what his accountability to
the debtor would be if the debtor were in fact suing him.
Id. (quoting, in part, Messall v. Suburban Trust Co., 244 Md. 502, 506, 224 A.2d 419, 421
(1966)).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 61:824

nishee has any funds, property or credits which belong to the judgment debtor."'3 16 Described as a "tool," the purpose of wage
garnishment was clear: It allowed a judgment creditor to reach a
debtor's assets that were "in the hands of a third party, the garnishee."1 -7 As a result of the court's decision in Shanks, the nature of
the proceeding has changed. Instead of simply focusing on the assets
in its possession, a garnishee has an additional responsibility. It must
now include tips as part of a total wages calculation, in effect deter38
mining how much the judgment debtor could potentially owe.1
The court's departure from precedent is puzzling because the
Maryland courts have generally interpreted the wage garnishment
statute narrowly in deference to the General Assembly. 3 ' As the Fico
court explained, "[i]n Maryland, a court's authority in attachment
proceedings is derived from a 'special and limited statutory
power.""") In Mayor of Baltimore v. Hooper, for example, the majority

refused to find that attachments could reach city disability allowances
unless authorized by statute.' 4 ' The Hooper court further noted how
the General Assembly "got the message" from a previous attachment
case and subsequently amended the law when the court refused to
allow the attachment. 14 2 Because the court in the past declined to
authorize an attachment not specifically authorized by the statute, the
Shanks court should also have interpreted the statute narrowly.
In addition, the Shanks court's understanding of wages is markedly different from the interpretation the court has applied to the
term in the past. Maryland courts have emphasized that wages are
limited to the amount the employee is entitled to receive. 43 United
States v. Williams explained that wages not due on the attachment date
136. Fico, Inc. v. Ghingher, 287 Md. 150, 159, 411 A.2d 430, 436 (1980). In his dissent
in Shanks, Judge Eldridge maintained that the "opinions of this Court have accordingly
emphasized the principle that the creditor merely steps into the shoes of the debtor and
can only recover to the same extent as could the debtor." Shanks, 364 Md. at 549, 774 A.2d
at 417 (Eldridge,J., dissenting). He then listed twelve cases following this rule. Id. at 551,
774 A.2d at 418-19.
137. Shanks, 364 Md. at 552, 774 A.2d at 419 (EldridgeJ., dissenting) (quoting Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Veatherall, Inc., 267 Md. 378, 384, 298 A.2d 1, 5 (1972)).
138. Shanks, 364 Md. at 548, 774 A.2d at 417.
139. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 292 Md. 293, 311, 439
A.2d 1095, 1104 (1982) (explaining that "[t]he historic pattern has been one of exclusion
by construction in the absence of clear statutory inclusion").
140. Fico, 287 Md. at 158-59, 411 A.2d at 436 (quoting Belcher v. Gov't Employees' Ins.
Co., 282 Md. 718, 720, 387 A.2d 770, 772 (1978)).
141. Mayor of Baltimore v. Hooper, 312 Md. 378, 387, 539 A.2d 1130, 1135 (1988).
142. Id. at 382, 539 A.2d at 1132.
143. See supna notes 50-59 and accompanying text (reviewing how the Maryland courts
have generally interpreted the wage garnishment statute narrowly).
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were not subject to garnishment because the employee's right to sue
his employer, the garnishee, did not yet mature. 14 4 In In re Lewis, the
bankruptcy court relied on the fact that the General Assembly
amended the statute in 1975 to replace "actually due" with "payable." 14 5 This change, according to the Lewis court, made the definition more "precise" because it described a specific moment in timepayday-rather than whether the obligation was owed. 4 '
By focusing on the amount received by the employee on payday,
Maryland courts limited the definition of wages for the purposes of
garnishment to a "precise" amount that is easy for the garnishee to
determine. The Shanks court, on the other hand, created a situation
involving two levels of wages: the total wage amount determined by
aggregating wages and tips, and the actual amount possessed by the
garnishee. Furthermore, by including tips, the Shanks court included
an amount that the employee is not entitled to receive from the employer. 47 This is contrary to how the Maryland courts have defined
wages in the past. 48
The court in the past also adopted a limited approach to favor
the debtor on public policy grounds, reasoning that construing the
statute narrowly allows more debtors to retain their wages and thus
support their families.' 4 9 Given that the General Assembly chose to
144. 279 Md. 673, 678, 370 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1977). Additionally, the Fico court distinguished between a contingent interest, which could not be attached, and an unmatured
interest, which could be attached. Fico, 287 Md. at 160, 411 A.2d at 436-37. A contingent
interest, the court explained, "is one in which liability is not certain and absolute, but
depends upon some independent event." Id., 411 A.2d at 436. An unmatured interest, on
the other hand, "exists when there is no question about the fact of the garnishee's liability." Id., 411 A.2d at 437. Because tips are neither "certain" nor "absolute" and depend on
the "independent" event of a patron deciding to leave a tip for service, they arguably meet
the Fico court's definition of a contingent, and thus unattachable, interest.
145. 116 B.R. 54, 56 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990).
146. Id.
147. Shanks, 364 Md. at 550, 774 A.2d at 418 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). Customers, not
employers, pay tips. Further, customers generally are not obligated to pay tips.
148. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (explaining how Maryland courts have
emphasized that wages are limited to the amount the employee is entitled to receive).
149. Bendix Radio Corp. v. Hoy, 207 Md. 225, 232, 114 A.2d 45, 48 (1955). In Bendix,
the court explained:
[T]he better and almost universal rule is that such statutes should receive a liberal construction in favor of the debtor in order to advance the human purpose
of preserving to the unfortunate or improvident debtor or his family the means of
obtaining a livelihood and prevent them from becoming a charge on the public.
Id. (quoting Hickman v. Hanover, 33 F.2d 873, 874 (4th Cir. 1929)); see also Williams, 279
Md. at 678, 370 A.2d at 1137 (noting that the "very purpose of the statutory exemptions is
to protect a family from being deprived of all support by attachment proceedings brought
by an outsider"). Indeed, when Congress passed the Consumer Credit Protection Act in
1970, it placed restrictions on wage garnishment proceedings based on the finding that the
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widen the scope of wage garnishment law several times in favor of the
creditor,15 the majority could have rationalized its decision based on
this established trend in public policy, but it failed to do so. The
Shanks court instead relied on an out-of-state decision, 15 ' reasoning
that the creditor's interest in including tips in the total wage calculation should be protected in the interest of fairness.152 Without an imminent need for changing a well-established rule, the Shanks court
should have read Maryland wage attachment law narrowly, especially
because the General Assembly has shown its willingness to amend
wage garnishment provisions in the past.
b. Increasingthe AdministrativeBurden on the Garnishee.-In its
efforts to protect the creditor's interests, the Shanks court may have
ended up complicating the garnishment proceeding in a manner that
unduly burdens garnishees. 15' Given that garnishees are innocent
personal bankruptcy rate was significantly lower in states where wage garnishment was prohibited. See Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of §§ 301-307 of Consumer
Credit ProtectionAct (15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677) PlacingRestrictions on Garnishmentof Individual's
Earnings, 14 A.L.R. FED. 447, 449-50 (1973) (explaining that the House Report for the Act
indicated how Congress perceived a close relationship between stricter state garnishment
laws and personal bankruptcy by noting that, in states with stricter garnishment proceedings, the bankruptcy rate was 200-300 persons per 100,000, while the bankruptcy rate was 59 persons per 100,000 in states where garnishment was prohibited); see also Anderson v.
Anderson, 285 Md. 515, 525, 404 A.2d 275, 281 (1979) (explaining that Maryland wage
garnishment protects the debtor to a greater extent than the Federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act and that "where a state and the federal government have both enacted
provisions which limit garnishment of wages, the statute which protects a greater amount
of a debtor's earnings from garnishment will be controlling").
150. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (explaining the recent legislative action with respect to garnishment that had the effect of widening the scope of garnishable
wages in favor of the judgment creditor).
151. Shanks, 364 Md. at 547-48, 774 A.2d at 416-17 (citing United Guar. Residential Ins.
Co. v. Dimmick, 916 P.2d 638 (Colo. 1996)).
152. Id. Interestingly, the Shanks court noted that the Colorado court crafted its decision to include aggregate tips as part of garnishable wages based on recent changes in the
wage garnishment statute's legislative history. Id. The Shanks court could have done the
same, but failed to do so.
153. See Letsou, supra note 131, at 602-04 (explaining that garnishees are often "hostile"
toward the debtor-employee whose wages it must garnish because of the burdensome nature of the proceeding itself). Professor Letsou notes that the "employer is forced to bear
much of the administrative cost of processing the garnishment orders. These costs can be
substantial, as garnishment orders often require employers to make payroll adjustments on
short notice." Id. at 603-04. According to Professor Letsou, "[t]he average cost to an employer of complying with a garnishment order has been estimated to be approximately
$22." Id. at 604 n.45.
See also Wage Garnishments:How to Reduce the Nightmare, PAYROLL MANAGER'S REP., Nov.
1996, at 5 (providing a good example of how garnishment laws affect garnishees on a
practical level and describing the complex issues garnishees face). The article begins
bluntly: "Most payroll managers would agree: Garnishments are hellish. To make matters
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third parties to the dispute between the creditor and debtor, 154 overburdening the garnishee seems especially unjust as Maryland courts
155
have avoided placing unfair burdens on garnishees in the past.
The court's ruling complicates the garnishment proceeding by
making the garnishee responsible for both calculating the debtor's
total wage and garnishing the wages it actually pays to the debtor.
The garnishee will now have to distinguish for the creditor the
amount of the debtor's tips in its possession, which may be from credit
cards or a tipping pool, from the amount of total tips it was required
to report."6 Unless the garnishee is able to communicate to the creditor that the "total amount" calculated for the purposes of the exemptions is not necessarily the actual garnished amount, a creditor will
rightly expect to receive the stated amount until the garnishee explains otherwise.
Although the majority maintained that this calculation is no different from the calculation the garnishee must provide to state and

worse, the many new laws mean that your usual attention to detail will be stretched to the
maximum as you incorporate them into the existing complexities." Id. The article then
describes "troublesome areas" such as "calculating garnishment limits under the two minimum wage increases; withholding on defaulted student loans; prioritizing student loans
with other garnishments; and handling department of motor vehicle (DMV) garnishments." Id.
154. See 6 AMJUR. 2D Attachment and Garnishment§ 522 (1999) ("A garnishee is regarded
as an innocent person owing money to another having possession of another's property.").
155. Parkville Fed. Sav. Bank v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 343 Md. 412, 422, 681 A.2d 521,
526 (1996). The Parkvilecourt makes it clear that the garnishee's role in interpreting the
writ is limited:
A garnishee should not be required to engage in a questionable interpretation of
a particular writ to determine whether the property of a particular judgment
debtor is or is not to be garnished. The face of the writ should clearly and unambiguously identify any and all judgment debtors whose property is to be garnished. To hold otherwise would place an unfair burden on the garnishee.
Id.
156. See generally THE MARYLAND INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION OF
LAwYERs, INC., ENFORCING LIENS AND COLLECTING JUDGMENTS, at A-12 to A-21 (2000)
(describing the administrative procedures required for wage garnishment). The current
writ of attachment form in Maryland requires the garnishee to report the debtor's wages in
the following manner: "The Defendant (name)
is employed by this
Garnishee, and the rate or basis of pay is
" Id. at A55-56. It is unclear
whether the "rate or basis of pay" amount should reflect the new "total wage" amount now
required by Shanks. Unless the creditor informs the garnishee that tips are to be included
as the "rate or basis of pay," it is highly unlikely that the garnishee will be aware of a duty to
do so as the form now stands. The form should be revised to provide a place for the
garnishee to distinguish for the creditor the total wage amount and the actual amount in
its possession after removing tips. Otherwise, if the "rate or basis of pay" is to reflect the
new total wage amount, the garnishee will then be in the position of explaining to the
creditor why the garnished amount is less than the reported total.
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federal agencies for income tax withholding purposes,' 5 7 calculating
tips may also make a garnishee liable for the tips if the garnishee
makes a mistake in its calculation, even if none of the tips were ever in
the garnishee's possession. 1 58 As the Parkville court explained, a garnishee impounds its employee's assets in a way similar to a banking
institution. 159 If a garnishee makes a mistake, the garnishee could be
liable to either the employee-debtor or the creditor for that mistake
just as a banking institution would be liable.' 60 For this reason, the
Parkvillecourt held that it was up to the creditor, not the garnishee, to
make sure that the information provided on the writ of garnishment
was clearly communicated and correct. 6 '
The Parkvillecourt explained that the need for certainty was "critical given that a writ requires the garnishee to take positive action and
impound assets owned by another party."16' 2 In this way, the court recognized the seriousness of the garnishee's position-the garnishee is,
after all, impounding assets that its employee normally has a right to
receive. 163 By placing the responsibility for certainty in the writ
squarely on the creditor, the Parkville court protected the garnishee by
making the creditor liable for any assets that might be mistakenly garnished.' 6 4 The Shanks decision, on the other hand, places the burden
65
for certainty of the total wages on the garnishee.

157. Shanks, 364 Md. at 546-47, 774 A.2d at 416. In addition to garnishing the debtor's
wages, however, garnishees are also required to file monthly reports to the court showing
the amount withheld and how it was calculated. PAUL V. NEIMEYER & LINDA M. RICHARDS,
MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY 402 (1984).
158. See Hunt Valley Masonry, Inc. v. Fred Maier Block, Inc., 108 Md. App. 100, 107, 671
A.2d 47, 50 (1996) (explaining how the court may enter ajudgment against a garnishee if
the garnishee fails to withhold the debtor's wages "as the law requires").
159. Parkville, 343 Md. at 422-423, 681 A.2d at 526. The court explained:
A banking institution may be held liable for damages if it improperly impounds
assets of parties not covered by a writ. Hence, if a banking institution incorrectly
interprets an ambiguous writ of garnishment and, as a result, impounds assets
owned by a party not actually covered by the writ, the banking institution may be
liable for any resulting damages. At the same time, if the banking institution
erroneously interprets an ambiguous writ of garnishment as not covering a party
that turns out to be covered by the writ, and hence does not impound that party's
assets, the bank could be liable to the judgment creditor.
Id. (citations omitted).
160. Id. at 422, 681 A.2d at 526.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. An employer may be liable for treble damages and attorneys' fees for not paying
wages owed to an employee. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-507.1 (2001).
164. Parkville, 343 Md. at 422-423, 681 A.2d at 526.
165. Shanks, 364 Md. at 548, 774 A.2d at 417.
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Furthermore, requiring garnishees to include tips runs against
the established test of a garnishee's liability-"whether the garnishee
has in his hands funds, property or credits for which the debtor would
himself have a right to sue. 166 Although an employee could sue for
tips unlawfully withheld by his or her employer,' 6 7 the employee generally does not have a right to sue for tips because the customer, not
the employer, is the source of the tips.
By requiring the garnishee to calculate tips as part of the employee's total wages, the Shanks court increased the total amount for
which a garnishee could be liable. If the garnishee makes a mistake in
the calculation, he or she could be liable to either the creditor or the
employee depending upon in whose favor the mistake was made.1 68
Therefore, instead of being liable for the salary it had "in its hands" as
in the past, the garnishee may be liable for that amount plus whatever
tip amount it over- or under-reported on the garnishment. This result
is directly contrary to the longstanding rule in Maryland wage garnishment law that a garnishee would not be put in a "worse position" than
169
if he had been sued directly by his employee.
Finally, the court's ruling also opens up the possibility that the
garnishee's administrative burden will increase because the garnishee
may become responsible for both calculating and garnishing any tips
that come into its possession, such as tips left on credit cards. 7 ' Be166. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Weatherall, Inc., 267 Md. 378, 385, 298 A.2d 1, 6
(1972) (citations omitted).
167. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-507.1.
168. For example, if the garnishee over-reports an employee's tips, the garnishee could
end up being liable to the employee in two ways. First, it could put the employee over the
statutory exemption limit when the employee had a statutory right to have her wages exempted from garnishment. Second, over-reporting tips would increase the total amount
garnished from the employee's wages. The garnishee could then be liable to the employee
for this excess amount, an amount beyond what was owed the employee in salary in the
first place. On the other hand, if the garnishee under-reports an employee's tips, the garnishee could end up being liable to the creditor. An under-reported amount could put an
employee under the exemption limit. This would deprive the creditor from reaching the
portion of the employee's earnings he is entitled to by statute. Granted, the garnishee
should not make mistakes when completing the wage garnishment form. However, including tips as part of the total wages calculation greatly increases the possibility for mistakes.
For this reason, the current wage garnishment form should reflect the garnishee's new
duty.
169. Messall v. Suburban Trust Co., 244 Md. 502, 507, 224 A.2d 419, 421 (1966).
170. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (explaining how the Shanks majority
noted this possibility and declined to address it). Should the court later determine that
tips in the possession of the garnishee are subject to attachment, it then can be said that it
has departed entirely from the traditional rule. Because the amount that can be garnished
is based on the "monetary obligation that the garnishee owes the debtor," including tips
will alter the rule entirely. Hoffman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Washington County Nat'l Sav. Bank,
297 Md. 691, 697, 467 A.2d 758, 761 (1983). Instead of the garnishee being liable for any

846

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 61:824

cause the garnishee will now be calculating the tips for the creditor as
part of the debtor's total wages, it is probable that a diligent creditor
will attempt to garnish all the tips that come into the garnishee's possession as well. Garnishees will then be faced with a double bind: either garnish the tips and risk suit by the debtor, or refuse, risking a
lawsuit by the creditor. As a result, the garnishee, a "neutral party" to
the conflict between the judgment creditor and debtor, 17 1 may now
be exposed to an increased risk of litigation.
5. Conclusion.-Inan effort to promote the interests of the judgment creditor, the Court of Appeals shifted the focus of wage garnishment law from the evaluation of a garnishee's liability to an
assessment of the debtor's liability. The court did not give due attention to how this might increase a garnishee's administrative burden by
both blurring a well-established, bright-line rule and complicating the
garnishment proceeding. The traditional test of the garnishee's liability is whether it held "in his hands, the property of the debtor, for
which the debtor would have the right to sue. "172 By requiring a garnishee to account for tips as part of the total wages calculation, the
ruling in effect makes a garnishee liable for assets that are out of its
hands. The ruling also increases the administrative burden on garnishees. As "the historic pattern" for Maryland courts has been "one
of exclusion by construction in the absence of clear statutory inclusion, ' 73 the Shanks court should have placed the ultimate decision on
this issue in the hands of the General Assembly.
SHANA CAMPBELL JONES

wages in its possession for which the judgment debtor would have the right to sue, the
garnishee would be liable for any wages in its possession period-regardless of whether it
"owed" the amounts to the debtor or not.
171. 6 AM. JuR. 2D Attachment and Garnishment § 473 (1999) (citations omitted).
172. Bendix Radio Corp. v. Hoy, 207 Md. 225, 229, 114 A.2d 45, 47 (1955) (emphasis
added).
173. Mayor of Baltimore v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 292 Md. 293, 311, 439 A.2d
1095, 1103 (1982).

III.

A.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

In the Name of Equality: The ProperExpansion of Maryland's
Heightened Rational Basis Standard

In Frankel v. Board of Regents of the University of Maryland System,'
the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed whether the Board of
Regents's (the Board) student residency policy violated the equal protection rights of Maryland residents.2 The Board's suspect policy
treated financially independent and dependent students differently;
independent students were allowed to use eight domiciliary factors to
prove Maryland residency, while dependent students were forced to
adopt the residency of the individual who provided the majority of
their financial support.' After examining the historical development
of Maryland's equal protection doctrine, the court concluded that this
classification scheme should be reviewed under a rational basis standard.4 Rather than applying the typically "toothless" rational basis
standard, however, the court actually applied a heightened standard
that is normally reserved for limited types of classifications.5 Under
this heightened standard, the court not only found that the policy had
"little relation" to its intended objective, but also that it lacked the
required "fair and substantial relation."6 As a result, the court found
the policy unconstitutional. 7 More importantly, however, the court
expanded the use of the heightened standard by applying it to an economic classification for the first time. Unfortunately, the court did
not place any parameters upon the application of the standard to economic classifications, which may prove problematic in the future. Regardless, the court's application of the heightened standard was
appropriate, and the determination of the policy's unconstitutionality
was proper.

1. 361 Md. 298, 761 A.2d 324 (2000).
2. Id. at 301, 761 A.2d at 325.
3. Id. at 302-03, 761 A.2d at 326.
4. Id. at 315, 761 A.2d at 333.
5. See id.
6. Id. at 317-18, 761 A.2d at 334.
7. Id. at 312, 761 A.2d at 331. The court based its decision solely on its interpretation
of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and did not address whether the policy
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 313 n.3, 761
A.2d at 332 n.3.
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The Case.-

a. Policy Procedureto Determine Residency. -The University System of Maryland consists of eleven institutions, including the University of Maryland, College Park.8 The Board sets forth the institutions'
policies and regulations.9 For the institutions in the system that
charge differently for in-state and out-of-state residents, the Board enacted a policy for determining students' state residency.' ° The University of Maryland, College Park is one such institution with tuition
charge differentials between "in-state" and "out-of-state" students, and
is therefore subject to the policy."
The policy delineates that the source of students' financial support classifies students as being either financially dependent or independent. 2 Once determined financially independent, students have
the opportunity to prove bona fide state residence through the use of
eight traditional domiciliary factors, such as place of residence, voter
or motor vehicle registration, property ownership, driver's license, the
state to which one pays income taxes, and the receipt of public assis3
tance from a state or local government other than one in Maryland.'
14
However, financially dependent students cannot use these factors.
The policy considers the residence of financially dependent students

8. MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 12-101(b)(4) (2001).
9. See id. § 12-102(b) ("The government of the University System of Maryland is vested
in the Board of Regents of the University System of Maryland."); see also Frankel, 361 Md. at
301-02, 761 A.2d at 325-26 (describing the rule-making powers of the Board of Regents).
10. Frankel, 361 Md. at 302, 761 A.2d at 326.
11. Id.
12. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

MARYLAND SYSTEM, POLICY FOR STUDENT
RESIDENCY CLASSIFICATION FOR ADMISSION, TUITION AND CHARGE-DIFFERENTIAL PURPOSES, at

(III) (A)-(B) (1990). The policy states that a financially independent student is not a dependent for tax purposes, receives less than one-half of his or her support "from any other
person or persons," and "demonstrates that he or she provides through self-support onehalf or more of his or her total expenses." Id. at (III) (B). The initial inquiry into a student's residency status is made by the University at the time a student's application for
admission is under consideration. Id. at (II) (A) (1). If the student's circumstances change
or the student is not satisfied with the initial classification, the student can request a reevaluation of his or her residency status. Id. at (II) (B). If after the re-evaluation the student is still dissatisfied, the student may file a written appeal with the Residency Review
Committee. Id. at (II)(B)(2).
13. Frankel,361 Md. at 302, 761 A.2d at 326; see also BOARD OF REGENTS, supra note 12,
at (I) (A)(1)-(8).
14. See BOARD OF REGENTS, supra note 12, at (I) (A). Defined under the policy, a "financially dependent student" is "one who is claimed as a dependent for tax purposes, or who
receives more than one-half of his or her support from a parent, legal guardian, or spouse
during the twelve (12) month period immediately prior to the last published date for registration for the semester or session." Id. at (III) (A).
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as that of the individual or individuals providing the majority of the
1 5
student's financial support.
b. Frankel's Case.-Jeremy Frankel was born and lived in Maryland for fourteen years before moving to Rhode Island when his
parents divorced.' 6 At age seventeen, Frankel returned to Maryland
to attend the University of Maryland, College Park. Frankel's mother
continued to reside in Rhode Island while his father lived in Washington, D.C. During his four years of attendance at the University, Frankel lived year-round in Maryland, registered as a Maryland voter,
possessed a Maryland driver's license, worked part-time, and paid income tax on employment wages to the State of Maryland. Although it
was not clear how much support Frankel received from his parents, he
did, at the very least, receive over one-half of his support from a joint
Maryland bank account, owned by himself and his parents.1 7
During Frankel's first two years of attendance at the University,
he paid the higher out-of-state tuition without challenge. 8 However,
prior to the start of the Fall 1996 semester, Frankel, claiming to be a
financially independent, permanent resident of the State of Maryland,
requested a reclassification of residency status. Frankel's reclassification request was denied. Frankel appealed the decision to the "Residency Classification Office," which classified Frankel as financially
15. Id. at (1)(C). In Frankel,Judge Eldridge also discussed a discrepancy within the
policy between the definitions of "financially dependent" and "financially independent."
Frankel, 361 Md. at 303 n.2, 761 A.2d at 327 n.2. The definition for a financially dependent
student refers to one "who receives more than one-half of his or her support from a parent,
legal guardian, or spouse," id. (quoting BOARD OF REGENTS, supra note 12, at (III) (A)),

whereas a financially independent student is defined as one who receives less than one-half
of his or her financial support "from any otherperson or persons." Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting BOARD OF REGENTS, supra note 12, at (II1) (B)). Yet, Justice Eldridge continued:
Despite the discrepancy, the record discloses that a student who cannot prove
financial independence, as defined in the Policy, will automatically be deemed
financially dependent. Thus, a student who receives one-half or more of his or
her support from any other person or persons, regardless of whether such persons are parents, legal guardians, or a spouse, will be deemed financially dependent and will be deemed to have the residence of such other persons.
Id. Additionally, a well-settled twelve-month durational residency requirement is imposed.
Id. at 303, 761 A.2d at 326-27; see also BOARD OF REGENTS, supra note 12, at (I) (B). For cases
discussing the reasonableness of similar durational residency requirements, see Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973) (stating that a durational residency requirement is valid so
long as it is reasonable); Kirk v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of California,78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 269-70
(Cal. Ct. App. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970) (holding that a one-year residency requirement set by the California Board of Regents was not unconstitutional on its
face or in its application).
16. Frankel, 361 Md. at 304, 761 A.2d at 327.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 305, 761 A.2d at 327.
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dependent and denied him in-state status because of his failure to
demonstrate that he financed at least one-half of his total expenses.
Frankel submitted bank documents, copies of income tax returns, his
driver's license, and his voters registration card to the "Residency Review Committee" in his final appeal disputing his out-of-state residency classification. Regardless of these domiciliary factors, because
he was determined financially dependent upon his parents who lived
out-of-state, Frankel remained classified as a nonresident, and his appeal was denied.' 9
Exhausting his administrative remedies, Frankel and his father
filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County alleging that Frankel was financially independent and was entitled to in-state tuition under the policy, and that
Frankel's due process and equal protection rights were violated because of the policy's nonresidency presumption based on financial dependency.2" The Board filed a motion to dismiss, or in the
alternative, for summary judgment. Frankel filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment.2 1
The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Board, declaring that the "financially dependent" classification was
not "arbitrary and capricious, illegal, or unreasonable."2 2 Further, the
court found that the policy violated neither due process nor Frankel's
right to equal protection because there is a rational basis for treating
financially dependent and independent students differently when determining residency.2" The Frankels appealed the decision, and the
Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment.2 4 Jeremy Frankel then filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, 25 pleading that the policy's distinction of financial
independence violated his right to due process and equal protection
under both Maryland and federal law. 26 The Court of Appeals
granted certiorari to consider whether a classification based upon a

19. Id.
20. Id., 761 A.2d at 328. The complaint named the Board of Regents and the President
of the University of Maryland, College Park as defendants. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 304-05, 761 A.2d at 328.
24. Id. at 306, 761 A.2d at 328.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 310, 761 A.2d at 330.

2002]

COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

student's economic status violated that student's due process and
27
equal protection guarantees under federal and Maryland law.
2. Legal Background.--Despite not expressly conveying an equal
protection principle, it is well-settled in Maryland that Article 24 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights28 embodies the concept of equal
protection. 2 ' Furthermore, Maryland's equal protection analysis is
analogous to that established and developed by the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3" However, Maryland's guarantees are independent and fully capable of a divergent application."
a. The Federal Equal Protection Analysis.-The Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause ensures that no state shall
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."" 2 The Supreme Court has developed three differing approaches for determining whether government action violates the
Equal Protection Clause: strict, intermediate, and rational basis
scrutinies.33
Strict scrutiny, the highest level of scrutiny, is applied to government classifications that allegedly burden a "suspect class," or infringe

27. Id. at 306, 761 A.2d at 328. After the Court of Appeals granted certiorari, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing a lack of standing. Id. The Court of Appeals
deferred action and addressed the motion in their opinion. Id. at 306-10, 761 A.2d at 32830.
28. MD. DECL. OF RTs. art. 24. Article 24 states "[t]hat no man ought to be taken or
imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in
any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of
his peers, or by the Law of the land." Id.
29. See, e.g., Renko v. McLean, 346 Md. 464, 482, 697 A.2d 468, 477 (1997) (stating that
Article 24 supports the concept of equal protection even though it does not expressly state
it).
30. See, e.g., Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 353-54, 601 A.2d 102, 107-08 (1992)
(describing how Article 24, although independent from the federal Equal Protection
Clause, has consistently been applied in the same way as the federal Equal Protection
Clause).
31. See, e.g., Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 417, 635 A.2d 967, 970 (1994)
(stating that the Maryland Court of Appeals has "consistently recognized that the federal
Equal Protection Clause and the Article 24 guarantee of equal protection of the laws are
complementary but independent"); Kirsch v. Prince George's County, 331 Md. 89, 97, 626
A.2d 372, 376, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1011 (1993) (stating that "the two provisions [the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and Article 24] are independent of one another, and a violation of one is not necessarily a violation of the other").
32. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
33. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985)
(describing the well-settled framework for equal protection analysis involving three levels
of scrutiny with increasingly demanding requirements that must be satisfied if a classification is to survive a constitutional challenge).
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upon a "fundamental right."3 These "suspect classes" include race,
alienage, and national origin.3 5 "Fundamental rights" include, among
others, the right to vote, the right to access the courts, the right to
interstate travel, and the right to privacy.3 6 The Court closely scrutinizes these classifications and rights because they are rarely relevant to
achieving a legitimate state interest and typically prejudice an innocent class.3 v Moreover, these classifications are unlikely to be cured
through the legislative process because they are directed at minority
groups who have a history of political powerlessness. 31 "[T] hese
laws ...

will be sustained only if they are narrowly tailored to serve a

compelling state interest.""
An intermediate level of scrutiny has also been developed for
gender and illegitimacy classifications." This intermediate scrutiny
requires that classifications serve "important governmental objectives"
and be "substantially related" to achieving those objectives." These
classifications are given a heightened scrutiny because the Court has
34. Id. at 440 (explaining that race, alienage, and national origin receive the strictest
scrutiny because "[t]hese factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that ...these laws... will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored
to serve a compelling state interest"). In addition to those rights set forth in the Bill of
Rights, the Supreme Court has held that "fundamental rights" include the right to vote,
the right of access to the courts, the right to interstate travel, and the right to privacy. See
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (affirming that the right to
vote is fundamental); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-55 (1996) (recognizing the right to
court access); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969) (holding that the right to
travel or migrate interstate is constitutionally protected). The fundamental right to travel,
however, applies only to domestic travel. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306 (1981). The
Supreme Court has held that international travel is not a fundamental right, and thus laws
burdening such travel will be analyzed under rational basis scrutiny. See id. For additional
examples of "fundamental rights," see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)
(right to use contraceptives); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (right to marry);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (right to control the upbringing of one's own
children); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (right to
refuse medical treatment); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (right to
be free from government interference in choosing to have an abortion in limited
circumstances).
35. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
36. See snpra note 34 (listing and describing established fundamental fights).
37. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (stating that "[t]hese factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy").
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that classifications based on
gender are subject to intermediate scrutiny); see also Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265-76
(1978) (applying an intermediate scrutiny analysis to an illegitimacy claim).
41. Craig,429 U.S. at 197; see also Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1982) (deciding that classifications involving illegitimate children must be "substantially related to a
legitimate state interest").
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found that the basis for these classifications are often beyond a person's control and have no relation to one's ability to "participate in
and contribute to society. "42
Rational basis scrutiny is the lowest level of scrutiny and is
predominantly applied to social and economic classifications.4 3
Under this review, a classification is presumptively valid and remains
so until the challenging party proves the classification is not "rationally related to a legitimate state interest."4 4 Furthermore, the party
attacking such a classification bears the burden
of negating "every
45
conceivable basis which might support it."

In the mid-1980s, however, the Supreme Court developed a more
strenuous rational basis review. 46 For example, in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, the Supreme Court set aside the presumptively
valid rational basis analysis for a more stringent review in order to
invalidate a legislative classification.4 7 At issue was a zoning ordinance
requiring only group homes for the mentally disabled to obtain a special operating permit. Other types of group homes were exempt from
this requirement.4 8 The Court first commented on the rational basis
standard's characteristic presumption of legislative validity and the

42. Mathews v.Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973) (holding that gender characteristics seldom relate to one's ability
to contribute to society).
43. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (finding that the states are given wide latitude in
regulating social and economic matters); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)
(stating that local social and economic legislation is analyzed under the rational basis standard). For examples of other classifications where a rational basis review is applied, see
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (age); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (age); Dandridge v.Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-87 (1970) (wealth);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-196 (1986) (sexual orientation); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996) (sexual orientation).
44. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; see also Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911) (holding that a challenged classification fails only if it is completely
arbitrary).
45. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973) (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940)); see also FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508
U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993).
46. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60-65 (1982) (demonstrating the Court's
application of a stricter rational basis review). For other mid-1980s decisions that demonstrate the Supreme Court's more strenuous application of the rational basis review, see
Hooper v.Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14
(1985); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
47. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
48. Id. at 447. Other group homes that the Court considered to be excluded from the
ordinance included: apartment complexes, boarding and lodging houses, fraternity or sorority houses, dormitories, hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes, private clubs, and fraternal orders. Id.
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enormous latitude typically afforded state legislative classifications.49
The Court then abruptly changed its tone and stated that the protections a rational basis analysis provide include preventing states from
asserting attenuated goals or harming politically unpopular groups.5 °
From this position, the Court explored the ordinance's relation to its
proffered goals and determined that the permit requirement irrationally prejudiced the mentally disabled.5"
Since City of Cleburne, the Supreme Court has clearly returned to
historical form and now consistently applies the traditional and deferential rational basis standard. In FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.,
the Supreme Court applied the rational basis standard in upholding a
cable television regulation.5 2 The Beach Court expressed its intention
to exhibit judicial restraint and grant legislative classifications their
deservedly strong presumption of validity.5 3 Further, the Court remarked that because legislatures are not required to articulate reasons
for enacting legislation, it is irrelevant and unnecessary to explore the
conceivable reasons for enacted classifications. 4 Consequently, today's federal rational basis test provides challenged classifications the
luxury of presumptive validity and the safeguard that any basis may be
used as support.5 5
b.

Maryland's Rational Basis Standard.-

(1) HistoricalDevelopment.--Since 1923, in Havre de Grace
v.
the Court of Appeals of Maryland has applied a slightly
more stringent rational basis review than that applied under the federal equal protection scheme. At issue in Havre de Grace was a city
ordinance prohibiting only nonresidents from operating automobile
Johnson,5 6

49. Id. at 439-40.
50. Id. at 446-47.
51. Id. at 449-50. The Court stated that although the mentally retarded suffer from
disabilities not common to all, the record lacked a rational explanation as to why this
"difference warrants a density regulation that others need not observe." Id. at 450. Further, the alleged aims of avoiding a concentrated population and street congestion failed
to explain why residential facilities such as apartment complexes and fraternity or sorority
houses could freely operate without a special permit. Id.
52. 508 U.S. 307, 317 (1993).
53. Id. at 314-15.
54. Id. at 315.
55. See Cent. State Univ. v. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 526 U.S. 124, 127-28 (1999)
(citing to the rational basis test as applied in Beach Communications and explaining that the
Court has repeatedly held that certain classifications cannot "run afoul" of the Equal Protection Clause if they satisfy the rational basis test).
56. 143 Md. 601, 123 A. 65 (1923).
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transportation-for-hire businesses on certain city streets. 5

7

The court

found an equal protection violation after it applied a rational basis
analysis and considered Havre de Grace's possible interests for enacting the ordinance: preserving order on public highways, protecting
public highways from private interference, and ensuring the public
peace, health, and general welfare.5" The court would not accept that
the differing treatment was reasonably or rationally related to the
city's interests. 5' The court held that the more "probable view would
be that it was intended to confer [a business] monopoly . . .upon

residents of the town," which was clearly an unreasonable discrimination violating Marylanders' equal protection rights.6 ° By investigating
Havre de Grace's possible interests, rather than simply presuming legislative validity, the court made an early demonstration that Maryland
courts would not simply "rubber stamp" legislation, but would actually
examine whether challenged legislation was reasonably related to possible government interests. 6 '
Thirteen years later, in Schneider v. Duer,62 the court again showed
its willingness to investigate government interests, albeit while presuming that the legislation was valid. 63 Schneider filed suit in equity alleging that a state statute imposed an elaborate and expensive scheme of
regulations upon barbering schools and shops that was unequal to
other technical professions.6 4 The regulation established divisions,
grades, and tests for those wishing to enter the trade of barbering, as
well as requiring a number of new physical and manual qualifications.6 5 The court applied its rational basis analysis to the challenged
statute and explained "that it [was its] duty, if possible, to so construe
the law as to effectuate the intention of the Legislature."6 6 The court
explained that an "act of the Legislature which is called in question is
entitled to the benefit of every reasonable presumption in favor of its
validity. If there is any rational theory upon which it can be sustained
57. Id. at 602-03, 123 A. at 65.
58. Id. at 608-09, 123 A. at 67.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 608, 123 A. at 67.
61. See id.
62. 170 Md. 326, 184 A. 914 (1936).
63. Id. at 336, 184 A. at 919.
64. Id. at 331-33, 184 A. at 917. Other technical professions that were not subjected to
the same regulations as the barbering schools included the carpentering, bricklaying, and
painting professions, which required similar technical development and experience in order to engage in the trade. Id. at 332, 184 A. at 917.
65. Id. at 329, 184 A. at 916.
66. Id. at 336, 184 A. at 919 (quoting State v. Tag, 100 Md. 588, 591, 60 A. 465, 466
(1904)).
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consistently with constitutional limitations, it is the duty of the courts
to reach that conclusion. '6 7 Despite the court's express intent to confer deferential treatment to government legislation, it struck down the
contested regulations.6" The court found that the classification's justifications included ensuring public health and safety, but it also found
the regulations "unnecessary and unreasonable in safeguarding public
health or security."6 Again, although the court commented on the
legislative deference afforded under Maryland's rational basis review,
it set aside this notion and invalidated the ordinance.
In Bruce v. Director,Department of Chesapeake Bay Affairs,v" the court

continued to recognize the need to not "shackle the legislature," but
rather provide it with the "widest discretion in classifying those who
are to be regulated and taxed."7 The challenged statute treated Maryland's tidewater and nontidewater county residents engaging in
crabbing and oystering differently by imposing residential requirements and territorial restrictions on the licensing of commercial fishermen.72 The court reviewed the challenged statute under a rational
basis analysis and acknowledged that a legitimate government interest
existed in distinguishing between Maryland's tidewater and nontidewater counties.73 However, the court invalidated the statute because
the respondent failed to provide a rational basis as to how the restrictions would benefit "the safety, health, moral, social or economic welfare," of the state, or further any realistic conservational scheme. 4
Despite finding the statute invalid, the Bruce court articulated an even
stronger preference for presuming legislative validity. 75 The court explained that "[o] nly ifthe [classification] is without any reasonable basis, and so entirely arbitrary, is it forbidden. ' 76 Further, the court
reiterated that a classification of this sort is presumed valid, any reasonably conceived state of facts can sustain validity, and those who
challenge a classification bear the burden of proving its
unreasonableness. 7 7
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
Motor
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. (quoting State v. J.M. Seney Co., 134 Md. 437, 448, 107 A. 189, 193 (1919)).
Id. at 338-39, 184 A. at 920.
Id. at 332, 184 A. at 917.
261 Md. 585, 276 A.2d 200 (1971).
Id. at 601-02, 276 A.2d at 209 (quoting Allied Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Comm'r of
Vehicles, 219 Md. 607, 623, 150 A.2d 421, 431 (1959)).
Id. at 589-90, 276 A.2d at 202-03.
Id. at 606, 276 A.2d at 211.
Id. at 602-03, 276 A.2d at 209.
Id. at 602, 276 A.2d at 209.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Allied, 219 Md. at 623, 150 A.2d at 431).
Id.
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Two years later, in 1973, the court took enormous steps towards
heightening Maryland's rational basis scrutiny in Maryland State Board
of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn.7 8 In Kuhn, the court first required that
legislative classifications be related to their actual objective. 79 This examination of the actual "object of the legislation" was a novel concept
in Maryland because previously the "widest discretion" had been afforded.8" Second, the court held that a challenged classification's validity would not satisfy a rational basis analysis if it simply related to
the actual object of the legislation; rather, the court would now require that relationship to be a substantial one.8" In Kuhn, the appellees challenged a statute that restricted cosmetologists from cutting
men's hair but allowed barbers to cut both men and women's hair.8 2
The appellants argued that the regulation was a constitutionally condoned occupational classification based upon differences in training,
which protected the health, safety, and welfare of male patrons.83 The
appellees argued that the statute prohibited cosmetologists from servicing male patrons as they serviced female patrons.8 4 Applying the
newly formulated heightened rational basis standard, the court found
the appellees' argument convincing and held that the distinction had
neither a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose nor "a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. 8 5
(2) Maryland's Modern-Day Rational Basis Analysis.-Beginning with the Havre de Gracedecision in 1923, the Court of Appeals
began the development of a more heightened rational basis analysis
than had previously been used in Maryland or in the federal courts.
However, it was not until the Kuhn decision in 1973 that the standard
was fully articulated as applied today. Still, Kuhn merely established a
foundation because it left undetermined what types of classifications
would be subject to this new standard. Havre de Grace and Bruce dealt
with geographical classifications, whereas Schneider and Kuhn dealt
with employment classifications. Many other classifications, however,
78. 270 Md. 496, 312 A.2d 216 (1973).
79. Id. at 511, 312 A.2d at 225.
80. See Bruce, 261 Md. at 601-02, 276 A.2d at 209.
81. Kuhn, 270 Md. at 511, 312 A.2d at 225 (holding that "if a statute purporting to have
been enacted to protect the public health, morals, safety and welfare has no real or substantial relation to those objects... it is our duty to so adjudge and thereby give effect to
the Constitution").
82. Id. at 498-99, 312 A.2d at 217-18.
83. Id. at 507-08, 312 A.2d at 222-23.
84. Id. at 503, 312 A.2d at 220.
85. Id. at 509-10, 312 A.2d at 224.
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were still subject to the "toothless" rational basis standard.8 6 Over the
past few decades, the court has addressed this concern and has clarified Maryland's modern-day rational basis analysis.
87
In 1981, the court, in Attorney General of Maryland v. Waldron,
began to clarify its modern-day approach to rational basis review. In
Waldron, the court found that a statute denied retired judges equal
protection of the laws when it prohibited them from accepting their
rightfully earned pension if they chose to engage in the practice of law
for compensation.8 8 The court conducted a lengthy review of United
States Supreme Court and Maryland case law concerning rational basis scrutiny8 9 and found that both federal and Maryland case law warranted an elevated rational basis review of a legislative classification
when "vital personal interests ...

are substantially affected by a statu-

tory classification."9 Further, the court found that, while the employment classifications at issue did not burden any recognized
fundamental right,9" they did impact vital personal interests and thus
warranted a higher degree of scrutiny than mere "toothless" rational
basis review.9 2
Despite employment classifications' elevated scrutiny, the court
made clear that an equal protection analysis of employment classifications fell under the swath of rational basis review.9" In line with the
Kuhn court's employment classification analysis, the Waldron court expressed its intention of inquiring into the actual statutory objective of
the classification rather than being satisfied with any conceivable purpose.94 Under this elevated examination, the court found the statute
86. See, e.g., Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. State, 286 Md. 611, 613, 409 A.2d 250, 251
(1979) (finding Sunday closing laws, a social and economic regulation, imposed against
some businesses and not others not in violation of Maryland's equal protection principles).
87. 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981).
88. Id. at 728, 426 A.2d at 953-54.
89. See id. at 703-15, 426 A.2d at 940-47 (detailing the history of the rational basis scrutiny in the Supreme Court and how the Court of Appeals of Maryland has developed its
equal protection analysis).
90. Id. at 717, 426 A.2d at 948. This heightened rational basis review, in the federal
equal protection scheme, would become what is known today as intermediate scrutiny. See
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985) (stating that the intermediate scrutiny standard requires that applicable classifications be "substantially related
to a sufficiently important governmental interest."); see also Waldron, 289 Md. at 708-12, 426
A.2d at 943-45 (discussing the evolution of the federal equal protection analysis). However, in Maryland, the intermediate scrutiny standard and the heightened rational basis
standard have evolved separately. See Waldron, 289 Md. at 714-22, 426 A.2d at 946-50 (addressing how Maryland courts have and will handle the evolving equal protection analysis).
91. Waldron, 289 Md. at 717, 426 A.2d at 947-48.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 722, 426 A.2d at 950.
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lacking the proper design of a true income maintenance scheme as
was proffered by the appellee, and thus invalidated the suspect section." Although similar to Kuhn, the Waldron court clarified Maryland's modern-day approach by indicating that two rational basis
standards would co-exist. Thus, when vital personal interests were at
stake, a classification that would otherwise be subject to the typical
"toothless" rational basis analysis would receive a more heightened rational basis review.

96

Two years later, in Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education,9 7
the Court of Appeals recognized the Waldron court's articulation of a
more heightened rational basis standard, yet continued to show its
resolve in concurrently maintaining the traditional deferential rational basis analysis.9 8 The action challenged whether state regulations that called for public school financing through taxable wealth
unconstitutionally deprived children living in poorer districts of an
education equal to the education given children from more affluent
areas. 99 The court accepted the appellant's argument that, in Waldron, a heightened rational basis analysis-requiring that a statute
"rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation"-was triggered when a statute
affected a vital personal interest.1 °° However, the court rejected the
appellant's contention that the statute be reviewed under the heightened rational basis scrutiny.10 1 The court explained that the heightened review was not applicable because there had been "no significant
interference" with a person's right to an education. 10 2 Consequently,
the court found that the suspect regulations' primary purpose was "to
establish and maintain a substantial measure of local control over the
local public school system." ' 3 The court held that this state interest
was legitimate and one to which the financing system was reasonably
related. 104

95. Id. at 723, 426 A.2d at 951.
96. See id. at 717, 426 A.2d at 947.
97. 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983).
98. See id. at 641-42, 458 A.2d at 781-82 (explaining both standards of review and when
they are traditionally applied).
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

603, 458 A.2d at
641-42, 458 A.2d
651-53, 458 A.2d
653, 458 A.2d at
654, 458 A.2d at

761-62.
at 781-82.
at 787-88.
788.
788.
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Ten years later, in Kirsch v. Prince George's County,' ° 5 the court ap-

plied the more stringent rational basis review.1" 6 At issue in Kirsch was
whether a county zoning ordinance restricting certain rental properties from college students deprived them of equal protection under
the Maryland Constitution."17 Significantly, the ordinance was framed
as one "regulating the pursuit of occupations," thus justifying application of the more stringent rational basis test.' °8 By applying the
heightened review's "stated purpose" doctrine of Kuhn and Waldron,
the court found the government interest in the ordinance-preventing or controlling detrimental effects upon neighboring properties 1°"l-"wholly unrelated to the stated purpose of the ordinance,"
and in violation of Maryland's equal protection provision."'
In Verzi v. Baltimore County,"' the Court of Appeals invalidated a

Baltimore County ordinance requiring that all tow truck operators
called by the police for the towing of disabled vehicles be from Baltimore County." 2 Applying the elevated rational basis standard-requiring a "fair and substantial relation" to the actual object of the
legislation'' '-the court found the regulation "unrelated to any legitimate government objective."'"' Significantly, the Verzi court followed
Hornbeck and adopted the "fair and substantial relation" standard ap115
plied in Kuhn in combination with the statutory objective inquiry.
Furthermore, the Verzi court, by applying the elevated rational basis
review, reaffirmed its use for geographic classifications." 6
3.

The Courts Reasoning.--In Frankel v. Board of Regents of the Uni-

versity of Maryland System, the Court of Appeals held that a student residency policy based on the financial dependence or independence of
the student in question created an "arbitrary and irrational classification" in violation of Maryland's equal protection principle." 7 In so
holding, the court concluded that a student's residency classification
could not be determined solely by financial dependence or indepen105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

331 Md. 89, 626 A.2d 372, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1011 (1993).
Id. at 104, 626 A.2d at 379-80.
Id. at 91, 626 A.2d at 373.
Id. at 104, 626 A.2d at 379-80.
Id. at 105, 626 A.2d at 380.
Id. at 108, 626 A.2d at 381.
333 Md. 411, 635 A.2d 967 (1994).
Id. at 427, 635 A.2d at 975.
Id. at 425-26, 635 A.2d at 974.
Id. at 427, 635 A.2d at 975.
Id. at 419, 635 A.2d at 971.
Id. at 427, 635 A.2d at 975.
Frankel, 361 Md. at 318, 761 A.2d at 334.
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dence; rather, the University must base its residency determination
upon eight domiciliary factors."'
Writing for the majority, Judge Eldridge addressed the question
of equal protection by first reviewing the arguments presented by
Frankel and the counterarguments presented by the Board." 9 Frankel claimed that the Board's policy requiring the use of different standards to evaluate dependent and independent students' state
residency irrationally classified students in violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
20
Constitution and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.'
The Board argued that financial dependency is relevant when determining residency because the origin of one's financial support may
be indicative of one's ties or allegiance. 1 2 1 Further, the Board argued
that the state has a rational and legitimate interest in residency classification so that only bona fide Maryland residents receive the benefit of
lower tuition rates.' 22 The Board continued, arguing that financial
dependency on out-of-state resources is "far more probative" than are
the other domiciliary factors. 123 Had Frankel achieved financial independence, the Board argued that the policy's presumption of nonresidency would be completely rebutted. 24 Finally, the Board argued
that the policy did not violate equal protection principles because it
"easily passes the minimal test of a rational basis for the distinction
1 25
between a financially independent and dependent student.
Finding for Frankel on state equal protection grounds, the court
decided to simply presume that the policy's classification was subject
118. Id. at 318, 761 A.2d at 334-35.
119. See id. at 310-12, 761 A.2d at 330-31. The court initially addressed the issue of standing when deciding the Board's motion to dismiss. Id. at 306, 761 A.2d at 328. The Board
argued that Frankel's case became moot when he graduated because he abandoned his
refund claim when he amended his complaint and because he was no longer attending the
University. Id. at 306-07, 761 A.2d at 328. The court rejected the Board's argument that "a
wording change" in the amended complaint meant an abandonment of Frankel's refund
claim and found Frankel's claim justiciable. Id. at 306, 761 A.2d at 328-29.
120. Id. at 310, 761 A.2d at 330. Frankel's brief stated:
The Classification Policy's purpose is to limit in-state tuition to bona fide State
residents. Financial dependency-whether it is on out-of-state parents, or an outof-state bank for that matter-sheds no light on a person's choice of permanent
residence. It is arbitrary, therefore, for Respondents to rely on financial dependency as a discriminating factor, let alone the sole discriminating factor in determining a person's residence.
Id. at 311, 761 A.2d at 331.
121. Id. at 311-12, 761 A.2d at 331.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 312, 761 A.2d at 331.
124. Id.
125. Id.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 61:847

to a rational basis analysis. 2 6 The court recognized that even under
this deferential standard, basing residency7 on financial dependence
12
or independence lacked a rational basis.
Applying the'rational basis test, the court analogized this economic classification of bona fide Maryland residents based on the geographical origin of their financial support to a number of other
geographically based regulation cases that were invalidated by the
court. 128 Accordingly, the court applied the same heightened rational

basis review as it had in the analogous cases and required that "a governmental regulation placing a greater burden on some Marylanders
than on others based on geographical factors must 'rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantialrelation to the object of
the regulation."" 2 9 This being the case, the Board contended that
the policy's objective was to ensure that only bona fide Maryland residents received the benefits of a lower tuition rate.' 3 ° Additionally,
because Frankel did not challenge the Board's stated objective, the
court assumed the objective was legitimate.' 3 1
The court, however, explored numerous hypothetical scenarios
illustrating situations in which bona fide Maryland residents would be
forced to pay the higher out-of-state tuition simply because the student's financial support was derived from out of state. 1 2 Consequently, the court found that the policy had "little relation," much less
than that which was necessary to qualify as a fair and substantial relation, to the policy's objective, 133 and that the application of the policy

126. Id. at 315, 761 A.2d at 332.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 315-16, 761 A.2d at 333-34. The court relied on Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333
Md. 411, 635 A.2d 967 (1994) (invalidating a residency requirement regulating emergency
towing services in Baltimore County); Bruce v. Director,Department of Chesapeake Bay Affairs,
261 Md. 585, 276 A.2d 200 (1971) (declaring unconstitutional a residency requirement for
the licensing of commercial fishermen that engage in crabbing and oystering); Dasch v.
Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 183 A. 534 (1936) (striking down geographic classifications of paperhangers); and Havre de Grace v. Johnson, 143 Md. 601, 123 A. 65 (1923) (invalidating a city
regulation prohibiting nonresidents from operating automobiles-for-hire services on certain streets of town).
129. Frankel, 361 Md. at 317, 761 A.2d at 334 (emphasis added) (quoting Vezi, 333 Md.
at 419, 635 A.2d at 971).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 317-18, 761 A.2d at 334 (explaining that a Maryland born-and-raised student, financially supported primarily by one or more parents, grandparents, etc., who live
outside Maryland, would be considered a financially dependent out-of-state resident and
therefore forced to pay the higher out-of-state fees).
133. Id. at 318, 761 A.2d at 334.
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would often lead to inconsistencies in providing tuition benefits for
bona fide Maryland residents.1" 4
4. Analysis.-In Frankel, the Court of Appeals used an elevated
rational basis standard when examining an economic classification. 13 5
Prior to Frankel, such an elevated rational basis scrutiny had been reserved only for classifications involving "vital personal interests," such
as employment classifications 3 6 or the prevention of discrimination
due to geographical location. 3 7 However, the expansion of the elevated rational basis standard in Frankelwas a necessary and appropriate step towards ensuring the equal protection of all Marylanders
under the law.
a. The Policy-A Purely Economic Classification.-The Frankel
decision is significant because it illustrates an expansion of Maryland's
elevated rational basis scrutiny. Although Frankeldeals with what may
appear to be a geographic classification, 3 8 the actual classification
created by the policy is an economic one. Frankel deals with the
Board's unequal treatment of dependent and independent students, a
classification based solely on one's income. 139 It is only after the dependency classification is made that the geographical twist-the orit 40
gin of one's financial support-becomes important.
The policy defines and classifies both "financially dependent"
and "financially independent" students.14 1 Financially dependent students are those declared dependent for tax purposes or those who
receive the majority of their financial support from another. 4 2 Financially independent students, on the other hand, have declared themselves financially independent, do not appear on another's federal or
state income taxes, have received less than half their support from
134. Id. at 317, 761 A.2d at 334.
135. See id.
136. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. of Md. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 717, 426 A.2d 929, 948
(1981) (finding the heightened rational basis review applicable because it considered employment a vital personal interest).
137. Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 427, 635 A.2d 967, 975 (1994) (holding
that where one chooses to reside within Maryland is a vital personal interest, and any classification burdening that choice is subject to a heightened rational basis review).
138. See Frankel, 361 Md. at 316, 761 A.2d at 333 (analogizing this case to prior decisions
that dealt with discrimination based upon geographical factors).
139. Frankel, 361 Md. at 302-03, 761 A.2d at 326; see also BOARD OF REGENTS, supra note
12, at (I).
140. Frankel, 361 Md. at 302-03, 761 A.2d at 326; see also BOARD OF REGENTS, supra note
12, at (I)(A).
141. BOARD OF REGENTS, supra note 12, at (III) (A)-(B).
142. Id. at (III)(A).
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another, and have shown that they personally provide more than half
of their total expenses. 143 Based entirely upon the economic strength
of students, the initial classification as either "financially dependent"
or "financially independent" is the divergent point upon which stu144
dents were then treated unequally.
b. The Frankel Effect. -It seems that the Frankelcourt simply
followed the applicable case law in examining the Board's suspect policy under a heightened rational basis standard. 145 The Frankel court
did apply the applicable case law; however, neither its application nor
its ramifications are simple. The Frankelcourt's holding expands Maryland's previous case law, which limited the heightened rational basis
scrutiny to employment or geographical classifications involving "vital
personal interests," to include economic classifications.

dard.-The

(1) Expanding the 'Fair and Substantial Relation" StanFrankelcourt relied chiefly on Verzi v. Baltimore County for

the rational basis standard it applied to the Board's suspect policy.14 6
However, Frankeldiffers from Verzi, causing a further expansion of the
applicable parameters of the heightened rational basis standard.
In Waldron, the court explored both federal and Maryland case
law and concluded that an elevated rational basis standard was in
use. 147 The Waldron court took it upon itself to express guidelines as
to when this heightened rational basis standard would apply. These
guidelines required the heightened standard's application when a
classification did not rise to the level of affecting a fundamental interest, warranting a strict scrutiny review, but rather when it affected a
"vital personal interest."' 4 s In Waldron this vital interest dealt with a
149
person's personal interest in employment.
Following Waldron, the Verzi court, although not expressing which
vital personal interest invoked the heightened scrutiny, articulated the
143. Id. at (1II)(B).
144. Financially independent students are given the opportunity to prove bona fide Maryland residence based on eight domiciliary factors, whereas financially dependent students are prevented from making a showing of the domiciliary factors and are simply
deemed residents of wherever their primary financier is a resident. Frankel, 361 Md. at 30203, 761 A.2d at 326.
145. See id. at 316, 761 A.2d at 333-34 (citing several prior cases dealing with classifications based upon geographical factors).
146. See id. at 315-17, 761 A.2d at 333-34.
147. Attorney Gen. of Md. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 717, 426 A.2d 929, 948 (1981).
148. Id.
149. See id. at 718-22, 426 A.2d at 948-50 (citing several cases holding that employment
classifications rise to the level of vital personal interests).

20021

COURT OF APPFALS OF MARYLAND

865

same heightened standard-requiring that a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation exist-when it reaffirmed the use
of the heightened standard on geographical classifications. 50 In Frankel, the court's use of the heightened rational basis standard illustrates
a further expansion of this standard's use to areas of economic
classifications. 151
A clear expansion of the heightened rational basis standard in
Frankelis difficult to see because the facts present an economic regulation with a geographic twist. This may be why the Frankel court mistakenly analogized the Frankel case with Verzi, a case with markedly
different facts.152 In Frankel, the court was confronted with a classification based entirely on an individual's financial status. ' 3 Directly following this financial status determination, the individual was classified
into one of two groups, financially dependent and financially independent. 54 In Verzi, the two classes, tow-truck operators within Baltimore County and those outside of Baltimore County, were only
classified by their geographic location. 1 55 Significantly, the classification in Frankel is solely an economic one. The geographical twist is
merely an element for the way in which the individuals are treated
differently and has no actual bearing on determining the classification. Therefore, the Frankel court expanded the use of the heightened rational basis scrutiny to include not only employment and
geographical classifications, but economic ones as well.
(2) Ramifications of the Frankel Expansion.-Prior to
Frankel, the heightened rational basis scrutiny was only applicable
when "vital personal interests" were affected by a statutory classification. 1 56 Further, when the Waldron court first articulated the "vital
personal interest" requirement, it explicitly stated that the standard
was not to be used when vital interests were subject to economic regu-

150. See Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 427, 635 A.2d 967, 975 (1994).
151. Frankel, 361 Md. at 317, 761 A.2d at 334.
152. See id. at 316, 761 A.2d at 333 (comparing the case to Verzi's geographic
classification).
153. See BOARD OF REGENTS, supra note 12, at (Ill) (A)-(B) (describing the classifications
for financially dependent and independent students and how they are based on financial
status).

154. See id. at (I) (A) (explaining the tuition charge differentials based on a student's
residency, which is determined by his or her financial dependence).
155. Verzi, 333 Md. at 414, 635 A.2d at 968.
156. See Attorney Gen. of Md. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 717, 426 A.2d 929, 948 (1981);
see also Verzi, 333 Md. at 419, 635 A.2d at 971 (applying the same test).
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lations 5 7 However, following Frankel, economic classifications are
now included under the heightened rational basis standard's protection, so long as the differing treatment affects a "vital" interest. 5 8
Subsequently, the next logical question, and one that is problematic,
is what is considered a "vital" interest.' 59 This question has been left
unanswered in the case law and, via application, seems as loose and
malleable as many other widely used and amorphous legal doctrines. 160 Thus, as of a result of the Frankel decision, this sparingly
used standard, reserved for past cases involving employment or geographical classifications, may seemingly be invoked against a vast array
of classifications, possibly overshadowing the once dominantly applied
deferential standard.
Although the Frankelcourt cloaked the case under the guise of a
geographic classification, the truth is that the policy's classification
was a purely economic one, against which the court applied the
heightened rational basis standard.1 6 ' What makes this scenario problematic is that the application of the heightened rational basis standard to economic classifications was explicitly forbidden in
62

Waldron.1
In Waldron, the court adopted the federal position that, in regard
to economic classifications, the courts should defer to legislative determinations.'63 So long as fundamental rights or suspect classes are
not involved, the courts should not function as a "superlegislature,"
judging the decisions and determinations of legislative policy
choices.' 6 4 Allowing the expansion of the heightened scrutiny stan157. See Waldron, 289 Md. at 717, 426 A.2d at 948 (stating that "where vital personal
interests (other than those impacted by wholly economic regulations) are substantially affected by a statutory classification, courts should not [merely grant deference to the
legislature]").
158. See Frankel, 361 Md. at 315-17, 761 A.2d at 333-34 (citing to Waldron and applying
the same "vital personal interest" heightened rational basis scrutiny test to the challenged
classification).
159. "Vital" was a term referred to in Waldron, yet it was left without a clear definition.
Waldron, 289 Md. at 717, 426 A.2d at 948. Waldron's use of the heightened standard implies that employment classifications are "vital," id., as does the heightened standard's use
in Verzi imply that choice of residence (i.e., geographical classifications) is "vital." Verzi, 333
Md. at 427, 635 A.2d at 975.
160. Neither Waldron nor any of the relevant subsequent cases address what constitutes a
"vital" personal interest. Rather, this language has become a doctrinal test similar to those
applied in other areas of law-e.g., a "compelling" state interest or "reasonable foreseeability." Consequently, consistent application of this standard may, to a great degree, be determined by less legitimate variables as opposed to the letter of the law.
161. Frankel, 361 Md. at 316-17, 761 A.2d at 333-34.
162. See Waldron, 289 Md. at 717, 426 A.2d at 948.
163. Id.
164. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
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dard to economic classifications creates just the sort of situation the
Waldron court feared by giving the courts the ability to second guess
the broad expanse of legislative powers, including taxing and
1 65
spending.
Furthermore, the Frankel decision is problematic in that it applies
the heightened rational basis scrutiny reserved for cases involving "vital personal interests," but never articulates what the vital personal interests at issue were. Although not explicitly required by the Waldron
decision, 1 66 nor even articulated in Verzi,' 6 7 an accounting of the vital
personal interests at stake would be helpful in forming parameters for
future cases. More importantly, a definition of vital personal interests
would give guidance to the legislature as to what types of economic
classifications could be subject to heightened rational basis scrutiny.
Without such an articulation, the Frankel opinion leaves future courts
an opportunity to construe or abuse the invisible parameters of a
proper application of the heightened rational basis scrutiny.
c. Frankel Ensures the Equal Protection of Marylanders.-Regardless of the problems the Frankel decision may present in the future, the court properly applied the more stringent rational basis
standard and correctly found the policy in violation of Maryland's
equal protection principles.1 6 Clearly, the policy imposed an unequal standard upon financially dependent students 6 9 who, in a number of cases, would be bona fide Maryland residents. v° Therefore,
because the classification did not fairly or substantially meet the purpose of the suspect policy, the Frankel court appropriately applied the
heightened rational basis scrutiny.' 7 ' The application was appropriate despite the exemption expressed in Waldron, which forebade the
use of the heightened standard for economic classifications, because
the Waldron exemption is so inflexible that it strips the courts of their
duty to review cases.' 7 2 Furthermore, although the court did not

165. See Waldron, 289 Md. at 717, 426 A.2d at 948.
166. Id.
167. SeeVerzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 419, 423, 635 A.2d 967, 971, 973 (1994)
(applying the same standard as applied in Waldron, but not referencing any vital personal
interests at stake).
168. Frankel, 361 Md. at 318, 761 A.2d at 334.
169. See BOARD OF REGENTS, supra note 12, at (I) (A).
170. See Frankel,361 Md. at 317-18, 761 A.2d at 334 (describing a situation where a financially dependent student may nevertheless be a bona fide Maryland resident).
171. Id. at 318, 761 A.2d at 334.
172. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (stating that regardless of the
deferential standard, it is imperative for the courts to have the ability to examine legislation in order to perform their duties); see also Nicole Richter, Note, A Standardfor "Class of
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clearly state the vital personal interests at stake, it recognized that
some vital interests did in fact exist. 73 Jeremy Frankel's access to a
public education was hindered by his classification,' 74 and Jeremy's
father was restricted from leaving Maryland, which affected his right
1 75
to travel, in order forJeremy to receive the in-state tuition benefit.
However, the Frankelcourt, while successfully ensuring the rights of all
Marylanders, should have better expressed its rationale for the expansion of the heightened rational basis scrutiny and placed articulable
parameters on its use so as to prevent the unhindered use of the standard in the future.
5. Conclusion.-The classification at issue in Frankel could have
been simply presumed valid, as are typical economic classifications.
However, the court properly examined the Frankelcase and appropriately applied a heightened rational basis test, ultimately invalidating
the suspect policy. The court's decision could have more clearly characterized the classification as being an economic one, and further, it
would have been helpful for future cases had the court better defined
the parameters for when an economic classification invokes the
heightened rational basis standard. Regardless, the court properly expanded the heightened rational basis standard to encompass the classification presented in Frankel; therefore, the court properly ensured
Marylanders' equal protection under the law.
DISMAS N. LoCARiA

One" Claims Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: Protecting Victims of
Non-Class Based Discriminationfrom Vindicative State Action, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 197, 209 n.86
(2000) (explaining that the Supreme Court "insists on knowing the relation between the
classification adopted and the object to be attained," and without it substance is not given
to the Equal Protection Clause nor is guidance or discipline provided to the legislature).
173. See Frankel, 361 Md. at 317-18, 761 A.2d at 334-35 (eluding to an interest in economic freedom that is due a more heightened rational basis test).
174. See Attorney Gen. of Md. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 712, 426 A.2d 929, 945 (1981)
(indicating that the interest in obtaining a higher education is a vital one).
175. See id. at 706, 426 A.2d at 942 (recognizing that the right to travel is a fundamental
right).

B.

A Missed Opportunity to Take a Clear Stance on the Constitutionality
of DiscriminatoryEmployment Practices by
Religious Organizations

In Montrose Christian School Corp. v. Walsh,1 the Court of Appeals
of Maryland considered whether a religious school had the right,
under the First Amendment,2 to fire administrative employees because they were not members of the church affiliated with the school.3
The court examined section 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code,
which provided that employment discrimination based on religious
creed is illegal, with the exception of allowing "for a religious corporation ...to hire and employ employees of a particular religion to perform purely religious functions."4 Relying on several Title V11 5 cases,
the court held that the First Amendment requires a "ministerial exception" in discrimination statutes that allows religious organizations
to hire spiritual leaders of their choice, and that section 27-19 did not
contain such a constitutionally mandated exemption. 6 Because the
remaining portion of the statute allowed the school to hire employees
of its choice, the Montrose Christian School was found not liable for
discrimination.7 By invalidating one section of the statute, the court
failed to address the more difficult constitutional question concerning
the scope of religious organization exemptions from employment dis1. 363 Md. 565, 770 A.2d 111 (2001).
2. The First Amendment states, in relevant part, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. " U.S. CONST.
amend I.
3. Walsh, 363 Md. at 578, 770 A.2d at 118-19.
4. MONTGOMERY COUNTY,MD., CODE § 27-19(d) (2) (2001). Following the decision in
Walsh, section 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code was redrafted and many of its provisions were moved or slightly modified. Section 27-19(d) (2) can now be found at section
27-19(e) (2) and, as a result of the Walsh decision striking the "perform purely religion
functions" clause, now provides that "a religious corporation ... [can] hire and employ
employees of a particular religion ...." Id. § 27-19(e) (2).
5. The relevant portion of Title VII states:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
6. Walsh, 363 Md. at 596, 770 A.2d at 129. The court found the "purely religious
functions" clause of the statute unconstitutional because no one engages in "only" religious functions, and the court held that this clause thus nullified the constitutionally required "ministerial exception." Id. at 593-94, 770 A.2d at 127-28.
7. Id. at 597, 770 A.2d at 130.
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crimination laws. This decision is problematic because the court's
strict interpretation of the statutory language of section 27-19 of the
Montgomery County Code conflicts with established principles of statutory construction, and what remains of the statute after striking this
language violates the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Had the court
read section 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code as a "ministerial
exception," the entire statute likely would have been found constitutional, and Maryland would have clear boundaries designating the
scope of religious organizations' First Amendment right to discriminate in their hiring practices.
1. The Case.-Montrose Christian School Corporation is a private, religious school affiliated with, and operating alongside, the
Montrose Baptist Church in Montgomery County, Maryland.8 In February 1996, Ray Hope was appointed the new pastor of the Montrose
Baptist Church, and soon after, in June 1996, Gregory Scheck was promoted from vice principal to principal of the school.' Following this
change in administration, with the exception of two janitors, all employees who were not members of the Montrose Baptist Church were
fired from their jobs at the school.' 0
Barbara Anne Carver worked as a teacher's aide for the Montrose
Christian School, performing administrative tasks and assisting school
staff from 1990 until Gregory Scheck fired her in June 1996. " After
exhausting all administrative remedies, Ms. Carver filed a lawsuit
against the school in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, alleging employment discrimination.' 2 In a separate lawsuit in the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County, three additional former employees of
the school filed similar discrimination claims. I" The plaintiffs in both
cases alleged that the school violated section 27-19 of the Montgomery
County Code; specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that they were fired
8. Id. at 573, 770 A.2d at 115-16. Although located on the same grounds, membership
in the church is not a requirement for attending the school, and the majority of the students are neither members of the church nor affiliated with the Baptist religion. Id.
9. Id. According to the bylaws of the school, the principal is responsible for the
school's administration and is under the direct supervision of the pastor. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 573-74, 770 A.2d at 116. When she was hired, the school knew she was not
Baptist and not a member of the church. Id.
12. Id. at 574, 770 A.2d at 116.
13. Id. at 576, 770 A.2d at 117. The three plaintiffs in this case were: Mary LouJones, a
bookkeeper and principal's secretary who began working at the school in 1979; Sharon M.
Walsh, a registration and administrative secretary who began working at the school in 1982;
and Helen E. Poole, a cafeteria worker who began working at the school in 1989. Id.
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from their jobs because they were not members of the Montrose Baptist Church. 4
In response to these allegations, Montrose Christian School asserted several defenses. First, the defendants claimed that the firings
fell within one of the exceptions to the Montgomery County employment discrimination law.'" In addition, they asserted the doctrine of
charitable immunity.' 6 The defendants also claimed that state law
preempted Montgomery County law because the county code impermissibly conflicted with the state employment discrimination law. 7 Finally, the defendants argued that the Montgomery County Code
violated the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 36 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights. 8
In Carver's case, the circuit court held that the school's actions
violated section 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code and did not
fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the county code. 9 The
court further found that the county law did not impermissibly conflict
with state law and that the defendants were not entitled to charitable
immunity. 20 Finally, the court held that section 27-19 did not violate
either the First Amendment of the United States Constitution or the
Maryland Declaration of Rights. 2 ' Carver was awarded a total of
$31,000 in damages, but the court denied her request for injunctive
14. Id. at 574, 576, 770 A.2d at 116, 118. The relevant portion of the Montgomery
County Code made it unlawful for an employer to fire an employee based on religious
belief. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 27-19(a) (2001).

15. Walsh, 363 Md. at 574, 576, 770 A.2d at 116, 117.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 575, 576, 770 A.2d at 116, 117. The relevant portion of the Maryland Code
provides that discrimination laws "shall not apply.., to a religious corporation, association, educational institution or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a
particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
association, educational institution or society of its activities." Mo. ANN. ConE art. 49B,
§ 18 (1998).
18. Walsh, 363 Md. at 574-75, 770 A.2d at 116-17. Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states that:
all persons are equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty; wherefore,
no person ought by any law to be molested in his person or estate, on account of
his religious persuasion, or profession, or for his religious practice, unless, under
the color of religion, he shall disturb the good order, peace or safety of the State,
or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others in their natural, civil or
religious rights ....
MD. DECL. OF RTs. art. 36.

Montgomery County intervened in both cases in order to defend both the constitutionality and the preemption claims. Walsh, 363 Md. at 575-76, 770 A.2d at 117.
19. Walsh, 363 Md. at 575, 770 A.2d at 117.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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relief.2 2 The Montrose Christian School and principal Gregory
Scheck filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, but before
argument could be heard, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of
certiorari.2 3
In the case involving the three additional former employees, a
jury determined that the plaintiffs were fired because of their religious
creed and awarded them compensatory damages.2 4 After the jury verdict, the circuit court issued an opinion holding that state law did not
preempt the local laws and that section 27-19 did not violate the First
Amendment or the Maryland Declaration of Rights.2 5 The court did
find that the school was entitled to charitable immunity, but that it did
not apply to the school's principal, Gregory Scheck.2" As a result, in
accordance with the jury verdict, the court issued judgments in favor
of the plaintiffs and ordered Scheck to pay compensatory damages.2 7
The court denied the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief.2" Both
the defendants and the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, 29 but prior to argument, the Court of Appeals granted
certiorari.3 °
2. Legal Background.-The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution state that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof ...."" These two clauses present an interesting dichotomy for judicial interpretation: how to "preserve[ ] the autonomy
and freedom of religious bodies while avoiding any semblance of established religion." 2 The Supreme Court has entertained a long line
of cases balancing these two interests33 and has established a threepart test to determine whether a statute is constitutional under the
22. Id.
23. Id. at 575-76, 770 A.2d at 117.
24. Id. at 577, 770 A.2d at 118.
25. Id. The court rejected the constitutional defenses because it was persuaded by arguments that the plaintiffs' duties were not instructional or policy oriented, but rather
administrative in nature. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. The court noted that it was inappropriate to take the appeal of the Montrose
Christian School because the charitable immunity claim allowed for ajudgment entirely in
its favor. Id. at 577 n.3, 770 A.2d at 118 n.3.
30. Id. at 577-78, 770 A.2d at 118.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
32. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970).
33. See bifra notes 38-68 and accompanying text (describing the relevant Supreme
Court cases considering questions about the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment).
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First Amendment.3 4 Based on this test, several circuits have analyzed
employment discrimination claims, specifically those under Title VII,
by balancing the goal of preventing discrimination against upholding
separation of church and state and freedom of religion. 5 From this
balance arose a "ministerial exception" to employment discrimination
claims, allowing religious institutions to hire and fire religious leaders
and teachers of their choice." 6 Relying on the rules outlined by the
Supreme Court, Maryland courts have applied their own rules of statutory construction to maintain the balance between these two
interests.:
a. The Supreme Court's Interpretationof the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.-The United States Supreme
Court established the foundation for future rulings regarding the employment decisions of religious organizations under the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment in Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral."s The Kedroff Court found that religious organizations require "an independence from secular control or manipulation-in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith
and doctrine."3 9 As a result, the Court concluded that the First
Amendment allows religious organizations to select their own clergy
without state interference.4 "
Having recognized that the First Amendment prevents the government from interfering in employment decisions regarding religious leaders, the Court faced questions regarding whether the First
Amendment prohibited state support of religion through government
benefits. In Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, the Supreme Court
considered whether granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations for religious properties used solely for religious worship
violated the First Amendment because it indirectly forced taxpayers to

34. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
35. See infra notes 74-92 and accompanying text (discussing various circuit cases dealing with the Religion Clauses). The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutionality
of the "ministerial exception" as it applies to the First Amendment rights of religious institutions to discriminate when hiring religious leaders.
36. See infta note 79 (providing examples of circuits that have upheld a "ministerial
exception").
37. See infta notes 104-115 and accompanying text (setting forth the Maryland rules of
statutory construction).
38. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
39. Id. at 116.
40. Id.
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support various religions. 4 ' The Court noted that "[no perfect or
absolute separation is really possible," but the job of the courts is "to
mark boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement. '42 Holding that
the property tax exemption neither sponsored nor inhibited a particular religion and did not result in excessive government entanglement in religious governance, the Court declared the property tax
exemption constitutional.4 3
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court adopted a three-part
test to determine if a statute will pass constitutional muster under the
Establishment Clause. 4 4 In Lemon, the Court considered the constitutionality of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes that provided state
aid to religious-sponsored private schools for instruction on secular
topics.45 The Court established a three-part test to determine the constitutionality of the statutes: (1) The statute must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) its primary effect must not be to promote or inhibit
a particular religion; and (3) the statute must not create excessive
state "entanglement with religion.

'46

Holding that teachers have the

potential to implicate religion even while teaching secular topics, the
Court recognized that the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania programs
presented a definite possibility of unconstitutional fostering of a religion. 47 Additionally, the Court recognized that significant government
supervision would be required to monitor these statutes, constituting
another violation of the constitutionally mandated separation of
church and state.48
Following Lemon, in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,4 9 the Supreme Court focused on the third prong of the Lemon analysis and
considered whether it was constitutional for the NLRB to be involved
in collective bargaining for teachers employed at religious private
41. 397 U.S. 664, 666-67 (1970).
42. Id. at 670.
43. Id. at 680.
44. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
45. Id. at 615-22. The Rhode Island program involved paying nonpublic school teachers a direct salary supplement of 15%. A supplemented salary could not exceed the salary
paid to public school teachers. Id. at 607. The statute required teachers to only teach what
was offered in public schools. Id. at 608. The Pennsylvania program authorized the state
to purchase secular services and tools for nonpublic schools. Id. at 609. Schools seeking
involvement in this program had to keep detailed accounting records and were subject to a
state audit. Id. at 609-10.
46. Id. at 612-13 (quoting, in part, Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
47. Id. at 617, 620-21. The Court noted "that a dedicated religious person, teaching in
a school affiliated with his or her faith and operated to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably
experience great difficulty in remaining religiously neutral." Id. at 618.
48. Id. at 619, 621-22.
49. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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schools.5 ° Noting the potential for excessive government entanglement in religion, the Court recognized that this type of involvement
would be problematic under the First Amendment.5 1 Holding that
there was no express congressional intent to establish such a relationship, the Court declined to consider the First Amendment questions
that might arise if the Board were to have jurisdiction over churchsponsored schools.5 2
The Court further refined the three pronged test laid out in
Lemon in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos.53 In Amos, the

Court considered whether section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964," 4 which allows religious organizations to discriminate in hiring
on the basis of religion, violates the First Amendment when the exemptions are applied to the secular activities of religious organizations.5 5 Finding that section 702 survived the first part of the Lemon
analysis, the Court reasoned that the purpose of the statute was to
reduce government interference with the decisions made by religious
organizations. 5 ' Examining the second prong of the Lemon analysis,
the Court determined that the primary effect of the statute did not
advance or inhibit religion.5 7 Finally, the Court held that section 702
easily passed the third prong of the Lemon examination-avoiding an
excessive entanglement between government and religion-because
the statute specifically allows religious organizations to make their
own hiring decisions.5 8 Holding that section 702 passed all three
prongs of the Lemon analysis, the Court found the statute
constitutional.5 9
50. Id. at 491.
51. Id. at 502, 504.
52. Id. at 507.
53. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
54. Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, in relevant part, that Title VII
"shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation . . . with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such
corporation .. .of its activities." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (a) (2000).
55. Amos, 483 U.S. at 329-30. In Amos, the Court determined whether a church-owned
gymnasium could, without violating the First Amendment, fire an assistant building manager because he was denied membership at an affiliated temple. Id.
56. Id. at 336. The Court further noted that it would be "a significant burden on a
religious organization to require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict which of its
activities a secular court will consider religious. The line is hardly a bright one ...." Id.
57. Id. at 336-37. The Court explained that a statute "is not unconstitutional simply
because it allows churches to advance religion"; a statute only crosses the boundary when
"the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence." Id. at
337.
58. Id. at 339.
59. Id. at 340.
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The Supreme Court has used different reasoning in its Establishment Clause cases. In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,6" the Supreme Court questioned whether Oregon
could deny unemployment benefits to individuals who smoke peyote,
classified as a controlled substance under Oregon law, as part of their
religious rituals. 6 ' The Court reasoned that individuals must comply
with neutral state laws, regardless of religious beliefs, when the laws
are valid and involve activities the state has the right to regulate. 62
Noting that the drug enforcement law was neutral and not aimed at
inhibiting any religious beliefs, the Court held that Oregon did not
violate the First Amendment by enforcing its criminal laws.6"
Three years later, the Supreme Court applied the Smith ruling to
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.64 The Court
considered whether city ordinances, passed with the intention of
preventing a religious institution from establishing a church in the
city, were constitutional.6 5 Reasoning that the ordinances at issue
could not survive a strict scrutiny inquiry66 because they were not neutral and actually targeted a particular religion, the Court found the
ordinances unconstitutional.6 7 Finding that the "Free Exercise Clause
commits government itself to religious tolerance" the Court found
that government must ensure that laws are designed for secular
purposes.6 8
b. The Evolution of the "'MinisterialException" to Title VII Employment DiscriminationClaims.-In 1964, Congress codified Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, making it illegal for employers to discriminate in
employment decisions based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 69 Title VII created a problem for the courts because employers

60. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
61. Id. at 874.
62. Id. at 882.
63. Id.
64. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
65. Id. at 531. This suit arose when the City of Hialeah passed several ordinances in an
attempt to discourage the Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye from establishing a church in
their city because some of the church's practices, including animal sacrifices, were not
welcome. Id. at 526-28.
66. Any law that is not neutral and of general applicability must pass the strict scrutiny
test-it "must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly
tailored to advance that interest." Id. at 531-32.
67. Id. at 540. The Court also pointed out that narrower regulations could achieve the
city's goals of protecting against cruelty to animals and other health code problems. Id. at
539.
68. Id. at 547.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1966) (amended 1972).
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were not permitted to discriminate under Title VII, but the First

Amendment limited the power of government to interfere in the decision-making of religious organizations. 7 In an attempt to rectify this
problem, Title VII included an exemption for religious organizations,
permitting them to discriminate when hiring individuals "to perform
work connected with the carrying on" of the employer's "religious activities.71 Congress amended Title VII in 1972, deleting the word "religious," so the clause now provides religious organizations an
exemption from discrimination laws when hiring individuals to per-

form activities for the organization. 72 The legislative history of this
amendment details Congress's intent to foster the separation between
church and state.73
The conflict between the First Amendment and the states' interest in preventing and protecting against discrimination gave rise to a
court-established "ministerial exception" to Title VII employment discrimination claims. The Fifth Circuit first officially recognized a "ministerial exception" to Title VII employment discrimination claims in

McClure v. Salvation Army. 7 1 In McClure, a former minister of the Salvation Army, Ms. McClure, brought suit alleging discrimination by the
Salvation Army because of her gender, in violation of Title VII. 75 The
court reasoned that separation of church and state requires a church
to decide "free from state interference, matters of church administration and government."7 6 Asking the government to review hiring
practices or salary assignments would involve a high level of government interference in church decision-making. 77 Finding that Con-

70. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2000).
73. See 118 CONG. REc. 4503 (1972) (noting that the objective of the amendment was
"to take the political hands of Caesar off of the institutions of God, where they have no
place to be").
74. 460 F.2d 553, 560-61 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972).
75. Id. at 555. Specifically, Ms. McClure argued that she received less salary and benefits than male officers and that she was fired because she filed complaints with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. Id.
76. Id. at 560. In establishing the ministerial exception, the Fifth Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral,which held that religious organizations must be granted the "power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government." 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). Interpreting this to permit
religious organizations to discriminate when hiring religious leaders, the court coined the
"ministerial exception" to Title VII, exempting religious organizations from discrimination
claims relating to hiring religious leaders. McClure, 460 F.2d at 560-61.
77. McClure, 460 F.2d at 560.
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gress never intended to supervise the religious leadership choices of
congregations, the court dismissed Ms. McClure's complaint. 7
Following McClure, several circuits upheld a "ministerial exception" to Title VII employment discrimination cases, recognizing that
religious organizations have the right under the First Amendment to
choose their spiritual leaders.7 1 Over time, the exception grew to include employees other than ordained ministers and clergy members.8 ° The "ministerial exception" has been upheld more recently
for employees whose "primary duties consist of teaching, spreading
the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship,"81 or any
position that is "important to the spiritual and pastoral mission" of the
82
religious organization.
78. Id. at 561.
79. See Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1304
(11th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment "prohibit a
church from being sued under Title VII by its clergy" and "mandate[ ] that churches retain
exclusive control over strictly ecclesiastical matters"); Combs v. Cent. Texas Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that a
court cannot decide whether a ministerial employment decision was based on legitimate
grounds without unconstitutionally interfering with the internal management of the
church); Bell v. Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that decisions about the "nature, extent, administration, and termination of a religious ministry falls
within the ecclesiastical sphere that the First Amendment protects from civil court intervention"); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding
the ministerial exception by dismissing a Title VII sex discrimination claim of a nun who
was denied tenure); Young v. N. Illinois Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d
184, 187-88 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that religious organizations have the right, under the
First Amendment, to make their own decisions regarding the employment of clergy members); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir.
1991) (finding that a church-affiliated hospital has the right to choose its spiritual leader
under the First Amendment); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772
F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that review of ministerial appointments would
cause excessive state entanglement in religious decisions).
80. See EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 797 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding
that a music teacher could not maintain a Title VII discrimination suit against her former
employer because the "ministerial exception" applies to all employees whose responsibilities include teaching, spreading the faith, or any other integral portion of the spiritual
message); Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 463 (finding that the ministerial exception applies to "all employees of a religious institution, whether ordained or not, whose primary
functions serve its spiritual and pastoral mission"); Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 949 (3d
Cir. 1991) (holding that an elementary school teacher at a private religious school could
not maintain a suit under Title VII for employment discrimination because churches have
a "constitutionally protected interest in applying religious criteria to at least some of their
employees"); EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283-84
(5th Cir. 1981) (noting that faculty and administrative staff of a seminary are "ministers"
for the purpose of the "ministerial exception").
81. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169.
82. Id.
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Although Title VII now allows religious organizations to discriminate when hiring certain employees, the Supreme Court recognized,
in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc.,8" that
religious schools are not totally free from state governance.8 4 In Dayton Christian Schools, the Court held that Ohio's Civil Rights Commission could investigate the procedures of a religious school without
8 5
violating the constitutional rights of the members of the school.
The Court further noted that it is within a state's interest to prevent
employment discrimination, and that state procedures to investigate
such discrimination do not on their face violate the Religion Clauses
of the Constitution, even if the investigation involves a religious
school.8 6 Several circuit courts have recognized that the prohibitions
in Title VII regarding discrimination based on race, color, sex, or national origin still apply to religious organizations.8 7 Moreover, the
Court has recognized that states, in their individual constitutions, can
provide their citizens with greater protections than those guaranteed
in the federal constitution.

88

The "ministerial exception" has preempted many Title VII claims
against religious employers, but courts have maintained the protections guaranteed in Title VII by limiting the scope of the exception to
"what is necessary to comply with the First Amendment."8 9 The
Fourth Circuit noted, in Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, that Congress could have exempted religious organizations
from all Title VII discrimination claims, but it did not, leaving them
open to suits based on discrimination on the basis of race, national
origin, or sexY0 Attempting to guard against erosion of the protections found in Title VII, the Fourth Circuit noted, in EEOC v. Roman
Catholic Diocese, that the "ministerial exception" would "not apply to
employment decisions concerning purely custodial or administrative

83. 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
84. Id. at 628.
85. Id
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1166 (noting that "Title VII does not confer upon
religious organizations a license to make [hiring decisions] on the basis of race, sex, or
national origin"); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972) (finding
that both the language and legislative history of the Civil Rights Act indicate that Congress
intended religious organizations to be liable for discrimination on the basis of race, color,
sex, and national origin).
88. See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1014 (1983); Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1269 (3d Cir. 1992).
89. Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 1999).
90. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1166.
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personnel."'" Other circuits have also precluded the application of
the "ministerial exception" to the employment of lay people and
others who are not central to the religious mission of the organization." The Supreme Court has yet to consider a case regarding the
constitutionality of the "ministerial exception" as it applies to the required separation of church and state mandated by the Constitution.
c.

Maryland Law Regarding Issues Presented in the Instant

Case.(1) Maiyland Constitutional Cases.-Much like the Supreme Court, Maryland courts have entertained many cases challenging the limits of the First Amendment, and the courts have attempted
to maintain a balance between individual freedoms and society's desire to legislate for the general good. Addressing the tension between
these two ideals, the Court of Appeals, in Hopkins v. State,9 3 stressed
that the First Amendment provides an absolute freedom to believe,
but limited freedom to act."' Like the Supreme Court in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, the Hopkins court recognized that under the First Amendment, individuals must follow laws
of general applicability, even if they have the effect of violating personal religious beliefs.9 5
Expanding upon the idea that the First Amendment does not
provide individuals a blanket exemption to general laws under the
guise of religious freedom, the Court of Appeals held, in Craig v.
State,96 that personal conduct is subject to state regulation so long as
the laws are general and nondiscriminatory. 9 Craig questioned
whether a husband and wife were guilty of involuntary manslaughter
91. 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000). Xrhen the issue does not involve First Amendment rights, Title VII still applies to religious employers unless Congress provides otherwise. Id.
92. See Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 363 n.3 (8th
Cir. 1991) (noting the importance of stricter statutory scrutiny when questions arise about
nonreligious employment decisions made by religious institutions); EEOC v. Southwestern
Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 284 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that the "ministerial exception" does not apply to support staff at a religious seminary because they are not
typically engaged in "ecclesiastical or religious" activities); EEOC v. Mississippi Coll., 626
F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding a Title VII claim brought by a secular teacher
against a religious college because the "ministerial exception" does not apply to faculty
members who are not ministers).
93. 193 Md. 489, 69 A.2d 456 (1949).
94. Id. at 496, 69 A.2d at 459. This case considered whether a local ordinance preventing ministers from advertising marriage services violated the First Amendment. [d. at 495,
69 A.2d at 458.
95. Id. at 496-97, 69 A.2d at 459.
96. 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959).
97. Id. at 599, 155 A.2d at 690.
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when they failed to render medical care to their child, who later died,
because it was not in accordance with their religious beliefs.98 The
court held that individuals are prohibited from citing religious beliefs
as an excuse for violating religiously neutral, general safety laws.99
In upholding individuals' freedom of worship, the Maryland
courts have also recognized the First Amendment right to discriminate in the hiring practices of religious leaders. A former candidate
for priesthood filed suit against the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Baltimore in Downs v. Roman CatholicArchbishop,'0 ' seeking to demonstrate that defamatory statements were made against him, ruining his
reputation in the community and preventing him from becoming ordained as a priest.'°' The court rejected this claim, noting that even if
the statements were defamatory, the statements were made in an effort to prevent Downs from becoming a priest.' 0 2 Because the statements related to the appointment of religious leaders, the court felt it
was out of its realm of authority."" Although no direct reference to a
"ministerial exception" was made, this case is the closest Maryland
courts have come to finding that religious organizations have the right
to hire religious leaders of their choice, even while violating other
laws.
(2) Maiyland Law Regarding Statutory Interpretation.There are several rules of construction that Maryland courts apply to
determine the meaning of a statute. The guiding principle regarding
statutory interpretation is that a statute should be construed as the
legislature intended when the statute was written.1 4 All the rules of
t 5
construction must give way to this intention.'
The best way to ascertain legislative intent is to look at the actual
wording of the statute itself.10 6 When the wording of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, courts must apply the plain meaning of the statute
without inserting or omitting words. 1 7 The clear and plain meaning

98. Id. at 593, 155 A.2d at 686.
99. Id. at 599, 155 A.2d at 690.
100. 111 Md. App. 616, 683 A.2d 808 (1996).
101. Id. at 619-20, 683 A.2d at 810.
102. Id. at 625, 683 A.2d at 813.
103. Id. at 624-25, 683 A.2d at 812-13.
104. See, e.g., Welsh v. Kuntz, 196 Md. 86, 93, 75 A.2d 343, 345 (1950) ("The cardinal
rule of statutory construction is that statutes should always be construed to effectuate the
intention of the Legislature.").
105. McKeon v. State, 211 Md. 437, 443, 127 A.2d 635, 638 (1956).
106. Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398, 405, 535 A.2d 471, 474 (1988).
107. Welsh, 196 Md. at 93, 75 A.2d at 345 (noting that "[t]he manifest intention will
always prevail over the rules of grammatical construction"); see also Grimm v. State, 212 Md.
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of the statute is to be determined by reviewing the contextual meaning of each word, and it should be interpreted so as to evince the
intentions of the statute as a whole."0 8 Only when the wording of a
statute is unclear will courts look to legislative history to determine
legislative intent. 10 9 Overall, a statute should be construed such "that
all its parts harmonize with each other," resulting in an interpretation
that is consistent with the intent of the legislature." 0
Because the legislature presumably intends its statutes to be valid
and enforceable, and thereby constitutional, a construction that renders a statute constitutional is always preferred to an interpretation
producing an unconstitutional result."' In Davis v. State,' 12 the Court
of Appeals emphasized that a constitutional construction, however,
must be "reasonable" within the plain meaning of the statute and can
'
The Davis
only be construed as such where the "language permits."113
court noted that courts are not permitted to redraft statutes by fixing
defective language or inserting words or phrases not originally present
within the statute." 4 Finally, if a portion of a statute is deemed unconstitutional, there is a strong presumption that the constitutional
5
portions can be severed from those that are not constitutional."
3.

The Court's Reasoning.-In Montrose Christian School Corp. v.

Walsh, the Court of Appeals held the clause "to perform purely religious functions" in section 27-19(d)(2) of the Montgomery County
243, 246, 129 A.2d 128, 129 (1957) (noting that courts are not permitted to apply rules of
construction when the wording of a statue is unambiguous); Maguire v. State, 192 Md. 615,
622, 65 A.2d 299, 302 (1949) (reasoning that courts can only resort tojudicial construction
when ambiguity exists).
108. See Maguire, 192 Md. at 623, 65 A.2d at 302 (noting that words should not be isolated for purposes of interpretation, and that a statute must be construed as a whole, rather
than just as individual parts); Jones, 311 Md. at 405, 535 A.2d at 474 ("When construing a
provision that is part of a single statutory scheme, the legislative intent must be gathered
from the entire statute, rather than from only one part.").
109. Welsh, 196 Md. at 93, 75 A.2d at 345.
110. Maguire, 192 Md. at 623, 65 A.2d at 302.
111. See Mayor of Baltimore v. Concord Baptist Church, Inc., 257 Md. 132, 140, 262 A.2d
755, 760 (1970) (stating that there is a strong presumption of the constitutionality of a
statute, and that adopting a construction that avoids a conflict with the Constitution is
always preferred to one that does not); Becker v. State, 363 Md. 77, 92, 767 A.2d 816, 824
(2001) (emphasizing that courts prefer to construe a statute as constitutional rather than
casting doubt on its constitutionality).
112. 294 Md. 370, 451 A.2d 107 (1982).
113. Id. at 377-78, 451 A.2d at 111.
114. Id. at 378, 451 A.2d at 111.
115. See Bd. of Supervisors of Elections of Anne Arundel County v. Smallwood, 327 Md.
220, 245, 608 A.2d 1222, 1234 (1992) (holding that invalid portions of a statute should be
severed so as to allow the remaining portions to be enforced).
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Code unconstitutional, finding that it nullified the rights of members
of religious organizations to hire spiritual and religious leaders of a
particular religion.1 1 6 Having consolidated both the Carver and Walsh
cases because of the similarity of issues on appellate review, the Court
of Appeals reversed the decisions of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County in both cases.' 17
After reviewing the relevant portions of the First Amendment and
the Maryland Constitution, the court began its analysis by recognizing
that religious organizations do not have the right to "'ignore neutral
laws of general applicability' even when such laws have an incidental
effect of burdening a particular religious activity."' " 8 The court
pointed out, however, that the First Amendment prevents the government from regulating religious beliefs as such and noted the unconstitutionality under both the United States and Maryland constitutions
of government interference with the regulation and management of
religious organizations.' 1 9
Relying on the "ministerial exception" upheld in several Title VII
employment discrimination cases, the court explained that the First
Amendment ensures a constitutional right for religious organizations
to be free from government interference when it comes to the hiring
and firing of spiritual and religious leaders.12 ° By strictly interpreting
the words "purely religious functions" in the Montgomery County
Code and noting that all religious heads perform both secular and
religious duties as part of theirjobs, the court held that the Montgomery County Code prevents religious organizations from ever discriminating because no employees engage in "purely" religious
functions.1 21 As a result, the clause was deemed unconstitutional and
116. Walsh, 363 Md. at 584, 770 A.2d at 122.
117. Id. Adhering to the principle that a court should decide a case on constitutional
grounds only when it is not possible to resolve the issue on nonconstitutional grounds, the
court examined the preemption and charitable immunity issues before looking to the
question of constitutionality. Id. at 578, 770 A.2d at 119 (citing Baltimore Sun v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 359 Md. 653, 659, 755 A.2d 1130, 1133-34 (2000)). First, the court considered
whether state law conflicted with, and thus preempted, section 27-19 of the Montgomery
County Code. Id. at 579-81, 770 A.2d at 119-20. Using Maryland's controlling preemption
principles, the court found that no conflict existed between the state and local laws. Id. at
581, 770 A.2d at 120. Considering next whether the doctrine of charitable immunity prevented both the school and Scheck from being liable to the former employees, the court
concluded that charitable immunity only applies to tort actions and was therefore inapplicable to this statutory employment discrimination claim. Id. at 581-84, 770 A.2d at 121-22.
118. Id. at 585-86, 770 A.2d at 123 (quoting, in part, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 513 (1997)).
119. Id. at 586-87, 770 A.2d at 123-24.
120. Id. at 590-92, 770 A.2d at 126-27.
121. Id. at 594, 770 A.2d at 128.
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severed from the rest of the statute.122 The remaining portion of the
statute provided that religious organizations could "employ employees
of a particular religion," allowing the Montrose Christian School to
hire only those employees who are members of the Montrose Baptist
Church.'
The decisions of the circuit court were thereby reversed,
24
was entered for the defendants.1
judgment
and
4. Analysis.-In Walsh, the Court of Appeals of Maryland missed
an opportunity to establish a clear rule on the scope of religious organizations' right to discriminate under the First Amendment. The
Walsh court rested its decision entirely on a strict interpretation of the
words "purely religious functions" and was unwilling to interpret the
phrase to mean anything other than individuals who engage in "only"
religious functions.125 Reasoning that no employee engages in only
religious duties, the court held this part of the statute unconstitutional
because it did not allow religious organizations to discriminate even in
the hiring of their spiritual leader, a clear violation of the First
Amendment. 126 By focusing on this interpretation, the court ignored
several of Maryland's statutory construction principles and retained a
statute that violates the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Had the
court instead analyzed section 27-19 as a ministerial exception, it is
likely that the statute would have been found constitutional. The
Walsh decision could have provided much needed guidance in Maryland regarding the scope of employment discrimination under the
First Amendment.
a. The Court's Strict Interpretationof Section 2 7-19 Ignores Principles of Statutory Construction and Results in a Statute that Conflicts with the
Maryland Declaration of Rights.(1) The Court Failed to Comply with Established Statutory
Construction Principles.-The Walsh decision is problematic because it
122. Id. at 596-97, 770 A.2d at 129-30. The court relied on the general presumption that
the legislature would intend for invalid portions of a statute to be severed such that the
remaining portion is still enforceable. Id. at 596, 770 A.2d at 129. The court also recognized that not severing the invalid portion would lead to the exact result it was trying to
prevent: no exemption for religious organizations in their employment decisions. Id, at
596-97, 770 A.2d at 129-30.
123. Id. at 597, 770 A.2d at 130.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 594, 770 A.2d at 128.
126. Id. The court noted: "Even ministers, pastors, priests, rabbis, and other theological
heads of religious organizations occasionally perform functions which would not ordinarily
be characterized as 'religious.' Man), other employees of religious organizations, such as
teachers, may perform both religious and non-religious functions." Id.
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failed to follow Maryland's established statutory interpretation principles when holding the "purely religious functions" clause of section
27-19 of the Montgomery County Code unconstitutional. It is wellsettled in Maryland that the main purpose of statutory interpretation
is for the court to determine what the legislature intended when enacting the statute. 1 27 Additionally, it is well-established that a reading
of a statute that is constitutional is always preferred to one that raises
issues of its constitutionality. 128 Section 27-19 specifically noted that
although religious discrimination is illegal in Montgomery County, religious organizations are permitted to discriminate when hiring individuals to perform purely religious functions.12 9 Although the
legislative history is unavailable, the wording of section 27-19 indicates
that the Montgomery County Council was attempting to establish a
"ministerial exception," allowing religious institutions to hire individuals of their choice, provided they were to perform religious, as opposed to administrative, tasks.'3 0 Had the court interpreted this
clause as a "ministerial exception," it would have read the statute as
the legislature intended and likely would have avoided an unconstitutional ruling.
Even if the court had concluded that the wording of the statute
was ambiguous as to the legislature's intent, it violated principles of
statutory construction by failing to consider the meaning of the word
"purely" in the context of the rest of the statute. The Walsh court
cited to Davis v. State, where the Court of Appeals refused to read a
sentence into a statute where no such clause was present.'3 1 The reasoning used in Davis does not apply in Walsh, however, because the
Walsh court interpreted the actual wording of a clause, rather than
adding, substituting, or deleting words as in Davis. However, the
Walsh court relied on Davis, stating that it is not permitted to substitute or insert words, and refused to interpret the word "purely" as
anything other than "only."' 2 While it is understandable that the
court would not want to reinvent the statute, principles of statutory
construction mandate that when the wording of a statute is ambiguous, a court should look to the entire statute in context to determine
127. See, e.g., McKeon v. State, 211 Md. 437, 443, 127 A.2d 635, 638 (1956).
128. See, e.g., Becker v. State, 363 Md. 77, 92, 767 A.2d 816, 824 (2001).
129. MONTGOMERY COUN-Y, MD., CODE § 27 -19(e) (2001).
130. See id.
131. Davis v. State, 294 Md. 370, 378, 451 A.2d 107, 111 (1982). The Davis court refused
to replace a clause stating "the tenets and practice of a recognized church or religious
denomination of which he is an adherent or member" with the phrase "his religious beliefs." Id.
132. Walsh, 363 Md. at 594-95, 770 A.2d at 128-29.
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the legislative intent. 3 ' By providing a clause that exempts religious
organizations from the general discrimination rules when they hire
individuals who engage in "purely religious functions," the Montgomery County legislature was clearly trying to establish a "ministerial exception." The court disregarded this intent by interpreting the clause
"purely religious functions" without considering the meaning of this
clause in the context of the statute as a whole.
(2) The Remaining Portion of the Statute Violates the Maryland
Declaration of Rights.-The redacted version of section 27-19 of the
Montgomery County Code created by the Walsh court clearly violates
the Maryland Declaration of Rights.'
The statute as it reads now
provides a total exemption for religious organizations to discriminate
in their hiring practices for both religious and administrative employees. 13 5 Although this redacted statute is arguably constitutional under
the federal constitution, it violates the Maryland Declaration of
Rights. The Maryland Declaration of Rights is narrower than the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in that it provides individuals
with religious freedom so long as they do not "injure others in their
natural, civil or religious rights ....

"136

Allowing religious organiza-

tions to discriminate in all of their hiring decisions clearly infringes
on the religious and civil rights of individuals seeking jobs who are not
members of that particular religious organization.
Although the Maryland Constitution provides for narrower religious protections than the First Amendment,"3 7 it is well-settled that
states can provide more protection to their citizens than the federal
133. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398, 405, 535 A.2d 471, 474 (1988).
134. The Maryland Declaration of Rights provides, in relevant part:
all persons are equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty; wherefore,
no person ought by any law to be molested in his person or estate, on account of
his religious persuasion, or profession, or for his religious practice, unless, under
the color of religion, he shall disturb the good order, peace or safety of the State,
or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others in their natural, civil or
religious rights ....
MD. DECL. OF RTs. art. 36.
135. After the "purely religious function" clause is stricken, section 27-19(d) of the
Montgomery County Code reads: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this division, it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice: . . . (2) For a religious corporation . . . to
hire and employ employees of a particular religion." See Walsh, 363 Md. at 597, 770 A.2d at
130.
136. MD. DECL. OF RTS. art. 36.
137. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. "), with MD. DECL. OF RTs.
art. 36 ("[A]I1 persons are equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty; ... unless,
under the color of religion, he shall . . . injure others in their natural, civil or religious
rights ....
).
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government without violating the United States Constitution."' As
such, assuming that the statute is constitutional under the federal
Constitution, it is permissible for the Maryland Constitution to provide more religious and civil freedoms to its citizens than the federal
constitution. The Walsh court stated that section 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code violated the Maryland Declaration of Rights because the state should not interfere with the management of religious
organizations.1 3 9 This interpretation fails to consider the possibility
that the Maryland Constitution could provide citizens more protection from discrimination than the First Amendment. Additionally, it
conflicts with both the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio Civil Rights
Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools and circuit decisions that have
held that it is within a state's interest to prevent employment discrimination and that the provisions of Title VII still apply to religious
organizations.14 0
b. Reading Section 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code as a
"MinisterialException" Would Likely Be Constitutional Under Lemon and
its Progeny.-Based on Lemon v. Kurtzman and its progeny, it is likely
that section 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code would have passed
constitutional muster had the court viewed it as a "ministerial exception." In Lemon, the Supreme Court established a three-part test to
determine whether a statute violates the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. 4 ' The first prong of the analysis requires that the purpose of the statute must be secular; the second prong dictates that the
primary effect of the statute must not promote or inhibit particular
religious beliefs or practices; and finally, the statute must not foster
"an excessive government entanglement with religion."142
The first prong of the Lemon analysis, requiring that a statute have
a "secular legislative purpose," does not pose an insurmountable hurdle for section 27-19. This test has been interpreted to require that
138. See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1014 (1983) (noting that states can
provide more protections to criminals than federal law requires); Kreimer v. Bureau of
Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1269 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that states are free to provide more
constitutional rights than the federal constitution).
139. Walsh, 363 Md. at 588, 770 A.2d at 124.
140. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Dayton ChristianSchools and citing to the circuits that have upheld Title VII claims
against religious employers).
141. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
142. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). The
Supreme Court has not yet considered the constitutionality of a "ministerial exception,"
but numerous circuit courts have justified its constitutionality. See supra note 79 (setting
forth cases from the numerous circuits that have accepted a "ministerial exception").
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the government remain neutral when enacting legislation, preventing
state endorsement or promotion of a particular religious belief.'4 3
Clearly section 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code does not have
the purpose of advancing a particular religion because it gives blanket
permission to all religions to discriminate when hiring individuals to
perform "purely religious functions."
The second prong of the Lemon analysis requires that the statute's
"principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion."' 4 4 This prong does not forbid a statute that allows
churches to advance religion; rather, it prevents the government itself
from advancing religion. 4 5 The Supreme Court held that section 702
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which permitted much broader discrimination by religious groups in the hiring of individuals to perform
work connected with the activities of the religious organization, was
constitutional. 1 46 Based on this holding, section 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code would pass the second prong of the Lemon test
because its allowance for discrimination is much narrower than section 702.
The third prong of the Lemon test poses more of a challenge for
demonstrating the constitutionality of section 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code. This prong requires a court to examine whether
the statute fosters "an excessive government entanglement with religion. '"17 This test results from the Court's holding in Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedralthat religious organizations must have the power to
decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church
governance."' 8 In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, the Supreme
Court interpreted this to mean that it is inappropriate for government
officials to be involved in the supervision of religious management.' 4 9
Citing to these decisions, the Walsh court stated that determining
whether individuals are engaged in "purely" or "primarily" religious
143. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
144. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
145. Amos, 483 U.S. at 337. Justice O'Connor recognized in her concurring opinion
that this is not a bright line distinction because "[a]lmost any government benefit to religion could be recharacterized as simply 'allowing' a religion to better advance itself .
Id. at 347 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
146. Amos, 483 U.S. at 337.
147. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664,
674 (1970)).
148. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
149. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504 (1979). The Court found
that one of the problems with the NLRB's involvement in the collective bargaining process
for religious schools would be forcing the state to get involved with issues of religious
management. Id.
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activities would involve excessive government entanglement in religious affairs. 15 ° However, this analysis is problematic because it fails to
consider that a "ministerial exception" will always require such
considerations.
Despite the extensions of the "ministerial exception" to teachers
and other educators, no circuit has gone so far as to hold that employment discrimination laws do not apply to religious organizations. A
"ministerial exception" applies only to individuals whose "primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in
religious ritual and worship."1" 1 As such, when examining whether a
"ministerial exception" applies, a court will always be faced with deciding whether the individual who was discriminated against is engaged
in religious or secular activities.
The Walsh court correctly noted that section 27-19 requires some
judicial determination regarding what is a "purely religious function." 152 Such a determination, however, is no different than one that
any court would have to make when questioning whether an individual who was discriminated against was a religious leader, and therefore out of the realm of state governance, or an administrative
employee protected by employment discrimination laws. To make
such a determination, a court would have to review the activities of the
individual and determine whether his or her activities were primarily
religious or administrative. Thus, if the "ministerial exception" is constitutionally mandated, as the Walsh court held, 153 courts will always be
forced to make the very determinations that the court held problematic in this case. Under the third prong of Lemon, the Walsh court
should have found that such judicial determinations would always be
part of the "ministerial exception" question, and therefore did not
involve excessive government entanglement in religious affairs. Had
the court made this decision, section 27-19 of the Montgomery
County Code would likely pass constitutional muster.
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals rested its entire decision
in Walsh on the strict interpretation of the word "purely."154 The
Walsh court spent considerable time explaining the need for a consti150. Walsh, 363 Md. at 596 n.10, 770 A.2d at 129 n.10.
151. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th
Cir. 1985) (quoting Bruce N. Bagni, Discriminationin the Name of the Lord: A CriticalEvaluation of Discriminationby Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 1545 (1979)).
152. Walsh, 363 Md. at 596 n.10, 770 A.2d at 129 n.10.
153. Id. at 594, 770 A.2d at 128.
154. Id. at 594-96, 770 A.2d at 128-29.
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tutionally mandated "ministerial exception" to discrimination laws
providing religious organizations the right to hire spiritual leaders of
their choice.15 5 In failing to recognize that the "purely religious functions" clause was a "ministerial exception" to Montgomery County's
employment discrimination law, the Walsh court eradicated the very
exception it was trying to uphold. This failure resulted in a decision
that provides little guidance as to the scope of religious organizations'
rights to discriminate under the First Amendment in Maryland and
leaves behind a statute that clearly conflicts with legislative intent and
the Maryland Constitution. It is up to the Montgomery County Council to amend the code to include a narrowly tailored "ministerial exception" or to do nothing and allow religious organizations to
discriminate in all of their hiring practices until someone else brings a
First Amendment challenge.
STEPHANIE KAYE BARON

155. Id. at 590-93, 770 A.2d at 126-28.

IV.

A.

CRIMINAL LAW

A PartialAbrogation of Maryland'sJustifiable Homicide Doctrine

In Sydnor v. State,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether a robbery victim may use deadly force to prevent a robber
from consummating a robbery.2 The court held that a robbery victim
may only employ deadly force when facing an imminent threat of
death or serious bodily injury.' The court concluded that because the
robber was running away when he was killed, the robbery victim was
not facing an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury at the
moment he employed deadly force.4 Having determined that the victim's act of killing was not justifiable homicide, the court affirmed the
conviction.5 The court's decision does not follow the common law.
The court's analysis is led astray by its inaccurate reading of the origins of justifiable homicide doctrine and its incorrect application of
excusable homicide doctrine. Notwithstanding that the court's decision diverges from the common law, it is a proper reformulation of an
antiquated doctrine, developed centuries ago under a philosophy that
society has long since discarded.
1. The Case.-Late in the evening on December 9, 1988,
Roosevelt Preston Sydnor was sitting with some friends on the front
steps of a rowhouse in east Baltimore when he was approached by
Anthony Jackson. 6 Jackson asked Sydnor whether he had any marijuana for sale, and Sydnor responded that he did not. Jackson then
pulled out a gun and ordered Sydnor to give him the gold chain Sydnor was wearing around his neck.7 Jackson then threatened to shoot
Sydnor and began to hit him on the head with the gun. Jackson removed thirty dollars from Sydnor's possession without incident, but
when Jackson reached for Sydnor's chain, a struggle ensued. Sydnor
and two friends grabbed both Jackson and the gun.8 After having the
gun wrestled away from him, Jackson turned to flee. He ran approxi1. 365 Md. 205, 776 A.2d 669 (2001).
2. Id. at 210-11, 776 A.2d at 671-72.
3. Id. at 211, 776 A.2d at 672.
4. Id. at 219-20, 776 A.2d at 677.
5. Id. at 220, 776 A.2d at 677. The defendant, Sydnor, was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. Id. at 208, 776 A.2d at
670.
6. Id. at 207, 776 A.2d at 670.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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mately twenty feet before he was shot four times by Sydnor; once in
the front of his thigh, once in the forearm, and twice in the back.'
One of the shots was later found to have been fired from close range.
Jackson died approximately forty yards from where the robbery
occurred.10

The circumstances surrounding the shooting were generally not
in dispute. 1 One witness testified that she saw the men struggling for
the gun and heard one of them say "if you have a gun you better use
it."' 2 After backing away from the window, the witness heard the
sound of running feet and several gunshots. Another witness testified
that she saw Jackson approach Sydnor and pull out a gun and then
saw Sydnor wrestle the gun away from Jackson. The witness also testified that Jackson "tried to run and [Sydnor] shot him in his back and
then . . .ran in the opposite direction."'"

Nearby police officers heard the shots and responded to the
scene.' 4 They pursued Sydnor, who witnesses identified as the
shooter. 15 After being apprehended, Sydnor informed one of the police officers, "I shot [Jackson] because he was beating me with a gun
and robbed me for $30 so I took the gun from him and shot him."16
Sydnor was tried in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.' 7 At the
end of the trial, the judge instructed the jury on the law of murder
and manslaughter before explaining the defense of self-defense.'"
Describing the defense, the trial judge gave the following instructions:
[B]efore using deadly force, the defendant is required to
make all reasonable effort to retreat. Defendant does not
have to retreat if the defendant was in his home or retreat
9. Id. In all, five shots were fired. Id.
10. Id. Sydnor's thirty dollars were recovered by the police from Jackson's body. Sydnor v. State, 133 Md. App. 173, 178, 754 A.2d 1064, 1067 (2000).
11. Sydnor, 365 Md. at 208, 776 A.2d at 670.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 209, 776 A.2d at 671. In a statement later given to the police at the police
station, Sydnor stated:
I twisted the gtun out of his hand.... After that I panicked I just shot at him, as
soon as I got the gun from him. You know, I didn't know whether or not he
had... another gun on him or not.... Like I said I looked at it like this, it would
be my life or his life. He said he was going to kill me.
Sydnor v. State, 133 Md. App. 173, 178, 754 A.2d 1064, 1066 (2000).
17. Sydnor, 365 Md. at 208, 776 A.2d at 670.
18. Id. at 209, 776 A.2d at 671. Self-defense can either serve as a complete defense to
homicide or mitigate murder to manslaughter. See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying
text.
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was unsafe or the avenue of retreat was unknown to the defendant or the defendant was being robbed at the moment that the
force was used or the defendant was lawfully arresting the
victim.' 9
Later, during deliberations, the jury asked for additional instructions.2 ° In response, the judge provided a slightly different
instruction:
[B] efore using deadly force, the defendant is required to
make all reasonable effort to retreat. The defendant does
not have to retreat if the defendant was in his home or retreat was unsafe or if the avenue was unknown to the defendant or ifat the moment that the shots were fired the defendant was
being robbed,
or the defendant was lawfully arresting the
21
victim.
The defense objected to this change, arguing that it represented
commentary by the court.2 2 The trial judge asserted that the change
was immaterial, and the jury convicted Sydnor of voluntary manslaughter and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.23
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the jury instruction was
legally incorrect because the defendant had no obligation to retreat,
but instead could resist the robbery and use deadly force until such
point as the robber made his escape. 24 The defense predicated its
argument on English common law and American cases which note
that a robbery victim is justified in killing his attacker, as well as the
Court of Appeals's previous application of the felony-murder rule.2 5
The Court of Special Appeals rejected Sydnor's argument.26 Relying
upon established self-defense doctrine, the Court of Special Appeals
held that a robbery victim may use deadly force to repel a robber up
to the point at which the threat of death or serious bodily injury is no

19. Sydnor, 365 Md. at 209-10, 776 A.2d at 671. The instruction given by the judge
reflected nearly verbatim the language recommended by the Maryland Criminal Pattern
Jury Instructions. Id. at 210, 776 A.2d at 671.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 210, 776 A.2d at 671.
22. Id. The defense did not elaborate on its objection until later on appeal. Id.
23. Id. at 208, 776 A.2d at 670. The jury acquitted Sydnor of first and second-degree
murder and of carrying a handgun. Id.
24. Id. at 210, 776 A.2d at 671-72.
25. Id. Noting that the Court of Appeals previously held that the period during which
a robbery is considered ongoing continues up to the point at which the robber has "made
good his or her escape and reached a place of temporary safety," Sydnor claimed that
becauseJackson had not yet made his escape, he was entitled to use deadly force to prevent
the robbery from being carried out. Id., 776 A.2d at 672.
26. Id., 776 A.2d at 672.
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longer imminent.2 7 The intermediate appellate court concluded that
absent an imminent threat, deadly force "is the sine qua non of proof
of excessive force. 2 8
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to decide whether the
victim of a robbery is entitled to use deadly force to prevent his attacker's escape.2 9
2. Legal Background.--Since the early days of English common
law, the law has recognized three different categories of homicide:
felonious homicide, justifiable homicide, and excusable homicide. 0
The law distinguishes these categories based on the circumstances in
which the homicide is committed and the degree of blame that society
attaches to perpetrators.3 1 While felonious homicide is considered
the highest crime man can commit, the law forgives, either completely
32
or partially, perpetrators of justifiable and excusable homicide.
These categories, which permeated the English common law, were implicitly adopted by Maryland through the language of its
constitution."
a. Justifiable Homicide.-Justifiable homicides originally included killings committed in execution of the law according to the
king's authority, such as when an officer attempting to apprehend a
felon killed the felon to prevent his escape.3 4 A slight variation also
covers situations where the homicide is committed for the advancement of public justice, such as when an officer kills to repel an assault.15 Homicides committed to prevent some "forcible and
atrocious crime" were also justified. 6 While this legal privilege was
originally limited to officers of the law, over time the concept was extended to ordinary persons faced with becoming victims of certain
felonies.3 7 Presently, the category of "forcible and atrocious" crimes
27. Sydnor v. State, 133 Md. App. 173, 191-92, 754 A.2d 1064, 1074 (2000).
28. Id. at 185, 754 A.2d at 1070.
29. Sydnor, 365 Md. at 210-11, 776 A.2d at 672.
30. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*177.

31. See id. at *177-204 (describing the different types of homicide).
32. Id. at *177-78.
33. See MD.CONST. art. V (providing that "the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to
the Common Law of England").
34. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at *178-79.
35. Id. at *179.

36. Id.
37. Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L. REV. 567, 572
(1903).
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includes offenses such as murder, burglary, and rape;3 however, the
doctrine of justifiable homicide as a defense by private persons originally applied "almost without exception" to robbery cases.3 9 Thus, a
robbery victim who killed his attacker in the course of the robbery
was, historically, held blameless for his actions.4" Such a killing was
permissible to prevent the robber from perpetrating the taking of the
victim's property or from taking flight after the taking was complete. 4
Historically, the law has treated persons committing justifiable
homicides as though they were performing some legal necessity, or
even a civic duty.4 2 Accordingly, perpetrators of such killings faced no
negative repercussions for their actions.4 3 Their act was not only
blameless, it was commendable."
All other killings warranted
conviction.4 5
In response to perceived attempts to stretch justifiable homicide
beyond its historical underpinnings, some jurisdictions have sought to
clarify the applicability of the doctrine. In People v. Ceballos, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the conviction of a man who set a
trap gun in his garage that shot a boy attempting to break into the
garage.46 The court held that deadly force is only justifiable if necessary to protect a victim of a forcible and atrocious crime from "death
or serious bodily harm. 4 7 Because the defendant was not home when
the burglary, which would be classified as a forcible and atrocious
crime, took place, the court concluded that deadly force was employed solely for the protection of personal property and not for protecting the defendant against death or serious bodily harm."
38. See Law v. State, 21 Md. App. 13, 27, 318 A.2d 859, 867 (1974) (noting that the
prevention of certain felonies may justify homicide); People v. Ceballos, 526 P.2d 241, 245
(Cal. 1974) (listing murder, mayhem, rape, and robbery as examples of forcible and atrocious crimes); State v. Moore, 31 Conn. 479, 483 (1863) (noting that murder, robbery,
burglary, arson, breaking into a house in the daytime with intent to rob, sodomy, and rape
are forcible and atrocious crimes).
39. Beale, supra note 37, at 572.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 572-73.
42. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at *178.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Beale, supra note 37, at 568.
46. 526 P.2d 241, 243 (Cal. 1974).
47. Id. at 249; see aLso State v. Marfaudille, 92 P. 939, 941 (Wash. 1907) (noting that in
all felonies to which the defense of justifiable homicide applies, "human life either is, or is
presumed to be in peril" and "a person has no right to take human life directly or indirectly to prevent . . . theft of property").
48. Ceballos, 526 P.2d at 249.
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Accordingly, the court concluded that the killing was not justifiable
homicide. 49
Unlike the Ceballos court, a number of jurisdictions have not limited the application of a justifiable homicide defense to only those
situations where a person is faced with an imminent threat of death or
serious bodily injury, but have applied it more broadly. In People v.
Cook,5" the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the defendant's contention that he was justified in using deadly force to prevent his daughter
from running off with her beau. 5 ' The court noted that the defendant would have been justified in using deadly force only under one
of three circumstances: "[He] supposed that his life was in danger, or
that he would receive grievous bodily harm, or that immediate action
52
on his part was necessary to prevent a felony attempted by violence.
The court affirmed the defendant's conviction, having determined
that this situation did not constitute a felony or pose a threat of death
or injury to anyone.
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Harris,5 4 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court observed that a defense ofjustifiable homicide may be available
in two types of situations.5 5 The first situation combines the first two
situations described above in Cook: when one is faced with an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. 56 The Harriscourt further observed that one is justified in killing when he or she believes
"that a felony is in process of commission, which can only be averted
by the death of the supposed felon." 57 It is the latter situation that
most jurisdictions agree falls within the ambit of justifiable
homicide.5 8
While these common law notions have existed in America since
the earliest days of the republic,5 9 cases involving robbery victims
49. Id.
50. 39 Mich. 236 (1878).
51. Id. at 241.
52. Id. at 242.
53. Id. at 240.
54. 281 A.2d 879 (Pa. 1971).
55. Id. at 881.
56. Id.
57. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
58. See, e.g., Flynn v. Commonwealth, 264 S.W. 1111, 1112 (Ky. 1924) (noting that the
right to kill a robber to prevent a robbery has existed since the earliest days of the common
law); Cook, 39 Mich. at 243 (observing that numerous authorities recognize the right of a
robbery victim to kill his attacker to prevent the robbery); Weaver v. State, 19 Tex. Ct. App.
547, 568-69 (1885) (reviewing English common law on justifiable homicide); State v.
Marfaudille, 92 P. 939, 940-41 (Wash. 1907) (observing that most authorities agree that a
robbery victim may kill his attacker to prevent the robbery).
59. See Flynn, 264 S.W. at 1112.
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shooting their robbers are relatively few. In Crawford v. State,6 ° the
Georgia Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a man who killed
another man who had just robbed him of a large piece of meat.61 ' The
court acknowledged the common law notion that it is justifiable to kill
"one who manifestly intends, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony" provided that the killing is necessary to prevent that felony.' 2
The court determined that the trial court's jury instruction, which
stated that the right to kill ended with the transfer of possession of the
property from the victim to the robber, was improper.6" The court
concluded that "[t]he taking was not a past, but a present and progressing, injury."" Consequently, the court held that the robbery victim need not yield after the property has changed possession, but may
65
kill the robber to prevent the property from being carried away.
In Flynn v. Commonwealth, the Kentucky Supreme Court took a
similar position in reversing the murder conviction of a defendant for
killing a man who had just robbed him and was making his escape. 6 6
The court noted that the victim:
had the right, so long as the deceased remained in his immediate presence with the property, to use such force as was
necessary, or reasonably appeared to him to be necessary, to
prevent the deceased from carrying the money away, even to
the taking of the life of the deceased.6 7
This, the court noted, has been justifiable homicide "[f] rom the earliest days of common law .

. ."68

Justifiable homicide doctrine, in its historical form, has been the
subject of little discussion in the Maryland courts. Before Sydnor, only
one Maryland case, Law v. State,69 a Court of Special Appeals case,
discussed the right of a victim of robbery to kill his attacker to prevent
the commission of the robbery.7 " The Law court observed that forci60. 17 S.E. 628 (Ga. 1893).
61. Id. at 631.
62. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
63. Id. at 629-30.
64. Id. at 630.
65. Id.
66. 264 S.W. 1111, 1112 (Ky. 1924).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 21 Md. App. 13, 318 A.2d 859 (1974).
70. Id. at 26-27, 318 A.2d at 867. Two previous Court of Special Appeals decisions
recognized that a victim of a forcible felony is justified in killing his or her attacker. See
Thomas v. State, 9 Md. App. 94, 95-96, 262 A.2d 797, 799 (1970); Whitehead v. State, 9 Md.
App. 7, 10, 262 A.2d 316, 319 (1970). Nevertheless, Law v. State was the first to enumerate
robbery as one such forcible felony. 21 Md. App. at 26-27, 318 A.2d at 867.
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ble felonies, such as murder, robbery, burglary, rape, or arson, may
justifiably be resisted with deadly force. 7' However, the court noted
that this right is not absolute and that deadly force may be applied
only when it is necessary to prevent such offenses. 72 Thus, Maryland's
formulation of justifiable homicide doctrine mirrors its historical
predecessor.73
b. Excusable Homicide.-Excusable homicide is of two varieties: misadventure and self-defense. 74 A homicide in the course of a
legal act that accidentally results in death is homicide by misadventure, 75 while self-defense involves the victim of an assault or sudden
76
quarrel killing the one who assaults him.

Historically, perpetrators of excusable homicide, unlike perpetrators ofjustifiable homicide, were deemed, to some degree, blameworthy for their acts. 77 Perpetrators were subject to conviction and were

forced to forfeit their personal goods. 7' Nevertheless, in cases of excusable homicide, the king would issue pardons in the name of equity
to the convicted. 79 These pardons became so common that by the
reign of Henry VIII, the equitable defense, through statutory enactments, became a legal defense. 0
Thereafter, instead of being subject to conviction, forfeiture, and
pardon, charges against perpetrators of excusable homicide were dismissed and no forfeiture or pardon followed.8" In this respect, the
practical distinction between excusable and justifiable homicide
ceased to exist, although the distinction between their historical roots
remains.
71. Law, 21 Md. App. at 27, 318 A.2d at 867.
72. Id.
73. See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text (describing the origins of justifiable
homicide doctrine).

74. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at *182.
75. According to Blackstone, misadventure is "where a man, doing a lawful act, without
any intention of hurt, unfortunately kills another: as where a man is at work with a hatchet,
and the head therefore flies off and kills a standerby." Id
76. Id. at *184.
77. Beale, supra note 37, at 569.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 571. By the reign of Edward III, the Clerk of Chancery ceased giving notice to
the king of pardons made in self-defense cases. Id. at 570. Pardons in these cases continued as a mere formality for some 200 years until the reign of Henry VII. Id. at 570-71.
Around this time, courts began to dismiss charges for killing in self-defense, and the need
for a pardon became obsolete. Id. at 570. Eventually, the defense was codified. Id at 571.
81. Id. at 571.
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The principle underlying self-defense, one form of excusable
homicide, is that "a man may protect himself from an assault, or the
like, in the course of a sudden brawl or quarrel, by killing him who
assaults him.''8 2 This doctrine became a part of the common law of
Maryland with the adoption of the Maryland Constitution, 3 and existed unrefined until 1970, when the Court of Special Appeals, in
Whitehead v. State, 4 bifurcated self-defense into two types: justifiable
and excusable. 5 In Whitehead, the court considered whether the defendant, convicted of second-degree murder, acted in self-defense
during a fistfight that resulted in his opponent's death. According to
the Court of Special Appeals:
Justifiable self defense is where a person is feloniously assaulted, being without fault himself, and necessarily kills his
assailant to save himself from death or great harm, or from
other felony attempted by force or surprise. Excusable self
defense is where a person becomes engaged in a sudden affray or combat, and in the course of the affray or combat,
necessarily, or under reasonably apparent necessity, kills his
adversary to save himself from death or great bodily
harm . . 86

The court noted that there was no practical difference between justifiable and excusable self-defense: in either case the defendant is not
culpable. 7 Because the defendant participated in the fight intentionally, the court held that he did not act in self-defense, thus the killing
was neither justifiable nor excusable."
Later, in State v. Faulkner,9 the Court of Appeals also divided selfdefense into two categories: perfect and imperfect self-defense.9 ° In
82. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at *184.
83. MD. CONST. art. V. This article states "[t]hat the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England ...."
84. In Whitehead, the defendant was confronted by the decedent, who accused the defendant of stealing the wallet of the decedent's wife. 9 Md. App. 7, 12, 262 A.2d 316, 319
(1970). The two men began to fight, and as a result of blows sustained during the fight,
the decedent died. Id, 262 A.2d at 320. The defendant claimed self-defense. Id. at 9, 262
A.2d at 318.
85. Id. at 10, 262 A.2d at 319.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 301 Md. 482, 483 A.2d 759 (1984).
90. Id. at 485-86, 483 A.2d at 761. Wqhen the Faulknercasereached the Court of Special
Appeals, the court reaffirmed the distinction between justifiable and excusable self-defense
it had established in Whitehead. Faulkner v. State, 54 Md. App. 113, 115, 458 A.2d 81, 82
(1983). The Court of Appeals, however, did not address the Court of Special Appeals's
new dichotomy.
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Faulkner,the court observed that to succeed on a claim of perfect selfdefense, a defendant must establish the following:
(1) The accused must have had reasonable grounds to believe himself in apparent imminent or immediate danger of
death or serious bodily harm from his assailant or potential
assailant;
(2) The accused must have in fact believed himself in this
danger;
(3) The accused claiming the right of self defense must not
have been the aggressor or provoked the conflict; and
(4) The force used must have not been unreasonable and
excessive, that is, the force must not have been more force
than the exigency demanded."
The court distinguished imperfect self-defense as a situation where
the killer's belief that he faced an imminent threat of death or serious
bodily injury is not objectively reasonable; rather, the killer possesses a
subjectively honest but unreasonable belief that such danger exists. 2
The practical distinction between perfect and imperfect self-defense is
that the former is a complete defense, while the latter merely serves as
mitigation from murder to manslaughter."
Thus, in Maryland, a homicide committed in perfect self-defense
diverges from the original formulation of self-defense because no guilt
attaches to one who commits it.94 Maryland's imperfect self-defense
95
doctrine, by contrast, more closely resembles its historical ancestor.
A homicide committed in imperfect self-defense is worthy of some
blame, and the perpetrator of it remains subject to conviction and
96
punishment.
In Gray v. State, 7 the Court of Special Appeals encountered a selfdefense claim similar to the defendant in Sydnor. s In Gray, a father
91. 301 Md. at 485-86, 483 A.2d at 761.
92. Id. at 499-500, 483 A.2d at 768-69.
93. Id. at 486, 483 A.2d at 761.
94. Perfect self-defense is a complete defense to homicide and results in a defendant's
acquittal. Id. at 485, 483 A.2d at 761. Originally, someone killing in self-defense was subject to conviction. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
95. Imperfect self-defense is a partial defense to homicide, mitigating murder to manslaughter. Faulkne; 301 Md. at 486, 483 A.2d at 761. Thus, one killing in imperfect selfdefense is not as blameworthy as someone committing a felonious murder, but more
blameworthy than someone killing in perfect self-defense. See id. The perfect/imperfect
self-defense dichotomy thus mirrors the historical treatment of perpetrators of justifiable
homicide and excusable homicide; while the former were completely without blame, the
latter were only partially so. Beale, supra note 37, at 568-69.
96. Faulkner, 301 Md. at 486, 483 A.2d at 761.
97. 4 Md. App. 175, 241 A.2d 909 (1968).
98. Id. at 180, 241 A.2d at 912.
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became enraged when he returned home to find his daughter's boyfriend, who was visiting the daughter, in the house, shirtless. 9 The
father and the boyfriend began to argue and each drew a gun."' The
boyfriend fired a shot, and the father turned to flee down the stairs
leading to the basement."0 ' While the father fled, the boyfriend continued shooting, killing the father. 1 2 The defendant claimed he had
fired in self-defense. 0 3 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the
defendant's conviction for second-degree murder, concluding that
Gray had not acted in self-defense because when the father turned to
flee, regardless of whether he still possessed a gun, the defendant was
no longer facing an imminent threat of death or serious bodily
injury.

10 4

In Souffle v. State,t °5 the Court of Special Appeals rejected a similar claim by a woman convicted of second-degree murder.'0 6 The defendant and a friend were hitchhiking when they were picked up by
the victim.'0 7 After having intercourse with the victim, the defendant
shot and killed him."0 ' The defendant claimed she shot the victim
after he had raped her, and thus the shooting was in self-defense. 0 9
Following its reasoning in Law, the Souffle court observed that had the
defendant killed her supposed assailant to prevent the rape, the killing may have been justified.' 10 Notwithstanding, the court noted that
the defendant killed her accused rapist after the act."' The court
thus rejected the defendant's argument, concluding that "[t] he short
answer to [a claim of self-defense] is that one does not defend oneself
from a rape by killing the rapist after the act has been perpetrated .... [T] he right of self-defense does not
extend to punishment
2
or revenge for an act already perpetrated."'
99. Id. at 178, 241 A.2d at 911.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 180, 241 A.2d at 912-13.
102. Id., 241 A.2d at 913.
103. Id., 241 A.2d at 912.
104. Id., 241 A.2d at 912-13.
105. 50 Md. App. 547, 439 A.2d 1127 (1982).
106. Id. at 564, 439 A.2d at 1136.
107. Id. at 548, 439 A.2d at 1129.
108. Id. at 549, 439 A.2d at 1129.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 564, 439 A.2d at 1136. As noted by the Court of Special Appeals in Law,
Maryland common law has recognized rape as a forcible and atrocious crime, and a killing
committed to prevent the commission of a rape would be justifiable homicide. Law v.
State, 21 Md. App. 13, 27, 318 A.2d 859, 867 (1974).
111. Souffle, 50 Md. App. at 564, 439 A.2d at 1136.
112. Id. at 564, 439 A.2d at 1136. Despite rejecting the defendant's self-defense claim,
the court did observe that "[t]he argument may give rise to an issue of mitigation in the
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Sydnor, the Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's contention that the jury instruction offered by
the trial court inaccurately represented Maryland's justifiable homicide doctrine.1 1 The court determined that deadly force within the
context of self-defense may only be employed at the moment that the
14
individual is faced with a threat of death or serious bodily injury.'
This requirement, the court noted, extends to all killings done in selfdefense, regardless of whether the killing is committed in resistance of
a robbery." 5 The court observed that the trial court's jury instruction
correctly reflected this legal principle." 6 Consequently, the court determined that because Sydnor used deadly force while the defendant
was fleeing, the use of deadly force was not justifiable." 7
The court rejected Sydnor's contention that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on excusable rather than justifiable homicide doctrine."' The court recognized the English common law
distinctions between justifiable and excusable homicide, particularly
that at common law justifiable homicide permitted the killing of a
robber in the course of the robbery." 9 The court determined, however, that the justifiable homicide doctrine "was based on the presumed imminent threat to life or limb posed by such felonies, not on
the fact that they may entail the loss of property."1 20 In this respect,
the court concluded that the right of a robbery victim to repel his
21
attacker mirrors the right of one to repel another in self-defense.'
Accordingly, the court determined that the availability of deadly force
as a method of repelling any attacker is contingent upon the victim of
the attack being faced with an imminent threat of death or serious
bodily injury, and the victim reasonably believing that deadly force is
122
necessary to repel that threat.

The court concluded that because the victim had turned to flee,
Sydnor's actions were not in defense of his person, but rather his
nature of justifiable homicide to prevent the rape." Id. However, the defendant did not
raise justifiable homicide as a defense, and the court did not consider the issue sua sponte.
Id.
113. Sydnor, 365 Md. at 219, 776 A.2d at 677.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 219-20, 776 A.2d at 677.
118. Id. at 219, 776 A.2d at 677.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 218, 776 A.2d at 676-77.
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property, 123 and deadly force, absent an imminent threat of death or
serious bodily injury, is not permitted. 124 Additionally, notwithstanding its original distinctions, the court noted that the concepts of justifiable and excusable homicide have long since blurred, and their
historical distinctions have lost practical effect.1 25 Consequently, the
court noted that even if the robbery were still in progress, unless Sydnor was faced with an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, deadly force was not justifiable.1 26 For these reasons, the court
held that the jury instruction, which accurately reflected Maryland's
conceptualization of justifiable homicide, was proper and affirmed
12 7
the defendant's conviction.
In her concurrence, Judge Raker joined with the majority in affirming Sydnor's conviction, but only because she concluded that the
issue of whether the jury instructions regarding the law of self-defense
were legally correct was not preserved for appeal. 12 1 Judge Raker
noted that while Sydnor's attorney objected to the supplemental jury
instruction at trial, that objection failed to raise the issue of whether
Sydnor had a right to resist the robbery through the use of deadly
force. 129 Instead, Judge Raker observed, Sydnor first advanced this
theory at the Court of Special Appeals.1 3 ° Because this theory was not
advanced at trial, Judge Raker determined that the Court of Appeals
should not have decided the issue.13 1
In his dissent, Judge Cathell objected to what he perceived to be a
misapplication of the law by the majority. 13 2 Judge Cathell asserted
that while the majority's recitation of self-defense doctrine may have
been on point, it was improperly applied.13 Judge Cathell argued
that self-defense doctrine is not applicable to the use of deadly force
to stop a robbery, but instead that the rules governing deadly force to
prevent a robbery are, and always have been, different.'
Judge Cathell emphasized the fact that the cases cited by the majority in defense of its position are all traditional self-defense cases,
none of which involve a victim killing his attacker to prevent the com123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.

219-20, 776 A.2d at 677.
219, 776 A.2d at 677.

222, 776 A.2d at 679 (Raker, J., concurring).

228, 776 A.2d at 682 (Cathell, J., dissenting).
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mission of a robbery, and are inapposite to this case. 13 5 He concluded
that because self-defense law was incorrectly applied, the majority had
provided no authority for its proposition that deadly force may only
be applied by a person faced with an imminent threat of death or
serious bodily
injury, regardless of the context in which the killing
6
13

occurs.

Judge Cathell argued that by sweeping killings committed to prevent a robbery under the auspices of self-defense doctrine-thereby
merging justifiable and excusable homicide-the majority has created
an impractical rule whereby victims of robbery are precluded from
preventing the asportation of their property as of the moment posses7 This, Judge
sion changes hands from the victim to his robber. 3138
Cathell noted, is not the common law of other states.
Additionally, Judge Cathell objected to the inconsistency of this
new rule with the "continuous offense" theory of robbery advocated
by the court in Ball v. State.'" 9 Had Jackson shot and killed Sydnor
while he was fleeing, rather than Sydnor killing Jackson, under the
"continuing offense" theory espoused in Ball, Jackson would have
committed felony-murder. 4 ° Accordingly, Judge Cathell disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that the robbery was not ongoing when
135. Id. at 228, 776 A.2d at 683. Shooting a robber in the course of a robbery had, until
Sydnor, been a case of justifiable homicide, not self-defense. See supra notes 34-41, 69-73
and accompanying text (discussing the historical formulation of the justifiable homicide
defense and Maryland's similar formulation).
136. Sydnor, 365 Md. at 228-29, 776 A.2d at 683 (Cathell, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 230, 776 A.2d at 683. Judge Cathell noted that at the time the shooting took
place, although Jackson had already taken possession of Sydnor's money, the robbery was
still in progress because the elements of robbery include not only taking by force, but also
the canying away of the property. Id. at 227-28, 776 A.2d at 682.
138. Id. at 226-27, 776 A.2d at 681-82.
139. 347 Md. 156, 699 A.2d 1170 (1997). In Ball, the Court of Appeals addressed the
question of whether force employed after property was taken in a robbery attempt to effectuate an escape, rather than to obtain possession of the property, satisfies the requisite
forcible taking element of common law robbery. Id. at 184-85, 699 A.2d at 1183. The
defendant, Ball, asserted that because he had taken the items before he killed the daughter of the homeowner (who returned home and interrupted the robbery), the force he
employed did not further the taking of the items, but merely aided in his escape. Id. The
court evaluated two differing theories adopted by various jurisdictions. Id. at 185-86, 699
A.2d at 1183-84. The first approach propounds that robbery is not committed when an
individual peaceably gains possession of property then employs violence to effectuate his
escape. Id. at 185, 699 A.2d at 1183-84. In contrast, the other approach asserts that force
employed to aid in an escape satisfies the elements for a robbery conviction. Id. at 185-86,
699 A.2d at 1184. This latter theory, labeled the "continuing offense" theory by the Ball
court, treats robbery as "a continuous transaction that is not complete until the perpetrator
reaches a place of temporary safety." Id. at 185, 699 A.2d at 1184. The Ball court adopted
the "continuing offense" theory. Id. at 188, 699 A.2d at 1185.
140. Sydnor, 365 Md. at 231, 776 A.2d at 684 (Cathell, J., dissenting).
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Sydnor shot Jackson. 141 Judge Cathell observed that this distinction
made no sense and was unjust, concluding:
To proffer that a robbery is continuous because the commission of a robbery is needed to support a conviction for felony
murder. . . , but not continuous when it would support the
acquittal of a person defending against the same robbery, is
simply, in my view, with all due respect to the majority, unacceptable in terms of consistency, intellectual honesty, fairness, and due process. There should not be differing
standards supporting the State's desire for conviction and a
defendant's desire for an acquittal. Both the State
and the
42
defendant should be subject to the same rules.
Judge Cathell noted that the majority concluded that the "continuous
offense" theory does not trump or expand the self-defense rule, but
rejects the notion as irrelevant. 14 3 He observed that the right to shoot
a robber to prevent a robbery and the right to kill in self-defense are
different concepts and have always coexisted.' 4 4 Judge Cathell noted
that ironically it was the majority who sought to limit or trump the
justifiable homicide rule. 4 5 In so doing, Judge Cathell lamented that
with its holding, the majority, "under the guise of asserting that the
concept never existed," restricted the rights of crime victims to protect
themselves for no legitimate reason.146
4. Analysis.-In Sydnor, the Court of Appeals held that a victim
of a robbery may only employ deadly force to repel his attacker when
the victim reasonably believes that the robber presents an imminent
threat of death or serious bodily injury.' 4 7 In arriving at this rule, the
court misapplied self-defense doctrine to a situation for which it was
never intended. Applying self-defense principles to a robbery situation is a departure from English common law, adopted by the people
of Maryland as part of the Maryland Constitution.' 4 8 Before Sydnor,
robbery victims could use deadly force to prevent the consummation
of the robbery.14 9 The rule espoused in Sydnor takes away this right.
After Sydnor, the right to use deadly force only arises when a robbery
141. Id.
142. Id. at 229, 776 A.2d at 683.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 229-30, 776 A.2d at 683.
147. Sydnor, 365 Md.. at 218, 776 A.2d at 676.
148. See MD. CONST. art. V.
149. See Law v. State, 21 Md. App. 13, 27, 318 A.2d 859, 867 (1974) (noting that the
prevention of a robber, justifies the taking of a life).
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victim is faced with an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. 15 1 Sydnor thus has the effect of merging the historically distinct
categories of justifiable and excusable homicide, placing robbery victims who kill to prevent the commission of a robbery in the same position as persons using deadly force in self-defense. Notwithstanding
this departure from the common law, the court's decision was proper
because the robbery rule was archaic, based on principles that have
long since been rejected by modern society.
a. A Misunderstandingof the Historical UnderpinningsofJustifiable Homicide.-The court's analysis is led astray by its misinterpretation of the origins of justifiable homicide and excusable homicide
doctrine. The court premised its decision on the mistaken conclusion
that the impetus of justifiable homicide doctrine "was always the necessity... to protect oneself. That is the only premise that reasonably
can justify the use of deadly force." '5 1 The court acknowledged the
historical differences between the justifiable homicide and excusable
homicide doctrines, but quickly discounted these differences as insubstantial and no longer applicable. 5 2 A review of the common law of
Maryland and other states reveals that these differences are substantial
and have, until this decision, remained applicable. 5 3 As Judge
Cathell accurately concluded in his dissent, "The majority confuses
the law of self-defense, with the different and separate rules relating to
the use of force by a victim to prevent a robbery .... This is a robbery
case-the rules are, and have always been, different." 154
Contrary to the majority's assertion, the doctrine of justifiable
homicide was not based solely on the desire to protect "life or
limb."'15 5 As the court correctly observed, justifiable homicide historically applied to killings committed to prevent forcible and atrocious
crimes. 156 While it is true that crimes included under this umbrella,
such as murder, robbery, burglary, rape, and arson, 157 are those that
pose the potential for great personal injury,15 the prevention of injury was not the only consideration behind this doctrine's origin; pre150. Sydnor, 365 Md. at 218, 776 A.2d at 676.
151. Id. at 219, 776 A.2d at 677.
152. Id. at 215, 776 A.2d at 674-75.
153. See supra notes 34-112 and accompanying text.
154. Sydnor, 365 Md. at 228, 776 A.2d at 682 (Cathell, J., dissenting).
155. Sydnor, 365 Md. . at 219, 776 A.2d at 677.
156. See id. at 211-12, 776 A.2d at 672 (reviewing the history of justifiable homicide).
The court acknowledged that robbery was a forcible and atrocious crime. Id. at 212, 776
A.2d at 672.
157. Law v. State, 21 Md. App. 13, 27, 318 A.2d 859, 867 (1974).
158. People v. Ceballos, 526 P.2d 241, 245 (Cal. 1974).
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vention of the crime itself was another consideration, one
unrecognized by the Sydnor court."'
Not all forcible and atrocious crimes inherently pose a risk of
death or serious bodily injury to the victim.' 6 0 Some forcible and atrocious crimes, such as murder and rape, are by definition crimes
against persons.' 61 For these offenses, personal injury is an inherent
component. Accordingly, using deadly force to prevent these crimes
would prevent personal injury. Thus, were Jackson trying to kill Sydnor, rather than rob him, when Sydnor used deadly force, that force
would have been employed to protect life and limb.
Using deadly force in the course of other forcible and atrocious
crimes, such as robbery and burglary, does not necessarily protect life
and limb. While these felonies all possess a risk of great personal injury,' 6 2 they are by definition crimes involving property,"' which can
be committed without resulting in physical injury. A slight change in
the facts of Sydnor exemplify this point. Had Jackson not hit Sydnor
with the gun, and had he escaped, he would have committed the robbery, a forcible and atrocious crime, without causing any personal

injury.
Notwithstanding the inherent differences in these forcible and
atrocious crimes, the common law in this country provided that victims of these felonies were justified in killing the perpetrators provided that the commission of the crime was imminent,' 6 4 which does
not necessarily mean that death or serious bodily injury was imminent. 6 5 Killings committed for the prevention of robbery, historically
the type of situation in which justifiable homicide doctrine was applied, were permitted "solely to prevent the consummation of the rob-

159. See People v. Cook, 39 Mich. 236, 243 (1878) (noting that "it is the duty of every
one who sees a felony attempted by violence to prevent it if possible, and that life may be
taken in so doing if necessary").
160. See State v. Korzep, 799 P.2d 831, 833 (Ariz. 1990) (noting that a justification defense applies to killings committed to prevent offenses that are not inherently life
threatening).
161. See generally ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 34-51, 152-71 (2d ed. 1969) (describing different categories of criminal acts).
162. See Ceballos, 526 P.2d at 245.
163. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. SCOrr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 692-704, 70817 (1972) (describing different categories of criminal acts).
164. See, e.g., State v. Sundberg, 611 P.2d 44, 4748 (Alaska 1980) (noting that a person
may use deadly force to prevent a crime, rather than wait until the crime has been committed); Weaver v. State, 19 Tex. Ct. App. 547, 570 (1885) (noting that killing to prevent a
felony is not justifiable unless that felony is imminent).
165. See Sundberg, 611 P.2d at 48 (noting that originally the common law provided for a
justification defense regardless of whether the offense sought to be prevented posed a
danger to the victim).
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bery."' 6 6 Accordingly, to prevent the commission of these crimes,
contrary to the Sydnor court's assertion, justifiable homicide doctrine
has never required a robbery victim, such as Sydnor, to wait until such
time as he is imminently threatened with death or serious bodily injury. Instead, Sydnor was free to kill Jackson provided that the felony
was imminent. Thus, ifJackson were still in the process of committing
the robbery, Sydnor would have been justified in using deadly force.
As Maryland's common law indicates, Jackson was still in the process
of committing the robbery, thus Sydnor was justified in using deadly
force.
In Ball v. State, the Court of Appeals determined that a robbery is
still being consummated while the robber is trying to make his escape,
and the robbery is not complete until after the escape is complete.' 6 7
The rules espoused in Crawford v. State and Flynn v. Commonwealth mirror the Ball court's conclusion. In Crawford, the Georgia Supreme
Court, relying on the common law, observed that a robbery victim's
right to kill his attacker does not end when the stolen property
changes possession. 6 ' Instead, the right continues so long as the
property is in the victim's immediate presence, during which time the
robbery is "a present and progressing, injury."1'69 The rule in Flynn
was nearly identical. 7 ' Thus, although he was fleeing, Jackson was
still in the course of consummating the robbery. 7 ' Consequently,
Sydnor was justified in using deadly force.
The progressing nature of the felony in Sydnor distinguishes this
case from Souffle v. State, where the Court of Special Appeals affirmed
a woman's conviction for murder because she shot her supposed rapist after his forcible and atrocious crime had been completed. 7 2 Because Sydnor's injury was ongoing, whereas Souffle's was not, under
traditional justifiable homicide doctrine, Sydnor, unlike Souffle, was
justified in killing his attacker. The principle of justifiable homicide
doctrine, thus, was based on more than just the need to protect one-

166. Beale, supra note 37, at 572.
167. 347 Md.156, 185, 699 A.2d 1170, 1184 (1997); see also supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing Balts holding that a robbery is considered ongoing until such time
as the robber makes good his escape).
168. 17 S.E. 628, 630 (Ga. 1893).
169. Id.
170. See Flynn v.Commonwealth, 264 S.W.1111, 1112 (Ky.1924) (noting that a robbery
victim may kill his robber to prevent his goods from being carried away).
171. Sydnor shotJackson asJackson was running away. Sydnor, 365 Md. at 207, 776 A.2d
at 670.
172. 50 Md. App. 547, 564, 439 A.2d 1127, 1136 (1982).
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self from personal injury, which the majority mistakenly claimed was
the doctrine's singular purpose. 7 ' Crime prevention is also its object.
Recognizing that certain homicides were justifiable to prevent
criminal acts, including robbery, from being carried out, one commentator noted, "if the killing were to prevent robbery it could not
properly be avoided by leaving the robber in possession of the booty,
since the object of the law in giving the justification would not then be
attained." '7 4 As noted by the Alaska Supreme Court in Sundberg
The use of force has historically been justified when its purpose is the prevention of a criminal act ....

Thus the effect

of the crime-prevention privilege is to allow a person to use
force in preventing a crime, rather than
compel him to await
17 5
the commission of the unlawful act.
The Sundberg court explained that this privilege is granted because of society's general interest in preventing criminal acts.176 Had
he allowed Jackson to flee with his property, Sydnor would have allowed the crime to be completed, violating the principle that originally justified killings to prevent robbery. Thus, killing a robber is an
act committed not to protect life and limb, but rather "for the advancement of public justice,"177 namely, preventing the criminal from
accomplishing his task.
Justifiable homicide was clearly developed for this type of situation. In killing Jackson to prevent the robbery, Sydnor was exercising
his "natural right" to protect his property from being carried away. 7 8
To claim otherwise would run contrary to the rule that "a man shall
never give way to a thief.'17 9 With its decision, the Court of Appeals
made clear that crime prevention is no longer a sufficient reason to
justify killing a felon attempting to flee,1 80 and that today a man must
give way to a thief. In declaring that a robbery victim may not employ
173. Sydnor, 365 Md. at 219, 776 A.2d at 677.
174. Beale, supra note 37, at 574; see also People v. Cook, 39 Mich. 236, 243 (1878) (noting that it is one's duty to try to prevent the commission of a violent felony, even if it
requires taking the life of the felon to do so).
175. 611 P.2d 44, 47 (Alaska 1980) (quoting Note, Just ication for the Use of Force in the
Criminal Law, 13 STAN. L. REV. 566, 568 (1961)).
176. Id.; see also State v. W.J.B., 276 S.E.2d 550, 555 (W. Va. 1981) ("The taking of life to
prevent the commission of a felony . . . is part of a more general rule relating to crime
prevention.").
177. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at *179.
178. See State v. Moore, 31 Conn. 479, 482 (1863).
179. Beale, supra note 37, at 572 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
180. In Maryland, law enforcement officers are still justified in killing a fleeing felon.
See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
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deadly force to prevent the consummation of the robbery absent a
threat of death or serious bodily injury, the court has failed to advance
public justice.
The existence of the dual doctrines of justifiable homicide and
excusable homicide, and the clear philosophy behind each, casts into
doubt the majority's claim that the defense ofjustifiable homicide was
intended to protect people, not property, from injury and to prevent
death. Originally, justifiable homicide was the only type of homicide
literally endorsed by the criminal law.18 1 Someone killing to prevent
certain atrocious crimes was not only without blame, the killer was
satisfying a social duty.18 2 Notably excluded from the ambit ofjustifiable homicide were killings committed in self-defense.'
Were the
court correct in its assertion that the origins of justifiable homicide
doctrine was solely the desire to protect "life and limb," there would
seem no reason to explicitly exclude from this doctrine homicides
committed in self-defense-the quintessential situation where the protection of life and limb is the only consideration. Thus, in spite of the
majority's claim to the contrary, it is clear that originally the prevention of physical assaults was not the only situation where justifiable
homicide would apply.I8 4
The court's own words also call into question its assertion that the
purpose for early justifiable homicide doctrine "was always the necessity . . .to protect oneself."' 8 5 The Sydnor court acknowledged that

deadly force may be used by law enforcement in the execution of their
duties, noting that an officer may, without blame, kill a fleeing
87
felon.'8 6 This right was also recognized by English common law.1
In such a situation, there is no inherent risk or threat to life or limb.
Thus, both English and Maryland common law have recognized that
in certain circumstances, killings may be committed for a purpose
other than to protect life and limb. Additionally, while English common law originally only exempted from punishment law enforcement

181. Beale, supra note 37, at 568. The doctrine of excusable homicide developed much
later. Id. at 568-70.
182. See, e.g., People v. Cook, 39 Mich. 236, 243 (1878).
183. Beale, supra note 37, at 568.
184. The majority concluded that this doctrine was developed solely to protect life, not
property. See Sydnor, 365 Md. at 219, 776 A.2d at 677.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 216-17, 776 A.2d at 675 (noting that one may kill pursuant to "command
of the law," which includes killing a fleeing felon).
187. Beale, supra note 37, at 572.
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officers killing to prevent a felon from escaping, this right was expanded to include private persons killing felons."' 8
Nevertheless, it is clear by its refusal to excuse Sydnor for killing
Jackson that the court is unwilling to allow a person to exercise deadly
force in the absence of an imminent threat of death or serious bodily
injury unless the person is acting under "an absolute command of the
law."1 9 The lone distinction, then, between English common law and
Maryland common law pre-Sydnor, and Maryland common law postSydnor, is that Maryland courts are no longer willing to grant this right,
available to officers of the law, to private persons. Thus, with its decision in Sydnor, the court limited the rights of Maryland citizens to protect themselves, their property, and other potential robbery victims.
Before Sydnor, Maryland citizens were granted the right to kill in execution of the law. They are now expressly excluded from that right.19 0
The court's rationale would be appropriate had Jackson's assault
on Sydnor not included a robbery. Jackson did commit an assault and
battery upon Sydnor, hitting him on the head with the gun. IfJackson
did not try to take anything from Sydnor, but merely hit him with the
gun, lose the gun in the struggle, then turn to flee, Sydnor would not
have been permitted to kill Jackson. This scenario would mirror Gray
v. State, a self-defense case decided by the Court of Special Appeals
involving a man who was shot in the back and killed after turning to
run from a man upon whom the deceased had pulled a gun.1 9 ' Notwithstanding the similarities between Sydnor and Gray, the same doctrine should not have been applied to both cases. Gray involved an
assault with a gun that resulted in a homicide, an excusable homicide,
self-defense situation. 192 Jackson's assault on Sydnor, however, did
not stop after he committed an assault and battery by hitting Sydnor
with the gun. 9 ' The assault progressed into a robbery, and when it
did, the situation was brought within the ambit of justifiable homicide.1 94 Self-defense no longer applied. Shooting a robber and shooting an assailant who is committing no robbery are unique situations,
95
and different laws apply to each.1

The Sydnor court's reasoning was led astray by its confusing the
law of self-defense with the distinct law governing the right of a rob188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Sydnor, 365 Md. at 217, 776 A.2d at 675.
Id. at 219, 776 A.2d at 677.
4 Md. App. 175, 180, 241 A.2d 909, 912-13 (1968).
Id. at 178, 241 A.2d at 911.
Sydnor, 365 Md. at 207, 776 A.2d at 670.
Id. at 226, 776 A.2d at 681 (Cathell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 228, 776 A.2d at 682.
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bery victim to use deadly force to prevent the robbery from being carried out. According to the common law of Maryland, these situations
are different, and different law applies.' 96 Despite this, the Court of
Appeals treated Sydnor as indistinguishable from Gray, although the
two cases are clearly different. Self-defense doctrine was correctly applied to the latter, but incorrectly applied to the former.
Applying the same law to Gray and Sydnor reveals the court's misunderstanding of the origins ofjustifiable homicide doctrine. Historically, someone killing in self-defense was subject to conviction and
forfeiture,19 7 while someone killing a robber in the course of a robbery was acquitted, "with commendation rather than blame."' 98 Thus,
it is clear that at the time justifiable homicide doctrine originally developed, the common law provided that Sydnor could have been convicted for killing Jackson if Jackson had only tried to murder him, a
self-defense situation, but not if, as was the case, Jackson was robbing
him, a justifiable homicide situation.'9 9 While it is true that with the
development of self-defense doctrine, Sydnor would not have been
convicted had Jackson been attempting to murder him, it is equally
true that the common law, prior to Sydnor, provided that one was justified in killing a robber in the course of a robbery."' 0 In denying the
existence of the clear philosophical distinctions between these two
scenarios, both historical and modern, the weight of the Sydnor court's
reasoning is diminished.
b.

The Place of Justifiable Homicide in Modern Times.-The

court could have limited the right to kill a robber in the course of a
robbery merely by limiting the application of the felony-murder rule
outlined in Ball,2"' rather than by gutting the doctrine of justifiable
homicide.20 2 By limiting the period during which a robbery is considered ongoing-classifying the robbery as complete upon the taking of
196. Id.
197. Beale, supra note 37, at 569.
198. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at *182.
199. Beale, supra note 37, at 572. Beale observed, "There seems no sufficient reason for
distinguishing between killing a robber and killing a felon who is attempting murder...
but the law is explicit." Id.
200. See, e.g., Law v. State, 21 Md. App. 13, 27, 318 A.2d 859, 867 (1974).
201. According to Ball, a robbery is considered ongoing even after the property is taken,
until such time as the robber escapes. Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 188, 699 A.2d 1170, 1185
(1997).
202. The dissent would still object to this reformulation, which would make the right to
use deadly force depend on "a mere second, and mere feet or even inches" by preventing
its use once the property changes possession and the robber turns to flee. Sydnor, 365 Md.
at 226, 776 A.2d at 681 (Cathell, J., dissenting).
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the victim's property-the court could have achieved its desired result
in this case. Had the court done so, the robbery would have been
over, and Sydnor could not have justifiably shot Jackson. But the
court did not take this course. Instead, the court elected to limit the
applicability ofjustifiable homicide doctrine rather than limit the period during which a robbery is considered ongoing. The court's failure to do the latter seems to indicate a general rejection of the
historical ideology that led to the original formulation of the concept.
Despite being a clear departure from existing common law, given
changes in the law since the development of justifiable homicide doctrine, which are reflective of changes in social ideology, the court's
decision in Sydnor was an appropriate one.
As previously noted, homicide was considered justifiable to prevent the commission of certain forcible and atrocious crimes, including murder, burglary, rape, arson, and robbery.2' 3 Killings committed
to prevent these offenses were justifiable because these were capital
crimes, punishable by death. In the early days of English and American common law, the philosophy underlying justifiable homicide was
"that where a crime, in itself capital, is endeavored to be committed by
force, it is lawful to repel that force by the death of the party attempting."2 4 In Maryland, each of these offenses is now punishable, pursuant to statute, only by a term of incarceration, with the exception of
murder, which is still a capital crime under certain circumstances.2 °5
To endorse a rule that allows for the killing of an offender of a noncapital crime would be to endorse "a state of uncivilized nature. "206
Indeed, for decades legal commentators have called for limits on
the availability of a justification defense to only situations in which
there is a threat of death or serious bodily injury.2 ° 7 Specifically, commentators have called for limits on the availability of a justification
defense even related to police officers attempting to make an arrest.2" 8 These commentators have called for this defense to be availa-

203. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
204. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at *181; see also State v. Sundberg, 611 P.2d 44, 47
(Alaska 1980); Weaver v. State, 19 Tex. Ct. App. 547, 568 (1885).
205. Burglary in the first degree is punishable by not more than 20 years imprisonment.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 29(b) (1996). Rape in the first degree is punishable by not more
than life imprisonment. Id. § 462(b). Arson is punishable by not more than 30 years imprisonment. Id. § 6(b). Robbery with a deadly weapon is punishable by not more than 20
years imprisonment. Id. § 488. Murder in the first degree is punishable by death or life
imprisonment. Id. § 412(b).
206. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at *181.
207. Sundberg, 611 P.2d at 48 & n.12.
208. Id.; see, e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman, Execution Without Trial: Police Homicide and the
Constitution, 33 VAND. L. Rv. 71 (1980).
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ble only when officer killings are necessary to protect others from
death or serious bodily injury.2 "9
Such proposals are significant in light of the historical context of
justifiable homicide doctrine. The early common law originally provided that only those homicides committed by officers of the law were
justifiable. Only later was this right expanded to include ordinary citizens.2 10 Accordingly, calling for limits on the availability of this defense to police officers represents a significant philosophical shift
from the early common law, a shift that mirrors a movement within
recent decades emphasizing individual rights, including the rights of
21
criminals, over the absolute need to ensure law and order. 1
This shift was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
Tennessee v. Garner.212 In Garner, the Court adopted these calls for limitations on police officers' use of deadly force, noting that absent an
imminent threat to an officer or others, the officer may not employ
deadly force. 2 13 The Court took note of the historical justification behind an officer's right to use deadly force, observing that "the common-law rule is best understood in light of the fact that it arose at a
time when virtually all felonies were punishable by death, "214 a principle that mirrors the origins of justifiable homicide doctrine. 215 The
Court concluded, however, that modern changes to legal doctrine
have rendered many of the principles that originally gave rise to the
doctrine of justifiable homicide obsolete, and the use of deadly force
can no longer be justified as it was centuries ago.21 6
The Sydnor court could have similarly rejected the historical roots
of justifiable homicide as antiquated in modem times. Yet, the court

failed to take advantage of the path that Garnerpaved. However, notwithstanding its flawed reasoning, Sydnor was a proper revision of an
217
outmoded rule.

209. Sundberg, 611 P.2d at 48 & n.12.
210. Beale, supra note 37, at 572.
211. See Sherman, supra note 208, at 91-93 (noting how "the evolving standards of a
maturing society" have become less tolerant of killings by police that have historically been
considered justifiable).
212. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
213. Id. at 11.
214. Id. at 13-14.
215. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
216. See Garner,471 U.S. at 14.
217. Cf Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 258-59, 462 A.2d 506, 514 (1983) (quoting Lewis
v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526, 531 (Mass. 1976)).
When the rationales which gave meaning and coherence to a judicially created
rule are no longer vital, and the rule itself is not consonant with the needs of
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Additionally, allowing private citizens to execute the law, as they
would when killing a robber to prevent the commission of a robbery, 2 18 was more of a practical necessity centuries ago than it is today.
When the justifiable homicide doctrine was originally formulated, the
largely rural society was more diffuse, and law enforcement was less
capable of providing the degree of protection it provides today.2 19 At
that time, private enforcement of the law was a greater necessity. Today, with rapid urbanization and technological advances, law enforcement has become more capable of providing protections unavailable
centuries ago. 220 Accordingly, today, granting private citizens the
same privileges as law enforcement, such as the ability to kill a fleeing
felon, is less tenable.
5. Conclusion.-In equating justifiable homicide with self-defense, the majority ignored the historical underpinnings of each doctrine. As aptly noted by Judge Cathell in his dissent, until this decision
these doctrines were and always had been different. 22' They are different no more. Nevertheless, the concepts of justifiable and excusable homicide have evolved over the centuries. The moral and
normative ideology permeating society differs considerably from that
of the thirteenth century, and much of the criminal law has evolved as
a consequence. In Sydnor, the Court of Appeals elected to make an
appropriate adaptation of the antiquated doctrine for modern time.
In rejecting the archaic origins of justifiable homicide, the court's decision brings Maryland law more in line with modern social and legal
ideology.
Notwithstanding, Sydnor is a clear departure from the common
law. The court refused to acknowledge this, ignoring the historical
distinctions between justifiable homicide and self-defense. Under the
guise of bringing clarity to a dichotomy that the court asserted had
become "blurred,"2 22 the court offered nothing more than a thin veil
for its true purpose-abrogating a policy out of step with modern ideology. The court did not need to hide its true reasoning, for "a court
not only has the authority but also the duty to reexamine its prececontemporary society, a court not only has the authority but also the duty to reexamine its precedents rather than to apply by rote an antiquated formula.
Id
218.
219.
protect
220.
221.
222.

Beale, supra note 37, at 572.
Cf Sherman, supra note 208, at 74 (discussing law enforcement's limited capacity to
the public centuries ago).
Id.
Sydnor, 365 Md. at 228, 776 A.2d at 682 (Cathell, J., dissenting).
Sydnor, 365 Md.. at 215, 776 A.2d at 674.
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dents rather than to apply by rote an antiquated formula. '2 23 While
the result of the decision would be the same regardless of motive, the
court needlessly subjected itself to skepticism and attacks on the legitimacy of this decision.
AARON C.

STORM

223. Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 259, 462 A.2d 506, 514 (1983) (quoting Lewis v.
Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526, 531 (Mass. 1976)).

V.

A.

ELECTION LAW

Choosing the Lesser of Two Evils to Preserve the Integrity of
Election Laws

In City of Seat Pleasant v. Jones,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
dismissed a writ of mandamus compelling the City Board of Supervisors of Elections (City Board) to count a vote in a recent mayoral election, holding that the actions taken by the City Board, though possibly
negligent, were neither arbitrary nor capricious.2 The court recognized that while no allegations of fraud were made in this case,3 the
City Board had committed administrative errors in denying a voter
her right to cast a ballot.4 When confronted with those errors, however, the City Board's actions were in conformity with provisions in
the Seat Pleasant City Charter (City Charter) mandating how city elections were to be conducted.5 Though denying even one voter his or
her right to vote is certainly not a satisfying result, especially in a case
where the vote would have changed the outcome of the election, "the
greater evil" would have been to disregard the law in favor of correcting the mistake.6 Because the City Board's response to the administrative errors was neither arbitrary nor capricious, the writ of
mandamus was not an appropriate remedy.7
1. The Case.-In an election conducted by the City Board on
September 11, 2000, Thurman D. Jones lost the election for the office
of mayor of the City of Seat Pleasant in Prince George's County to the
incumbent, Eugene F. Kennedy, by one vote." A supporter of Jones,
Brenda Smith, was not permitted to vote despite being a registered
voter at the time of the election.'
1. 364 Md. 663, 774 A.2d 1167 (2001).
2. Id. at 667, 774 A.2d at 1169.
3. Id. at 685, 774 A.2d at 1180.
4. See id. at 684, 774 A.2d at 1179. The circuit court's issuance of a writ of mandamus
was based solely on its finding that the City Board had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
denying a voter her fundamental right to vote. Id. at 671-72, 774 A.2d at 1172.
5. Id. at 684, 774 A.2d at 1179.
6. Hammond v. Love, 187 Md. 138, 149, 49 A.2d 75, 80 (1946).
7. City of Seat Pleasant, 364 Md. at 684-85, 774 A.2d at 1179-80 (holding that the City
Board's response to its administrative errors was in compliance with the City Charter, and
therefore was not arbitrary or capricious).
8. Id. at 669, 774 A.2d at 1170. Kennedy received 247 votes and Jones received 246.
Id.
9. Id. at 667-69, 774 A.2d at 1169-70.
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When Smith went to the polling place for Seat Pleasant on September 11, 2000, around 5 p.m., with the intention of voting forJones
in the mayoral election, she found that her name was neither on the
voter registration list nor the voter registration cards.1 0 At all times
relevant to the case, Smith both resided in the City of Seat Pleasant
and was registered to vote with the Prince George's County Board of
Elections (County Board). 1 However, because Smith, who had
moved from one address to another within the City of Seat Pleasant,
had forwarded her change of address form after the deadline for registration, the computer at the County Board failed to recognize her
residency.1 2 As a result, Smith's name was omitted from the County
Board's printed voter registration list and voter authority cards. 3 The
County Board also failed to provide the City Board with an "extract"
file that would have contained the names of voters whose names may
otherwise have been omitted because of address changes. 14
The chairperson of the City Board, Yvonne Sumner, who was at
the polling place when Smith arrived, attempted unsuccessfully to
telephone the County Board to ascertain whether Smith was registered to vote in Seat Pleasant.' 5 The County Board had closed at 4
p.m. and could not be reached.' 6 Sumner then told Smith that she
"would not be allowed to vote," and Smith left without casting a
ballot. "

After the polls closed, the City Board tallied the ballots and certified the results to the Clerk of the City, reporting that Kennedy had
been elected Mayor.' 8 Jones wrote a letter to Sumner on September
10. Id. at 667-68, 774 A.2d at 1169.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 668 & n.2, 774 A.2d at 1169 & n.2.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 668, 774 A.2d at 1170. According to the acting Administrator of the County
Board, an extract file should automatically be generated when the voter registration list is
generated. The County Board usually provides the extract file printout with the voter registration list, but did not prepare one for the City of Seat Pleasant election. Id. at 668 n.3,
774 A.2d at 1170 n.3.
15. Id. at 668, 774 A.2d at 1170.
16. Id. at 668-69, 774 A.2d at 1170. Though no advance request had been made to the
County Board to have someone available after hours, Sumner testified that she had made
an oral request shortly before the County Board closed for the day. Id. at 669 & n.5, 774
A.2d at 1170 & n.5. Sumner also testified that she had been instructed by the County
Board to call the direct number of the staff member at the County Board with whom she
usually dealt. Id. at 669 n.5, 774 A.2d at 1170 n.5.
17. Id. at 669, 774 A.2d at 1170.
18. Id. Section C-616 of the City Charter states that "[t]he Board of Supervisors of
Elections shall begin counting the votes immediately after the polls have closed" and "shall
complete the vote count within twenty-four (24) hours after the polls have closed." The
charter further specifies that the candidate with the highest number of votes shall be "de-
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13, 2000, requesting a recount because Smith, one of his supporters,
was not allowed to vote. 9 On September 20, 2000, Jones's attorney
wrote a letter to the City Board requesting that the board hold a hearing and make formal findings as to the number of votes cast and that
Smith had been denied the right to vote. 2' He further requested that
the Board refuse to certify the result of the election and make a formal recommendation to the City Counsel that a new election be
held.2
On September 25, 2000, the City Council held a special meeting,
which Jones and his counsel apparently did not attend. 22 At the special meeting, the City Board reported the results of the election and
discussed Jones's challenge.2 3 The City Council determined that
24
Jones "would have to pursue his challenge through judicial action."
Jones then filed a two count Verified Petition for Declaratory Relief, Temporary Restraining Order, and Permanent Injunction with
the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. 25 In the first count, he

sought a judgment that the City Board, by preventing Smith, a "duly
registered and qualified voter," from voting in the mayoral election,
had caused a significant irregularity in election procedure that had
changed the outcome of the election. 26 He asked the court to find
that the City Board's actions were "arbitrary, capricious, illegal, and
undertaken without any rational basis"' 27 and requested relief in the
form of a run-off election or a new special election in accordance with
clared elected," and that a tie will be decided "by special election between the tied candidates." SEAT PLEASANT, MD., CODE § C-616 (1976).

19. City of Seat Pleasant, 364 Md. at 669, 774 A.2d at 1170. Smith signed an affidavit
stating that she had been denied the right to vote, and that if she had been allowed to vote
she would have voted for Jones. Id. The affidavit was attached to the letter Jones sent to
Sumner. Id,
20. Id.
21. Id. The letter also suggested that upon receiving the recommendation, the City
Board should either hold a new election or seek "declaratory judgment from the Circuit
Court for Prince George's County upon the facts as found by the board." Id. at 669, 774
A.2d at 1170-71.
22. An allegation was made that the City Board was to hold a hearing the same night.
Id. at 669-70, 774 A.2d at 1171. Jones's attorney sent a letter to the City Board, with a copy
to the City Council, stating that his client would be unable to attend the hearing and
requesting that it be postponed until all interested parties could be present. Id. at 670, 774
A.2d at 1171. WhetherJones actually attended the City Council special meeting, in light of
this letter, is unclear.
23. Id. at 670, 774 A.2d at 1171.
24. Id.
25. Id. The circuit court noted that, in a memorandum of law, Jones also requested
mandamus relief. Id. at 670 n.7, 774 A.2d at 1171 n.7.
26. Id. at 670-71, 774 A.2d at 1171.
27. Id. at 671 n.8, 774 A.2d at 1171 n.8.
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the City Charter. 28 In the second count, Jones requested a temporary
restraining order precluding the city from swearing in Kennedy as the
new mayor and, after a hearing on the merits, a permanent injunction
requiring the city to conduct the run-off or special election. 9
The circuit court granted the request for a temporary injunction,
and the city was prevented from swearing Kennedy in as the new
mayor.3" The circuit court further ordered that Kennedy, as the incumbent, would remain mayor until the conclusion of the proceedings." After a hearing on the merits, the circuit court found that the
City Board and County Board had, by way of their collective errors,
"wrongfully infringed upon Ms. Smith's fundamental right to vote. "32
Specifically, the court faulted Sumner's failure to follow proper procedure in not arranging for someone at the County Board to stay late
and for only making one call. 3 The circuit court also noted the
County Board's failure to provide a complete list of voters or an extract file.3 4 Further, the circuit court found that there was sufficient
evidence that Smith would have voted for Jones, which would have
materially affected the result of the election. 5 Finding that the City
and County Board's actions were "arbitrary and capricious," the circuit court issued a writ of mandamus ordering that the city allow
Smith to vote, and that a run-off election be held in accordance with
the city charter in the event of a tie.3"
The City of Seat Pleasant appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but prior to any proceedings in that court, both parties petitioned for certiorari.3 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to the
City of Seat Pleasant 8 to consider whether a writ of mandamus was an
appropriate remedy when a citizen, whose vote would have changed
the outcome of the election, was denied her right to vote due to administrative errors.3 9

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.,
Id.
Id.,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 671, 774 A.2d at 1171.
774 A.2d at 1171-72.
774 A.2d at 1172.
at 671-72, 774 A.2d at 1172.
at 672, 774 A.2d at 1172.

38. Id. The court denied Jones's petition for certiorari. Id.
39. Id. at 667, 774 A.2d at 1169.
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2.

Legal Background.a. The Writ of Mandamus Generally.-The writ of mandamus
is generally used by a court to compel administrative agencies and
public officials to perform their functions or the obligatory duties that
do not involve the exercise of judgment or discretion to which the
applicant has a clear legal right.4" Maryland courts have recognized
that mandamus is an original action, as opposed to an appeal. 4 ' Mandamus may not be used "as a substitute for an appeal or a writ of
error."4 2 As far back as 1883, in George's Creek Coal & Iron Co. v. County
Commissioners,4 3 the Maryland Court of Appeals recognized the "extraordinary" nature of mandamus relief and ruled that in cases where
it might "be doubtful or the duty discretionary, or of a nature to require the exercise of judgement," or if there is any other legal recourse, a writ of mandamus will not be granted.44 The court held that
a writ of mandamus was inappropriate when a corporation tried to
compel the state to refund taxes paid after a statute had been passed
requiring the stockholders to pay the tax instead because the corporation had other legal recourse. 45 The court noted that the policies behind and reason for a law should be taken into account when
determining whether a writ should be issued to compel a party to
act. 46 Also, the court stated that a writ should not be issued unless the
"[c] ourt is satisfied that it is necessary to secure the ends ofjustice," or
to serve some "useful purpose.

47

b. Mandamus in Election Cases.-Maryland courts have used
the writ of mandamus in cases involving election challenges. The actions of election supervisors, however, are not subject to mandamus
40. Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 514, 331 A.2d 55, 72 (1975).
41. Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. 130, 145, 680 A.2d 1040, 1047 (1996). The Goodwich
court held that a writ of mandamus was not an appropriate remedy to protect privileged
information when the plaintiff had other options available, such as seeking a protective
order. Id. at 152, 680 A.2d at 1051.
42. Id. at 145, 680 A.2d at 1047.
43. 59 Md. 255 (1883).
44. Id. at 259.
45. Id. at 261. The court determined that the corporation only sought the writ because
it had not pursued the matter through judicial channels before the three-year statute of
limitations had run out; therefore, other legal recourse was, or had been, available. Id. at
258-59. The court held that mandamus was not an appropriate remedy, and the remainder of the discussion regarding mandamus in George's Creek Coal is dicta. Subsequent Maryland cases, however, have cited the discussion as the basis for their rulings. As a result,
George's Creek Coal has become the seminal Maryland case on when a writ of mandamus can
be used to compel an administrative agency or public official to act. See, e.g., Gould, 273
Md. at 514, 331 A.2d at 72.
46. George's Creek Coal, 59 Md. at 262.
47. Id. at 259.
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review unless those actions are fraudulent, arbitrary, or illegal.4 8 Absent fraud or illegality, the writ may only be used to correct abuses of
discretion and "arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable acts" by
election officials.4 9 When doing so, however, care must be taken not
to interfere with legislative intent or administrative discretion.50 In
addition, the party requesting the writ must have had no other procedure for obtaining review.5"
Over sixty years after George's Creek Coal, in Hammond v. Love,52 the
Court of Appeals held that a writ of mandamus was an appropriate
form of relief to prohibit a board of election supervisors from counting ballots lacking ajudge's initials when the controlling statute stated
that ajudge must initial all ballots. 53 The court recognized that election supervisors are only empowered to execute election laws, and
that their actions, similar to those of an administrative agency, are subject to judicial review and thus the possibility of a writ of mandamus.5 4
In doing so, the court rejected the board of election's argument that
its actions were discretionary when they were in direct conflict with
the governing statute.5 5 The court stated that "a clear mistake of law,
however honest, is 'arbitrary' action. ' 56 The court concluded that although it was unfortunate that the voters whose ballots did not bear
the initials of a judge, through error on the part of the election officials, were denied their right to vote, the greater evil would be to allow
election officials to ignore statutes "designed to safeguard the integ57
rity of elections, i.e., the rights of all the voters.
In Hammond, the court examined a case with an error on the part
of both election officials and voters. The court drew a distinction between statutes that are directory and statutes that are, by their word,
mandatory, such as the law requiring ajudge's initials on all ballots.
If the election law in question is mandatory, a writ of mandamus may
clearly be issued.59 If the election law is directory in nature, however,
48. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 205 Md. 325, 336, 108 A.2d
143, 147-48 (1954).
49. Hecht v. Crook, 184 Md. 271, 280, 40 A.2d 673, 677 (1945).
50. Id. at 280-81, 40 A.2d at 677.
51. Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. 130, 146, 680 A.2d 1040, 1048 (1996).
52. 187 Md. 138, 49 A.2d 75 (1946).
53. Id. at 149, 49 A.2d at 80.
54. Id. at 144, 49 A.2d at 77.
55. See id. ("Decisions contrary to law... are not within the exercise of sound administrative discretion ... but are arbitrary and illegal acts.").
56. Id. at 145, 49 A.2d at 78.
57. Id. at 149, 49 A.2d at 80.
58. Id. at 145-46, 49 A.2d at 78.
59. Id. at 145, 49 A.2d at 78.
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the court must decide if the alleged mistake "probably prevented a
free and full expression of the popular will" before deciding whether
a writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy.6" The court noted that
although it had inherent power to issue writs of mandamus to correct
abuses of discretion and "arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable
acts;... care must be taken not to interfere with the legislative perogafive, or with the exercise of sound administrative discretion."6 1
In Mahoney v. Board of Supervisors of Elections,6 2 the court held that
when an election board has made "an obvious mistake of law in counting or rejecting ballots," the court has the power to correct the mistake.6" The court also ruled that a writ of mandamus should only be
issued when the petitioner has an absolute legal right and would derive a substantial benefit.6 4 The petitioner in this case clearly had an
absolute legal right because if the illegal ballots were counted, he
would have lost the election. 65
In McNulty v. Board of Supervisors of Elections,6 voters were allegedly denied their right to vote through the error of the election officials, but not the shared error of the voters.6 7 The court held that a
writ of mandamus was not appropriate where the results of the election were irregular due to negligence and administrative error, but
not illegal action, by election officials.6 8 In McNulty, the petitioner
argued that he should have been awarded 136 votes cast on the blank
line below his name. 69 He had campaigned under the slogan "vote
the bottom line" because his name should have appeared last on the
democratic ballot.7v Voters were unable to vote for the petitioner on
the last line because, due to a shortage of covers on the majority of the
machines, election officials neglected to cover and lock the space below the petitioner's name.7 ' In holding that a writ of mandamus was
not appropriate under the circumstances, the court noted that no
60. Id. (quoting Soper v. Jones, 171 Md. 643, 648, 187 A. 833, 836 (1937) (quoting
Bowers v. Smith, 20 S.W. 101, 105 (Mo. 1892))).
61. Id. at 144, 49 A.2d at 77 (quoting Hecht v. Crook, 184 Md. 271, 281, 40 A.2d 673,
677 (1945)).
62. 205 Md. 325, 108 A.2d 143 (1954).
63. Id. at 336, 108 A.2d at 148.
64. Id. at 335, 108 A.2d at 147.
65. Id. If the petitioner had a legal, but abstract, right and the exercise of that right
would "be unaccompanied by any substantial benefit," a writ of mandamus should not be
issued. Id.
66. 245 Md. 1, 224 A.2d 844 (1966).
67. Id. at 4-8, 224 A.2d at 846-48.
68. Id. at 8-9, 224 A.2d at 848.
69. Id. at 7, 224 A.2d at 847.
70. Id., 224 A.2d at 848.
71. Id. at 5-6, 224 A.2d at 846.
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voter was denied their chance to vote because each voter could have
read the instructions and voted in the space next to the petitioners
The court found that the error was neither arbitrary nor caname.
pricious, and that a writ of mandamus was not appropriate. 73 The
court expressed regret for the negligence and administrative error of
election officials, but ruled that mandamus did not lie absent
"any
74
hint of fraud or chicanery attributable to any of the parties.
In the case of Fowler v. Board of Supervisors of Elections,75 the court
again held that mandamus was not an appropriate remedy when administrative error on the part of election officials caused an irregular
election result.7 6 The record established that some voting machines
had not been properly zeroed, that some machines had been misprogrammed, that Republican candidates in one sub-district appeared
on machines in a different sub-district, that some machines had levers
which were locked, that unauthorized persons repaired and adjusted
the machines, and numerous other counts of error.7 7 The court ruled
that even in cases where the administrative errors may be extremely
serious, in the absence of illegality, fraud, or any evidence that a specific individual attempted to vote and was not permitted to, mandamus was not an appropriate remedy.7 8 It based its finding both on the
fact that there was no indication of fraud or illegal action on the part
of the election officials and on the failure to show that any "specific
individual" had been denied his or her right to vote.79
In Lamb v. Hammond,80 the court returned to the issue of whether
election officials had the discretion to count ballots that did not conform with statutory constraints. 8' In Lamb, the nonconformity was

72. Id. at 9, 224 A.2d at 848-49. The instructions were published in the newspaper, on
specimen ballots, and were posted at the polling place. Id.
73. Id. The court also expressed concern that it had no way, short of the "occult," of
knowing if the 136 people who had voted in the blank line had actually intended to vote
for the petitioner. Id. at 10, 224 A.2d at 849.
74. Id. at 9, 224 A.2d at 848.
75. 259 Md. 615, 270 A.2d 660 (1970).
76. Id. at 618-19, 270 A.2d at 661-62.
77. Id. at 617, 270 A.2d at 661.
78. Id. at 618-19, 270 A.2d at 662.
79. Id. at 618, 270 A.2d at 662. The court noted that there was evidence that some
people who wanted to vote were unable to do so at the time they went to the polling place,
and that they may not have returned. Id. However, no evidence was proffered that any
specific person was unable to vote. Id. Similarly, there was no evidence to show that the
election would have turned out any differently if the errors had not occurred. Id. at 61819, 270 A.2d at 662.
80. 308 Md. 286, 518 A.2d 1057 (1987).
81. Id. at 308-12, 518 A.2d at 1068-70.
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due entirely to the error of election officials.12 The court held that
mandamus was not appropriate to compel an election board to count
twelve absentee ballots that did not comply with statutory requirements despite the misleading nature of the instructions that had been
given to the absentee voters.8 3 In response to the appellant's argument that the statutes in question were merely directory, the court
replied that in recent times it has "departed from the notion that clear
commands or conditions imposed by a legislative body may be disregarded on the theory that they are merely 'directory.'"84 Expressing
regret that innocent voters would be denied their right to vote due to
the error of election officials, the court ruled that this was a lesser evil
than overturning statutes enacted to protect "the integrity of elections. 8 5 The court found that disenfranchising the voters for technical noncompliance was still a lesser evil than allowing the election
officials to "effectively change the law by giving erroneous, ambiguous,
or misleading instructions to the voters," or to allow a court to command election officials to "credit the improper instructions rather
than the law."8 6
82. Id. at 290, 518 A.2d at 1059.
83. Id. at 308, 518 A.2d at 1068. Of the twelve absentee ballots that were in dispute,
nine ballots were mailed from within the United States.
The timeliness of those ballots is governed by Md. Code Ann. art. 33, § 279(c) (1), which . . . regards an absentee ballot as timely if:
(i) It has been received by the board prior to the closing of the polls on election
day; or
(ii)1. It was mailed before election day;
2. The United State[s] Postal Service, or the postal service of any other country,
has provided verification of that fact by affixing a mark so indicating on the covering envelope; and
3. The board receives the ballot from the United States Postal Service not later
than 4 p.m. on the Wednesday following election day.
Id. at 305-06, 518 A.2d at 1066-67. The postmark on the ballots showed that, although they
had been received by the Wednesday deadline, they had not been mailed before election
day. Id. at 306, 518 A.2d at 1067. Therefore, the election officials were correct not to
count the absentee ballots, even though the instructions given to absentee voters were "at
best ambiguous" regarding the actual deadline. Id. at 305-06, 518 A.2d at 1066-67. The
three ballots mailed from outside the United States were similarly mailed after the statutory deadline, and the absentee voters had been given similarly misleading instructions. Id.
at 307-08, 518 A.2d at 1067-68.
84. Id. at 309, 518 A.2d at 1068.
85. Id. at 311, 518 A.2d at 1069 (quoting Hammond v. Love, 187 Md. 138, 149, 49 A.2d
75, 80 (1946)).
86. Id. at 311-12, 518 A.2d at 1069-70. The court noted that other states, confronted
with the case of a person disenfranchised for technical noncompliance with the law because of error on the part of the election officials, allowed mandamus to correct the error.
Id. at 310, 518 A.2d at 1069. See, e.g., In re Recount of Ballots Cast in Gen. Election, 325
A.2d 303 (Pa. 1974); In re Contest of 1979 Gen. Election, 414 A.2d 310 (Pa. 1980); Hawkins
v. Persons, 484 So. 2d 1072 (Ala. 1986).
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-In City of Seat Pleasant, the Court of
Appeals held that a writ of mandamus was not an appropriate remedy
when the errors of an election board do not rise to the level of being
arbitrary and capricious, even when those errors denied a specific
voter her right to vote and that vote would have changed the outcome
7
of the election.

8

The court reviewed the circumstances in which a writ of mandamus may be used to correct an error in an election, observing that
although the decision is within "the sound judicial discretion of the
court, all the circumstances of the case must be considered."8 8 Applying the standards set out in mandamus cases to situations involving
error in counting or rejecting ballots, the court stated that the action
of the election supervisors was not subject to "review by mandamus in
the absence of conduct that is fraudulent, arbitrary or in violation of
law.'89

In examining previous applications of the standard to election
cases, the court differentiated between cases of irregular elections
where officials committed errors of law, and cases where the error was
administrative in nature.90 The court observed that in cases like Mahoney, where election officials made "an obvious mistake of law in counting or rejecting ballots," a writ of mandamus was appropriate to
"correct such mistake."9 1 On the other hand, the court noted that in
cases like McNulty and Fowler, where the election officials' error was
negligent and of an administrative nature, but not in violation of the
law or amounting to fraud or arbitrary conduct, mandamus was not an
92
appropriate remedy.
In reversing the circuit court's ruling with an instruction to dismiss the writ of mandamus, the Court of Appeals first examined
whether the City Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in infringing
on the right of Smith, a registered voter, to cast her ballot.9" The
Court of Appeals observed that information regarding Smith's regis87. City of Seat Pleasant, 364 Md. at 667, 774 A.2d at 1169.
88. Id. at 673, 774 A.2d at 1172 (quoting George's Creek Coal & Iron Co. v. County
Comm'rs, 59 Md. 255, 259 (1883)).
89. Id. at 675, 774 A.2d at 1174.
90. Id. at 676, 774 A.2d at 1175.
91. Id. at 675, 774 A.2d at 1174 (quoting Mahoney v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections,
205 Md. 325, 336, 108 A.2d 143, 148 (1954)).
92. Id. at 676-79, 774 A.2d at 1175-76. The court noted that other states, confronted
with the situation of a person disenfranchised for technical noncompliance with the law
because of error on the part of the election officials, allowed mandamus to correct the
error. Id. at 681, 774 A.2d at 1178.
93. Id. at 684, 774 A.2d at 1179.
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tration was unavailable at the time she tried to vote. 4 According to
the City Charter,9 5 a person must be registered to vote. 6 Smith's
name did not appear on the list provided by the County Board; therefore, the court reasoned that "it was neither arbitrary nor capricious"
for the City Board, based on the information available at the time, to
turn Smith away.97 "Acting in accordance with the dictates of the
Charter," the court noted, "can hardly be deemed arbitrary and capricious."9 The court observed that allowing Smith to vote without
proof of her registration would have been arbitrary and capricious. 9 9
The court observed that there was no allegation or evidence that
the City Board acted fraudulently or that it made any attempt to increase or to influence the number of votes for any mayoral candidate.1"' Although Sumner's neglect in failing to make arrangements
to have someone at the County Board remain at the office after hours
may have been an administrative error, the court further found that
there was no proof that Sumner's behavior under the circumstances
was "arbitrary and capricious conduct justifying the issuance of the
writ of mandamus." 0 1
The Court of Appeals turned to the City Charter in finding that
the City Board's actions were not arbitrary or capricious when it certified the result of the election knowing that Smith had been turned
away from the polls.10 2 The applicable section of the Charter requires
the City Board to begin counting the ballots immediately after the
polls close and to continue counting until all votes are counted.10 3
The Charter then instructs the City Board to certify the result to the
Clerk of the City. 10 4 The court observed that nowhere in the City

94. Id.
95. Section C,602 of the Seat Pleasant Charter specifies that "[elvery person who ...is
registered in accordance with the provisions of this Charter.. . shall be entitled to vote in
any or all city elections." SEAT PLEASANT, MD., CODE § C-602 (1976). Section C-607 reiterates that "[no] person is entitled to vote in city elections unless he/she is registered." Id.
§ C-607.
96. City of Seat Pleasant, 364 Md. at 684, 774 A.2d at 1179.
97. Id. The court noted that the City Charter did not grant Sumner the discretion to
allow Smith to vote without proof of her registration. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. Although the circuit court suggested that Sumner should have allowed Smith to
make a "contingent vote," the Court of Appeals observed that the City Charter does not
allow for "such a contingency." Id. at 685, 774 A.2d at 1179.
100. Id. at 685, 774 A.2d at 1180.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. SEAT PLEASANT, MD., CODE § C-616 (1976).
104. Id.
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errors
Charter is the City Board vested with judicial power to correct
10 5
of election officers in the performance of their duties.
The Court of Appeals next found that the circuit court's reliance
on certain statements in Fowler and McNulty---those implying that the
determinative questions in deciding whether mandamus was an appropriate remedy in cases of error on the part of election officials
were whether a specific voter had been denied his or her right to vote
and whether that vote would have affected the result of the electionwas misplaced.' °6 While the circuit court found this outcome-oriented test dispositive, the Court of Appeals found it inapplicable because the Fowler court found no fraud, illegal action, or specific
evidence of any person whose vote had not been counted and because, in that case, the court had dismissed the election challenge;
thus, the test was dictum.'0 7 In addition, the court noted that the
Fowler court was concerned that unquestionably qualified voters may
have been denied their right to vote, whereas the Seat Pleasant court
was faced with a voter whose qualifications could not be verified due
08
to administrative error.'
Finally, the court observed that the circuit court relied on a particular statement in McNulty: "[W] herever an ambiguity arises with regard to election results, every effort should be made to reasonably
ascertain the intention of voters and this is the initial duty of the
Board.... 9 In ruling that this standard was not applicable in this case,
the court observed that, in McNulty, the court was "referring to voters
who had actually voted," as opposed to a person who had not been
"allowed to vote because... her registration could not be verified."' 10
In dissent, Judge Wilner stated he would have held that, because
Smith's vote "may well have changed the result of the election," mandamus was an appropriate remedy."' Judge Wilner based his dissent
on his reading of McNulty and Fowler." 2 He disagreed with the majority's interpretation of McNulty, believing the court's dismissal of the
105. City of Seat Pleasant, 364 Md. at 686, 774 A.2d at 1180.
106. See id. at 686-87, 774 A.2d at 1181. In Fowler, the court stated that "the decisive
question was whether or not eligible voters who sought to cast a vote ... were deprived of
votes and whether or not, had they voted, this vote would have changed the outcome of the
election." Fowler v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 259 Md. 615, 618-19, 270 A.2d 660, 662
(1970) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. City of Seat Pleasant, 364 Md. at 687, 774 A.2d at 1181.
108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting McNulty v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 245 Md. 1, 8, 224 A.2d 844,
848 (1966)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 688, 774 A.2d at 1181 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
112. See id. at 689-91, 774 A.2d at 1182-83.
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trial court's writ in that case was based on "whether or not eligible voters
who sought to cast a vote. . . were deprived of votes and whether or not, had
they voted, this vote would have changed the outcome of the election."'1 3 In
Judge Wilner's opinion, the McNulty court refused to issue a writ of
mandamus because "no voter was actually prevented from voting for the
candidate of his choice."' "1
Judge Wilner also disagreed with the majority's interpretation of
Fowler, observing that the court again seemed to base its refusal to
issue a writ of mandamus on the fact that no qualified voter, whose
vote would have changed the outcome of the election, was denied his
or her right to vote." 5 Judge Wilner based his dissent on the fact that,
in the case at hand, a citizen was denied her right to vote through no
fault of her own and, more importantly, that her vote would have
changed the outcome of the election."1 6 Therefore, according to
Judge Wilner, mandamus would have been an appropriate remedy to
compel the City Board to count Smith's vote. 17
4. Analysis.-In City of Seat Pleasant, the Court of Appeals correctly held that a writ of mandamus was not an appropriate remedy
because the City and County Board's actions were neither arbitrary
nor capricious."' Although the test from McNulty and Fowler, which
asks whether a specific person was denied his or her right to vote in
deciding whether mandamus was an appropriate remedy in an election case, was not irrelevant to this case (as the court suggests),
neither was it determinative. Instead, the test was a threshold requirement to determine whether the applicant had a substantial right in
need of protection. After answering the question in the affirmative,
the court correctly applied the remainder of the test, asking if the
board's actions were arbitrary and capricious, to determine that mandamus was not an appropriate remedy.
a. The Court Improperly Dismissed the Test from Fowler and McNulty.-The Court of Appeals based its decision, in part, on incorrect
interpretations of the holding of two previous cases. Both Fowler and

113. Id. at 690, 774 A.2d at 1182-83 (quoting Fowler v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections,
259 Md. 615, 618-19, 270 A.2d 660, 662 (1970)).
114. Id. at 689, 774 A.2d at 1182 (quoting McNulty, 245 Md. at 9, 224 A.2d at 848).
115. Id.
116. See id. at 690, 774 A.2d at 1183.
117. See id. at 691, 774 A.2d at 183. The case at hand, Judge Wilner believed, was the
case foreseen in Fowlerand McNulty and "needs to be treated accordingly" by following the
test applied in those cases. Id.
118. City of Seat Pleasant, 364 Md. at 685, 774 A.2d at 1180.
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McNulty, which the court dismissed as not being relevant to the facts
of this case, were cases where voters were potentially denied their
right to vote, based on the error of election officials.11 The court in
Fowler clearly stated that its reason for not allowing a writ of mandamus was that no specific voter could be shown to have been denied his
or her right to vote, and therefore there was no evidence that irregularities changed the result of the election. 12 ° Similarly, the court in
McNulty largely based its ruling on the fact that no voter was "actually
prevented from voting for the candidate of his choice" because they
could have followed the instructions at the polling place and on the
ballot.

12 1

The Seat Pleasant court's contention that the comments in Fowler
and McNulty were dictum because the courts in those cases answered
the test in the negative is not convincing because the results of the
tests were necessary to the holdings of both cases. 1 2 2 Furthermore,
the facts of the two cases are not significantly different from the facts
12
in Seat Pleasant.'
Whether, as the court suggests, the issue before the
court concerned voters whose qualifications were not at issue being
prevented from voting, as was the case in Fowler,1 24 or whether the
issue concerned a voter whose registration could not be verified, as in
the case at hand, 2 5 the court was still ruling on a case of whether
mandamus is appropriate in situations where citizens' fundamental
right to vote has been denied due to administrative error. The differ-

119. See Fowler v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 259 Md. 615, 619, 270 A.2d 660, 662
(1970) (ruling that numerous irregularities involving voting machines were not sufficient
tojustify a writ of mandamus); McNulty, 245 Md. at 13, 224 A.2d at 851 (ruling that mandamus was not an appropriate remedy when the bottom windows of voting machines were
locked, potentially causing voters voting "the bottom line" to put their mark on the wrong
space of the ballot).
120. Fowler, 259 Md. at 618-19, 270 A.2d at 661-62.
121. McNulty, 245 Md. at 9, 224 A.2d at 848-49.
122. City of Seat Pleasant,364 Md. at 687, 774 A.2d at 1181; Fowler, 259 Md. at 618-19, 270
A.2d at 662 (holding that because there was "no showing that any specific individual" had
been deprived of his or her right to vote and that the errors had not affected the outcome
of the election, mandamus was not an appropriate remedy); McNulty, 245 Md. at 9, 224
A.2d at 848 (noting that ordering a special election was not an appropriate remedy because no voter was prevented from voting for the candidate of his or her choice).
123. See City of Seat Pleasant,364 Md. at 690, 774 A.2d at 1183 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
124. See Fowler, 259 Md. at 618, 270 A.2d at 662 (noting the trial judge's determination
that, due to the election official's errors, there may have been some voters who wished to
vote and were not able).
125. City of Seat Pleasant, 364 Md. at 687, 774 A.2d at 1181. In response to the court's
assertion that this case was different than Fowler because Smith did not vote, Judge Wilner
pointed out that the only reason Smith did not vote was that she was not permitted to do
so. Id. at 689, 774 A.2d at 1182 (Wilner,J., dissenting).

2002]

COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

ence between a case where voters "had actually voted" 12 6 but possibly
cast their ballots for the wrong candidate due to maintenance
problems with the ballot boxes, as in McNulty, 127 and a case where a
person has been denied the right to vote because her registration
could not be verified, as in the present case, is also illusory. A voter
was still denied her opportunity to vote for the candidate of her
choice due to negligence or administrative error on the part of election officials. Therefore, the substantial right test was relevant to the
case at hand.
b. Application of the "SubstantialRight" Threshold.-The Court
of Appeals has ruled that, in election cases not involving fraud or illegal behavior on the part of the election officials, mandamus is not an
appropriate remedy for an abstract right "unaccompanied by any substantial benefit." 2 ' Although the courts have referred to this need for
a benefit in different ways, authorities often refer to it as a substantial
right in need of protection.' 2 9 The Court of Appeals in City of Seat
Pleasantcorrectly applied the test for substantial right, asking whether
Smith had been denied her right to vote and whether that vote would
have changed the result of the election, as a mere threshold test, 3 °
although the court did not articulate that that was what it was doing in
the opinion. If the determinative test was whether a voter has been
denied his or her right to vote due to administrative error, and
whether that vote would have changed the outcome of the election,
Judge Wilner would be correct that this is the case that was foreseen in
Fowler and McNulty, and that the circuit court correctly issued the writ
of mandamus.1 3 1 A careful reading of these cases, however, reveals
that the test, while pertinent to the resolution of the case, was actually
a threshold test. In Fowler, the court first asked whether the administrative error that allegedly denied voters their right to vote stemmed
from either fraudulent or illegal action.1 32 When the answer was no,
126. Id. at 687, 774 A.2d at 1181.
127. McNulty, 245 Md. at 11-13, 224 A.2d at 850-51.
128. Mahoney v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 205 Md. 325, 335, 108 A.2d 143, 147
(1954).
129. See S.S. MERRILL, LAW OF MANDAMUS § 49 (1892) (stating that mandamus generally
"will only be used to protect a person from substantial injury or protect substantial rights"
and "will not issue unless temporal rights are involved").
130. See City of Seat Pleasant, 364 Md. at 684, 774 A.2d at 1179.
131. See id. at 691, 774 A.2d at 1183 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
132. See Fowler v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 259 Md. 615, 618-19, 270 A.2d 660,
661-62 (1970). The kind of fraud the court was concerned with was that "which would
result in some one or more people causing the candidate who should have been elected to
be rejected and some other candidate elected instead." Id,

932

MARYLAND LAW REVIEV

[VOL. 61
61:917

the court then asked whether a specific person could be shown to
have been denied his or her right to vote and whether that vote would
have changed the outcome of the election.13 3 Again answering in the
negative, the Fowler court ruled that mandamus was not appropriate
under the circumstances. 13 4 After similar reasoning, the court in McNulty came to substantially the same result.1 35 However, even if the
courts had found that a specific voter had been denied his or her
right to vote and that the vote would have changed the result of the
election, the court would not necessarily rule that mandamus was
proper under the facts of the case without applying the remainder of
the test for mandamus, which further asks whether the administrative
error was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.
Under this reasoning, the courts in Fowler and McNulty can be
seen as asking if the petitioner had a substantial right in need of protection and, when the answer was no, ruling that mandamus was not
an appropriate remedy.'
Applying the same standard to the City of
Seat Pleasant, the court effectively found that Jones had a substantial
right in need of protection because a specific voter, Smith, was denied
her right to vote."' Had that vote been cast, the result of the mayoral
election may have changed.' 3 8 Therefore, the "substantial right"
threshold was met, and the court proceeded to apply the remainder
of the test, asking whether the election official's conduct was arbitrary
139
and capricious or an abuse of discretion.

133. Id. at 618-19, 270 A.2d at 662.
134. See id.
135. See McNulty v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 245 Md. 1, 9, 224 A.2d 844, 848
(1966).
136. Although the court in Fowler recognized that there was some evidence that some
voters were turned away and did not return, no specific voter could be shown to have been
denied his or her right to vote; therefore, there was no substantial evidence that the result
of the election would have changed. Fowler,259 Md. at 618, 270 A.2d at 662. Similarly, in
McNulty, although the election board thought that the intent of the voters who put their
mark in the unlocked bottom space was likely to vote for the petitioner, their actual intent
was impossible to ascertain, so they could not be shown to have actually been denied their
right to vote. See McNulty, 245 Md. at 10, 224 A.2d at 849.
137. City of Seat Pleasant,364 Md. at 669, 774 A.2d at 1170.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 684-86, 774 A.2d at 1179-81. If this was the test the court adopted, a court
would first ask if the actions of the election officials were illegal or fraudulent. If the answer was yes, the court would rule mandamus appropriate regardless of whether the petitioner could show he or she had been denied a substantial right. If the answer was no, the
court would ask if the petitioner had been denied a substantial and verifiable right. Only
after this threshold requirement had been affirmed would the court proceed to apply the
remainder of the test, asking whether the election official's conduct was arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
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c. The Court Correctly Found that the City Board's Actions Were
Neither Arbitrary nor Capricious.--Once past the threshold test for substantial right, the court applied the remainder of the test for the appropriateness of a writ of mandamus and determined that the actions
taken by the City and County Boards, though possibly negligent, were
not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.1 40 Maryland
courts have discarded the notion that "commands or conditions imposed by a legislative body" are ever merely directory.' 4 1 Therefore,
all provisions of the governing statute must be considered mandatory,
and a voting board is restricted to exercising the powers and procedures expressly granted in that statute. 1 42 Because the relevant sections of the City Charter' 4 3 contain no provision granting the City
Board judicial power to correct errors and mistakes previously made
by officers, 1 4 4 the actions of the City Board could not be discretionary
because it had not been granted any discretion to abuse.14 5
The Court of Appeals did not deny that administrative errors led
to Smith's name being left off the voter registration list. Instead, the
court asked whether Sumner's and the City Board's actions in addressing these mistakes were arbitrary and capricious.' 4 6 In deciding
whether the behavior of an election official was arbitrary and capricious, the court looked to whether, after the administrative mistakes
14 7
were discovered, the City Board obeyed the relevant election laws.
The court has long recognized that "the reason and policy" of a statute should be considered in determining the right of the applicant to
obtain the benefit of the writ of mandamus. 48 The election procedures contained in the City Charter were instituted to ensure the efficient flow of the election process and to safeguard the integrity of the
election for the registered voters. 149 When laws designed to protect
the voters are involved, the court has ruled that it would be a greater
140. Id. at 684-86, 774 A.2d at 1179-80.
141. Lamb v. Hammond, 308 Md. 286, 309, 518 A.2d 1057, 1068 (1987).
142. See id.
143. See supra note 95 (setting forth the relevant provisions of the City Charter).
144. City of Seat Pleasant, 364 Md. at 686, 774 A.2d at 1180. "The Board's duty, as a
canvassing board, 'is purely ministerial and extends only to the casting up of the votes and
awarding the certificate to the person having the highest number; [it] has no judicial
power."' Id. (quoting GEORGE W. McCRARv, TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF ELECTIONS
§ 261, at 198 (4th ed. 1897)).
145. See id.
146. See id. at 684-85, 774 A.2d at 1179-80.
147. See id. at 685-86, 774 A.2d at 1180.
148. George's Creek Coal & Iron Co. v. County Comm'rs, 59 Md. 255, 262 (1883).
149. See City of Seat Pleasant,364 Md. at 682-86, 774 A.2d at 1178-80. Section C-607 of the
City Charter provides that "[n]o person is entitled to vote unless he/she is registered."
SEAT PLEASANT, MD., CODE § C-607 (1976).
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evil to allow "election officials to ignore statutory requirements designed to safeguard the integrity of elections, i.e., the rights of all the
voters" than to allow election officials to ignore an individual voter's
150
right to vote.
Although the City Board clearly made administrative errors, in
each circumstance when the error came to light, the representatives
of the Board just as clearly did their best to act in accordance with the
dictates of the City Charter.15 ' When Sumner discovered Smith's
name was not on the list of registered voters, she acted in accordance
with the City Charter in not allowing her to vote. 1 52 The charter did
not grant Sumner the discretion to allow Smith to cast a "contingent
vote. " "' And when the City Board, knowing of a potential irregularity, certified the results of the election to the Clerk of the City Council, they were again acting according to the dictates of the City
Charter. 54 The provisions in the City Charter mandating that the
City Board count the votes and immediately report the results to the
Clerk of the City cannot be seen as discretionary;' 5 5 Maryland courts
have "departed from the notion that clear commands or conditions
imposed by a legislative body may be disregarded on the theory that
they are merely 'directory."" 5 6
Even viewed in light of prior administrative errors, obeying the
mandatory provisions of the City Charter from the time that Smith
arrived at the polling place can hardly be seen as arbitrary and capricious behavior.'5 7 Indeed, as the court observed, failing to follow the
provisions of the City Charter would have been arbitrary and
capricious. 151
d. The Court's Denial of Mandamus Chooses Lesser of Two
Evils.-While denying a voter her right to vote is not a desirable outcome, it is still the lesser of two evils when compared to weakening
150. Hammond v. Love, 187 Md. 138, 149, 49 A.2d 75, 80 (1946).
151. City of Seat Pleasant, 364 Md. at 684-86, 774 A.2d at 1179-80.
152. Id. at 684, 774 A.2d at 1179. The court's conclusion that Sumner's failure to arrange for someone from the County Board to stay after hours was unfortunate, but not
arbitrary or capricious, is persuasive. If the result of any election could be overturned by
the failure to make a single phone call, the results of many elections would be called into
question.
153. Id. at 685, 774 A.2d at 1179.
154. Id. at 685-86, 774 A.2d at 1180.
155. Id.; see also supra note 105 and accompanying text (noting that the City Board is not
empowered to correct the errors of election officials).
156. Lamb v. Hammond, 308 Md. 286, 309, 518 A.2d 1057, 1068 (1987).
157. See City of Seat Pleasant, 364 Md. at 684, 774 A.2d at 1179.
158. Id.
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laws designed to protect the integrity of the election process for all
voters. Maryland courts have often discussed the conflict between denying individuals their right to vote and obeying election law in terms
of lesser and greater evils. 159 Mandamus is an extreme remedy that
should only be used "to secure the ends of justice, or to []serve some
just or useful purpose."' 6 ° In this case, counting Ms. Smith's vote
would have resulted in the court effectively mandating that portions
of the City Charter were discretionary. This result would open the
door for losing candidates to second guess election results in future
elections and ultimately weaken the power of the election laws.
Therefore, the results of allowing the writ of mandamus would arguably be neither just nor useful. The Court of Appeals properly restrained itself from using its power of mandamus to substitute its own
judgment for that of the City Board. Denying a person his or her
right to vote is hardly a satisfactory result, but compared to chipping
away at laws designed as an important safeguard to protect all voters, it
is certainly the lesser of the two evils. 16 '
5. Conclusion.-In City of Seat Pleasant, the court correctly ruled
that a writ of mandamus was not an appropriate remedy when election officials, despite administrative error, did their best to conform to
statutes when confronted with the results of that error. 16 2 To allow
the writ to stand would be to allow the court to substitute its own
judgement for the dictates of the City Charter, a situation certainly as
bad as allowing election officials, through their error, to effectively
change the election laws.16 The court also established that in cases
where election irregularities occur because of error on the part of
election officials, the questions of whether a specific voter was denied
his or her right to vote and whether that vote would have changed the
outcome of the election are merely threshold questions to determine
if the petitioner has a substantial right. They are not determinative
questions that conclusively establish whether a writ of mandamus is an
appropriate remedy.
JOHN G. POPE

159. See Hammond v. Love, 187 Md. 138, 149, 49 A.2d 75, 80 (1946); Lamb, 308 Md. at
311, 518 A.2d at 1069.
160. George's Creek Coal & Iron Co. v. County Comm'rs, 59 Md. 255, 259 (1883).
161. Love, 187 Md. at 149, 49 A.2d at 80.
162. City of Seat Pleasant, 364 Md. at 667, 774 A.2d at 1169.
163. See Lamb, 308 Md. at 311-12, 518 A.2d at 1069-70 (holding that confusing instructions on mail-in ballots do not overcome election statutes when ballots are mailed-in past
the statutory deadline).

VI.

A.

HEALTH CARE

The Court Refrains from JudicialPolicymaking in Medicaid

In Department of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Campbell,1 the Court
of Appeals of Maryland addressed the issue of whether commissions
and attorneys' fees for court-appointed guardians over the property of
mentally incompetent Medicaid recipients should be deducted from
those recipients' "available income" under the Maryland Medicaid Assistance Program.2 Specifically, the court considered whether guardianship commissions were an allowable deduction as part of the
Medical Assistance recipient's "personal needs allowance" under the
Code of Maryland Administrative Regulations (COMAR) section
10.09.24.10D(2)(d). 3 While noting that it was not bound by an administrative agency's conclusions of law,4 the court reversed the circuit court and agreed with the Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene (the Department) and the Office of Administrative Hearings
(OAH) in holding that guardianship commissions and legal fees are
not the type of "personal needs" expenses contemplated by COMAR
section 10.09.24.10D. 5 The court held that the forty dollar monthly
allowance for "personal needs" was intended to cover essential items
necessary for maintaining one's personal hygiene and was not enough
to accommodate the costs of guardianship fees.6
In Campbell, the Court of Appeals again signaled its unwillingness
to venture into or even approach the judicial policymaking arena and
declined an invitation to adopt a legal rule based on public policy
considerations. 7 The Campbell court declined to read into the Medicaid provisions an allowance that would cover the costs of court-appointed guardians despite the numerous public policy arguments in
favor of such a finding.8 While courts in at least two other states have
1. 364 Md. 108, 771 A.2d 1051 (2001).
2. Id. at 111, 771 A.2d at 1052-53; MD. CODE ANN., HFALTH-GEN. I § 15-103 (2000)
(amended 2001).
3. Campbell, 364 Md. at 111-12 & n.1, 771 A.2d at 1052-53 & n.1. The personal allowance is not defined in the Maryland regulations. However, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(q) (1) (A) (i)
(2000) requires that the allowance be "reasonable in amount for clothing and other personal needs of the individual (or couple) while in an institution ..
4. Campbell, 364 Md. at 118, 771 A.2d at 1057.
5. Id. at 122, 771 A.2d at 1059.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 118-22, 771 A.2d at 1057-59.
8. Id. at 111-12, 119, 771 A.2d at 1053, 1057. The policy issues were given more attention at the trial court level. See id. at 116-17, 771 A.2d at 1056 (reviewing the trial judge's
memorandum opinion). Although the trial court outwardly rejected the various public
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been willing to allow a deduction from Medicaid recipients' "available
income" for the fees of court-appointed guardians,9 the Court of Appeals has commendably refused to resort to such judicial activism.
1. The Case.-Arthur L. Drager was appointed guardian of the
property for seven mentally incompetent Medicaid recipients.10 The
Maryland rules governing the appointment of guardians over the
property of disabled or incompetent persons are set forth in section
13-705 of the Estates and Trusts Article,' 1 which provides that a court
may appoint a guardian if it determines that an individual lacks sufficient mental capacity to make or communicate basic decisions necessary to support him or herself, and that no less intrusive alternative is
available. 12
All of the recipients were residents of long-term care nursing facilities and received Medicaid benefits to help pay for their institutional care and medical needs. 13 The amount of assistance provided
to each recipient is based on that recipient's "available income," the
amount of which is determined by various regulations.1 4 The recipient is required to contribute all of his or her "available income" to the
nursing facility to cover the cost of care, while the Medicaid assistance
policy arguments raised by the recipients and suggested that courts were an improper forum for resolving legislative or regulatory issues, the trial court went on to assume a policy
position in supporting its finding that the guardianship fees should be deductible. Id. at
117, 771 A.2d at 1056. The trial judge opined that the services of many court-appointed
guardians are "essential to life and living," and that income allowances permitting Medicaid recipients to compensate these guardians for their services were vital to the continued
functioning and effectiveness of the guardianship system. Id.
9. See infra notes 74-97 and accompanying text (discussing Massachusetts and Missouri
cases in which the courts permitted guardianship fees to be deducted from Medicaid recipients' income contributions).
10. Campbell, 364 Md. at 114-15, 771 A.2d at 1055. The Medicaid recipients and the
dates on which Drager was appointed their guardian are: Minnie Campbell, May 1996;
Lillian Cheatham, September 1993; Melster Dysart, September 1993; Mahalia LaCruze,
May 1996; Thomas Roundtree, August 1995; Vivian Tazewell, February 1996; and Daisy
Watts, April 1991. Id. at 115 n.7, 771 A.2d at 1055 n.7.
11. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-705 (2001).
12. Id. Section 13-705(b) provides that on petition and after any notice or hearing
required by law, a court may appoint a guardian for an individual if the court determines
from clear and convincing evidence that a person lacks sufficient understanding
or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his person, including provisions for health care, food, clothing, or shelter, because of
any mental disability, senility, other mental weakness, disease, habitual drunkenness, or addiction to drugs, and that no less restrictive form of intervention is
available which is consistent with the person's welfare and safety.
Id. § 13-705(b).
13. Campbell, 364 Md. at 115, 771 A.2d at 1055.
14. See id. at 113, 771 A.2d at 1054; see also MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § .09.24.10D (2000).
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makes up the difference.' 5 Certain deductions from this "available
income" are permitted to cover other expenses and needs.' 6
Acting in his capacity as guardian for the Medicaid recipients, Arthur L. Drager requested that the Maryland Medical Assistance Program (the Program) of the Department permit his wards to deduct his
guardianship commissions from the amount of their "available in17
come," thereby awarding his commissions priority over other costs.

Commissions were sought by Drager in the amounts of: $522.78 for
Minnie Campbell, $294.62 for Lillian Cheatham, $416.27 for Melster
Dystart, $689.04 for Mahalia LaCruze, $263.42 for Thomas Roundtree,
$925.36 for Vivian Tazewell, and $829.37 for Daisy Watts.18
Advising him that there were no provisions in the applicable regulations that would allow for such deductions, the Department denied
Drager's requests and refused to allow the recipients to deduct his
commissions from their available income.' 9 Drager appealed to the
OAH on the grounds that deduction of the commissions should be
permitted as part of the "personal needs" allowance awarded to each
Medicaid recipient.2 0 Drager also argued that the OAH should follow
prior OAH, Board of Review, and circuit court decisions that permitted the deduction of such commissions. 2 ' Finally, Drager set forth a
number of public policy arguments to support his appeal.2 2 The Administrative LawJudge (ALJ) affirmed the Department's decision that
the guardianship fees could not be deducted in each case, determining that the Department had correctly found that guardianship com15. Campbell, 364 Md. at 113, 771 A.2d at 1054; MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § .09.24.10D
(3).
16. See infra notes 101-110 and accompanying text (discussing the specific income deductions or allowances recognized by the applicable regulations).
17. Campbell, 364 Md. at 115, 771 A.2d at 1055. Each claim was processed separately
before the Department and OAH and heard separately before several administrative law
judges. Id. at 115 n.8, 771 A.2d at 1055 n.8. The cases were later consolidated forjudicial
review proceedings in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Id.
18. Id. at 115, 771 A.2d at 1055. Thus, the total amount of combined guardianship fees
sought by Mr. Drager from the seven individual recipients was $3,251.82. For comparison,
if the monthly personal needs allowances of all seven of these recipients were combined,
they would only amount to $280. Assuming each individual contributed 100% of his or her
personal needs allowance toward the guardianship costs, it would take almost twelve
months to pay off the fees. Individually it would have taken Mr. Roundtree (who owed
over $900, the most out of any recipient) two years to pay the guardianship fees owed to
Mr. Drager.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 115-16, 771 A.2d at 1055.
22. Id. at 116, 771 A.2d at 1055. Specific details of these policy arguments are not
mentioned anywhere in the Campbell opinnion, and they were flatly ignored in the court's
decision and reasoning.
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missions were not within the scope of "personal needs" as
contemplated by the regulations, and therefore were not a permissible deduction in calculating a Medicaid recipient's available income. 23 The additional arguments advanced by the recipients were
also rejected. 24 The recipients appealed the ALJ's decisions to the
Board of Review, which affirmed on the grounds that the personal
needs allowance did not cover the cost of guardianship services.2 5
The recipients then sought judicial review of the administrative
decisions in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, at which time the
individual cases were consolidated for hearing. 26 In addition to seeking a deduction of the guardianship commissions, the recipients also
sought a similar deduction for attorney's fees. 27 The circuit court
judge agreed with the recipients' claim that guardianship commissions should be deducted from a recipient's available income as part
of the personal needs allowance and reversed the administrative decision. 2' The court reasoned that its experience with the guardianship
23. Id. at 116 & n.9, 771 A.2d at 1055-56 & n.9. The ALJs that decided the Campbell,
Cheatham, and Tazewell cases found that the personal needs covered by the statutory allowance were "incidental items used for clothing or for grooming one's body," such as
haircuts, shampoos, and chewing gum, and not legal fees. Id. at 116 n.9, 771 A.2d at 1055
n.9. The ALJs in the LaCruze, Dysart, and Watts cases further determined that the Department's reading of the regulations was not only correct, but was also "bolstered by the
State's need to comply with federal requirements .
Id.
24. Id. at 116, 771 A.2d at 1056.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The appellees requested that the trial court grant reasonable attorneys' fees in
the amount of $600 per case, plus court costs. Id. at 123, 771 A.2d at 1059. The trial court
granted the request and signed an order directing the Department to "allow a counsel fee
in the amount of six Hundred Dollars ($600,00) [sic] to be paid unto Arthur L. Drager for
services rendered by him in his capacity as Guardian of the Property." Id., 771 A.2d at
1059-60. On appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that the order of attorneys' fees was
ambiguous and reversed. Id. at 123-25, 771 A.2d at 1060-61. The court found that it was
not clear from the order "whether ...the court considered the fees as a part of the 'personal needs allowance' and, as such, deductible from the appellees' income to determine
their 'available income,' or whether the court awarded the attorneys' fees in respect to the
prosecution of the appeal." Id. at 123, 771 A.2d at 1060. Ultimately, however, the court
held that the award could not withstand review in either event. Id. at 123, 771 A.2d at
1060. First, the court held that because the issue of attorneys' fees was presented to the
circuit court for the first time without first being raised in, or decided by, the administrative tribunal, the trial court erred in awarding them beecause a court "may not pass upon
issues presented to it for the first time on judicial review and that are not encompassed in
the final decision of the administrative agency." Id. The court went on to determine that
the award of attorneys' fees must be denied because it is "contrary to the established practice in this country," and that nothing in the applicable statutory provisions in this case
authorized such action. Id. at 124, 771 A.2d at 1060. However, the issue of attorneys' fees
was of secondary importance in this case; accordingly, this Note will focus exclusively on
the Medicaid deduction issues.
28. Id. at 117, 771 A.2d at 1056.
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docket suggested that the services provided by court-appointed guardians were "essential to life and to living," without which countless indigent, elderly, and mentally incompetent individuals would otherwise
be living on the streets.2 9 The trial court did not view an income allowance for Medicaid recipients to pay for the services of their guardi30
ans as a "sort of gilding the lily," but rather as a basic necessity.
The Department appealed the circuit court's decision to the
Court of Special Appeals. 3 ' The Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari while the case was still pending in the Court of Special Appeals
to address the issue of whether guardianship fees are part of a Medicaid recipient's personal needs allowance, and therefore properly deductible from the recipient's "available income."3 2
2. Legal Background.-Medicaid is composed of a complex web
of statutory laws and administrative regulations at both the state and
federal level that govern the administration of this significant social
welfare program.
a. The Medicaid Program.--Medicaid is a jointly funded program operated by individual states and the federal government that
provides medical and financial assistance to low-income persons (particularly seniors) who are unable to fund their medical care.33 The
program is structured on a voluntary, opt-in basis in that states may
elect, but are not required, to participate. 34 If a state elects to participate, it is required to develop and submit its own State Medicaid Plan
for approval by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA),
the federal agency charged with administering the Medicaid program.3 5 The State Medicaid Plan outlining the provision of medical
assistance to beneficiaries must comply with the Medicaid Act and the
various regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Department
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. The court made a point of acknowledging that it "issued the writ of certiorari
on [its] own motion, while this case was pending in the Court of Special Appeals." Id.
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000) (identifying Medicaid as a program for "enabling each
State, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to furnish ... medical assistance on behalf of families with dependant children and aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical
services . .").
34. See id. ("The sums made available under this section shall be used for making payments to States which have submitted, and had approved by the Secretary, State plans for
medical assistance.").
35. Id. § 1396a(a); 42 C.F.R. §§ 430-456 (2001).
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of Health and Human Services.3 6 Upon HCFA approval of the plan,
the state qualifies to receive federal funding.3 7 Once the plan is approved, however, subsequent unapproved alterations may jeopardize
its federal funding."
b. Maryland's Medicaid Program: The Maryland Medical Assistance Program.-Marylandhas elected to participate in the Medicaid
program and has done so through the creation and implementation
of the Maryland Medical Assistance Program, which is administered by
the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. 9 The Medical Assistance Program administers Medicaid by providing certain persons,
such as indigent or medically indigent persons, with reimbursements
for the cost of their health care services." °
Under the program guidelines, elderly, blind, or disabled individuals with an income of less than $2500 will qualify for Medical Assistance Benefits.4 1 An individual with an income that exceeds these
limits but who is still unable to meet his or her health care costs may
enter a nursing home or other long-term care facility. 42 These individuals are then required to contribute all of their "available income"
to pay for the costs of the nursing facility, while the Medical Assistance
Program makes up the difference between the recipient's available income and the cost of their care. 43
Although no concrete definition of "available income" exists, a
formula for determining "available income" for individual recipients
is set forth in the applicable regulations." The regulations define "income" as "any property or service received by a person in cash or in36. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a); 42 C.F.R. §§ 430-456. For instance, the Medicaid statute
mandates that in determining the extent of coverage, a state's plan must include "reasonable standards" for determining the extent of available medical assistance in accordance
with the objectives and purpose of the Medicaid program. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (17).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b).
38. Id. § 1396c.
39. See generally Md. Code Ann,, Health-Gen. I § 15-103 (2000) (amended 2001) (outlining the basic framework for the implementation and administration of Maryland's Medicaid program).
40. See id. § 15-103(a) (2) (i). "Indigent" or "medically indigent" persons are not defined by the code, but the Secretary is authorized to adopt rules and regulations to carry
out the provisions of the code. Id. § 2-104(b) (1); see also MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10,
§§ .09.24.01-.10 (2000) (setting forth the program's eligibility requirements in detail).
41. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 15-109(b)(1); see also Mo. REGS. CODE tit. 10,
§ .09.24.08 (setting forth detailed guidelines for determining "income" or "resource" levels
with respect to medical assistance eligibility).
42. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § .09.24.10D(3).
43. Id.; see also 42 C.F.R. § 435.832(a) (2001) (setting forth similar federal regulatory
guidelines).
44. MD. REGs. CODE tit. 10, § .09.24.1OD(2).
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kind which can be applied directly, or by sale or conversion, to meet
basic needs for food, shelter, and medical expenses.' 4 5 "Available income," therefore, can be defined as the difference between total gross
income and any allowable deductions.4 6 The regulations also provide
for various deductions that may be taken from an individual's income
in arriving at the amount of "available income" they are required to
contribute to their cost of care. 47 Institutionalized recipients are allowed to deduct the following: a personal needs allowance; a spousal
or family allowance; a residential maintenance allowance; and incurred medical expenses that are not subject to payment by a thirdparty insurer.4 8
The federal Medicaid statute mandates the provision of a "personal needs allowance" in the state program by providing that a state
plan will not receive federal approval unless certain deductions or "allowances" are allowed to be taken from a recipient's monthly income,
including a "personal needs" allowance.4 9 Thus, the state is required
to provide a minimal personal needs allowance in order to remain in
compliance with federal guidelines.50
c. Medicaid in Maryland Courts: How Maryland's Appellate Courts
Have Interpreted the Laws and Regulations Governing the State's Medical As-

sistance Program.-The Court of Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals have often been asked to interpret the myriad of statutory
provisions and the regulatory scheme governing the administration of
Maryland's health care subsidy programs in various other areas.5 1
45. Id. § .09.24.02B(23) (a).
46. See id.; Campbell, 364 Md. at 114, 771 A.2d at 1054.
47. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § .09.24.10D(2)(a)-(d).
48. Id.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(q) (1) (A) (2000). The federal statute provides, in pertinent part,
that:
[i]n order to meet the requirement of subsection (a) (50), the State plan must
provide that, in the case of an institutionalized individual or couple described in
subparagraph (B), in determining the amount of the individual's or couple's income to be applied monthly to payment for the cost of care in an institution,
there shall be deducted from the monthly income (in addition to other allowances otherwise provided under the State plan) a monthly personal needs allowance(i) which is reasonable in amount for clothing and other personal needs ....
Id.
50. Id.
51. Prior to Campbell, the Maryland courts had not had an opportunity to interpret the
regulations governing the calculation of a Medicaid recipient's "available income" and the
various deductions included therein. See Campbell, 364 Md. at 111, 771 A.2d at 1052-53.
The lack of any cited precedent for interpreting the "available income" provisions is
noteworthy.
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In Callahan v. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene,5 2 the Court
of Special Appeals was asked to interpret the rules for determining
eligibility for Medicaid benefits under Maryland's program.53 The
Medicaid regulations giving rise to the dispute in Callahanpermitted
applicants to offset medical expenses against their income to meet
program eligibility requirements, but did not allow applicants to deduct these expenses from their "resource level" in order to become
eligible for assistance. 54 Thus, if an applicant had $50,000 of "resources" making them ineligible for assistance, he or she could not
deduct $20,000 of medical expenses to bring him or herself below the
minimum eligibility level and thereby qualify for public assistance. 55
The plaintiffs (an elderly couple) were denied MASO coverage 56 because their "resources" exceeded the minimum level. 57 The plaintiffs
sought review of the denial, challenging, inter alia, the constitutionality of the regulations permitting spend-down for income and not resource levels on the grounds that the distinction created between
those who earn and those who, like the plaintiffs, save, violated the
plaintiffs' equal protection rights. 58 The court rejected this argument. 59 The court applied the lowest level of equal protection scru-

tiny to the challenged regulations and, after determining that there
was a rational basis for the regulation, deferred to the judgment of the
legislative and administrative bodies charged with administering public medical assistance under the various programs.6 °
52. 69 Md. App. 316, 517 A.2d 781 (1986).
53. Id. at 320, 517 A.2d at 783.
54. Id. at 318-19, 517 A.2d at 782.
55. See MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § .09.24.09C (setting forth qualification guidelines).
56. MASO is the Medical Assistance State Only Program. MASO is essentially an alternative version of Medicaid funded entirely by the state. Its purpose is to provide alternative
medical coverage to those who meet certain income and resource limitations of the federal-state Medicaid program, but who nonetheless do not qualify for Medicaid because
they are not determined to be "categorically needy" or "medically needy." Callahan, 69
Md. App. at 319, 517 A.2d at 782. Essentially the same laws and regulations otherwise
apply, however, to MASO and Medicaid. Id
57. Id. The Callahans' "resources" were determined to be $6255, which exceeded the
eligibility limitation of $2600 for a family of two.

Id. (citing MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10,

§ .09.25.08J for the statutory limit for eligibility).
58. Id. at 321-22, 517 A.2d at 784. Plaintiffs also argued that their application was improperly considered under MASO instead of the Medicaid program. Id. at 320, 517 A.2d at
783.
59. Id. at 322, 517 A.2d at 784.
60. Id. at 322-25, 517 A.2d at 784-85. The court reached this conclusion by first determining that the classification between those who save and those who earn and spend is not
the type of suspect classification that the Supreme Court has subjected to a heightened
level of scrutiny. Id. at 323-24, 517 A.2d at 784-85. The court further declined to apply a
"middle tier" scrutiny analysis and held that the challenged classification was subject to
review under the rational basis test. Id. Applying this test, the court concluded that the
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In Department of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Riverview Nursing Centre, Inc.,6 1 the Court of Special Appeals was asked to resolve a claim
brought by Riverview (a nursing home that was a participant in the
Maryland Medical Assistance Program) regarding the Department's
disallowance of a portion of Riverview's claimed Medicaid reimbursement for services rendered to indigent or medically indigent persons.62 Maryland's reimbursement guidelines pay nursing homes a
per diem rate for each Medicaid patient receiving services.6 3 This per
diem rate is calculated by totaling four cost categories: administrative
and routine costs, direct nursing care costs, other patient costs, and
64
capital costs.
The dispute in Riverview Nursing revolved around the Department's method of calculating reimbursement figures in the capital
costs category. 65 Specifically, Riverview challenged the Department's
application of an interest offset rule in calculating the home's net interest expenses under the capital cost category.6 6 Riverview argued
that the Department's interpretation and application of these regulations to "non-investor operated" facilities such as Riverview were in
conflict with the general principle underlying Medicaid reimbursement and did not further program purposes. 67 In response, the Department maintained that although the COMAR regulations did not
expressly call for the challenged application of the offset rule, the offset of interest income against interest expense was required under the
state Medicaid laws, and the offset rule had been consistently applied
in this manner since the inception of the current reimbursement
rules.68

state had a legitimate interest in providing additional medical benefits to supplement
those provided under Medicaid and held that the state regulations establishing eligibility
for such benefits were rationally related to that legitimate state purpose. Id. at 324, 517
A.2d at 785.
61. 104 Md. App. 593, 657 A.2d 372 (1995).
62. Id. at 597, 657 A.2d at 374. A significant aspect of the Medicaid program is the
reimbursement of medical providers, including nursing homes, for medical care rendered
to persons who are considered indigent or "medically indigent" and thus qualify for assistance. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (A) (2000). In Maryland, the Department is the designated agency that has a statutory responsibility to adopt rules and regulations governing
the reimbursement of Medicaid care providers under the state's Medical Assistance Program. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 15-103(a) (2000) (amended 2001).
63. Riverview Nursing, 104 Md. App. at 599, 657 A.2d at 375.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 600, 657 A.2d at 375.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 600-01, 657 A.2d at 375-76.
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The court upheld the Department's interpretation and application of the reimbursement rules.6 9 In reaching its decision, the court
relied heavily on the expertise of the Department in the complex field
of Medicaid reimbursement and gave great deference to the Department's interpretation of the applicable regulations.7 y The court reasoned that although it could substitute its judgment for that of an
administrative agency when interpreting a regulation, it was obligated
to ascertain the "intent of the State in adopting the regulation. '"71
The court identified its "primary goal" in examining regulatory policy
issues as effectuating the intent of the Legislature. 2 Ultimately, the
court deferred to the Department's determination of such legislative
intent and its long-standing and consistent interpretation of the reimbursement rules.73
d.

The Deductibility of GuardianshipFees In Other States.-The

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Rudow v. Commissioner of
the Division of Medical Assistance,7 and the Court of Appeals of Missouri, in Missouri State Division of Family Services v. Barclay,75 have con-

sidered the question of whether court-appointed guardian fees could
of Medicaid recipients
be deducted from the "available income"
76
under the appropriate state programs.
The plaintiffs in Rudow were two elderly Medicaid recipients adjudicated to be incompetent.7 7 The attorney acting as guardian sought,
on behalf of the recipients, authorization from the State's Division of
Medical Assistance for her fees and costs (which had been approved
by a probate judge) to be deducted as guardianship expenses from
each plaintiffs "patient paid amount" (PPA), the amount recipients
were required to contribute to their cost of care. 78 The administrative
agency denied the requests, and a welfare appeals referee affirmed
the denial, holding that recipients would have to pay for such expenses out of their $60 per month "personal needs allowance. 7 9
69. Id. at 607, 657 A.2d at 379.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 604, 657 A.2d at 377 (citing Genstar Stone Paving Prods. Co. v. State Highway
Admin., 94 Md. App. 594, 602, 618 A.2d 256, 259 (1993)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 606-07, 657 A.2d at 378-79.
74. 707 N.E.2d 339 (Mass. 1999).
75. 705 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
76. Rudow, 707 N.E.2d at 341-44; Barclay, 705 S.W.2d at 521-23.
77. Rudow, 707 N.E.2d at 341.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 342.
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The plaintiffs sought judicial review of the decision, and the trial
court held that the guardianship costs should be considered medical
or remedial and, subject to certain limits, allowed to be deducted
under the incurred medical expenses allowance.8 0 The trial court
then remanded the case to the administrative board of hearings for
further proceedings, and the Division appealed the decision.'
On
2
appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed. The
court reasoned that the appointment of guardians to act on behalf of
incompetent persons who require medical treatment is "an integral
part of the law in Massachusetts concerning medical treatment for incompetent patients." 3 The court went on to note that without a
court-appointed guardian, the plaintiffs would never have been able
to obtain necessary and appropriate medical treatment; therefore, the
84
guardianship fees must be considered necessary medical expenses.
The Missouri Court of Appeals also wrestled with the issue of allowing deductions from Medicaid recipients' income calculations for
guardianship fees in Missouri State Division of Family Services v. Barclay.
Like the Rudow court, the Barclay court concluded that the guardianship fees should be deductible.8 5 Betty Barclay, a deaf mute with numerous physical and mental impairments, was forced to move into a
long-term care facility when her grandmother passed away.8 6 When
the funds from her grandmother's estate were exhausted, Barclay was
adjudicated incompetent by a probate judge,
and Mr. A. B. Musik was
87
appointed to act as her legal guardian.
Musik was able to procure social security benefits and Medicaid
assistance through the Division of Family Services (DFS) to subsidize
the cost of Barclay's institutional care.88 Thereafter, the guardian successfully petitioned the probate court to allow him to withhold and set
aside a portion of Barclay's monthly income to pay for certain expenditures."s On review, however, the DFS determined that the only allowable deductions were a $25 personal needs allowance and $14.60 for
Barclay's Medicaid insurance premium.9" This determination was
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
1985).
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 345.
Missouri State Div. of Family Sen's. v. Barclay, 705 S.W.2d 518, 523 (Mo. Ct. App.
Id. at 519.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 520.
Id.
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reached based on an application of the formula set forth in the DFS
Income Maintenance Manual (IMM) for determining the amount of
"available income" Medicaid recipients would be required to contribute towards the cost of their care. 9 The director9 2of the DFS later
affirmed this decision after an evidentiary hearing.
The guardian appealed the decision of the DFS to the circuit
court, which reversed the DFS director's findings and held that the
withholdings ordered by the probate courts were permissible deductions.93 DFS appealed to the Court of Appeals, challenging the lower
court's reversal of the director's decision on the grounds that the
court exceeded its customarily limited role in reviewing and determining the validity of administrative bodies' decisions.9 4 The Court of Appeals held that while the provisions in the IMM at issue would be valid
rules with the force and effect of law if properly implemented, "the
asserted portion of IMM has no controlling force due to the noncompliance with the required procedures."9 5 Rather than simply end its
discussion there, however, the Barclay court dove into a policy debate. 96 The court went on to state, in dicta, "Assuming arguendo that
the [IMM] provisions had effective legal force, the director's decision
to limit the deductions to $25 from Betty's social security check is contrary to law in view of the Medicaid statutes and accompanying
regulations." 7
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Department of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Campbell, the Court of Appeals held that the "personal needs"
allowance was intended to allow recipients to pay for incidental personal items such as haircuts or shampoo, and that nothing in the regulations suggested that the allowance could be extended to cover items
such as guardianship fees.9 8 The court began by disposing of various
issues improperly presented for review. The court declined to consider the recipients' new alternative argument that the guardianship
fees should be deductible under the "incurred medical expenses" al-

91. Id.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 521.
Id.
Id.
Campbell, 364 Md. at 122, 771 A.2d at 1059.
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lowance because the recipients waived this argument by not presenting it at the lower levels of review.9"
After narrowing its focus to the issue of whether the guardian
commissions could be deducted from available income as part of a
recipient's "personal needs allowance," the court first examined the
relevant provisions of the Medical Assistance Program and its accompanying regulations.'0 ° Based on this review, the court determined
that the Maryland regulations (the validity of which were not at issue)
failed to provide any explanatory definition of the "personal needs
allowance."' 1 For insight into the meaning of this provision, the
court resorted to a "perusal of the pertinent sections of the federal
[Medicaid] statute and the accompanying regulations.""' 2 In the
court's view, the federal regulation 10 3 requiring states to allow a personal needs deduction is intended to cover clothing and other personal items or needs of individual recipients that are not provided
while they are in the institution.l° 4 The court, therefore, adopted this
as the proper interpretation of the5 personal needs allowance under
Maryland's Medicaid regulations.

1

In support of its finding that "[g]uardianship commissions are
not clothing, and they are not the kind of personal needs contemplated by the COMAR 10.09.24.1OD," the court noted that the amount
of the personal needs allowance was only $40.'o6 In the court's view,
that amount would undoubtedly accommodate the cost of "personal
items" necessary for personal hygiene, grooming, or even to pay for
some limited entertainment." 7 The court resolved that such an
99. Id. at 111-12 n.1, 771 A.2d at 1053 n.I. In their brief, the recipients changed the
approach they had taken at the administrative hearings and the lower court and for the
first time argued that the guardianship commissions should be deducted from the allowance for "incurred medical expenses." Id. The court pointed out that throughout the
prior stages of the proceedings (before the ALJs, the review board, and the circuit court)
the only basis upon which the recipients relied was the argument that the commission
should be considered as part of the recipients' "personal needs allowance." Id. The court
simply refused to consider this new argument, noting that "[w]e have said time and time
again, that we will review an adjudicatory agency decision solely on the grounds relied
upon by the agency." Id. The court did, however, expressly point out that its "refusal to
address the 'incurred medical expense' issue is without prejudice to it, or any other basis . . . ." Id. at 112 n.i, 771 A.2d at 1053 n.1.
100. Id. at 119-22, 771 A.2d at 1057-59.
101. Id. at 121, 771 A.2d at 1058.
102. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(50) (2000)).
103. 42 C.F.R. § 435.832(c)(1) (2001).
104. Campbell, 364 Md. at 122, 771 A.2d at 1059.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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amount would clearly be inadequate, however, to accommodate the
cost of items such as guardianship fees, which, as they did in the present case, are likely to considerably exceed the maximum amount of
the personal needs allowance."' The court went on to maintain that
the regulatory scheme of Maryland's Medical Assistance Program
demonstrates that the regulation is not intended to include guardianship within the personal needs allowance.' 0 9 Had the regulation been
intended in any way to permit or accommodate payments for items
such as guardianship fees, the court concluded that the regulation
10
"would have provided for a deduction larger than $40 per month."'
4. Analysis.-In Campbell, the Court of Appeals was confronted
with a policy issue as opposed to a classic legal problem: should Medicaid be used to subsidize the costs of court-appointed guardians over
the property of needy recipients? The court refused to acknowledge
such policy implications and, assuming the traditional role of the judiciary, applied a classic legal analysis to reach its decision."
Other
courts that have considered the same issue have done so by engaging
in 'judicial policymaking," with little adherence to the well-established
principles of statutory interpretation and legal analysis." 2 Thus, it appears that the Court of Appeals' ideological convictions with regard to
the proper function of the courts in deciding questions saturated in
public policy played a pivotal role in shaping the interpretation of Maryland's Medicaid law.
a. The Policy Implications of Campbell.-On its face, the question presented in Campbell appears relatively benign and straightforward. The court was merely asked to decide whether Medicaid
recipients who benefit from the services of court-appointed guardians
should be permitted to take a monthly deduction from their "available
income" to pay the commissions or fees of their guardians.'
Beneath the surface of this question, however, are a myriad of conflicting policy considerations and arguments.

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
111. See id.
112. See supra notes 74-97 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts
stretched applicable regulations and refused to defer to administrative agencies' interpretations of regulations in an effort to include guardianship fees within the permissible
deductions).
113. Campbell, 364 Md. at 111, 771 A.2d at 1052-53.

950

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 61:936

On the one hand, guardians are rightfully entitled to some measure of compensation for their services. 114 The reasonableness of the
commissions (calculated in accordance with the Maryland Code) was
not contested. 1 5 Moreover, the services and functions of court-appointed guardians are truly necessary and immeasurably beneficial to
recipients. 116 In fact, the circuit court, in setting forth its reasons for
allowing the guardianship fees to be deducted as part of the personal
needs allowance, noted that:
[A] lot of indigent people would be out on the street but for
our appointing guardians and having Counsel represent the
guardian, and then be able to get the benefits that they're
entitled to under the law. So, I don't view [deducting the
fees as part of the personal needs allowance] as sort of gilding the lily, I view it as essential to life and to living ...."'
Chief Judge Bell's opinion for the court in Campbell carefully avoided
this issue and, aside from quoting the foregoing language of the trial
court, did not directly address the value or usefulness of the guardianship system.
Complicating this situation is the fact that any decision rejecting a
deduction of the guardianship commissions from the available income of recipients will ultimately mean that the guardians will not be
paid for their services. 8 Under Medicaid, recipients must hand over
all of their available income to the Medical Assistance Program. 1 9
Thus, recipients of Medicaid assistance under Maryland's program essentially have no income with which to pay personal debts or obligations outside of their medical needs unless the regulations permit a
deduction of such amounts from their "available income."' 2 ° This
creates a situation where recipients are unable to compensate those
114. The guardianship commissions were calculated in accordance with MD.CODE ANN.,
& TRUSTS §§ 13-218, 14-103 (2001), and approved by the Trust Clerk for the Circuit
Court of Baltimore City. Campbell, 364 Md. at 116-17, 771 A.2d at 1056.
115. See Campbell, 364 Md. at 115-18, 771 A.2d at 1054-57.
116. See id. at 117, 771 A.2d at 1056 (citing the trial court judge's praise of the services
provided by court-appointed guardians).
117. Id.
118. The statutes governing the appointment of guardians and the calculation of their
fees do not provide for any alternative source of compensation in the event that a ward is
unable to pay. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 13-218, 13-705, 14-103 (2001) (governing the appointment of guardians and the calculation of their fees).
119. SeeMD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § .09.24.10D (2000). Aside from the recognized deductions or allowances, Medicaid recipients are required to contribute all of their income to
pay for the cost of care, leaving them with virtually nothing to pay for other items, except
for the $40 they are permitted to withhold through the personal needs allowance. Id.
120. Id. § .09.24.1OD(3).
EST.
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who provide services for them, such as court-appointed guardians, unless some sort of deduction from the income they must contribute to
the cost of their care is allowed.
On the other side of the coin, however, is the fact that any deductions that are allowed to be taken from the "available income" of recipients to pay for certain goods or services will, in effect, act as
government subsidies of such services.12 Consider the following example: A is a qualified Medicaid recipient with a total monthly income
of $500, and the total monthly costs of his medical care amount to
$1000. If A contributed all of his $500 monthly income to pay for his
care, it would cost the taxpayers $500 per month to provide Medicaid
assistance for him. The legislature and administrative agencies have
chosen, however, to allow A to "keep" a certain amount of his $500
monthly gross income by way of "deductions."'2 2 Thus, A is permitted
to keep $40 for "personal needs," and a "residential maintenance allowance." 2 ' Now A is keeping $200 and only contributing $300. The
net effect is that the government has essentially provided A with an
indirect subsidy at a cost of $200 per month.
Therefore, every deduction that is allowed to be taken from a
Medicaid recipient's "available income" amounts to an indirect government expenditure. The approval of public expenditures has traditionally been an area of government decision-making delegated to
elected officials, and the courts have been understandably reluctant to
124
play an active role in such decisions.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland demonstrated this reluctance in Callahan v. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene,1 2 an121. See id. Any difference between the recipient's aggregate cost of care and the
amount of available income he or she will contribute to cover such cost is made up by
Medicaid. Id. Medicaid is ultimately funded by state and federal tax revenues. See 42
U.S.C. § 1396 (2000).
122. See MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § .09.24.10D.
123. Id
124. See Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Riverview Nursing Ctr., Inc., 104 Md. App.
593, 602-04, 657 A.2d 372, 376-77, cert. denied, 340 Md. 215, 665 A.2d 1058 (1965) (recognizing the Department's superior ability to understand its own rules and regulations and
suggesting that courts should be reluctant to substitute their judgment for the expertise of
the administrative agency); Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Reeders Mem'l Home,
Inc., 86 Md. App. 447, 453, 586 A.2d 1295, 1297-98 (1991) (acknowledging and deferring
to the "expertise" of the Nursing Home Appeal Board, which hears disputes regarding
reimbursement under Medicaid, in interpreting and applying the complex Medicaid reimbursement regulations); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Bowen, 60 Md. App. 299, 305, 482
A.2d 921, 924 (1984) (noting that a court should defer to an agency's interpretation of a
statute because agencies have special expertise).
125. 69 Md. App. 316, 517 A.2d 781 (1986), cert. denied, 308 Md. 382, 519 A.2d 1283
(1987).
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other case in which the court was asked to render a decision that
would impact the State's medical assistance expenditures.' 26 Despite
the persuasive policy arguments advanced by the plaintiff and the
seemingly illogical effect of the eligibility regulations, the Court of
Special Appeals declined to "second-guess those officials who are responsible for the allocation of limited public funds 'among the myriad
of potential recipients. '' 127 While acknowledging the legitimate policy debate surrounding the issue, the court noted that "the intractable
economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of the
Court ....
128
On a more general level, Maryland courts have acknowledged
that the primary responsibility for interpreting, shaping, and administering the state's Medicaid program falls not on the courts, but on the
Department. 1 29 In Department of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Riverview
Nursing Centre, Inc., the Court of Special Appeals deferred to the Department on a decision concerning the reimbursement of health care
3
providers under certain provisions of the Medicaid program."'
In
fact, the court suggested that judges may not even be qualified to assume a significant role in at least some aspects of the Medicaid program. 31 The court determined that the complexity of Medicaid
reimbursement required a special level of agency "expertise," and
therefore the Department was better able to interpret and apply the
3 2
applicable laws and regulations in this area.1
b. JudicialActivism in Medicaid: ContrastingCampbell with the
Proactive Decision-MakingDisplayed by Courts in Other States.-Courts in
other states have been much more willing than the Court of Appeals
of Maryland to assume a proactive role in interpreting and applying
33
the same provisions of their own Medicaid statutes and regulations.1
A close examination of these decisions and the reasoning used to sup-

126. Id. at 320, 517 A.2d at 783.
127. Id. at 325, 517 A.2d at 785 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487
(1970)).
128. Id. (quoting Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 487).
129. See supra note 124 (highlighting several cases in which Maryland courts have expressed deference to the Department and the agencies and boards under it that are
charged with promulgating, interpreting, and administering the regulations governing the
Medicaid program).
130. 104 Md. App. 593, 602-03, 657 A.2d 372, 376-77 (1995).
131. See id. at 603, 657 A.2d at 377.
132. Id. at 603, 607, 657 A.2d at 376-77, 378-79.
133. See supra notes 74-97 and accompanying text (discussing the proactive approaches
taken by other courts in interpreting similar Medicaid provisions).
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port them will, when contrasted to the Campbell decision, highlight the
notable level of judicial self-restraint exercised by the Campbell court.
In Rudow v. Commissioner of the Division of Medical Assistance,13 4 a
case that presented factual and legal issues virtually identical to those
in Campbell, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found a way
to permit deductions from Medicaid recipients' "patient paid
amount" (the equivalent of "available income") to cover the costs of
guardianship commissions.' 3 5 The Rudow decision and the analysis
the court employed in reaching that decision stands in stark contrast
to the deferential, restrained interpretation of the applicable regulations displayed by the Court of Appeals in Campbell.' 6
The Rudow court refused to defer to legislative action, noting that
"[w]e also are not persuaded that the appropriate resolution of this
issue is legislative rather than judicial.""' The court hastily dismissed
the division's claim that a proper resolution of the issue could only
come through a legislative enactment increasing the "personal needs
allowance" for recipients who require court-appointed guardians to
obtain necessary medical treatment. 3 ' The court's inadequate justification for this position was that the personal needs allowance was
never intended to cover such costs and that such an alteration would
not be in harmony with the federal regulations. 3 9 Based on an examination of the federal and state statutory and regulatory provisions
pertaining to the personal needs allowance, the Rudow court simply
determined that the items and services that could be charged to a
recipient's personal needs allowance "are not analogous to guardianship expenses necessitated by the incapacity of a nursing home resident to consent to her own medically necessary treatment." 140
In reaching its decision, the Rudow court ignored evidence which
indicated that allowing deductions for guardianship fees under Medicaid would be in conflict with the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) policy interpretations of the cognate Federal Medicaid
134. 707 N.E.2d 339 (Mass. 1999)
135. Id. at 347.
136. Compare id. at 340-47 (displaying a clear willingness to consider policy implications
in its legal analysis), with Campbell, 364 Md. at 122, 771 A.2d at 1059 (employing a more
mechanical approach when interpreting the applicable language in the regulation).
137. Rudow, 707 N.E.2d at 346.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 346-47 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(q)(1)(A)(i) (2000) when defining the
proper scope of the personal needs allowance as a monthly deduction "reasonable in
amount for clothing and other personal needs of the individual (or couple) while in an
institution").
140. Id. at 347.
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statute and implementing regulations. 4 1 In its brief, the division
pointed to two separate instances in which the HCFA clearly and unequivocally indicated that expenses such as guardianship fees were
not deductible from a recipients'
requisite income contribution under
1 42
the current provisions.
In 1997 (the first instance in which the HCFA indicated its position), the Massachusetts Attorney General formally requested that the
HCFA interpret allowable deductions from a Medicaid recipient's income for "'necessary medical and remedial care' to include guardianship expenses." '4 3 The HCFA definitively declined to issue the
requested interpretation, responding that:
[a]lthough various medical evaluations, certifications, and
data are required as part of the process of appointing a...
guardian, appointment of a guardian is nevertheless a legal
proceeding. . . . [G]uardianship costs do not in any way
meet the definition of medical and remedial care, and thus
cannot be deducted from the individual's income under that
category. 144
The division also cited a second, similar refusal by the HCFA to
approve a proposed amendment to Missouri's Medicaid program in
1987 as indicative of the conflict between HCFA's interpretation of
applicable federal law and the decision ultimately reached by the
court in Rudow.'4 5 The proposed amendments to the Missouri Medicaid plan would have expressly permitted the deduction of "guardianship-related services" and expenses from the calculation of
institutionalized recipients' "available income" contributions.' 4 6 The
HCFA, interpreting the applicable federal regulations, concluded that
guardianship-related services were not the type of "necessary medical
or remedial care" contemplated under state law because "[t]he services of a guardian are plainly legal or administrative even though
they may be quite important to necessary medical care."1 4 7 As further
support for its position, the HCFA noted that guardianship services do
not require medical expertise or serve any medical purpose, and that
for tax purposes guardianship fees would not be included in the cate141. Id. at 345-46. The HCFA is a subsidiary agency of the United States Department of
Health and Human Services and is charged with administering the Medicaid program and
promulgating regulations for its implementation. Id. at 346 n.14.
142. Id. at 345-46 & nn.15 & 16.
143. Id. at 346 n.15.
144. Id. (alterations in original).
145. Id. at 346.
146. Id. at 346 n.1 6 .
147. Id. (alteration in original).
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gory148of "deductible medical expenses" recognized under federal tax
law.
Choosing to essentially ignore the position of the HCFA and
reach an entirely different conclusion, the Rudow court pointed to the
absence of any express HCFA regulations embodying its view on the
issue to justify its decision.' 4 9 The court went on to find that HCFA's
policy was not compelling in the absence of regulation and, while administrative interpretations are rightfully accorded some deference,
"interpretive rule making is not controlling upon the courts."'15 The
court ultimately concluded that "[w]e do not consider ourselves
bound by HCFA's policy position particularly where, as here, we conclude that position conflicts with the controlling Federal statutory
scheme."' 5 1
The deductibility of guardianship expenses incurred by Medicaid
recipients has also been addressed by the Missouri Court of Appeals in
Missouri State Division of Family Services v. Barclay." 2 That tribunal, like
the Rudow court in Massachusetts, displayed a much stronger inclination to interject itself into the policymaking process than did Maryland's high court.' 53 The Barclay court initially held that the
provisions of Missouri's IMM with respect to the deductibility of expenses such as guardianship fees were invalid on a very technical basis. 1 5 4 The court relied in the alternative, however, on what essentially
amounted to a public policy justification for allowing guardianship
1 55
fees to be deductible.

Although the court framed its "arguendo" holding as a determination of Medicaid "law," its reasoning clearly reveals that this purported conclusion of law was motivated not by statutory
interpretation, but by public policy considerations. 156 First, the court
outlined the "purpose" of the Medicaid program and made an unpersuasive attempt to argue that the DFS deduction rules applied to Barclay somehow conflicted with federal regulatory guidelines.' 57 The
court relied heavily on its conclusion that it would be a violation of the
148. Id.
149. Id. at 345-46.
150. Id. at 346.
151. Id.
152. 705 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
153. Id. at 521-23.
154. See id. at 521 (finding that the IMM provisions were invalid because they did not
satisfy certain publication and filing requirements for regulatory rules).
155. Id. at 521-23.
156. See id.
157. Id. at 521-22.
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federal regulations if the state were to allow the minimum "personal
needs" allowance of recipients' to be "invaded" to cover expenses such
as guardianship fees.'15 Thus, the court determined that the regulations must provide for a reasonable deduction for necessary or remedial medical care over and above the $25 personal needs allowance.' 5 9
The court ultimately remanded the case to DFS and instructed it to
allow Barclay to take an allowance for "medical and remedial care,"
instructing that the scope of the allowance cover the withholdings authorized by the probate court (which included guardian and attorneys' fees). 6 0
Inherent in the Barclay court's decision is a policy determination
by the court. 6 ' By instructing the administrative agency to create a
deduction under which guardianship fees would be included, the
court implicitly held that such expenses should be deductible and that
the Medicaid program should be extended to effectively subsidize
guardianship services for recipients.1 6 2 In so doing, the Barclay court
demonstrated its willingness to assume a hands-on, active role in administrative policy formation.
c.

Judicial Restraint and Deference on Display in Campbell.-

The analysis and legal reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland in reaching its decision in Campbell stands in stark contrast
to that displayed in both Barclay and Rudow and is indicative of the
legal traditionalism and discipline that has come to characterize the
decisions of Maryland's high court.' 6 3 Upon reading the opinions in
Rudow and Barclay, there are some indications that the judges deciding those cases, particularly in Rudow, simply determined that Medicaid recipients should be permitted to deduct guardianship expenses
from their income and then proceeded to formulate a legal basis for
that conclusion.16 4 Thus, the decisions in Rudow and Barclay reflect
the courts' view of what the Medicaid policy should be with respect to
158. Id. at 522-23 (quoting Potter v. James, 499 F. Supp. 607, 611 (N.D. Ala. 1980), in
which the court invalidated an Alabama statute requiring Medicaid recipients to pay part
of their prescription drug expenses out of their $25 personal allowance).
159. Id. at 523.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See Theo 1. Ogune, Judges and Statutory Construction:Judicial Zombism or Contextual
Activism?, U. BALT. L.F. Spring/Summer 2002, at 4, 35-37 (pointing to the Court of Appeals's focus on discerning and effectuating legislative intent in interpreting statutes and
regulations as a model for statutory interpretation).
164. See Rudow v. Comm'r of the Div. of Med. Assistance, 707 N.E.2d 339, 343-47 (Mass.
1999); Barclay, 705 S.W.2d at 521-23.
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deductions for guardianship fees and not what the policy is under the
applicable law.
In contrast, the decision of the Court of Appeals in Campbell is a
clarification of what the state's policy is as declared in the Medicaid
laws enacted and administered by the legislative and administrative
bodies empowered by the citizens of Maryland to make such determinations.' 6 5 Nothing in the laws or regulations governing the calculation and distribution of public benefits under Maryland's Medicaid
program suggests that the legislature or the Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene ever intended the personal needs allowance to
cover items such as guardianship or attorney's fees.' 6 6 Upon making
this determination, the court obviously felt compelled to end its interpretive inquiry.' 6 7
The Campbell court could have easily reached the opposite conclusion and held that guardianship fees should be deductible. The volume of ambiguities in the Medicaid statutes and regulations leaves
ample room for judicial interpretation, which, as evidenced in Rudow,
can serve as a tool for the courts to engage in both intentional and
inadvertent policymaking. Admittedly, the plaintiffs' (recipients) initial reliance on the personal needs allowance as the source of the
guardianship deduction (as opposed to the incurred medical expenses deduction) may have, at least in the court's view, tied the
court's hands in some respects. 6 ' However, the action in Rudow also
came before the appellate court after having been decided below on
the basis of the personal needs allowance, but the court nevertheless
based its holding on the incurred medical expenses allowance. 6 ' In
any event, the Campbellcourt refused to find a deduction for guardianship expenses and, in light of the court's opinion, it would seem unlikely that the outcome would have been different had the incurred
170
medical expenses allowance been at issue.
The Court of Appeals's decision in Campbell deserves praise because it establishes precedent for judicial restraint in the field of social
165. See Campbell, 364 Md. at 122, 771 A.2d at 1059.
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 111-12 n.1, 771 A.2d at 1053 n.1 (noting that the failure to raise the incurred medical expenses argument at any prior stage of the proceedings precluded its
consideration at the appellate level).
169. See Rudow, 707 N.E.2d at 342, 347. The court's opinion, however, does not address
this potential waiver issue or offer a clear explanation of the exact parameters of the administrative decisions. See id.
170. See Campbell, 364 Md. at 122, 771 A.2d at 1059 (describing the court's ultimate
decision on the matter).
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welfare programs, which are infused with politically charged policy is71
sues, and thereby preserves the credibility and prestige of the court.
The decision in Campbell can be described as an example, albeit a rela' 172
tively mundane one, of the exercise of 'Judicial restraint."
The responsibility for deciding political issues and formulating
public policy is allocated to the legislative branch of government, and
the courts' role in this area must necessarily be limited to objective
interpretation guided by legislative intent.1 7 ' The courts are not
structurally equipped to make policy decisions in areas such as Medicaid. 174 Courts are not representative bodies, and therefore they are
not politically responsive to the popular will that is supposed to navigate a democratic society. 1 75 The essential characteristics of the
courts are independence and political isolation. 7 6 The United States
Supreme Court itself has noted that "[h]istory teaches that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in
choosing between competing political, economic and social
pressures."

177

A long line of notable legal minds and scholars have advocated
an adherence to judicial restraint by contemporary courts.' 78 These
scholars argue that judicial activism creates the risk that citizens will
begin to view the courts as just another partisan branch of government, courts will lose their position as impartial resolvers of conflicts,

171. See Philip A. Talmadge, Understandingthe Limits of Power:JudicialRestraint in General
JurisdictionCourt Systems, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 695, 695-704 (1999) (discussing the proper
functioning of the state courts in the American political system and highlighting the necessity of exercising judicial restraint in deciding issues with political or public policy
overtones).
172. See id. at 698-99 (explaining why judicial restraint is crucial when considering the
core functions of the courts).
173. See id. at 697 (explaining that the primary reason for courts to exercise judicial
restraint "is the separation of powers inherent in our political structure").
174. See, e.g., Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Riverview Nursing Ctr., Inc., 104 Md.
App. 593, 603, 657 A.2d 372, 377 (1995) (acknowledging the courts' lack of competence
and expertise compared to the Nursing Home Appeal Board in interpreting and applying
Medicaid reimbursement provisions).
175. Talmadge, supra note 171, at 696 n.1 (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
176. Id.
177. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 525 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
178. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); ROBERT H.

BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE

POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Law: A Ruse for

Government by an Intellectual Elite, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 767 (1998); John Paul Stevens,
JudicialRestraint, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 437 (1985).
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and respect for the authority of the courts will erode. 7 9 In recent
years, some commentators have noticed a trend of increased judicial
activism from both the left and the right."'8 Some judges seem to view
themselves as "quasi-legislators" with a broad charge to address all issues and resolve all types of controversies that litigants bring before
the courts.' 8 ' According to one author, "what has emerged too often
is a cowboy judiciary riding roughshod over separation of powers in its
zeal to save every damsel in distress and to right every wrong." 182
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, however, has consistently
bucked this apparent trend toward activism, and the court's decision
The Campbell
in Campbell is merely one example of this practice.'
decision is nonetheless noteworthy in that the court was able to resist
the temptation to overextend its proper authority to come to the rescue of the recipients and their guardians, who undoubtedly commanded a great deal of sympathy.' 4 Moreover, the fact that the
regulatory policies at issue in Campbell were relatively minor suggests
that the court's deference was not induced by any significant political
85

pressure. 1

Campbell is not a watershed decision destined to permanently alter the shape of Maryland's Medical Assistance Program. Nor is Campbell likely to have a devastating impact on lives of Medicaid recipients
or the court-appointed guardian system." 6 The Campbell decision is
significant, however, to the extent that it signifies the court's view of
its proper role in the regulatory process. In this respect, Campbell may
179. See, e.g., Talmadge, supra note 171, at 696. Talmadge warns that when little known
and often non-elected judges render policy decisions using a process that is not clearly
understood, and those decisions conflict with determinations made by a majority of the
popularly elected legislature, "some people in the body politic will undoubtedly be upset."
Id. at 700.
180. See, e.g., id. at 695.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 696.
183. See Ogune, supra note 163, at 36-37 (describing the Court of Appeals's adherence
to the strictures of statutory interpretation in 163 cases reviewed by the author).
184. See Campbell, 364 Md. at 122, 771 A.2d at 1059 (reaching its decision based on an
interpretation of the applicable regulations).
185. Cf Stephen B. Bright, PoliticalAttacks on the Judiciary: CanJustice Be Done Amid Efforts
to Intimidate and Remove Judgesfrom Office for UnpopularDecisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 30812 (1997) (discussing political pressures imposed on judges when confronted with hotbutton political issues).
186. In fact, the decision in Campbell did not ultimately end the debate over the deductibility of guardianship fees from the income of Medicaid recipients because the court's
decision does not preclude a future case being brought on a theory that the guardianship
fees should be deductible under the "incurred medical expenses" allowance. Campbell 364
Md. at 112 n.1, 771 A.2d at 1053 n.1.
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serve as a guidepost to future litigants hoping to use the courts as a
forum for shaping Maryland's regulatory policy.
5. Conclusion.-In Campbell, the Court of Appeals prudently refrained from judicial policymaking and assumed the proper, limited
role required of the courts in the field of public welfare policy. The
Court of Appeals's deferential decision in Campbell may serve as a
guidepost for future Maryland courts when interjecting themselves
into the social policymaking domain. Campbell may also serve as a signal to those seeking to shape the state's social welfare policy at the
regulatory level that litigation cannot be relied upon as an effective
strategy for promoting such changes. The decision in Campbell clearly
suggests that the proper forum for such policy change lies in the legislative or administrative domain and not in the courts, whose role will
be limited to interpreting and effectuating the policies enacted by
those bodies. Thus, Campbell offers clear guidance (if not articulable
standards) as to the proper role of the courts vis-A-vis the relevant administrative bodies in the field of Medicaid, where the complex distribution of rule and policymaking authority can easily blur the
boundaries of judicial authority.
BRIEN M. PENN

VII.

A.

PRIVILEGE

The Hamilton Balancing Test Revisited: A FurtherRestriction on the
Use of Executive Privilege Under the Public Information Act

In Office of the Governor v. Washington Post Co., 1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed the issue of whether telephone and
scheduling records from the Office of the Governor and from Governor Parris Glendening were protected from disclosure to the Washington Post under the Maryland Public Information Act.' In deciding
that the Governor was not entitled to a broad claim of executive privilege, the court revisited the Hamilton v. Verdow balancing test' and further restricted the Executive's ability to utilize the doctrine of
executive privilege, particularly when the information being sought is
more factual in nature than deliberative.4 Thus, in situations such as
that in Office of the Governor,the disclosure of factual information, such
as telephone and scheduling records, will have to be explicitly proven
to impinge upon the deliberative process in order for the documents
to be privileged from disclosure. The court in Office of the Governor
erred by failing to examine the chilling effect such broad disclosure
would have on the Governor's deliberative process.
1. The Case.-In November and December 1996, reporters from
the Washington Post (the Post) contacted the Maryland Governor's
Office and requested telephone and scheduling records from the Office of the Governor (the Office) under Maryland's Public Information Act (the Act). 6 The records requested included the telephone
records and "call detail" 7 of the Governor and his staff over two years,
including records from phones in the Governor's Mansion, his State
House offices, his Baltimore and Washington offices, and all car
phones and cellular phones used by the Governor and his staff.8 The
1. 360 Md. 520, 759 A.2d 249 (2000).
2. Id. at 526, 759 A.2d at 252; see also MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 10-611 to -619
(1999 & Supp. 2001) (explaining the type of information that is subject to disclosure
under Maryland law).
3. See Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 563-66, 414 A.2d 914, 925-26 (1980) (establishing a balancing test to determine whether requested documents contain factual or deliberative information).
4. Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 565, 759 A.2d at 273.
5. Id. at 563-65, 759 A.2d at 272-73.
6. Id. at 526, 759 A.2d at 252; see also MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T §§ 10-611 to -630.
7. Call detail includes the date and time that each call took place, as well as the length
of each call and the party contacted. Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 527, 759 A.2d at 253.
8. Id. at 526, 759 A.2d at 252-53.
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Office denied part of the request for any "call detail," claiming executive privilege under Hamilton v. Verdow and section 10-618(b) of the
Act. 9
The Post also requested the scheduling records of the Governor,
including calendars that would indicate with whom the Governor met,
for how long, and the locations of the meetings.' "The Office released the Governor's public agendas.., but denied the remainder of
[the] request, stating that [such] records were not 'public records'
within the meaning of § 1 0 -6 1 1 (g) of the Act, and also invoking executive privilege, citing § 10-618(b) and Hamilton.""
In 1997, while negotiations between the Post and the Office were
ongoing, the Post limited its request to the telephone records pertaining to the Governor, his Chief of Staff, his Senior Advisor, and the
Secretary of State during a six month period from February 1, 1996 to
12
July 31, 1996, and to appointment records during the same period.
13
Nevertheless, the Office continued to deny the Post's request.
The Post filed suit against the Office of the Governor and against
Governor Parris Glendening on December 4, 1997, in the Circuit
Court for Anne Arundel County. 4 The Office moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the records the Post requested were exempt
from disclosure under section 10-618(b) of the Act. The Office further asserted that the documents sought would be exempt from disclosure under the doctrine of executive privilege. 5 Additionally, the
Office argued that publicizing the Governor's schedule, even after the
9. Id. at 527, 759 A.2d at 253; see also Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 563-66, 414
A.2d 914, 925-26 (1980) (concluding that a balancing test must be applied to determine
the effect disclosure of factual material would have on the executive's deliberative process
before such information may be released). Section 10-618(b) of the Act reads: "A custodian may deny inspection of any part of an interagency or intra-agency letter or memorandum that would not be available by law to a private party in litigation with the unit." MD.
CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 10-618(b). The Governor also argued that executive privilege
was incorporated into the Act under section 10-618(b). Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at
527, 759 A.2d at 253. The Governor also argued that case law from other states further
supported his claim of executive privilege over telephone and scheduling records. Id.
10. Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 526-27, 759 A.2d at 253.
11. Id. at 527, 759 A.2d at 253.
12. Id. at 527-28, 759 A.2d at 253.
13. Id. at 528, 759 A.2d at 253.
14. Id.
15. Id. The Office also claimed that some of the requested documents fell under other
exemptions to the Act, including exemptions for records containing personnel information, confidential commercial information, home address and telephone numbers of public employees, and confidential information on finances of individuals. Id. at 528-29, 759
A.2d at 254.
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fact, would threaten the security of the Governor and those around
16
him.
At the same time, the Post filed a cross motion for summary judgment. In it, the Post argued that the documents at issue were not
"interagency or intra-agency letter[s] or memorand[a]" within the
meaning of section 10-618(b) of the Act, and that the documents were
not privileged. 7 Furthermore, the Post argued that any threat to the
Governor's security was not a recognized exemption to the Act, and
that the other exemptions that the Governor and the Office were
claiming did not apply to the records at issue.' 8 After a hearing on
the motions for summary judgment, the court denied both motions in
July 1998.19 The court ordered the Office and the Governor to provide to the Post all telephone and scheduling records that they had
not claimed fell within executive privilege, and to submit to the court,
for in camera review, those documents that they claimed were privileged.2" The Office and the Governor submitted limited records to
the Post, and submitted to the court, for in camera review, unredacted
copies of the telephone and calendar records, as well as records with
proposed redactions highlighted and memorandum in support of
those redactions.2 1 On September 15, 1998, the Post filed a motion to
unseal the in camera explanations for the redactions, and arguments
were heard soon thereafter.2 2
On October 23, 1998, the court issued its final order, stating "that
the Defendants, with limited exceptions, have failed to make a particularized showing as to executive privilege."23 The court continued,
16. Id. at 528, 759 A.2d at 253. The argument that the Governor's security would be
threatened is not inherently different from the argument that disclosure would impair the
Governor's ability to effectively perform his duties because both are based on the harm
that might occur to the Governor. Id. However, the latter argument focuses more on the
effect disclosure would have on the deliberative processes of the Governor and his staff,
instead of the actual harm that may occur to the Governor himself.
17. Id. at 529, 759 A.2d at 254.
18. Id.
19. Id. Two weeks after the court issued its opinion, the Post asked the court to set a
compliance deadline for the Office. Id. at 530, 759 A.2d at 255. The Office filed a motion
for clarification and reconsideration, again asking the court to recognize the doctrine of
executive privilege with respect to all of the documents requested. Id. The court granted
the Post's motion and set a compliance deadline of September 1998. Id. The court also
denied the defendants' motion for reconsideration, holding that the Governor was not
entitled to a broad claim of executive privilege unless he could prove that "disclosure of
particular information [would] adversely affect [his ability] to effectively carry-out his Constitutional duties." Id.
20. Id. at 530, 759 A.2d at 255.
21. Id. at 531, 759 A.2d at 255.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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finding that the defendants had failed to demonstrate that the records
at issue were exempt from mandatory disclosure, therefore not satisfying their burden under the Act.2 4 The Office and the Governor immediately appealed and requested a stay of the circuit court's
26
judgment.2 5 The Court of Special Appeals granted the stay.
Before proceedings could continue in the Court of Special Appeals, however, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari to consider whether the Governor was entitled to executive privilege under
"
the deliberative process privilege enunciated in Hamilton.27
The court
also considered whether the Act applied to the Governor and his Office at all, even though the Act is usually construed in favor of a broad
28
policy of public disclosure.
2. Legal Backgound.-The Act was originally enacted and codified in 1970, and, to some extent, was modeled after the Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) .29 The Act entitles all persons access
to information about the affairs of the government and the acts of
public officials and employees while acting in an official capacity.30
The Act is to be construed in favor of disclosure.3 1
This section will proceed as follows. First, it will examine the applicability of state and federal public information acts to executive offices. Second, it will examine whether several exemptions in the
Maryland Public Information Act allow the Governor to prevent disclosure of certain documents. Third, it will examine the doctrine of
executive privilege in Maryland and other states. Finally, it will briefly
discuss separation of powers in Maryland.
a. Applicability of Public Information Acts to Executive Offices.In Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,12 the Supreme
Court held that FOIA did "render the 'Executive Office of the President' an agency subject to the Act," and "that the President's immedi-

24. Id. "The court granted the Post's motions to unseal the in camera explanations,
ordering the Office and the Governor to produce to the Post 'complete and unredacted
copies of all of the telephone and calendar records at issue ....' Id. "[L]n anticipation of
appeal, the court stayed the execution of the order and retained the records submitted in
camera for ninety-six hours." Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 532, 759 A.2d at 256.
29. Id. at 533, 759 A.2d at 256; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
30. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T §§ 10-611 to -628 (1999 & Supp. 2001).
31. See id. § 10-612(b).
32. 445 U.S. 136 (1980).
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ate personal staff or units in the Executive Office whose sole function
is to advise and assist the President are not included within the term
'agency' under the FOIA."3 3 In Kissinger, the Court addressed
whether summaries of telephone conversations, made by Henry Kissinger's secretaries during his tenure as Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs and Secretary of State and involving both
personal matters and official business, were subject to disclosure
under FOLA. 3 4 The Court found that FOIA renders the "Executive
Office of the President" subject to the Act. 35 However, the Court dis-

tinguished the Executive Office of the President from the Office of
the President; thus, the Court found that the President's personal staff
would not fit within the definition of a government agency. Because
Kissinger's notes were taken at the time he was serving as an advisor to
the President, and because he was not acting as an independent gov37
ernment agency, the notes were subject to disclosure under FOIA.
Unlike FOIA, the Act applies to "public records," as opposed to
"agency records.

'38

Section 10-611(g) of the Act defines "public
records" as "any documentary material that ... is made by a unit or

instrumentality of the State government. "-9 As a result of this distinction, Maryland courts have construed the Act much more broadly
than the Supreme Court has construed FOIA.4 °
In A.S. Abell v. Mezzanote,4" the Court of Appeals of Maryland ad-

dressed whether the Maryland Insurance Guaranty Association would
be considered "an agency or instrumentality of the State of Maryland,"
thus subjecting documents produced by the Association to disclosure
under the Act.4 2 The court, in interpreting the Act, stated that it allows the public to inspect the records of any branch of the state government,4 3 and that "the Public Information Act expressly states that
its provisions shall be broadly construed in every instance with the
33. Id. at 156 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under FOIA, "agency" is defined as
"any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government
controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government
(including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency."

5 u.s.C. § 552(f)(1).

34. Kissinger,445 U.S. at 13940.
35. Id. at 156.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. MD. ConE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 10-611(g) (i) (1999 & Snpp. 2001).
39. Id.
40. See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text (discussing how broadly Maryland
courts have interpreted the Public Information Act).
41. 297 Md. 26, 464 A.2d 1068 (1983).
42. Id. at 27, 464 A.2d at 1068-69.
43. Id. at 32, 464 A.2d at 1071.
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45
view toward public access."" Similarly, in Moberly v. Herboldsheimer,
where the court determined that a hospital was considered a public
agency, and thus subject to the requirements of the Act, a broad interpretation of the Act was emphasized.4 6 In broadly interpreting the
Act, the court stated that "if the General Assembly did not intend this
[broad] interpretation when it enacted this far reaching statute, it

should [have] so state[d]." 47

b. Specific Exemptions in Maryland'sPublic InformationAct Favor
Disclosure.--Given that the Act has been broadly held to apply to any
unit of the government, cases involving the Act require courts to consider whether the party can withhold documents based on certain exemptions within the Act. Section 10-615 allows a custodian to deny
inspection of a public record if the record is privileged or confidential, or if the disclosure is in violation of a federal or state statute.48
Section 10-616 allows for an exemption from disclosure for particular
types of documents, 49 and section 10-617 allows for exemptions from
disclosure for records containing certain types or specific categories of
information. ° Section 10-618(a) allows for an exemption from disclosure if such a denial would be in the public interest, as provided by
the section. 51 Because the Act has a policy of broad construction,
however, exemptions have been narrowly construed.52
Unlike some other states' public information acts, which grant an
exemption in cases where disclosure would be against the public interest,5" the Act has been interpreted not to have such a general public
interest "catchall." Instead, for a record to be exempt for public interest reasons under the Act, it must fall within one of the categories of
44. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. 276 Md. 211, 345 A.2d 855 (1975).
46. Id. at 213, 345 A.2d at 856.
47. Id. at 228, 345 A.2d at 864.
48. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-615 (1999).
49. The types of documents excluded from disclosure include adoption records, welfare records, letters of reference, circulation records, gifts, retirement records, hospital
records, and motor vehicle records containing personal information. Id. § 10-616.
50. Section 10-617 allows a custodian to deny inspection of a record if it contains medical and psychological information, sociological information, commercial information, information about public employees, financial information, information systems, or licensing
records. Id. § 10-617.
51. Id. § 10-618(a).
52. See, e.g., Fioretti v. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 351 Md. 66, 77, 716 A.2d 258, 264 (1998)
("[C]ourts must interpret the exemptions narrowly and in favor of disclosure.").
53. See, e.g., Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 813 P.2d 240, 241 (Cal. 1991).
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permissible denials specified in section 10-618." 4 If the records sought
do not fall clearly within a specified exemption, the custodian has no
authority to deny inspection based solely on public interest.55
Citing the fact that only certain documents were designated for
exemptions from disclosure, the Kirwan court acknowledged that this
reflected the legislative intent that "citizens of the State of Maryland
be accorded wide-ranging access to public information concerning
the operation of their government."5 6 The Kirwan court stated that
"the policy of the Public Information Act is to allow access to public
records .

.

. [and] the statute should be interpreted to favor disclo-

sure."5 7

Similarly, the Cranford court stated that "without a doubt the
bias of the [Maryland] Act is toward disclosure."5 The court explained that a document may not be exempt from disclosure merely
because its disclosure may be contrary to the public interest. Instead,
the Act's specified exemptions encompass situations where irreparable harm to the public interest is greater than any benefits. The court
stated that it is because of this that "[t] he custodian who withholds
public documents carries the burden of justifying nondisclosure.""
This public policy has been reiterated by Maryland courts time
and time again.6" It is clearly the policy of Maryland to ensure its
citizens access to information on government affairs. In furthering
that policy, the courts interpret the exemptions to the Act narrowly. 61
c. The Executive Privilege Doctrine in Maryland.-While the
doctrine of executive privilege was not expressly addressed by the Maryland courts until Hamilton v. Verdow in 1980,62 the doctrine finds its
54. See, e.g., Kirwan v. The Diamondback, 352 Md. 74, 88, 721 A.2d 196, 202-03 (1998)
(explaining that inspection of documents can be denied under § 10-618 only under certain specified conditions).
55. See id.
56. Id. at 81, 721 A.2d at 199 (quoting Fioretti,351 Md. at 73, 716 A.2d at 262 (quoting
A.S. Abell v. Mezzanote, 297 Md. 26, 32, 464 A.2d 1068, 1071 (1983))).
57. Id. at 84, 721 A.2d at 200.
58. Cranford v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 759, 771, 481 A.2d 221, 227 (1984).
59. Id.
60. See Office of the Attorney Gen. v. Gallagher, 359 Md. 341, 343, 753 A.2d 1036, 1037
(2000); Office of the State Prosecutor v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 356 Md. 118, 134, 737 A.2d
592, 601 (1999); Fioretti,351 Md. at 73, 716 A.2d at 262; Cranford, 300 Md. at 771, 481 A.2d
at 227.
61. See, e.g., Fioretti,351 Md. at 73, 716 A.2d at 262 (describing the legislative intent of
the Act).
62. 287 Md. 544, 414 A.2d 914 (1980). See generallyJoAnn Ellinghaus-Jones, Note, Privilege of Executive to Shield Informationfrom Discovey-Doctrine of Executive Privilege Recognized in
Maryland to Prevent Disclosureof Official Information, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 385 (1981) (discussing Hamilton and its implications on future court decisions).
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roots in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights."'3 Executive
privilege is also implicated by section 10-615 of the Act."4
Hamilton involved an action for monetary damages in a wrongful
death suit after a patient, who was recently released from a state
mental hospital, killed a young boy. 65 The boy's estate brought suit,
arguing that the superintendent of the hospital and two staff psychiatrists negligently recommended that the patient be treated at a mental
hospital rather than sent to a maximum security prison.6 6 The document at issue was an investigative report prepared after the murder by
a member of the Governor's staff.67 The report was prepared to identify and assess deficiencies in the government system that allowed such
an event to occur and to determine what future executive action
could be done to remedy the situation.6 8 The defendants argued that
the document was privileged because it was prepared for the purpose
of discussing future action to prevent other similar occurrences at
state facilities and contained opinions and recommendations for the
Governor's use.6 9
The Hamilton court recognized that certain documents would be
protected by executive privilege. 7" The court stated that confidential
advisory and deliberative communications, formulated between government officials and their advisors to determine future government
action, need to be protected from disclosure. 7 ' The Hamilton court
also recognized that just as the President is entitled to a degree of
executive privilege, the Governor, who has the same relation to the
state as the President has to the United States, should enjoy a similar
degree of executive privilege. 72
The Hamilton court stated that "protection from disclosure clearly
extends to confidential advisory and deliberative communications be63. Article 8 provides: "That the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other; and no persons exercising
the functions of one of said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any
other." MD. DECL. OF RTS. art. 8.
64. Section 10-615 of the Act allows for an exemption from disclosure if the material in
question is, "by law .... privileged." MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-615 (1999).
65. Hamilton, 287 Md. at 546-47, 414 A.2d at 917.
66. Id. at 547, 414 A.2d at 917.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 554, 414 A.2d at 920.
69. Id. at 548, 414 A.2d at 917.
70. Id. at 558, 414 A.2d at 922.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 556, 414 A.2d at 921. The court also recognized that the doctrine of executive privilege is founded on the principle of separation of powers enumerated in Article 8
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which limits the court's power to review or interfere
with coordinate branches of government. Id.
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tween officials and those who assist them in formulating and deciding
upon future governmental action."7 3 The court noted that advisory
communications from a subordinate to a government officer, examining and analyzing different options and alternatives in the decisionmaking process, are essential to the deliberative process.74 The court
explained that the public policy behind nondisclosure is the desire to
allow both aides and executives to have frank discussions in developing plans for government action.7 5 Such frank discussions would be
hampered if the communications were required to become public.7 6
Thus, with regard to advisory or deliberative communications, a presumptive privilege exists, and the burden rests on those seeking access
to the information in question . 7v The court declined, however, to extend the privilege to material that is solely factual in nature. 78 The
court stated that factual material contained in deliberative memoranda can be severed from the rest of the memoranda and is available
for discovery. 79 However, because "material cannot always 'easily be
separated into fact finding and decision making categories,' 8 0 material that is factual in nature may still be entitled to a degree of
protection. 8t
For example, executive privilege may apply when factual material
is obtained with a promise of confidentiality, or when facts are so intertwined with opinions and advice that disclosure would "impinge on
the deliberative process. '8 2 In these situations, the Hamilton court reasoned that a balancing test should be employed.8 3 The balancing test
requires a court examining such material to weigh the government's
reasons for disclosure against the litigant's need for discovery under

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

558, 414 A.2d at 922.
558-59, 414 A.2d at 922-23.
558, 414 A.2d at 922.
563, 414 A.2d at 925.
564, 414 A.2d at 925.

79. Id.
80. Id., 414 A.2d at 925-26 (quoting Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654,
662 (D.C. Cir. 1960)).
81. Id., 414 A.2d at 926.
82. Id. at 564-65, 414 A.2d at 926. The Hamilton court subsequently held that although
the report at issue contained confidentially obtained factual information, including hospital records, statements of witnesses, conviction records, and psychiatric evaluations, as well
as deliberative information advising the Governor on what course of action to take in response to the murder, an in camera review to determine whether the report would be privileged under the newly formulated balancing test would not be inconsistent with Maryland
law. Id. at 569-70, 414 A.2d at 928.
83. Id. at 565, 414 A.2d at 926.
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the facts of each case.8 4 If a court determines that the government's
reasons for disclosure outweigh the litigant's need for discovery, the
privilege should attach.8 5
d. The Doctrine of Executive Privilege Under the Public Information Acts of Other States.--Otherstates that have addressed whether telephone and scheduling records are exempt from disclosure under
their public information acts have employed a balancing test similar
to the Hamilton balancing test. For example, in Times Mirror Co. v.
Superior Court, 6 the California Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether the Governor was required, under the California Records
Act, to disclose his appointment calendars and schedules when requested to do so by a newspaper.8 7 The court held that disclosure of
the documents was not in the public interest because disclosure of the
identity of persons with whom the Governor met and consulted was
the "functional equivalent of revealing the substance or direction of
the Governor's judgment and mental processes." 8 The court found
that such material would divulge the interests and information the
Governor deemed to be of significance to the issues being addressed
at the time.8 9 Despite the fact that such information is factual in nature, the California court found that it was essentially deliberative, and
therefore executive privilege prevented the disclosure of the documents in question.90
Similarly, the Virginia Supreme Court, in Taylor v. Worrell Enterprises, Inc.,91 stated that data which would show the originating and
terminating location of a call placed by the Governor's office, when
disclosed to a newspaper, would "provide a basis for public speculation .

.

. [and] provide an information base for further investigation

which could subject recipients of such calls to inquiries regarding the
calls and their content."9 2 In Taylor, the special projects editor of The
Daily Progressrequested copies of the Governor's Office's monthly telephone bills.9 3 The office agreed to release the bill's cover sheet,
which showed the aggregate calls, but denied the request for the item84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
813 P.2d 240 (Cal. 1991).
Id. at 241.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 251-52.
409 S.E.2d 136 (Va. 1991).
Id. at 138.
Id. at 137.
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ized billings for each call claiming executive privilege. 94 The court
found that releasing the requested data could have a chilling effect on
the Governor's use of the telephone to conduct business for the Commonwealth.9 5 Both the Virginia and California courts based their decisions, in part, on the potential chilling effect that disclosure of the
documents would have on the ability of the Governors' offices to execute their official duties.9 6
e. The Doctrineof Separation of Powers.-The doctrine of separation of powers is found in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights, which states "[t]hat the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
powers of Government ought to be forever distinct from each
other . . ... " Separation of powers has a lengthy history in Maryland.9 8 The doctrine places a limit on the "court's power to review or
interfere with the conclusions, acts or decisions of a coordinate
branch of government" when that branch is acting within its own
sphere of authority.99 Thus, if the Governor chooses to act within his
own sphere of authority, neither the legislature nor the judiciary can
require him to disclose certain information that he believes to be
privileged.

94.
95.
96.
S.E.2d

Id.
Id. at 138.
Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 813 P.2d 240, 251 (Cal. 1991); Taylor, 409
at 138.
97. MD. DECL. oF RTs. art. 8.
98. The importance of the separation of powers doctrine was stressed in the early cases
of Miller v. State ex rel. Fiery, 8 Gill 145, 148 (1849) (holding that the legislative and judicial
powers, under the constitution of the state, are confined to different branches of government, and that the legislature is incompetent to exercise judicial powers) and Regents of the
University of Maryland v. Williams, 9 G. &J. 365, 410 (1838) (discussing the duties of the
legislature).
99. Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 556, 414 A.2d 914, 921 (1980); see also Dep't of
Natural Res. v. Linchester, 274 Md. 211, 223-24, 334 A.2d 514, 522-23 (1975) (observing
that courts have the power to review decisions of administrative agencies within limits, but
courts may not substitute their own judgment for that of the agencies); Heaps v. Cobb, 185
Md. 372, 379, 45 A.2d 73, 76 (1945) (stating that as the legislature may not divest the
judiciary of the ability to review actions of quasi-legislative boards, the courts are "without
authority to interfere with any exercise of the legislative prerogative within constitutional
limits, or with the lawful exercise of administrative authority or discretion"); Miles v. Bradford, 22 Md. 170, 184-85 (1864) (holding that the judiciary has no control or revisory
power over the Governor when he is acting within his discretionary authority); Watkins v.
Watkins, 2 Md. 341, 356 (1852) (stating that the judiciary's power does not include the
ability to compel action from a coordinate branch of government, only the power to restrain the other branches when their actions exceed their constitutional authority). But see
Magruder v. Swann, 25 Md. 173, 212 (1866) (concluding that while the Governor has political and discretionary powers, he is not exempt from judicial process).
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The mandates of Article 8, however, are not absolute. In Judy v.
Schaefer,t"" the court stated that Article 8 does not impose a "complete
separation between the branches of government."'01 In McCulloch v.
Glendening,1 2 the court reiterated that Article 8 has never been rigidly
applied. 0 3 The purpose of the separation of powers doctrine is to
preserve the functioning of each branch of government and to prohibit another branch from interfering with or usurping those functions, but not to create "clear lines of 'demarcation.'"104
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Office of the Governor, the Court of
Appeals held that the Governor was not entitled to a general claim of
executive privilege because the material requested was factual in nature. 1 5 The court further held that unless the Governor could show,
on remand, that specific parts of the records were privileged under
the principles set forth in Hamilton, the requested documents would
10 6
have to be disclosed.
The majority began its reasoning by addressing the threshold
matter of whether the Act applied to the Office.'0 7 Because the Act is
modeled, in part, after FOIA,1 0 8 which has been held not to apply to
the Office of the President, the Office, by analogy, argued that the Act
should not apply to it. t0 9 The court found this analogy flawed, drawing a distinction between the Act's use of the term "public records"
and FOIA's use of the term "agency records.""' Thus, the court determined that coverage under the Act turns on the definition of "public records," not on whether the government body holding the
records is considered an agency."'
The court broadly construed the Act, which applies to any "unit
or instrumentality of the State government," to include "[t] he offices
of the Governor and his staff in the State House and Shaw House in
' 12
Annapolis, as well as their offices in Baltimore and Washington." "
100. 331 Md. 239, 627 A.2d 1039 (1993).
101. Id. at 261, 627 A.2d at 1050 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
102. 347 Md. 272, 701 A.2d 99 (1997).
103. Id. at 283, 701 A.2d at 104.
104. Id.
105. Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 561-62, 759 A.2d at 272.
106. Id. at 565, 759 A.2d at 273.
107. The court addressed this issue on its own questioning at oral argument. Id. at 532,
759 A.2d at 256. The parties did not raise or brief the issue. Id.
108. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
109. Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 533, 759 A.2d at 256.
110. Id. at 533-34, 759 A.2d at 256-57.
111. Id. at 534-35, 759 A.2d at 257.
112. Id. at 536, 759 A.2d at 258; see also MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 10-611(g)(i)
(1999 & Supp. 2001). Despite the broad statement of coverage, the court found that cer-
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The court further stated that "[u]nlike the Federal Act, there is no
statutory language or legislative history suggesting that any unit of the
Maryland Government is exempt from the Public Information Act's
coverage.""' 3 Thus, the court reasoned that the Act would apply to
1 14
the Governor and the Office.
Having found that the Act applied to the Governor and the Office, the court addressed whether portions of the requested telephone
and scheduling records fell within certain recognized exemptions of
the Act.' 1 5 The court examined section 10-618(b), which gives the
custodian the right to deny inspection if such inspection is of a "letter
or memorandum that would not be available by law to a private party
in litigation with the unit."' 1 6 As the court stated, this exemption is a
reflection of the executive privilege doctrine that encompasses letters,
memoranda, or other government documents containing confidential
information." 7 The court determined that a telephone company bill
is not a government agency document, and that bills and listings of
the Governor's appointments could not be considered letters or memoranda within the meaning of the statute." 8

tain records requested by the Post were not made "in connection with the transaction of
public business" under the Act. Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 538 n.8, 759 A.2d at 259
n.8. Specifically, the court excluded records of telephone calls made from telephones in
the Governor's mansion because it was the family's private home, and such calls were made
with the reasonable expectation of privacy that one has in his or her own home. Id. at 53738, 759 A.2d at 258-59. The court stated that the Governor and his family were not required to relinquish normal expectations of privacy simply because their home and telephone services were furnished by the state. Id. at 537, 759 A.2d at 259. The court further
held that the circuit court "should have excluded certain documents, or portions of documents, from disclosure based upon the unavailability of the documents or the Post's own
limitations on the scope of its requests." Id. at 539, 759 A.2d at 259. Those records included telephone records from outside of the State House, the fourteen telephone lines
the Governor, Ms. Smith-Bauk, and Mr. Riddick had access to in the State House, and the
cellular telephones assigned to the three. Id. at 539-42, 759 A.2d at 259-61.
113. Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 536, 759 A.2d at 258.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 543-44, 759 A.2d at 262.
116. Id. at 551, 759 A.2d at 266. Section 10-618 reads:
(a) In general-Unless otherwise provided by law, if a custodian believes
that inspection of a part of a public record by the applicant would be contrary to
the public interest, the custodian may deny inspection by the applicant of that
part, as provided in this section.
(b) Interagency and intra-agency documents.-A custodian may deny inspection of any part of an interagency or intra-agency letter or memorandum that
would not be available by law to a private party in litigation with the unit.
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoVT § 10-618(a)-(b) (1999).
117. Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 551, 759 A.2d at 266.
118. Id. at 552, 759 A.2d at 266-67.
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Furthermore, the court distinguished the Act from other states'
public information acts that contain general public interest "catchalls." Because Maryland's public interest exemption only applies to
items falling within a statutorily defined category, it is not a general
",catchall."1 19 Because the records at issue in Office of the Governor did
not fall into any of the specified categories,1 2 ° and the Governor could
not withhold the records on the basis of the general public interest,
the court then examined whether the doctrine of executive privilege,
and consequently section 10-615(1) of the Act, prevented the docu21
ments from being disclosed.1
Section 10-615(1) of the Act provides that the custodian of a pub1' 2 2
lic record may deny inspection if "by law, the record is privileged.'
As a result, the court stated that if the records or any part of the
records cannot be disclosed because of executive privilege, the
records cannot be disclosed under section 10-615(1).123 The court
recognized the doctrine of executive privilege as a part of Maryland
common law and found that the privilege is also rooted in the separation of powers doctrine. 124 The court then stated that the purpose of
executive privilege is to protect confidential advisory communications
12 5
between state officials, as well as military and diplomatic secrets.
The court reasoned that the protection of some documents from disclosure is necessary to protect the decision-making process by allowing

119. Id. at 553-54, 759 A.2d at 267-68.
120. Specified categories of exemptions include sections 10-616 (d) and (i) (letters of
reference and personnel records), 10-617(d) (commercial information), and 10-617(e)
(home addresses and telephone numbers of state or local government employees). MD.
CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 10-616 to -617. The court found that the mere fact that the
Governor telephoned or met with an identified person to obtain information about a prospective employee did not constitute a letter of reference under section 10-616(d), nor did
a telephone call concerning possible future employment with the Office or a judgeship
constitute a personnel record. Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 547-48, 759 A.2d at 264.
Furthermore, the court concluded that the fact that the Governor made a telephone call to
a particular person did not constitute "commercial" information; for the call to be considered "commercial information," the Governor would have to prove in camera why such
information would jeopardize government projects or negotiations at critical stages of development. Id. at 549, 759 A.2d at 265. The court did state, however, that the telephone
numbers given were the personal numbers of state employees, and thus should be redacted from the record under section 10-617(e). Id. at 550, 759 A.2d at 265-66.
121. Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 556-57, 759 A.2d at 269.
122. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 10-615(1).
123. Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 557, 759 A.2d at 269.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 557, 759 A.2d at 269-70.
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the free consideration of different alternatives and candid communi12
cation by government officials without fear of public scrutiny. 1
The court's discussion of Hamilton first recognized that while executive privilege is not absolute, in order to protect deliberative
processes, courts must engage in a balancing test, "weighing the need
for confidentiality against the .

.

. need for disclosure and the impact

of nondisclosure upon the fair administration of justice. 127 The
court limited this privilege mainly to advisory or deliberative documents, distinguishing factual material, which is subject to disclosure. 12 ' The court held that factual material subject to executive
privilege, albeit not to the same degree as deliberative material, is that
which is either obtained upon a promise of confidentiality or investigative facts that underlie opinions or advice, which by disclosure
would encroach upon the deliberative process. 12' Because telephone
and scheduling records are not deliberative or advisory in nature, the
court reasoned that no blanket executive privilege would attach, and
the burden remained on the defendants to establish that the records
were privileged. i 0 Furthermore, even if the defendants asserted executive privilege on an item-by-item basis, the court would still apply the
balancing test, particularly because the Act generally favors
1

disclosure.

31

The court was very careful to guard against granting the privilege
to material that was factual in nature. The defendants argued that
disclosure of the telephone and scheduling records would encroach
upon the deliberative process because the names of persons with
whom the Governor and his staff met would become public knowledge, thus making persons reluctant in the future to offer advice to
the Governor. 13 2 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that
the purpose of executive privilege is not to protect public officials, but
is rather "for the benefit of the public."' 133 Although the substance of
what an adviser tells the Governor would be protected by the doctrine,
the court found that the simple revealing of a name would not fall
126. Id. at 558, 759 A.2d at 270 (citing Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 558, 414 A.2d
914, 922 (1980)). Courts throughout the country have recognized that the executive privilege doctrine "gives a measure of protection to the deliberative and mental processes of
decision-makers." Id. (quoting Hamilton, 287 Md. at 561, 414 A.2d at 924).
127. Id. at 558, 759 A.2d at 270 (quoting Hamilton, 287 Md. at 563, 414 A.2d at 925).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 559, 759 A.2d at 270 (citing Hamilton, 287 Md. at 564-65, 414 A.2d at 925-26).
130. Id. at 561, 759 A.2d at 271.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 562, 759 A.2d at 272.
133. Id. at 563, 759 A.2d at 272 (quoting Hamilton, 287 Md. at 563, 414 A.2d at 924).
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under executive privilege.'
Unwilling to recognize a general executive privilege for the Governor's telephone and scheduling records,
the court left the door open for the defendants to show the trial court,
on remand, that disclosure of a particular telephone number or
scheduling record would interfere with the Governor's deliberative
13 5
process in a particular circumstance.
Judge Cathell, joined by Chief Judge Bell, dissented. The dissent
focused on how the separation of powers doctrine prohibits the legislature from enacting laws that would require the Governor to make
his nonpublic activities public and asking the judiciary to enforce such
laws.' 3 6 Judge Cathell reasoned that the separation of powers doctrine prevents both the legislature and the judiciary from directing
the Governor how to behave.' 3 7 Thus, the documents at issue would
not be disclosable because the legislature would be prohibited from
requiring disclosure under the Act. Similarly, under the doctrine of
executive privilege, the judiciary would be prohibited from instructing
138
the Governor to disclose the documents.
In Judge Cathell's view, the majority did not sufficiently defer to
the mandates of separation of powers,' 39 and therefore erred by applying the Act to the Governor. 4 ° Given that separation of powers is
expressly designated in the Maryland Declaration of Rights,' 4 1 Judge
Cathell reasoned that the majority should have adhered more rigidly
to the doctrine of separation of powers, and by extension, the doctrine of executive privilege. 42 Judge Cathell opined that the fact that
the Supreme Court declined to apply FOJA to the Office of the President, even though separation of powers is only implied in the federal
134. Id.
135. Id. at 563-64, 759 A.2d at 273.
136. Id. at 565, 759 A.2d at 274 (CathellJ., dissenting). While the majority recognized
that the doctrine of executive privilege is due in part to the principle of separation of
powers enumerated in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the majority did not
explicitly address separation of powers. See Office of the Governor,360 Md. at 557, 759 A.2d at
269-70.
137. Judge Cathell stated specifically that the separation of powers doctrine
does not permit the Legislature to create laws that can be used directly to require
the Governor to make his nonpublic activities public . . . including his duties of
appointment, scheduling of private interviews and many of the other duties inherent to the position of Chief Officer of the ...
utive branch.
Id. at 565, 759 A.2d at 274 (Cathell, J., dissenting).

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See id.
Id. at 566, 759
Id. at 592, 759
As opposed to
Id. at 573, 759

separate and independent exec-

A.2d at 274.
A.2d at 288.
being implied as in the federal Constitution.
A.2d at 278.
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Constitution, supported his position that the majority erred by applying the Act to the Governor, particularly because separation
of powers
43
is explicit in the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 1
Judge Cathell stated that the information sought in the case was
in direct suit with the Governor. 14 4 Judge Cathell reasoned that the
Post was seeking to have the judiciary "compel the Governor to cooperate in the furnishing of information to [the Post]. ' 14 5 Because the
information the Post was seeking to compel was that "which is to the
detriment of the Chief Executive and his or her power to formulate
policy and gather information necessary to perform his or her functions effectively,"' 4 6 Judge Cathell reasoned that compelling disclosure would violate the principle of separation of powers.14 7
Judge Cathell went on to claim that the majority's distinction between the word "agency" as defined in FOIA and "instrumentalit [ies]
of the State government," in the Act was similarly flawed.' 41 In his
view, neither act contemplated an application to the executive office.' 49 Given that the Act is based in part on FOIA, Judge Cathell
reasoned that the application of the Act to the Governor should be
decided similarly to the application of FOIA to the Office of the President.1 5 Furthermore, because the Act itself does not expressly include the Office of the Governor, Judge Cathell would not find the
51
Governor subject to the Act.1
In a separate dissent, Judge Raker stated that all of the records at
issue should be exempt from disclosure under the doctrine of executive privilege described in Hamilton and incorporated into the Act
under section 10-615(1).152 Judge Raker stated that Hamilton recognized that while executive privilege was not absolute, "the interest in
protecting confidential government communications justified a presumptive privilege. ' 153 Judge Raker further opined that the burden of
negating the privilege would be on those seeking to compel disclo143. Id. at 565-66, 759 A.2d at 274.
144. Id. at 583, 759 A.2d at 283.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 584, 759 A.2d at 284.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 590, 759 A.2d at 287.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 592, 759 A.2d at 288. Judge Cathell would find the Office exempt from the
Act given the statute's "textual silence" on the issue. Id.
152. Id. at 593, 759 A.2d at 289 (Raker, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 593-94, 759 A.2d at 289.
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sure.15 4 For documents factual in nature, Judge Raker believed that a
balancing test should be applied, weighing "the government's need
1 55
for confidentiality .. . against the litigant's need for disclosure."
Judge Raker reasoned that while the documents sought were factual
in nature, compiling them together would reveal the Governor's deliberative processes.1 56 Citing the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court,Judge Raker stated:
Disclosing the identity of persons with whom the Governor
has met and consulted is the functional equivalent of revealing the substance or direction of the Governor's judgment and mental processes; such information would indicate
which interests or information he deemed to be of
signifi1 57
cance with respect to critical issues of the moment.
Judge Raker also agreed with the reasoning of the Virginia Supreme Court in Taylor v. Worrell Enterprises,writing:
"[D] ata which show the time and the originating and terminating location of a call is information concerning the activity of the Governor's office," since "[t]he data, standing
alone, could provide a basis for public speculation" and "an
information base for further investigation which could subject recipients of8 the calls to inquiries regarding the calls and
15
their content.
Sharing the Virginia court's concern, Judge Raker feared the
"chilling effect" disclosure of information would have on the Governor's deliberative process. Judge Raker believed that disclosure of
even seemingly factual information would impact the ability of executive officials to do their jobs properly.' 59 Given the potential disruption of "essential communicative, investigative, and deliberative
functions of the Governor's office," 16 Judge Raker concluded with
the premise that the burden should rest on the Post to show why it
had requested all of the Governor's schedules and telephone records
for a six month period. 161 In order to overcome the presumptive priv-

154. Id. at 594, 759 A.2d at 289 (citing Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 563, 414 A.2d
914, 925 (1980)).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 595, 759 A.2d at 290.
157. Id. at 596, 759 A.2d at 290 (quoting Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 813 P.2d
240, 251 (Cal. 1991)).
158. Id. at 597, 759 A.2d at 291 (quoting Taylor v. Worrell Enters., Inc., 409 S.E.2d 136,
138 (Va., 1991).
159. Id. at 597-98, 759 A.2d at 291.
160. Id. at 598, 759 A.2d at 292.
161. Id. at 598-99, 759 A.2d at 292.
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ilege, Judge Raker asserted that the party seeking disclosure must offer evidence to dispute the Governor's initial showing that the
documents are protected by executive privilege.' 6 2 Judge Raker believed that the Post had failed to make a sufficient showing of necessity to overcome the presumption of executive privilege.' 6 3
4. Analysis.-In Office of the Governor, the Court of Appeals erred
by failing to examine the chilling effect broad disclosure would have
on the Governor's deliberative process. While the court continued to
recognize the availability of executive privilege in limited circumstances, it failed to adequately balance the Governor's reasons for
nondisclosure against the litigant's need for discovery as required by
the test established in Hamilton v. Verdow. 1 6 4 The court focused primarily on the public policy goal of the Act, which is to allow citizens wideranging access to affairs of the government, and therefore did not
adequately consider the effect disclosure would have on the Governor's deliberative process as required by Hamilton.
a. Executive Privilege and the Hamilton Balancing Test.-The
Court first addressed the issue of executive privilege in Hamilton v.
Verdow, stating that "the policy and decision-making processes of the
Governor and the Executive Branch would be totally thwarted if they
were required to reveal the opinions, recommendations, and deliberations used in arriving at policy decisions."' 65 Two reasons exist to protect such information: (1) to encourage aides and colleagues to give
candid advice and (2) to give the Executive officer the freedom to
"think out loud." 1 66
The Hamilton court acknowledged that material which is solely
factual in nature is not usually privileged unless disclosure would "impinge on the deliberative process."' 6 7 Thus, the court established a
balancing test to determine if the privilege attaches when material is
162. Id. at 599, 759 A.2d at 292.
163. Id. at 599-600, 759 A.2d at 292-93. Given the sweeping scope of the Post's demands
and the lack of a specified public interest in the requested documents, Judge Raker stated
that the policy concerns in favor of nondisclosure were particularly compelling. Id.
164. The Hamilton balancing test protects material from disclosure, even if factual in
nature, that would "impinge on the deliberative process." Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md.
544, 564-65, 414 A.2d 914, 926 (1980).
165. Id. at 555, 414 A.2d at 921.
166. Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1410 (1974). Thinking
"out loud" allows the President or other executive officer to test ideas and debate policy
uninhibited by the fear that this thought process will be exposed to public critique and
comment. Id.
167. Hamilton, 287 Md. at 564-65, 414 A.2d at 926.
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factual in nature and would impinge the deliberative process if disclosed.' 68 The balancing test requires a court examin.ng potentially
privileged material to weigh the government's reasons for nondisclosure against the litigant's need for discovery under the facts of each
case. 169 Under this test, if a court determines that the government's
reasons for disclosure outweigh the litigants need for discovery, executive privilege should attach. 7 '
Documents that would expose the deliberative process of the
Governor are privileged, and the burden rests upon those seeking the
documents to compel disclosure. 7 ' Hamilton clearly articulated that
even if material is both factual and deliberative in nature, the court
should examine the effect disclosure of the material would have on
the deliberative process. 1 72 Given the deliberative nature of government, a legitimate need exists to protect certain kinds of government
information from public disclosure.' 73 If the effect of disclosure
would be to "chill" the deliberative process, the material should be
74

privileged. 1

b. How the Office of the Governor Court Should have Analyzed
this Case.-Because Hamilton established a balancing test for factual
information, the court in Office of the Governor should have expanded
its inquiry beyond the nature of the documents requested. The material at issue in Office of the Governor was factual in nature because the
substantive content of the calls and meetings was not requested. However, disclosing the names of people who called and met with the Governor could reveal the deliberative processes of the Governor or the
Office.I7 5 Although the scheduling and telephone records appear fac-

tual on the surface-only containing information about who the Governor met or spoke with, for how long, and on what dates-the
disclosure of the documents would impinge on the deliberative process because the release of such detail would expose the thought
processes of the Governor and provide a basis for public specula-

168. Id. at 565, 414 A.2d at 926.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 563, 566, 414 A.2d at 925-26.
172. Id. at 564-65, 414 A.2d at 925-26.
173. Id. at 556, 414 A.2d at 921; see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974)
("The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in
the separation of powers tinder the Constitution.").
174. See Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 597, 759 A.2d at 291 (Raker, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 595, 759 A.2d at 290.
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tion.' 7 6 Thus, the court in Office of the Governor should have examined
whether disclosure of the names of those the Governor called or met
with, on what dates they spoke or met, and length of the calls or meetings would have "chilled" those parties from meeting with him in the
future.
Examining all telephone calls the Governor made in six months,
who was called, how long the conversations lasted, and on what date
they took place could disclose a great deal of deliberative information,
such as what options or policies the Governor was considering.' 7 7 It
would not be difficult to compare the policy decisions that have been
publicly released to the telephone calls and the meetings that the Governor conducted before those policies were instituted in order to determine the deliberative process of the Governor.
Having made such comparisons, one with current access to the
Governor's telephone and scheduling records could continue to draw
conclusions about the Governor's deliberative process because "if you
know what information people seek, you can usually determine why
they seek it."' 7 8 As the California Supreme Court stated in Times
Mirror.
Disclosing the identity of persons with whom the Governor
has met and consulted is the functional equivalent of revealing the substance or direction of the Governor's judgment and mental processes; such information would indicate
which interests or information he deemed to be of signifi1 79
cance with respect to critical issues of the moment.
Thus, by requiring the Governor to release his scheduling
records and call detail in Office of the Governor, the court essentially
176. See Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 813 P.2d 240, 251 (Cal. 1991); Taylor v.
Worrell Enters., Inc., 409 S.E.2d 136, 138 (Va. 1991). The Virginia Supreme Court, in
examining an issue similar to that in Office of the Governor, continued its analysis beyond
whether the material was factual in nature. It examined the effect disclosure would have
on the deliberative process and found that the potential disruption to the execution of the
Governor's duties outweighed the public's interest in open government. Taylor, 409 S.E.2d
at 138-39.
177. See Times Mirror Co., 813 P.2d at 251. Office of the Governoralso seems to focus on
what type of information can be gleaned from the Governor's telephone records. The
majority concluded that little information could be found, and thus was unwilling to hold
the telephone and scheduling records exempt from public disclosure under the doctrine
of executive privilege. 360 Md. at 561-62, 759 A.2d at 271-72. In contrast, the dissent
believed that certain patterns could be inferred from those with whom the Governor and
the Office calls and meets. See id. at 595, 759 A.2d at 290 (Raker, J., dissenting).
178. Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 596, 759 A.2d at 291 (Raker, J., dissenting) (quoting Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 910 (D.C. Cir.
1993)).
179. Times Mirror Co., 813 P.2d at 251.
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revealed what the Governor was thinking about and when. Particularly in the aggregate, it is likely that the Post will be able to determine
with whom the Governor meets to discuss certain issues. As a result,
the deliberative process has been compromised.
As the dissenting opinions pointed out, the disclosure of the Governor's telephone and scheduling records would impinge on the deliberative process because they would reveal the Governor's thought
process.' 8 0 For example, as Judge Cathell discussed in his dissent, in
the riots of the 1960s in Maryland, the Governor had to meet with
military advisors in order to deploy the National Guard.1 8 ' If the public or the press could access the Governor's scheduling or telephone
records, such meetings could be compromised. 18 2 Also, the deliberative process could have been compromised when, during Governor
Glendening's tenure, the office of the president of the University of
Maryland, College Park became vacant.' 8 3 If the Post requested meeting schedules and telephone logs indicating the names of officials
from other universities that the Governor was interviewing and subsequently released the names, the candidates may have withdrawn from
consideration because of the negative consequences of their candidacy. 1 84 Moreover, the Post obviously believed that the documents requested contained substantive information about the Governor's
deliberative process; otherwise, the documents would not have been
85
requested.1
The Governor's deliberative process is similarly affected by the
"chilling effect" such disclosure would have on those who engage in
deliberations with the Governor. As the Hamilton court discussed,
" [h] uman experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the
decisionmaking process."' 8 6 Even though the substance of the communications may not be exposed, the fact that the meeting or the call
180. Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 592, 759 A.2d at 288 (Cathell, J., dissenting); id. at
595, 759 A.2d at 290 (Raker, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 592, 759 A.2d at 288 (Cathell, J., dissenting).
182. See id. The dissent pointed out that allowing access to information about past
events would open the door for granting access to information on current events in real
time. Id.
183. Brief for Appellant at 25, Office of the Governor (No. 117).
184. Id.
185. See Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 813 P.2d 240, 252 n.13 (Cal. 1991) (observing that the Los Angeles Times's persistence in obtaining the Governor's scheduling
records was in itself indicative of the information's substantive relevance).
186. Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 558-59, 414 A.2d 914, 922 (1980) (quoting
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974)).
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took place is still significant. If private meetings and telephone calls
were required to be disclosed, many groups would be deterred from
meeting with the Governor, and consequently particular viewpoints
might be eliminated from the Governor's consideration.1 7 Even routine meetings might be inhibited if the meetings were revealed to the
public and those groups were subjected to scrutiny by the press.18
Thus, the material in question in this case should be barred from disclosure under the doctrine of executive privilege.
One of the reasons that the court failed to adequately examine
the chilling effect disclosure of the requested documents would have
on the Governor's deliberative process was the competing desire to
allow Maryland citizens wide-ranging access to public information
concerning the operation of their government.1 89 Ultimately, Office of
the Governor represents the confusion that arises when separate values
come into conflict. This case illustrates the tension between the public policy in favor of disclosure-a policy allowing citizens to have access to affairs of the government under the Act-and the doctrine of
executive privilege, as enunciated by the court in Hamilton. In Office of
the Governor,the court reiterated that "[t] he Maryland Public Information Act establishes a public policy and a general presumption in favor
of disclosure of government or public documents.""'9 ° In so doing,
however, the court erred by failing to examine the chilling effect
broad disclosure would have on the Governor's deliberative process.
5. Conclusion.-The majority did not completely prohibit the
Governor from arguing executive privilege if he or she can show that
"because of identified special circumstances, disclosure of a specific
telephone number, or certain specific numbers, or disclosure of specific scheduling records," would "interfere with the deliberative process in the Governor's office."'' In failing to adequately address the
chilling effect disclosure of call detail and meeting schedules would
have on the Governor's deliberative process, however, the majority's
narrow interpretation of executive privilege sets a very high standard

187. See Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 597-98, 759 A.2d at 291-92 (Raker,
dissenting).

J.,

188. Id.
189. Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 544, 759 A.2d at 262; see also Kirwan v. The
Diamondback, 352 Md. 74, 80-81, 721 A.2d 196, 199 (1998) (explaining the presumption
in favor of disclosure of public documents).
190. Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 544, 759 A.2d at 262 (quoting Kirwan, 352 Md. at
80, 721 A.2d at 199).
191. Id. at 563, 759 A.2d at 273.
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for the Governor to overcome both on remand and in future cases
where information is sought under the Act. 92
EMILY R. SWEET

192. See id. at 565, 759 A.2d at 274 (Cathell, J., dissenting).

VIII.

A.

PROPERTY

Res Judicata Prematurely Bars Review of a FairHousing Act Claim

In Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Community Ass'n,' the Court of Appeals
of Maryland considered whether claim or issue preclusion barred a
Fair Housing Act (FHA) claim in a dispute involving enforcement of a
restrictive covenant on a group home. 2 After examining the opinions
of the lower courts in the case sub judice and a prior case between the
litigants, the court decided that both claim and issue preclusion applied 3 and affirmed the lower court's issuance of a permanent injunction.4 However, the court's conclusion was premature, given its
cursory application of the appropriate ttsts for determining whether
the claims and issues in both suits were the same. Had the court carefully applied these tests to the circumstances of this case, rather than
simply laying them out, the court would have found that claim preclusion did not apply and that the central issue in the second suit was not
precluded.
1. The Case.-The case involved a dispute between Richard Colandrea, owner of two residential properties in the Bryant Woods section of the Village of Wilde Lake, in Columbia, Maryland, and the
Village of Wilde Lake Community Association (Wilde Lake). 5 The
controversy arose over the applicability of a restrictive covenant to the
two properties, which contained group homes for the elderly.6 Wilde
Lake filed suit against Colandrea twice-once in 1993 and again in
1996-on the grounds that Colandrea's operation of the group

1. 361 Md. 371, 761 A.2d 899 (2000).
2. Id. at 385-93, 761 A.2d at 906-10.
3. Id. at 393, 761 A.2d at 910.
4. Id. at 402-03, 761 A.2d at 915.
5. Id. at 378, 761 A.2d at 902.
6. Id. As part of the larger planned community of Columbia, the properties are governed by a community association that imposes various covenants, including a restrictive
covenant that provides:
Section 11.02. No profession or home industry shall be conducted in or on any part of
a Lot or in any improvement thereon the Property without the specific written
approval of the Architectural Committee.... No such profession or home industry shall be permitted, however, unless it is considered, by the Architectural Committee, to be compatible with a high quality residential neighborhood.
Id. at 377, 761 A.2d at 902.
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homes violated the restrictive covenant.7 These cases will be discussed
in turn.
a. Columbia Ass'n v. Colandrea.-Richard Colandrea has
maintained the two homes in Bryant Woods for over ten years.8 The
house at 10461 Waterfowl Terrace has been a group home for disabled elderly since 1989.' The other house, located at 10433 Waterfowl Terrace, has been a group home since 1992.10 The homes
provide assistance to seniors who require help with basic chores but
do not require nursing-care." Each home houses up to eight senior
residents.'

2

In 1993, the Columbia Association and Wilde Lake filed suit in
the Circuit Court for Howard County to enjoin Colandrea from operating the two facilities.1 Colandrea filed a counterclaim alleging the
restrictive covenant violated provisions of the FHA. 4 The circuit
court denied the counterclaim and ruled that the FHA did not exempt Colandrea from complying with the covenant provisions. 5
However, the court did not enjoin operation of the homes; rather, the
court ordered Colandrea to apply to the Wilde Lake Architectural
Committee (the Committee) for approval. 6 Instead of applying to
the Committee, however, Colandrea filed an appeal with the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. He later voluntarily dismissed it. 7
b. Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Community Ass'n.-Colandrea
relented and petitioned the Committee for approval of the use of the
homes in 1996.18 The Committee held two public meetings to consider Colandrea's application. 9 Residents expressed concerns about
trash, noise, traffic, and inadequate street parking at both meetings.2z
During the second meeting, some residents expressed concern over
7. Columbia Ass'n v. Colandrea, No. 93-CA-21562, slip op. (Howard County, Md., Cir.
Ct. Feb. 16, 1995); Colandrea, 361 Md. at 371, 761 A.2d at 899.
8. Brief for Appellant at 2-3, Colandrea (No. 00-24).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Columbia Ass'n v. Colandrea, No. 93-CA-21562, slip op. at 1 (Howard County, Md.,
Cir. Ct. Feb. 16, 1995).
14. Id. at 2.
15. Id. at 6-7.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 7.
Colandrea,361 Md. at 386, 761 A.2d at 907.
Id. at 378, 761 A.2d at 902.
Id. at 379, 761 A.2d at 903.
Id. at 379-80, 761 A.2d at 903.
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medical waste and adult diapers.21 One member of the Committee
proposed to approve both homes on certain conditions. 22 This proposal was ultimately rejected, however, when the Committee voted to
approve the house at 10461 Waterfowl Terrace but not the one at
10433 Waterfowl Terrace.23 The Committee sent a letter detailing its
decision to Colandrea on March 19, 1996.24 In the letter, the Committee stated that its decision was based on "the incremental increase
in the amount of traffic, congestion, noise, trash and waste, as well as
' 25
parking problems attributable to an additional facility.
After Colandrea refused to comply with the Committee's decision, Wilde Lake filed suit in the Circuit Court for Howard County in
April 1996. In its complaint, Wilde Lake asked for an injunction barring Colandrea from operating a senior-assisted home at 10433 Waterfowl Terrace. 26 Colandrea filed a counterclaim on the grounds that
the decision of the Committee was arbitrary and capricious and violated the F-A.2 7 Colandrea asserted in his counterclaim that two
members of the Committee had a conflict of interest because they
were the founders of the Waterfowl Neighborhood Association, an organization allegedly founded to stop Colandrea from operating the
group homes.2 s
With respect to Colandrea's counterclaim, the circuit court held
that "the decision of the Committee was a reasonable, good faith exercise of discretion, based upon legitimate concerns regarding the impact of the facility upon the surrounding neighborhood. 29 The court
also held that the Committee's decision did not violate the FHA because maintenance of the second group home was not reasonable as
compared to the impact on the neighborhood, nor necessary to accommodate disabled elderly."0 Accordingly, the court granted the
permanent injunction. 3 ' Colandrea appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals, but the Court of Appeals granted certiorari sua sponte before
the intermediate court could review the case. 2 The court granted
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 379, 761 A.2d at 903.
Brief for Appellant at 5, Colandrea (No. 00-24).
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
Colandrea, 361 Md. at 378-79, 761 A.2d at 902-03.
Id. at 379, 761 A.2d at 903.
Id. at 382, 761 A.2d at 904-05.
Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Colandrea (No. 00-24).
Colandrea, 361 Md. at 381, 761 A.2d at 904.
Id. at 383-85, 761 A.2d at 905-06.
Id. at 382, 761 A.2d at 904.
Id. at 376, 761 A.2d at 901.
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certiorari to consider whether the restrictive covenant and its enforcement on the group homes violated the FHA.3 3
2. Legal Background.-The term res judicata has been used
broadly in the past to describe two separate doctrines: claim and issue
preclusion. 4 Claim preclusion bars the re-litigation of the same cause
of action or claim between the same parties or those in privity.3 5
Under issue preclusion, on the other hand, a party may not re-litigate
an issue that has already been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction in an action with the same parties, even if the causes of action
are different.3 6 Claim preclusion is broader than issue preclusion in
that it works to preclude not only the same claim but also any issues
that were raised or could have been raised in the litigation of the
claim.17 The policies behind these doctrines are to prevent the expense of repetitive litigation, to preserve judicial resources, to minimize inconsistency in judicial decisions, and to maintain the integrity

of the legal system.3"
a. The Elements of Claim Preclusion and Their Application.Courts have generally recognized three elements for claim preclusion
to apply: the same parties or those in privity with the parties to the
earlier suit; the same cause of action or claim as the previous suit; and
"a final judgment on the merits" in the prior suit.39 Disputes over the
first requirement usually center on whether a party was in privity with
the party in the first proceeding. Privity "refers to a cluster of relationships ....

under which the preclusive effects of a judgment extend

beyond a party to the original action."40 Such relationships include
trustee to beneficiary, guardian to ward, and property owner to subsequent property owner. 41
33. Id. at 376 n.1, 761 A.2d at 901 n.1.
34. SeeMigra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984) (observing that resjudicatahas been used in a broad sense to describe the preclusive effect of prior
adjudication and in a narrow sense to refer to issue preclusion alone).
35. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
36. Sterling v. Local 438, 207 Md. 132, 140-41, 113 A.2d 389, 393 (1955). Issue preclusion has been referred to in the past as collateral estoppel. See 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402 (1981 & Supp. 1999) (noting the different terminology used to refer to claim and issue preclusion).

37. Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948).
38. See, e.g.,
Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54.
39. See, e.g.,
id. at 153.
40. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS, ch. 1, intro. (1980).
41. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41; 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or JUDGMIENTS §§ 43-44.
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What constitutes the same claim can also be subject to debate.4 2
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments adopted the "transaction" test,
which focuses on the transaction from which the claims arose." According to the Restatement, the claims in two separate suits are the
same if they arose from the same transaction or series of related transactions.4 4 A transaction or series of transactions is a set of occurrences
or facts that are related either in time, space, origin, or motivation,
and form a natural unit.4 5 Some jurisdictions now apply the transactional test, while some courts still follow older tests.4 6
47
Prior to 1987, Maryland courts applied the "same evidence" test.
However, in Kent County Board of Education v. Bilbrough, the Court of
Appeals adopted the Restatement's "transaction" test for determining
whether a subsequent suit presents the same claim for preclusion purposes.4 8 Bilbrough involved a suit by a Kent County maintenance employee who had been terminated in 1981. 4" After losing his section
1983 claim in federal court, Bilbrough brought an action in Maryland
circuit court for invasion of privacy.5" The state trial court held this
action barred by the earlier federal judgment. Relying on the same
evidence test, the Court of Special Appeals reversed in part.5 ' Be42. See generally Ernst Schopflocher, What Is a Single Cause of Action for the Purpose of the
Doctrine of ResJudicata?, 21 OR. L. REV. 319 (1942) (discussing various tests to determine
what is a cause of action). Early analyses of what constituted the same claim relied on the
"primary right" test, wherein a claim or cause of action consists of the violation of a primary right. Kent County Bd. of Educ. v. Bilbrough, 309 Md. 487, 495, 525 A.2d 232, 236
(1987) (quoting I RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OFJUDGMENTS § 24, cmt. a). Another approach
is the "same evidence" or "identity of evidence" test, which requires an examination of the
evidence necessary to make a prima facie case. See, eg., Klein v. Xrhitehead, 40 Md. App. 1,
18, 389 A.2d 374, 384 (1978) (stating that the test "is whether the same evidentiary facts
would sustain both actions").
43. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 24(1).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 24(2). This section provides:
What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction", and what groupings constitute
a "series", are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation,
whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit
conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage.
Id.
46. See Flora, Flora & Montague, Inc. v. Saunders, 367 S.E.2d 493, 495 (Va. 1988) (stating that under Virginia law the principal test to determine whether two causes of action are
identical is the same evidence test); Huggett v. Dep't of Natural Resources, 590 N.W.2d
747, 752 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that claims are identical if "the same facts or evidence are essential to the maintenance of the two claims").
47. See, e.g.,
MPC Inc. v. Kenny, 279 Md. 29, 33, 367 A.2d 486, 489 (1977).
48. 309 Md. 487, 499, 525 A.2d 232, 238 (1987).
49. Id. at 490, 525 A.2d at 234.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 493, 525 A.2d at 235.
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cause the evidence required to establish Bilbrough's federal action
was different from that needed to sustain his claim for invasion of
privacy, the Court of Special Appeals held that the latter claim was not
precluded. 52 The Court of Appeals agreed with this result, but decided to jettison the same evidence test because it was under-inclusive. 53 That is, the test allowed parties to evade preclusion simply by a
"mere change in the legal theory, applied to the same set of facts previously litigated. '54 In its place, the court adopted the test recommended by the Restatement, wherein claims are defined in terms of the
factual transaction from which they arose.5 5 Applying this test, the
court concluded that the two claims arose out of two distinct transactions because they grew out of events occurring at different times and
places. 56 Thus, even under the more inclusive transaction test, Bilbrough's invasion of privacy claim in state court was not barred by the
federal action.5 7
More recently, the Court of Appeals applied the transaction test
in Gertz v. Anne Arundel County.58 In Gertz, a farmer, who was filling his

land with stumpage and organic material to create pastureland for his
horse boarding operation, sued for declaratory relief against Anne Arundel County. 59 The county had passed an ordinance requiring application for a permit to conduct land filling in 1990, soon after it had
lost a petition for contempt against Gertz for exceeding the terms of a
1985 consent agreement. 60 After the ordinance was passed, the
61
county informed Gertz that he would have to apply for a permit.
Gertz responded by filing for declaratory relief that the ordinance did
not apply to him, and the County filed a counterclaim for injunctive
relief to stop filling operations. 62 The first circuit court judge found
52. Id.
53. Id. at 494, 525 A.2d at 236 ("[W]e are concerned that sole reliance on [the same
evidence test] ...may improperly narrow the scope of a claim in the preclusion context.").
54. Id. at 495, 525 A.2d at 236.
55. Id. at 499, 525 A.2d at 238.
56. Id. at 500, 525 A.2d at 238-39.
57. Id.
58. 339 Md. 261, 661 A.2d 1157 (1995).
59. Id. at 263-64, 661 A.2d at 1158.
60. Id. at 264-65, 661 A.2d at 1159. After engaging in a dispute over the grading of his
land, Gertz entered into a consent decree with the county, which allowed him to continue
filling the land with tree stumps and similar organic material. Id. at 264, 661 A.2d at 1159.
However, the county filed suit in 1989 on the grounds that Gertz was not adhering to the
agreement. Id. The court concluded that Gertz's activities were bona fide farming activities
allowed by the consent decree. Id.
61. Id. at 265, 661 A.2d at 1159.
62. Id.
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for Gertz on one of the claims but did not address the other claims.6
The second circuit judge, however, found for the county on all the
claims.64
Based on res judicata, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the
second judge's decision in an unpublished opinion.6" The Court of
Special Appeals reasoned that Gertz's activities had not changed since
the 1989 dispute. 66 Because the lower court determined in the 1989
case that Gertz's activities were permissible under the consent decree,
the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the 1989 decision barred
the county's counterclaim.6 7
The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed after finding that the
claims in the two actions arose from two distinct transactions.6 8 The
Court of Appeals observed that the claims involved different conduct
that occurred at different times: violation of a consent decree versus
violation of an ordinance enacted much later.6 9 Moreover, the court
found that the motives behind the two actions differed. In the earlier
action, the county sought to enforce a consent decree for the grading
of the property, while in the second action the county sought to enforce an ordinance requiring permits for land filling activities. 7' The
court further found that the county's claims in the two actions would
not form a convenient trial unit because the ordinance did not exist
in 1989 when the first action was filed. 71 Finally, the court concluded
that treating the facts as separate trial units conformed to the parties'
expectations based on the 1989 trial court's decision, which only settled that Gertz's activities were farming activities, not whether they
constituted operation of a landfill.72
b. The Elements of Issue Preclusion and Their Application.Under issue preclusion, a party may not re-litigate an issue that has
already been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction in an action
with the same parties, even if the causes of action are different. 73 For
issue preclusion to apply, generally five elements must be satisfied.
The issue of fact or law must have been "actually litigatedand determined
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 266, 661 A.2d at 1160.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 266-67, 661 A.2d at 1160.
Id. at 267, 661 A.2d at 1160.
Id. at 270, 661 A.2d at 1162.
Id.
Id. at 270-71, 661 A.2d at 1162.
Id. at 271, 661 A.2d at 1162.
Id. at 271-72, 661 A.2d at 1162.
Sterling v. Local 438, 207 Md. 132, 140-41, 113 A.2d 389, 393 (1955).
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by a valid and final judgment, and the determination [must have been]
essential to the judgment . . . . "
Courts also require that the issue
presented in the latter proceeding be identical to the issue decided in
the prior proceeding, 75 and that "the party against whom estoppel is
asserted have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate" the issue in
the previous forum.76
Issue preclusion is closely related to claim preclusion. However,
issue preclusion is narrower than claim preclusion in application because it only bars raising a particular issue in the second suit, whereas
claim preclusion is an absolute bar to the entire suit. 77 Hence, if
claim preclusion were inapplicable, issue preclusion might still
78
apply.
The Court of Appeals has adopted a four-prong test to determine
if issue preclusion applies: whether the issue decided in the prior suit
is the same as the one presented in the present action; whether there
was a final judgment on the merits in the previous suit; whether the
party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a
party to the prior adjudication; and whether the party against whom
the plea is asserted was given a fair opportunity to be heard on the
issue."

74. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980) (emphasis added); see also
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979) (stating the elements necessary for the application of issue preclusion).
75. As the question of similarity of claims often arises under claim preclusion, the question of whether the issues are the same can also arise under issue preclusion. The Restatement (Second) ofJudgments suggests that courts consider the following factors when deciding
whether the issue in the present action is the same as the issue that has already been
litigated: whether there is substantial overlap between the evidence or argument to be
advanced in the second proceeding and that advanced in the first; whether the new evidence or argument involves application of the same rule of law as that involved in the prior
proceeding; whether the pretrial preparation and discovery relating to the matter
presented in the first action can reasonably be expected to have embraced the matter
sought to be presented in the second; and whether the claims in the two suits are closely
related. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c.
76. Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).
77. See Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1948) (explaining that "where the second action between the same parties is upon a different cause or
demand, the principle of resjudicatais applied much more narrowly"); MPC, Inc. v. Kenny,
279 Md. 29, 32-33, 367 A.2d 486, 488-89 (1977) (explaining the doctrines and their
differences).
78. Wolfe v. Anne Arundel County, 135 Md. App. 1, 28, 761 A.2d 935, 948-49 (2000).
79. Prescott v. Coppage, 266 Md. 562, 571, 296 A.2d 150, 154 (1972) (quoting State v.
Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298, 304 (D. Md. 1967)).
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In Mackall v. Zayre Corp.,80 the Court of Appeals stressed that the
issues must be identical for issue preclusion to apply.8 1 Mackall was an
employee of the Alden Corporation, which operated concession
stands within Zayre stores. s2 She suffered back injuries when she
slipped and fell during a shift at an Alden concession counter in a
Zayre store.8 3 Mackall filed a worker's compensation claim against Alden Corporation, and after finding that Mackall was an Alden employee, the Workers' Compensation Commission ordered Alden to
pay benefits to Mackall. s4 Subsequent to this determination, Mackall
filed a negligence suit against Zayre Corporation. Zayre contended
that Mackall was their employee as well, and thus she could not sue
Zayre in tort.85 Mackall argued that the Workers' Compensation
Board's determination of her employment status precluded Zayre
from raising the issue of her status as an employee. 8 6 The trial court,
however, granted Zayre's motion for a trial on the employment issue,8 7 and concluding from the facts that Mackall was an employee of
both Alden and Zayre, a jury found on behalf of Zayre.8 8 The Court
of Appeals affirmed.8" The court reasoned that the proceeding
before the Workers' Compensation Commission addressed the issue
of Alden's status as Mackall's employer, not the issue of Zayre's status
as Mackall's employer.9" On this basis, the court concluded that issue
preclusion did not apply, and Zayre could litigate the issue of whether
it was Mackall's employer.9'
In Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. TKU Associates,9 2
the Court of Appeals stressed the importance of a fair opportunity to
be heard. There, a developer sought a sewer permit for its redevelopment of a retail department store property." When the Washington
Suburban Sanitary Commission (WSSC) denied the permit, the developer sued for a decree mandating that the WSSC issue the permit. 4
80.
81.
action
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

293 Md. 221, 443 A.2d 98 (1982).
See id. at 229, 443 A.2d at 102 (holding that issue preclusion did not apply in a tort
for damages resulting from an employee's slip-and-fall injury).
Id. at 222-23, 443 A.2d at 99.
Id. at 223, 443 A.2d at 99.
Id.
Id. at 223-24, 443 A.2d at 99-100.
Id. at 227, 443 A.2d at 101.
Id. at 224, 443 A.2d at 100.
Id. at 226, 443 A.2d at 101.
Id.
Id. at 228-29, 443 A.2d at 102.
Id.
281 Md. 1, 376 A.2d 505 (1977).
Id. at 4-6, 376 A.2d at 507-08.
Id. at 12, 376 A.2d at 511.
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After the Circuit Court for Montgomery County ruled in the developer's favor, 9 5 the developer sued the county planning commission
for declaratory relief on the grounds that the commission had conspired with the WSSC to delay the development until the property
could be down-zoned.

96

At the trial in this second suit, the developer argued that the
planning commission was collaterally estopped from raising the issue
of the WSSC's conduct in denying the sewer permit. 9 7 However, the
court found that even if the first two parts of the test were met, the
third element, same party or party in privity, and the fourth element,
a fair opportunity to be heard, were not satisfied.9" Specifically, the
court found that Montgomery County, the county council, and the
planning commission were separate government units from the
WSSC, and thus they were not in privity with the sewer commission. 99
The court rejected the developer's argument that the agencies were in
fact part of a single government or that one was subordinate to another such that one was bound by the outcome of the earlier litigation
involving the other.'0 0 Consequently, WSSC did not have a fair opportunity to litigate the issue.1 '
c. The Fair Housing Act.-The analysis of whether claim or
issue preclusion applies is case-specific. Thus, an examination of the
substantive provisions of the FHA is necessary to decide whether either claim or issue preclusion applies in this case. The provision of
the FHA most pertinent to this discussion is § 3604.02 Section 3604
prohibits discrimination against the disabled and their agents in the
provision of housing.'0 3 The FHA defines discrimination, in part, as
95. Id. at 13-14, 376 A.2d at 511-12.
96. Id. at 14, 376 A.2d at 512.
97. Id. at 18, 376 A.2d at 514.
98. Id. at 19, 376 A.2d at 514.
99. Id. at 19-20, 376 A.2d at 514-15.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 19, 376 A.2d at 514.
102. Colandrea could have possibly brought a claim under § 3617 but failed to do so.
Section 3617 is an anti-intimidation provision that prohibits retaliation against those who
exercise their rights under the F-A. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2000). Accordingly, the circuit
court, and subsequently the Court of Appeals in Colandrea,analyzed Colandrea's case solely
in light of § 3604. See Colandrea, 361 Md. at 385-86, 392-93, 761 A.2d at 906-07, 910.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). Section 3604(f) makes it unlawful:
To discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of . . . that buyer or
renter, . . . a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is
sold, rented, or made available; or ... any person associated with that buyer or
renter.
Id. § 3406(f).
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"arefusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a
dwelling .. , 0" Courts have interpreted § 3604(0 as creating three
causes of action: disparate treatment, disparate impact, and refusal to
make reasonable accommodations.' 0 5
For a disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
the disability played a role in the adverse action. 10 6 Moreover, a plaintiff must demonstrate discriminatory intent.1 0 7 As the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland has summarized, "the inquiry under a disparate treatment analysis is whether similarly situated
persons or groups are subject to differential treatment."1 0 8 On the
other hand, a disparate impact claim necessitates a showing of discriminatory effect.1 0 9 Under a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff does
not need to show discriminatory intent."0 Rather, to determine discriminatory impact, a court must focus on four factors:
(1) how strong is the plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect; (2) is there some evidence of intent, though not
enough to satisfy the constitutional standard ... ; (3) what is

the defendant's interest in taking the action complained of;
and (4) does the plaintiff seek to compel the defendant to
affirmatively provide housing for members of minority
groups or merely to restrain the defendant from interfering
with individual property owners who wish to provide
housing."'
Finally, reasonable accommodation claims involve attempts to
"chang[e] some rule that is generally applicable so as to make its burden less onerous on the handicapped individual."1 12 Courts have interpreted reasonable to mean that the accommodation does not
require "a fundamental alteration in the nature of the program" and
104. Id. § 3604(f) (3) (B).
105. See, e.g., Hill v. Cmty. of Damien of Molokai, 911 P.2d 861, 871 (N.M. 1996)
(describing the three distinct claims under § 3604). Disparate treatment and disparate
impact claims arise under § 3604(f) (1), while reasonable accommodation claims arise
under § 3604(f)(3). Id. at 872.
106. Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, 823 F. Supp. 1285, 1295 (D.
Md. 1993).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Hill, 911 P.2d at 872-73.
110. Potomac Group Home, 823 F. Supp. at 1295.
111. Id. (quoting Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982))
112. Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 462 n.25 (D.NJ.
1992).

MARYLAND

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 61:985

does not "impose undue financial or administrative burdens.""' 3 In
determining reasonableness, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit has found that a court may consider: (1) whether
an accommodation would undermine existing zoning regulations; (2)
the benefits of the accommodation to the handicapped; (3) whether
more efficient 14
alternatives exist; and (4) the cost of the
accommodation.'

3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Community
Ass'n, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari to address three issues:
(1) whether the Village of Wilde Lake's enforcement of the restrictive
covenant was a violation of § 3604 of the FHA; (2) whether the circuit
court erred in granting a permanent injunction to enforce the restrictive covenant;' 5 and (3) whether the circuit court erred in holding
that the Committee's decision to deny approval for one of the homes
was reasonable, in good faith, and not "pretext for improper motives."' 16 As to the first issue, the court concluded that the FHA issues
had already been previously and finally litigated in Columbia Ass'n v.
Colandrea."7 Consequently, the court affirmed the circuit court's
holding that issue and claim preclusion operated to preclude relitigation of Colandrea's FT-IA counterclaims.' 18 As to the second and third
issues, the court upheld the issuance of an injunction to enforce the
'19
covenant, as well as the trial court's finding of "reasonableness."

113. United States v. City of Philadelphia, 838 F. Supp. 223, 228 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing
Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v.Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412-13 (1979)).
114. Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, 124 F.3d 597, 604 (4th Cir. 1997).
115. Colandrea, 361 Md. at 376, 761 A.2d at 901. The court addressed this second issue,
but because the focus of this Note is preclusion, the court's use of injunctions to enforce
restrictive covenants will not be discussed further.
116. Id. at 376-77, 761 A.2d at 901-02.
117. Id. at 393, 761 A.2d at 910-11.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 401-02, 761 A.2d at 915. Although the court addressed each separately, its
discussion of the last two issues seemed intertwined. The court partly relied on Kirkley v.
Siepelt, 212 Md. 127, 128 A.2d 430 (1957), when discussing both injunctive relief for private
covenants and the decision of the Committee. In Kirkley the plaintiff appealed the enforcement of a restrictive covenant that prevented her from installing metal awnings on the
front of her house. The Kirkley court upheld the injunction after holding that
refusal to approve the external design or location of development would have to
be based upon a reason that bears some relation to the other buildings or the
general plan of development; and.., be a reasonable determination made in good
faith, and not high-handed whimsical or captious in manner.
Id. at 133, 128 A.2d at 434 (emphasis added). In Colandrea, the court deferred to the trial
court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses in drawing its conclusions. Colandrea,
361 Md. at 402, 761 A.2d at 915.
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The court began by extensively reviewing the circuit court's decision. 12' The circuit court had determined that the issue of whether
the restrictive covenant violated the FHA had been resolved in Columbia Ass'n v. Colandrea.12 ' The circuit court also found that the presence of several senior assisted-living facilities in the county and the
twenty-five percent vacancy rate in such facilities contravened Colandrea's assertion that his group homes were necessary.1 22 After reviewing the decision below, the court then reviewed Judge Sybert's
decision in Columbia Ass'n v. Colandrea.'23 The court specifically noted
Judge Sybert's conclusion that the Committee's approval process was
"alegitimate way of addressing the issue of discrimination under the
FHA," and that Colandrea did not appeal the decision.1 24 The court
also noted that during the pendency of Columbia Ass'n v. Colandrea,
the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) was investigating a complaint of discrimination filed with
them by Colandrea. 12 5 With these previous cases in mind, the court
determined that the Fl-A issues were finally resolved and stated, "to
the extent we address F14A related issues .... it is limited to the Associ-

ation's actions occurring after the final judgment in [Columbia Ass'n v.
Colandrea] "126

This being said, the court went on to explain Maryland case law
regarding claim and issue preclusion. Turning first to collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, the court looked to its decision in Janes v.
State, where it defined issue preclusion as barring the re-litigation of
"an issue of fact or law [that was] actually litigated and determined by
a valid and final judgment, and the determination [was] essential to
the judgment."'127 After defining issue preclusion, the court explained the difference between issue and claim preclusion by extensively quoting Mackall v. Zayre Corp.128 To further clarify the
distinction, the court proceeded to describe claim preclusion by quot120. Colandrea, 361 Md. at 379-85, 761 A.2d at 903-06.
121. Id. at 384, 761 A.2d at 906. In Columbia Ass'n, the circuit court concluded that the
restrictive covenant did not violate the FHA because it was "facially neutral." Id.
122. Id. at 382-84, 761 A.2d at 905-06.
123. Id. at 385-86, 761 A.2d at 906-07.
124. Id.
125. Id. Colandrea had filed a complaint alleging violation of the FHA against the Village of Wilde Lake. Id. HUD dismissed the complaint after finding that "reasonable cause
does not exist to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred." Id.
126. Id.
127. 350 Md. 284, 295, 711 A.2d 1319, 1324 (1998) (quoting Murray Int'l Freight Corp.
v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 547, 555 A.2d 502, 504 (1989)).
128. Colandrea, 361 Md. at 387-89, 761 A.2d at 907-08 (quoting Mackall v. Zayre Corp.,
293 Md. 221, 227-28, 443 A.2d 98, 101-02 (1982)).
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ing FWB Bank v. Richman.'2 9 In FVB Bank, the court stressed that
claim preclusion bars the second claim completely, whereas issue preclusion will bar only those issues actually decided between the same
30
parties in a prior suit.
The court also foundJudge Wilner's explanation in Klein v. Whitehead helpful."' In that Court of Special Appeals decision, Judge Wilner described the related, yet distinct, concepts of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, and collateral attack on judgments.1 3 The court
summarized Judge Wilner's observations by stating that "[c] ollateral
estoppel is concerned with the issue implications of the earlier litigation of a different case, while res judicata is concerned with the legal
consequences of a judgment entered earlier in the same cause."13 3
Having described the distinction between these doctrines, the
court returned to the subject of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion).' 3 4 Citing its decision in Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. TKU Associates, the court laid out the four-part test for the
application of collateral estoppel.' 3 5 The court then listed the elements of claim preclusion.1 36 Finally, the court explained that a party
had to assert all legal theories in the first suit to avoid the application
1 37
of resjudicatain future actions between the same parties.
Turning to the instant case, the court found that the parties in
Colandreawere the same as those in both Columbia Ass'n v. Colandrea
and the HUD complaint, thus meeting the third element of issue pre-

129. Id. at 389-90, 761 A.2d at 908-09.
130. FWB Bank v. Richman, 354 Md. 472, 492-93, 731 A.2d 916, 927-28 (1999).
131. Colandrea, 361 Md. at 390, 761 A.2d at 909.
132. See Klein v. Whitehead, 40 Md. App. 1, 12, 389 A.2d 374, 381 (1978) ("These three
doctrines, though related, are different; they apply in different circumstances and they
prevent different things.").
133. Colandrea, 361 Md. at 390-91, 761 A.2d at 909.
134. Id. at 391, 761 A.2d at 909-10.
135. Id. The court summarized the four requirements for collateral estoppel as follows:
1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question?
2. Was there a final judgment on the merits?
3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party
to the prior adjudication?
4. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted given a fair opportunity to be
heard on the issue?
Id., 761 A.2d at 909.
136. Id. at 392, 761 A.2d at 910. The court stated that the requirements of resjudicataor
claim preclusion are: "1) that the parties in the present litigation are the same or in privity
with the parties to the earlier dispute; 2) that the claim presented in the current action is
identical to the one determined in the prior adjudication; and 3) that there was a final
judgment on the merits." Id.
137. Id.
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clusion and the first element of claim preclusion.' 3 8 The court further noted that Colandrea could have appealed the circuit court's
decision in Columbia Ass'n v. Colandrea but declined to pursue it.139
Thus, the court concluded that the issue of whether the restrictive
covenant, "its procedural requirements, or its effects" violated the
FHA had already been finally determined, meeting the second element of issue preclusion and the third element of claim preclusion. 4 0
The court then determined that the issue in Colandreawas the same as
that presented in Columbia Ass'n v. Colandrea.4 ' After making these
determinations, the court concluded that issue preclusion controlled.' 4 2 However, the court refused to discuss further any of the
FHA issues by stating, "[tio the extent that appellant may argue that
not every nuance was presented to the court in the prior case, every
nuance should have been presented under appellant's then [FRA]
counter-claim. The judgment in the prior case has collateral estoppel
effects on all issues there raised, or that should have been raised."' 4 3
Last, the court concluded that Colandreainvolved the same cause of
action as Columbia Ass'n v. Colandrea and expressed agreement with
144
the circuit court's disposition of the FHA arguments in Colandrea.
4. Analysis.-In affirming the circuit court's holding that the
FHA claims raised by Colandrea were precluded from litigation by the
1995 proceeding, 14 5 the Court of Appeals missed an opportunity to
address restrictive covenants under Maryland law in light of the Fair
Housing Act. Had the Court of Appeals applied the relevant tests for
claim and issue preclusion more thoroughly, it would have found that
Colandrea's claim that discriminatory motives were the basis for the
Committee's decision in the second proceeding was distinct from the
claim that the restrictive covenant was a violation of the FHA in the
first proceeding. The court also would have found that the issues associated with these claims were distinct.
a. The Claim in Colandrea Was Not Identical to that In Columbia Ass'n v. Colandrea.-The parties and courts confused the issues,

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 392-93, 761 A.2d at 910.
Id. at 393, 761 A.2d at 910.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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facts, and law in this case.' 4 6 While the counterclaim that Colandrea
brought in the first suit shared some elements with that brought in
the second suit, the latter was nonetheless "separate and distinct"
under the "transaction" test followed in Maryland, and thus should
not have been precluded.' 4 7
In Columbia Ass'n v. Colandrea, the controversy centered on the
restrictive covenant. 148 The first question was whether a group home
qualified as commercial or residential. 4 ' If commercial, then the
group homes at 10461 and 10433 Waterfowl Terrace were subject to
the restrictive covenant, which required application to the Committee
for approval.' 5 1 Colandrea contended that his group homes were residential and made essentially a reasonable accommodation claim that
the application of the restrictive covenant to the group homes violated
§ 3604(f) (3) of the FHA. 15 1 The circuit court ruled that these group
homes were commercial in nature and thus subject to the restrictive
covenant, but did not grant an injunction to the neighborhood association.' 52 Rather, the circuit court ordered that Colandrea apply to
the Committee for approval.153 In regard to Colandrea's reasonable
accommodation claim, the circuit court reasoned that the covenant
was facially neutral and was therefore not a violation of the FHA.' 5 4
In contrast, the Colandrea trial court focused on whether the
Committee's decision to deny approval for 10433 Waterfowl Terrace

146. See id. at 392-93, 761 A.2d at 910-11. The court seemed to apply the rules of claim
preclusion (resjudicata)to conclude that issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) applied. See
id.
147. See Kent County Bd. of Educ. v. Bilbrough, 309 Md. 487, 498-99, 525 A.2d 232, 238
(1987) (adopting the transaction test in Maryland).
148. Columbia Ass'n v. Colandrea, No. 93-CA-21562, slip op. at 1-2 (Howard County,
Md., Cir. Ct. Feb. 16, 1995).
149. Id. at 2.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 6-7.
153. Id. at 7.
154. Id. at 6. Building upon its conclusion that Colandrea's group homes were businesses subject to the restrictive covenant, the circuit court found that the covenant was not
discriminatory because it applied to all other business and professional activities. Id. This
analysis does not settle the FHA dispute, however. The abridgment of a restrictive covenant is not relevant to the question of whether there is a violation of the FHA. Skipper v.
Hambleton Meadows Architectural Review Comm., 996 F. Supp. 478, 484 (D. Md. 1998).
Furthermore, the facial neutrality of a restrictive covenant does not automatically defeat an
FHA claim. See Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 752 F. Supp. 1152, 116869 (D.P.R. 1990) (holding that enforcement of a neutral restrictive covenant still violated
the FHA).
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was reasonable. 155 Colandrea raised a reasonable accommodation
counterclaim here as well, but unlike the prior suit, he also made discriminatory intent and disparate impact claims under § 3604(f) (1).
In short, Colandrea claimed that discriminatory motives were the basis
for the Committee's decision to close 10433 Waterfowl Terrace and
that the Committee's decision was not a reasonable accommodation;
he did not claim that the enforcement of the restrictive covenant violated the reasonable accommodation requirement of the FHA.' 5 6
Application of the "transaction" test, as set forth in the Restatement
(Second) ofJudgments and adopted by the Court of Appeals in Bilbrough,
helps to elucidate the differences between the claims in the two actions.' 57 The determination of what is a "transaction" or "series of
transactions" involves weighing a variety of factors: the relationship of
the facts in time, space, origin, motivation; the formation of the facts
into a convenient trial unit; and the conformity of the facts as a unit
with the parties' expectations.158 In this case, the facts that were relevant to the issue in Columbia Ass'n included operation of the group
homes, their nature and character, activities occurring in the homes,
the fees the inhabitants pay, and Colandrea's relationship to the residents.1 59 The facts that were relevant to the issue in Colandrea included the Committee's process and criteria for granting approval to
in-home businesses, past Committee approvals and denials, the procedure for election of Committee members, qualifications of Committee
members, and the basis of the Committee decision in this particular
instance.16 ° Only Colandrea presented facts pertinent to the motivations of the neighborhood association, which was necessary for the
evaluation of a discriminatory intent or disparate impact claim under
§ 3604(f) (1) of the FHA.1 61 Thus, any overlap of facts relating to the
reasonable accommodation claims in the two suits should not have
155. Wilde Lake Crty. Ass'n v. Colandrea, No. 13-C-96-30540, slip op. at 5 (Howard
County, Md., Cir. Ct. Sept. 8, 1999). Judge Kane's opinion extensively discussed the Committee proceedings and the testimony. He concluded that "the decision of the Architectural Committee denying the application as to 10433 was made in good faith and was
reasonable." Id.
156. Id. at 10; Brief for Appellant at 8-9, Colandrea (No. 24).
157. Kent County Bd. of Educ. v. Bilbrough, 309 Md. 487, 498-99, 525 A.2d 232, 238
(1987); 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 24 (1980).
158. Bilbrough, 309 Md. at 498, 525 A.2d at 238 (quoting 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 24).
159. See Columbia Ass'n v. Colandrea, No. 93-CA-21562, slip op. at 4-5 (Howard County,
Md., Cir. Ct. Feb. 16, 1995) (listing facts considered in determining the nature of the
group homes).
160. Brief for Appellant at 3-7, Colandrea (No. 00-24).
161. Id.; see also supra notes 102-114 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of
§ 3604 claims).
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prevented adjudication of the discriminatory intent and disparate impact claims under § 3604(f) (1) in Colandrea. Indeed, the facts pertaining to the decision of the Committee did not exist at the time
Columbia Ass'n was decided because the Committee had not yet reviewed Colandrea's application.

16 2

In terms of the time factor, even if the events of Colandrea depended upon the occurrence of events in Columbia Ass'n, the suits
arose from incidents occurring at different times.1 6 3 The first suit
arose in 1993, five years earlier than the second. Yet, while the time
factor favors treating the claims as distinct, the space consideration
does not, as the two actions involved the same group homes, even
though the second action revolved around only one of the group
homes.1 64 So too with motivation; in both actions, Colandrea averred
that the neighborhood association's enforcement of the restrictive
covenant was motivated in part by discrimination against the
elderly.'

65

Another consideration in the "transaction" test is whether the factual grouping is a convenient trial unit.16 6 The timing of the suits
must figure into the analysis of this factor. 1 67 Co-adjudication of the
two incidents in the instant matter would be a difficult task because
one occurred in the past with no certain expectation that the second
incident would occur. It would be impossible to properly adjudicate
whether the Committee's review process violated § 3604 before it
made any decisions.' 68 Even if raised in Columbia Ass'n, the legality of
the Committee decision process was not actually litigated or essential
162. Columbia Ass'n, No. 93-CA-21562, slip op. at 6.
163. Colandrea, 361 Md. at 378 n.3, 761 A.2d at 902 n.3.
164. Id.
165. See Brief for Appellant at 8, Colandrea (No. 24); Columbia Ass'n, No. 93-CA-21562,
slip op. at 2.
166. Kent County Bd. of Educ. v. Bilbrough, 309 Md. 487, 498, 525 A.2d 232, 238
(1987); see also 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. b (1980) (explaining the
convenience of a unit for trial requires an inquiry into whether "the witnesses or proofs in
the second action would tend to overlap the witnesses or proofs relevant to the first").
167. See Gertz v. Anne Arundel County, 339 Md. 261, 271, 661 A.2d 1157, 1162 (1995)
(concluding that the facts in that case could not form a convenient trial unit in the first
litigation because the rights at issue in the second litigation did not exist until after the first
suit was decided).
168. See Lawlor v. Nat'l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 328 (1955) (observing that
while a prior "judgment precludes recovery on claims arising prior to its entry, it cannot be
given the effect of extinguishing claims which did not even then exist and which could not
possibly have been sued upon in the previous case"); Bilbrough, 309 Md. at 499, 525 A.2d at
238 (concluding that claim preclusion "is justified only when the parties have ample procedural means for fully developing the entire transaction in the one action going to the
merits to which the plaintiff is ordinarily confined" (quoting I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. a)).
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to the judgment in Columbia Ass'n, and thus was not reviewable. 1 69 It

was possible to adjudicate whether the restrictive covenant as applied
to a group home in Columbia Ass'n was valid without deciding whether
the Committee's decision had a reasonable basis. 7 ' For these reasons, the facts underlying the two claims could not form a convenient
trial unit.
In summary, the central concerns of each suit were different. Columbia Ass'n asked whether Colandrea's group homes were commercial and if the restrictive covenant violated the FHA, while Colandrea
asked whether the Committee's denial of permission for one group
home was based on improper motives. Consideration of the time factors also suggests distinguishing the claims in the two suits. Even
though the two actions involved the same properties and parties,
there were two distinct transactions, and thus claims. Therefore,
claim preclusion was not applicable.
b. Issue Preclusion Did Not Apply to All Issues in Colandrea.Issue preclusion may apply even if claim preclusion does not. 7 '
Here, the two suits involved the same parties, but the critical issues in
each case were different. The questions of whether the group home
was a business to which the restrictive covenant applied and whether
the F1-A exempted the group home from enforcement of the restrictive covenant were actually litigated and determined in Columbia
Ass'n. 172 Hence, Colandrea could not have raised these questions
again in Colandrea.
However, Colandrea could have litigated whether the Committee's decision was based on discriminatory motives in violation of the
Fl-A without danger of preclusion in Colandrea. This issue is not identical to those in Columbia Ass'n and was not actually litigated and deter-

169. See Murray Int'l Freight Corp. v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 552, 555 A.2d 502, 506
(1989) (stating that issue preclusion is not applicable if the "party against whom preclusion
is sought could not, as a matter of law, have obtained review of the judgment in the initial
action..." (quoting 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(1))).
170. Columbia Ass'n, No. 93-CA-21562, slip op. at 6-7; see also Murray Int'l Freight Corp., 315
Md. at 551, 555 A.2d at 505 (explaining that re-adjudication of issues determined but not
essential to the judgment in a prior proceeding is not barred in a later proceeding) (citing
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. h).
171. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Anne Arundel County, 135 Md. App. 1, 28, 761 A.2d 935, 948-49
(2000).
172. Columbia Ass'n, No. 93-CA-21562, slip op. at 6-7.
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mined in Columbia Ass'n.t 7 3 Moreover, the issue was not essential to
1 74
the judgment in Columbia Ass'n.
The issue of whether the Committee's decision in Colandrea's
case was based on discriminatory motives shared some facts with the
primary issue in Columbia Ass'n; however, this does not mean they were
identical. The crucial distinction is that the Committee had yet to
make a decision on the group homes when Columbia Ass'n was adjudi176
cated.' 7 5 Thus, discovery for the two issues would have differed.
77
The applicable rule of law for each issue also differs.1
In fact, the Columbia Ass'n court did not fully consider the decision-making process of the Committee, nor did the parties brief that
issue. 1' Given these circumstances, Colandrea was not given a fair
opportunity in Columbia Ass'n to be heard on this issue, and the issue
of the Committee's decision and decision-making process raised in Colandrea should have survived issue preclusion.
Finally, the issue of whether the Committee's decision process
was arbitrary was not essential to the judgment in Columbia Ass'n. Application of issue preclusion requires that the issue be essential to the
determination of the prior proceeding. 1 79 In regard to the FHA
claim, the Columbia Ass'n court based its decision solely on the facial
neutrality of the restrictive covenant.'
173. See Wilde Lake Cmty. Ass'n v. Colandrea, No. 13-C-96-30540, slip op. at 10 (Howard
County, Md., Cir. Ct. Sept. 8, 1999) (noting that Columbia Ass'n only "ruled... the FHA did
not relieve Colandrea from complying with the requirements of the covenants and seeking
approval of the Architectural Review Committee" and admitting that claims arising from
events occurring after Columbia Ass'n were not precluded from decision in Colandrea);see
also Colandrea, 361 Md. at 386, 761 A.2d at 907 ("[T]o the extent we address FHA related
issues, if we do, it is limited to the Association's actions occurring after the final judgment
in the prior case.").
174. Columbia Ass'n, No. 93-CA-21562, slip. op. at 6-7. There is simply no mention of
Wilde Lake's motives or intent in the opinion. Id. The claim in the first suit was a reasonable accommodation claim, which does not require consideration of intent. See Hill v.
Cmty. of Damien of Molokai, 911 P.2d 861, 874-75 (N.M. 1996) (discussing the elements of
§ 3604 claims).
175. See Columbia Ass'n, No. 93-CA-21562, slip op. at 7 (ordering Colandrea to apply to
the Committee).
176. See 1 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c (1982); see also supra note
75 (explaining factors to consider when evaluating whether the issue is the same in two
different cases).
177. The first suit relied on the reasonable accommodation aspect of § 3604(f) (1), but
the second suit relied more on the claims arising under § 3604(f) (3). See Hill, 911 P.2d at
872.
178. See Columbia Ass'n, No. 93-CA-21562, slip op. at 6.
179. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979).
180. Columbia Ass'n, No. 93-CA-21562, slip op. at 6-7 (stating that the covenant in question did not violate the FHA because it was applicable to any in-home business, not merely
group homes).
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5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
decision too quickly when it concluded that claim and issue preclusion controlled. Analysis under the "transaction" test shows that the
claims in Columbia Ass'n and Colandreawere distinct, even though facts
in the two cases overlapped. Last, the central issues in each suit were
not the same. As such, the Court of Appeals missed an opportunity to
examine a relatively new and important area of law.
KARYN S. BERGMANN

IX.

A.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Assuming the Role of the Legislature and Unjustifiably Changing the
Definition of "Willfully" in the Maryland Wiretap Statute

In Deibler v. State,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether the term "willfully,"2 for purposes of the Maryland wiretap
statute, 3 requires the defendant to knowingly violate the statute or
simply intend to carry out his acts.4 The court held that "willfully," in
the Maryland wiretap statute, means an act that is "done intentionallypurposely."5 In making its decision, the court focused on Maryland
cases defining the term "willfully" and Congress's intended definition
of "willfully" in the current federal wiretap statute.6 Although the
court analyzed the federal wiretap statute and Congress's intent, it erroneously failed to engage in an in-depth analysis of the legislative
intent behind the Maryland wiretap statute. The court's decision is
problematic because it deferred to Congress's current definition in
the federal statute instead of focusing on the intent of the Maryland
legislature. Thus, the court exceeded its judicial powers by assuming
the role of the legislature and changing the Maryland legislature's intended definition of "willfull" in the Maryland statute.
1. The Case.-While at the home of his friend, Scott Bagdasian,
Thomas Deibler planted a video camera in the Bagdasian family bathroom. 7 Deibler hid the camera, which contained an audio recording
device, in a bathroom sink drawer.' Some time after Deibler hid the
video camera in the bathroom, Scott Bagdasian's aunt, Mary Bagdasian, went into the bathroom to take a shower.9 Mary Bagdasian
1. 365 Md. 185, 776 A.2d 657 (2001).
2. As the Maryland Court of Appeals noted in Peny v. State, 357 Md. 37, 52 n. 7 , 741
A.2d 1162, 1170 n.7 (1999), the word "willful" can be spelled "willful" or "wilful." The
word is spelled with only one "1" in the Maryland wiretap statute. Throughout this Note,
the word will be spelled "willful."
3. Section 10-402(a)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland provides that "...
it is unlawful for any person to .. . [w)ilfully
intercept, endeavor to intercept, or procure any other person to intercept or endeavor to
intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication[.]" MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 10-402(a)(1) (1998 & Supp. 2001).

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Deibler, 365 Md. at 188, 776 A.2d at 659.
Id. at 199, 776 A.2d at 665.
See id. at 193-99, 776 A.2d at 661-65.
Id. at 188-89, 776 A.2d at 658-59.
Id.
Id. at 188, 776 A.2d at 659.
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showered, used the bathroom, and dried herself while the video camera recorded her private moments.1 °
After showering, Mary Bagdasian noticed a book of matches underneath a basket on the bathroom sink counter."t She removed the
matches, fearing a child may pick them up, and discovered a black
box in the basket. 1 2 Not understanding what the box was, Mary Bagdasian dressed and called her father to examine it. 3 Noticing that
the wires ran behind the splash panel of the sink, Mary Bagdasian and
her father opened the cabinet drawers and discovered the hidden
video camera.' 4 Mary watched the tape, and on it she saw herself going to the bathroom, taking a shower, and drying off.' 5 The tape also
recorded Mary Bagdasian and her father examining the box and recorded their conversation.16 In addition, the tape recorded Deibler
setting up the video camera; therefore, there was no question as to
who set up the video camera.' 7 Mary Bagdasian then waited for
Deibler to go back into the bathroom and, while listening at the door,
she heard him rummaging through the drawers. 8 When Deibler
came out of the bathroom, Mary Bagdasian described him as, "turning
in circles and as white as a ghost, because he knew that the camera was
gone." 9 Shortly thereafter, Mary Bagdasian handed the tape over to
the State's Attorney's Office.2 °
At trial, Deibler stated that he indeed placed the camera in the
bathroom, and that the camera recorded voices, including his own
voice, and his person. 21 Both Mary Bagdasian and her father testified
that neither gave permission to Deibler, or anyone else, to place a
video camera in the bathroom or record their conversation. 22 Based
upon the evidence, the trial court, sitting without a jury, convicted
Deibler of violating the Maryland wiretap statute, "by wilfully intercepting an oral communication. ''23 Deibler appealed directly to the

10. See id. at 189, 776 A.2d at 659.
11. Id. at 188, 776 A.2d at 659.
12. Id. at 188-89, 776 A.2d at 659.
13. Id. at 189, 776 A.2d at 659.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 191, 776 A.2d at 660; see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & Jun. PROC. § 10402(a)(1) (1998 & Supp. 2001) (providing that individuals violate the wiretap statute if
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Court of Appeals of Maryland, which granted certiorari to consider
whether a "willfull" violation of the Maryland wiretap statute requires
the defendant to know that his or her action is unlawful, or whether
mere intent to commit the interception is sufficient for a conviction.2 4
2.

Legal Background.a. The History of the Maryland and Federal Wiretap Statutes.(1) The Maryland Wiretap Statute.-In 1977, Maryland

adopted its present Wiretap and Electronic Surveillance Act.25 Sec-

tion 10-402 of the Maryland wiretap law makes it unlawful for any person to "wilfully intercept, endeavor to intercept, or procure any other
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or elec' 26

tronic communication."

Maryland's wiretap statute was modeled on the federal wiretap
statute 27 found in The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968.2' Basing itself on the federal act, the Maryland wiretap statute closely tracks the provisions of the federal statute.2 9 While the
Maryland and federal statutes are essentially the same in content, the
Maryland legislature made some of its provisions more restrictive than
the federal statute.30 These more restrictive provisions were instituted
to afford greater protection to the privacy of Maryland citizens. 3 '
they "[w]ilfully intercept, endeavor to intercept, or procure any other person to intercept
or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication").
24. See Deibler, 365 Md. at 188, 776 A.2d at 659. In addition, the trial court also convicted Deibler of violating Article 27, section 555A(2) of the Annotated Code of Maryland
for making repeated telephone calls to the chief criminal investigating officer, David Cordle, and intentionally harassing him. Id. at 190-91, 776 A.2d at 659-60. Deibler also appealed his harassment conviction. Id. at 191, 776 A.2d at 660. This Note will not discuss
the court's decision on the harassment appeal.
25. Act ofJuly 1, 1977, ch. 692, 1977 Md. Laws 2818 (providing the text and enactment
date of Maryland's wiretap statute).
26. MD.CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. § 10-402(a) (1).
27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000).
28. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351 tit. III, 82
Stat. 197, 212-24.
29. Ricks v. State, 312 Md. 11, 15, 537 A.2d 612, 614, cert denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988).
Thus, when interpreting and applying the Maryland wiretap statute, Maryland courts look
to the federal courts for guidance. See, e.g., Standiford v. Standiford, 89 Md. App. 326, 334,
598 A.2d 495, 498-99 (1991).
30. Ricks, 312 Md. at 15, 537 A.2d at 614. Compare MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 10-402(c) (3) (making it unlawful in Maryland for a person to intercept an oral communication unless all parties to the communication have given their prior consent to the interception), with 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (reflecting the 1986 amendment making an oral
interception lawful where only one person or party to the communication has given prior
consent to the interception).
31. Standiford, 89 Md. App. at 334, 598 A.2d at 499. For example, section 10-402(c) of
the Maryland statute is more restrictive than its federal counterpart with respect to the
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(2) The Federal Wiretap Statute.-The 1968 federal wiretap statute, which was the basis for Maryland's statute, prohibited any
person from "willfully" intercepting any wire or oral communication.12 The term "willfully" in the 1968 federal wiretap statute remained part of the statute for two decades. 33 In 1986, Congress
amended the wiretap statute by omitting the term "willfully," as it appeared in § 2511, and replacing it with the term "intentionally."3 4
b. Federal Courts' Interpretation of "Willfulness" in the Federal
Wiretap Statute.(1) Pre-1986 Amendment.-The 1968 Senate Judiciary
Committee Report parenthetically cited United States v. Murdock for
the meaning of "willfully" in § 2511 of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 35 The Murdock Court defined willful as
an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But, when used in a criminal
statute, it generally means an act done with a bad purpose;
without justifiable excuse; stubbornly, obstinately, perversely.
The word is also employed to characterize a thing done without ground for believing it is lawful, or conduct marked by
careless disregard whether or not one has the right so to
act."

State's Attorney's ability to obtain a grant from ajudge to intercept a wire or oral communication. MD. CODE A"NN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 10-402(c)(1)-(2). Section 10-402(c) of the
Maryland wiretap statute allows the Attorney General or the State's Attorney to apply to a
judge for authorization to intercept when the interception may provide evidence of, inter
alia, murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in controlled
substances. Id. Section 2516 of the Federal Wiretap Act allows any designated Assistant
Attorney General to apply for authorization when such interception may provide evidence
of any offense punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2516.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1968) (amended 1986). The statute created criminal liability for
anyone who: "(a) willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person
to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire or oral communication." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511 (1) (a) (emphasis added). In addition, parts (b) and (c) prohibited the willfuluse or
disclosure of such intercepted communications.
33. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1986), with 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1968) (replacing the term
"willfully" with "intentionally").
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000). The amended federal wiretap statute states that a person
is subject to criminal liability if he "(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or
procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication . . . ." Id. § 2511 (1)(a) (emphasis added).
35. S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 93 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2181.
36. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394-95 (1933) (citations omitted). In Murdock, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of "willful" in the context
of a federal criminal tax statute. See id. at 392.
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In 1983, in Citron v. Citron,3 7 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit interpreted the term "willful" using the Supreme Court's definition in Murdock to establish civil liability for a violation of the federal wiretap statute. 38 The Citron court defined the
term by stating that "[the reference to Murdock in the Senate Report]
makes it clear that congress [sic] employed the term 'willfully' to denote at least a voluntary, intentional violation of, and perhaps also a
reckless disregard of, a known legal duty."3 9 In addition, the court
held that this definition of "willful" should apply to civil, as well as
40
criminal, violations of the statute.
In Malouche v. JH Management Co., Inc.,4 1 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit's
interpretation in the context of civil liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2520.42
Holding that the criminal "willful" standard applied to the civil component of the federal wiretap statute, the Malouche court required the
plaintiff to establish that the defendant intentionally or recklessly disregarded his or her legal obligation.
(2) Post-1986 Amendment.--Following the 1986 amendment, which replaced "willfully" with "intentionally" in § 2511, courts
interpreted the statute differently by distinguishing between the two
mens rea requirements.4 4 Congress's intent behind the amendment
was to emphasize that inadvertent interceptions are not violations of
the Act. 45 "Intentionally," as used in the amended wiretap statute, has

37. 722 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1983).
38. See id. at 16.
39. Id.
40. Id. In addition to defining "willful," the Citron court responded to the plaintiffs
appeal that "willful" should not mean the same when used in a civil and criminal context.
Id. The court rejected this argument, explaining that liability under the civil provision of
the statute requires a finding that the defendant also violated the criminal portion of the
Act. Id. Thus, the court decided that a defendant cannot be found civilly liable unless he
or she "willfully" violated the criminal statute. Id.
41. 839 F.2d 1024 (4th Cir. 1988).
42. Id. at 1025. "The question presented [was] whether civil liability sought pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 2520, for alleged unlawful wiretapping occurring prior to the 1986 amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 2511, require[d] proof of criminal 'willfulness."' Id. (emphasis
added).
43. Id. at 1026. The Malouche court also stated that nothing in the statute's language or
history suggests that Congress intended "willfulness" to have different meanings when applied in the civil and criminal context. Id.
44. See, e.g., Adams v. Sumner, 39 F.3d 933, 935-36 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing
the need to treat federal wiretap law violations occurring before 1986 differently than
those occurring after 1986 and analyzing the act occurring under the pre-1986 amendment in accord with the Murdock definition of "willful").
45. S.REP. No. 99-541, at 23 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3577.
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a narrower definition than the dictionary definition; it means that
"one's state of mind is intentional as to one's conduct or the result of
one's conduct if such conduct or result is one's conscious objective."46
The replacement of the term "willfully" has changed the way federal courts interpret the mens rea element of the federal wiretap statute. In United States v. Townsend,4 7 the court defined the requisite
intent for the amended wiretap statute as "act[ing] deliberately and
purposefully; that is, defendant's act must have been the product of
defendant's conscious objective .... "48 Similarly, in Sanders v. Robert
Bosch Corp.,49 the court acknowledged the changed mens rea by stating
that the amended "section 2511 proscribes only 'intentional[ ]' interceptions." 50 In Abraham v. County of Greenville,5 1 the Fourth Circuit
further acknowledged the difference in treatment accorded to pre1986 amendment and post-1986 amendment cases when it noted that
now the statute requires only that interceptions be "intentional" as
opposed to "willful." 5 2 The Abraham court upheld a trial court's jury
instruction defining an intentional act as an act that is done when "it
cause the
is the conscious objective of the person to do the act or
53
result" and when "it is done knowingly or purposefully.
c. Maryland's Interpretation of "Willfulness" in the Maryland
Wiretap Statute.-Before Deibler v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had never specifically interpreted "willfull" for purposes of the
Maryland wiretap statute.5 4 Nevertheless, the Court of Special Ap-

46. Id.
47. 987 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1993).
48. Id. at 930.
49. 38 F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 1994).
50. Id. at 742 (alteration in original).
51. 237 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2001).
52. Id. at 391.
53. Id.
54. In 1999, in Perry v. State, the Court of Appeals reviewed "willful" in the wiretap
statute to consider whether a taped conversation between a defendant and co-conspirator
should be admissible. 357 Md. 37, 40, 741 A.2d 1162, 1164 (1999). In making a decision,
the court considered whether the taped conversation violated the wiretap statute. Id. at 63,
741 A.2d at 1176. The State argued that because the conversation was recorded "inadvertently," it was not recorded "willfully"; thus, the tape was properly admitted. Id. However,
defendant Perry argued the willfulness standard only applies to civil or criminal actions,
not questions regarding admissibility of evidence. Id. at 64, 741 A.2d at 1176. The court
agreed with Perry; thus, it did not define "willful" because the case was decided on other
grounds. See id. at 66-67, 741 A.2d at 1178. Despite the court's refusal to fully examine
"willful," the court concluded that the "interception of the conversation with Perry was
deliberate, purposeful, and intentional, and therefore willful." Id. at 69, 741 A.2d at 1179.
However, the court did not comment as to whether "willful" required any particular degree
of knowledge regarding the unlawful violation. See id.
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peals of Maryland has, on at least three occasions, reviewed and interpreted the willfulness standard of the Maryland wiretap statute. In
Petric v. State,5 5 the court essentially affirmed a definition for "willful"
which required that the defendant have known, or should have
known, he was violating the law when he recorded a conversation
without consent. 5 In Petric, the court considered the propriety of a
jury instruction wherein the trial court instructed the jury to find the
defendant not guilty if he lacked the mens rea required for a conviction
of the Maryland wiretap statute. 57 As to the mens rea, the jury was instructed that if the defendant recorded the conversations without
knowing that he was violating the law, then the jury should find that
he lacked the requisite intent for a conviction. 58 The jury was further
instructed that "if [they were to] find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant knew or should have known that he was violating the
law .

. . ,

it would not be a valid defense that [the defendant] did so

for.., any.. . purpose which appeared to him... to justify his actions
when he knowingly and willfully broke the law."'59 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the jury instructions and found no error because
the jury believed that the defendant knew he was violating the Maryland law.6"
A few years later, in Fearnow v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone

Co.,6"

the Court of Special Appeals explicitly defined "willful" in the
Maryland wiretap statute. 2 In Fearnozw, the defendant argued that a
"willful" violation only required intention to intercept the oral communication and did not include a reckless disregard standard.6 However, the court held "willful" to mean "more than intentional or
voluntary. It denotes either an intentional violation ora reckless disregard of a known legal duty."64 The court clearly stated that the defini-

55. 66 Md. App. 470, 504 A.2d 1168 (1986).
56. Id. at 477, 504 A.2d at 1172.
57. Id.
58. Id.

59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 477-78, 504 A.2d at 1172.
61. 104 Md. App. 1, 655 A.2d 1 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, 342 Md. 363, 676 A.2d 65
(1996).
62. Id. at 23, 655 A.2d at 12.
63. Id. at 23 n.20, 655 A.2d at 12 n.20.
64. Id. at 23, 655 A.2d at 12 (quoting Earley v. Smoot, 846 F. Stipp. 451, 453 (D. Md.
1994) and Benford v. Am. Broad. Co., 649 F. Supp. 9, 10 (D.Md. 1986) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). The Fearnow court restricted this interpretation of willful to the Maryland wiretap statute, so as not to affect other statutes using the term "willful." Id. at 24
n.20, 655 A.2d at 12 n.20.
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tion of willfulness includes knowledge of the law, which is an element
that must be specifically proven.6 5
In Hawes v. Carberry,6 6 the Court of Special Appeals agreed with
the Fearnow court's interpretation of "willful" in the Maryland wiretap
statute.6 7 The Hawes court established, after examining the Fearnow
decision, that the word "willful" means "an intentional violation or a
68
reckless disregard of a known legal duty.
d.

Federal Courts' Interpretation of "Willful" in the Maryland

Wiretap Statute.-The United States District Court for the District of
Maryland has reviewed the willfulness standard of the Maryland wiretap statute on two separate occasions. Benford v. American Broadcasting
Co. 69 was the first case to interpret the term "willful" in the context of

the Maryland wiretap statute. 70 The Benford court turned to the legislative history of the federal wiretap statute for guidance in interpreting the word "willful" because there was no helpful legislative history
in Maryland. 7 ' Accordingly, the court applied the definition of "willful" as courts had employed it in the federal statute, defining the Maryland willfulness standard as "denot[ing] either an intentional
72
violation or a reckless disregard of a known legal duty.
In 1994, the federal district court again interpreted the meaning
of willfulness in the Maryland wiretap statute. In Earley v. Smoot,73 the
court examined both the Maryland wiretap statute and the 1986
amended federal statute. 4 In so doing, it acknowledged that under
the Maryland statute, the plaintiff must prove the defendant knew that
65. See id. at 42-43, 655 A.2d at 21. The court in Fearnowstated,"[w]hen the law makes
knowledge of some requirement an element of the offense, it is totally incorrect to say that
ignorance of such law is no excuse or that everyone is presumed to know such law." Id.
(quoting United States v. Golitschek, 808 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In 1996, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari to reconsider some of
the provisions of the Maryland Wiretap Act interpreted by the Court of Special Appeals in
the Fearnow decision. Fearnow v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 342 Md. 363, 368, 676
A.2d 65, 67 (1996). The court did not review ajury instruction specifically as to the willfulness standard. See id. at 388, 676 A.2d at 77. However, the court suggested its agreement
with the Court of Special Appeals's definition of willfulness when it stated that the issue of
the defendant's willfulness turned on whether "he consciously disregard[ed] a known legal
duty." Id.
66. 103 Md. App. 214, 653 A.2d 479 (1995).
67. See id. at 222, 653 A.2d at 483.
68. Id. (citations omitted).
69. 649 F. Supp. 9 (D. Md. 1986).
70. See id. at 10.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 846 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1994).
74. See id. at 453.
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taping the proceedings without all parties' consent was unlawful.7 5
The Earley court distinguished the Maryland statute from the 1986
amended federal wiretap statute by explaining that a defendant is
criminally liable for "intentional-in the traditional sense of purposeful-conduct, without a showing of disregard of a known legal
duty" under the federal statute.7 6 In distinguishing the Maryland mens
rea requirement from the post-1986 federal requirement, the court
stated that Congress's purpose in adopting the 1986 wiretap amendment was to "dilute the standard of proof from willfulness to mere
intent" in the federal wiretap statute.7 7
e. Maryland's Interpretationof "Willful" in Other Criminal Statutes.-The term "willful" in Maryland criminal statutes has been interpreted various ways by the Court of Appeals. Specifically, some cases
define "willful" as only requiring mere intent to commit the act. In
the context of prosecution for destruction of property, the Court of
Appeals, in Rosenberg v. State,7" defined a "willful" criminal act as "an
act done with deliberate intention for which there is no reasonable
excuse. ''7 In State v. Devers,s ° the court again interpreted "willful" to
mean intentional."s The court defined the willfulness necessary for a
conviction of perjury to require that "the false oath must be deliberate
and not the result of surprise, confusion or bona fide mistake." 2 The
Court of Appeals, in Brown v. State, 3 distinguished between the terms
"maliciously" and "willfully," and noted that "willfully" is "commonly
interpreted as meaning 'intentionally.' "84
In Tichnell v. State,8 5 the Court of Appeals held that the element
of willfulness for the crime of murder requires "a specific purpose and
intent to kill."8 6 In Shell v. State,17 the Court of Appeals similarly inter75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The Earley court made no mention of how, or even if, the 1986 amendment to
the federal wiretap statute affected the Maryland wiretap statute. See id.
78. 164 Md. 473, 165 A. 306 (1933).
79. Id. at 476, 165 A.2d at 307; see also Ewell v. State, 207 Md. 288, 299, 114 A.2d 66, 72
(1954) (interpreting willful neglect in a Maryland criminal statute and citing to Rosenberg
for its definition of willful).

80. 260 Md. 360, 272 A.2d 794, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824 (1971).
81. Id. at 372, 272 A.2d at 800.

82. Id.
83. 285 Md. 469, 403 A.2d 788 (1979).
84. Id. at 475, 403 A.2d at 792. In Brown, the Court of Appeals was called upon to
decide whether the burning of an abandoned clubhouse was "maliciously caused or procured within the meaning of [the Maryland arson statute]." Id. at 470, 403 A.2d at 789.

85. 287 Md. 695, 415 A.2d 830 (1980).
86. Id. at 717, 415 A.2d at 842.
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preted "willful" in an arson statute to require "both a deliberate intention to injure the property of another and malice.""8 Further defining
"willful" in the context of a first-degree murder case, the Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction, finding no error with a jury instruction
that "[w]ilful means that the act which caused the death was done
intentionally and with purpose."8 "
Finally, the Court of Appeals has also interpreted "willful" as requiring a violation of a known legal duty.90 In Johnson v. State,"' the
court interpreted the willfulness requirement in Maryland Code, Article 81, section 32092 by looking to the Maryland statute's federal counterpart.9 3 The court determined that the "meaning accorded to
[willful] by the federal courts under [the federal statute] comports
with the legislative intention in enacting [the Maryland statute]. ' 4
The court then concluded that "wilfulness may be established through
proof that the accused's failure to file constituted a voluntary intentional violation of a known legal duty."9 5
3. The Court's Reasoning.--In Deibler v. State, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland held that the term "willful," for purposes of section 10402(a), and for sections 10-405, 10-408(i), and 10-410 of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code, means an interception that is done "intentionally-purposely," regardless of
whether the offender knows he is breaching a legal duty.9 6

87. 307 Md. 46, 512 A.2d 358 (1986).
88. Id. at 68, 512 A.2d at 369. In Shell, the court again noted that "wilfully... is commonly interpreted as meaning intentionally." Id. at 67, 512 A.2d at 369 (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Hunt v. State, 345 Md. 122, 162, 691 A.2d 1255, 1274 (1997).
90. See, e.g., Reisch v. State, 107 Md. App. 464, 476, 668 A.2d 970, 976 (1995) (defining
"willful" in a home improvement licensing statute and overturning the conviction when
the State failed to prove that the defendant acted "willfully, i.e., with the intent to violate a
known legal duty").
91. 294 Md. 515, 451 A.2d 330 (1982).
92. MD.ANN. CODE art. 81, § 320 (1980) (repealed 1997) (making it a crime to "willfully" fail to file a tax return).
93. Johnson, 294 Md. at 518-19, 451 A.2d at 332; see also I.R.C. § 7203 (2000) (making it
unlawful for a person to "willfully" fail to file a tax return).
94. Johnson, 294 Md. at 518, 451 A.2d at 332.
95. Id. at 518-19, 451 A.2d at 332.
96. Deibler, 365 Md. at 199, 776 A.2d at 665; see also MD.CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC.
§ 10405 (1998) (refusing to allow into evidence any communications derived from information obtained in violation of the wiretap statute); id. § 10-408(i) (allowing for an aggrieved party to move for the suppression of an unlawfully intercepted communication);
id. § 10-410 (imposing civil liability on an individual intercepting a communication in violation of the wiretap statute).
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Writing for the majority, Judge Wilner stated that "willful," as
used in Maryland statutes, including the Maryland wiretap statute, appears in a "variety of contexts" and can be construed in "several different ways." 97 The court further stated that it uses varying constructions
of "willful."98 The court listed several Maryland cases interpreting
"willful," in varying criminal statutes, to show that "willful" generally
means an act committed with a deliberate intent. 99 Further supporting its position that "willful" should be defined as "intentional," the
court relied on McBurney v. State""0 to show that its interpretation of
willfulness allows that the commission of the prohibited acts is sufficient for a conviction. 1 0'
Next, the court delineated the necessary steps for construing a
statutory term, namely, the need to give "willful" its most probable
contextual meaning intended by the legislature.' °2 In its statutory
analysis, the court focused primarily on the federal wiretap statute, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, because the Maryland wiretap statute is based
substantially on its federal counterpart. 1'
In its analysis of the federal wiretap statute, the court examined
the federal legislative history and federal courts' interpretations of the
statute.10 4 The majority looked to the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the federal wiretap law and United States v. Murdock to support
its interpretation of the Maryland wiretap statute's willfulness requirement. 10 5 The Deibler court concluded that Congress did not mean for
97. Deibler, 365 Md. at 192-94, 776 A.2d at 661-62 (noting that the term "willful" "appears 547 times in the Maryland Constitution, Code, and Rules in a variety of contexts").
The court further noted the complexity of the term by relying on the Supreme Court's
articulation that "[willful] is a word of many meanings, and its construction [is] often ...
influenced by its context." Id. (quoting Ratzalf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994)
(quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943))) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
98. Id. at 194, 776 A.2d at 662.
99. See id. at 194-95, 776 A.2d at 662.
100. 281 Md. 21, 371 A.2d 129 (1977).
101. Deibler,365 Md. at 194-95, 776 A.2d at 662.
102. Id. at 195, 776 A.2d at 663.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 196-99, 776 A.2d at 663-66.
105. Id. at 196, 776 A.2d at 663. The SenateJudiciary Committee Report on the federal
wiretap law did not include any explanation along with the notation that a violation of the
law be "willful" other than a parenthetical citation to United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389
(1933). See S. REP. No. 68-1097, at 93 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2181.
The Court in Murdock defined "willful" in a criminal statute as "an act done with a bad
purpose; withoutjustifiable excuse .... The word is also employed to characterize a thing
done without ground for believing it is lawful, or conduct marked by careless disregard
whether or not one has the right so to act." Murdock, 290 U.S. at 394-95 (citations
omitted).
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"willfully" to be so restrictive as to require a defendant to know that
the interception is unlawful.""
In support of its assertion that Congress intended a much less
restrictive definition of "willful," the majority relied on Congress's
1986 amendment to the federal wiretap statute, which eliminated the
term "willfully" and replaced it with "intentionally."'' 1 7 Explaining
Congress's purpose for the 1986 amendment, the court quoted a Senate Report stating that Congress's intent was "to underscore that inadvertent interceptions are not crimes under the [amended federal
wiretap law]."' 8 The court then concluded that the 1986 amendment meant to return the standard to Congress's original intent,
which was to require purposeful conduct." 9
After concluding that the 1986 amendment to the federal statute
was intended to return the meaning to Congress's original intent, the
court found that the federal definition-purposeful conduct-is consistent with Maryland's definition of willfulness in other criminal statutes,' 0 Thus, the court held "willful" in the Maryland wiretap statute
to mean "intentionally-purposely.""'
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Harrell disagreed with the majority's definition of willfulness." 2 Judge Harrell disapproved of the majority's departure from the "clear definition" of willfulness that was
106. Deibler, 365 Md. at 197, 776 A.2d at 664. The court noted that federal courts and
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland interpret Murdock as indicating that "willfully"
means at least an intentional violation of a known legal duty. See, e.g., Citron v. Citron, 722
F.2d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 973 (1984) (noting that the Senate Committee's reference to Murdock "makes it clear that congress [sic] employed the term 'willfully' to denote at least a voluntary, intentional violation of, and perhaps also a reckless
disregard of, a known legal duty"); Fearnow v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 104 Md.
App. 1, 23-24, 655 A.2d 1, 12 (1995), rev'd on other grounds,342 Md. 363, 676 A.2d 65 (1996)
(explaining that the violator must know that what he or she is doing is illegal to be liable
under the Maryland wiretap statute).
107. Deibler, 365 Md. at 197, 776 A.2d at 664. The Deibler court stated that Congress
found the term "willfully" to be "too amorphous." Id.
108. Id. at 198, 776 A.2d at 664 (quoting S. REP. No. 99-541, at 23 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3577 (emphasis added)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Id. at 198-99, 776 A.2d at 665. In Earley v. Smoot, 846 F. Supp. 451, 453 (D. Md.
1994), the court viewed Congress's replacement of the term "willful" as "dilut[ing] the
standard." However, the majority in Deibler firmly concluded that Congress was returning
to its original intent because the federal courts had so often misconstrued the statute's true
meaning. Deibler, 365 Md. at 198-99, 776 A.2d at 665.
110. Deibler, 365 Md. at 199, 776 A.2d at 665.
111. Id. The majority found this to be a sensible and appropriate definition and justified itself by stating that the required mental state of purposeful conduct, "requiring
neither a bad motive nor knowing unlawfulness," best fit with how the court defined "willful" in other Maryland statutes. Id.
112. Id. at 203, 776 A.2d at 667 (Harrell, J., dissenting). Chief Judge Bell joined in
Judge Harrell's dissent concerning the definition of willfulness, and Judge Battaglia only
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provided in Benford v. American BroadcastingCo." 3 He argued that the
better course was to follow the interpretations of the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland and the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in interpreting willfulness.' 14 Judge Harrell adhered
to the definition of "willful" in the Fearnow opinion that he authored
while on the Court of Special Appeals.' 15 Judge Harrell agreed that
Deibler's conduct was "morally reprehensible," but would have held
that Deibler did not possess the requisite degree of willfulness to support a conviction under the Maryland wiretap statute." 6
4. Analysis.-In Deibler, the Court of Appeals reached an appropriate outcome with flawed reasoning when it defined the term "willful" in section 10-402 of the Maryland wiretap statute as meaning
"intentionally-purposely," and not requiring knowledge of the breach
of a legal duty." 7 In so doing, the court ignored persuasive case law
interpreting "willful" in the Maryland wiretap statute and failed to
consider the meaning of "willful" within the context of the Maryland
wiretap statute. Furthermore, the court improperly analyzed the legislative history pertaining to the federal wiretap statute, and thus incorrectly applied the post-1986 legislative history of the Act. Because the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals and the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland already defined "willful" in the Maryland wiretap statute, the court improperly based its definition solely
on the language of the current federal wiretap statute.
a. The Court of Appeals Should Have Looked to Other Courts'Definition of "Willful. "--The Deibler court's attempt at defining "willful" is
flawed because it fails to consider the term in the context of the Maryland wiretap statute. The court essentially ignored the decisions that
already defined "willful" in the context of the Maryland wiretap
statute. 1 8
joined judge Harrell's dissent concerning the telephone harassment conviction. Id. at 205,
776 A.2d at 668-69.
113. Id.; see also Benford v. Am. Broad. Co., 649 F. Supp. 9, 10 (D. Md. 1986) (holding
that the definition of willfulness is "either an intentional violation or a reckless disregard of
a known legal duty").
114. Deibler, 365 Md. at 203, 776 A.2d at 667 (Harrell, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 203, 776 A.2d at 667-68. In Fearnow,Judge Harrell wrote that to establish
liability under the wiretap statute, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant "know what
he or she is doing is illegal." Fearnow v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 104 Md. App. 1,
24, 655 A.2d 1, 12 (1995).
116. Deibler, 365 Md. at 203, 776 A.2d at 668 (Harrell, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 199, 776 A.2d at 665.
118. See Deibler, 365 Md. at 192, 197, 776 A.2d at 661, 664; see also Earleyv. Smoot, 846 F.
Supp. 451, 453 (D. Md. 1994) (defining "willful" in the context of the Maryland wiretap
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The Deibler court should have looked to Hawes v. Carberry, Fearnow
v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., Earley v. Smoot, and Benford v.
American BroadcastingCo., decisions which interpreted "willful" in the
context of the Maryland wiretap statute.' 19 The relevance of these
cases is unmistakable. All of these opinions specifically analyze Maryland and federal legislative history surrounding the Maryland and federal wiretap statutes 12' and, more importantly, interpret the meaning
of "willful" in the context of the Maryland wiretap statute. The Court
of Appeals is well within its prerogative to disagree with the decisions
of the Court of Special Appeals and the United States District Court,
but considering the consistency in the courts' reasoning and interpretations, it should provide a logical reason for doing so. In Deibler, the
Court of Appeals did not state a reason for why these decisions were
not applicable and failed to sufficiently distinguish this case from the
others. 121
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals disregarded its own past discussion of the meaning of "willful" in the Maryland wiretap statute.
The Court of Appeals discussed the issue of willfulness in the Fearnow
case; however, the Deibler court failed to mention or acknowledge this
discussion. In Fearnow, the Court of Appeals reviewed the validity of
several jury instructions to which the defendant objected. 2 2 Deciding
whether an instruction should have been read to the jury regarding
23
section 10-402 (c) (2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,1
the court found the instruction necessary because it was critical to the
defendant's "defense that he was not recklessly disregarding a known
statute as requiring either an intentional violation of a known legal duty or a reckless disregard of a known legal duty); Benford, 649 F. Supp. at 10 (reviewing the meaning of "willful"
in the context of the Maryland wiretap statute and concluding that it requires an intentional or reckless disregard of a known legal duty); Fearnow v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.
Co., 342 Md. 363, 388, 676 A.2d 65, 77 (1996) (reviewing a jury instruction involving the
term "willful" in the context of the Maryland Wiretap Act); Fearnow, 104 Md. App. at 23-24,
655 A.2d at 12 (same); Hawes v. Carberry, 103 Md. App. 214, 222, 653 A.2d 479, 483 (1995)
(defining "willful" in the context of the Maryland Wiretap Act as requiring the violation of
a known legal duty).
119. See supra note 118 (providing the holdings of these cases).
120. See Earley, 846 F. Supp. at 453 (examining the federal statute's legislative history);
Benford, 649 F. Supp. at 10 (discussing the legislative history of both the federal and Maryland wiretap statutes).
121. Deibler, 365 Md. at 192, 776 A.2d at 661 (citing to Hawes and Fearnow, but only to
state that the Court of Appeals has not had the opportunity to define "willful").
122. Fearnow, 342 Md. at 373-88, 676 A.2d at 70-77.
123. Section 10-402(c) (2) of the Maryland statute provides the circumstances when an
investigator or law enforcement officer may lawfully intercept one's communications; thus,
this instruction was crucial to the question of whether the defendant acted "willfully" by
knowingly violating a legal duty. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. § 10-402(c) (2) (1998
& Supp. 2001).
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legal duty."' 2 4 The Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of Special
Appeals's definition of willfulness when it stated that the "question of
[the defendant's] willfulness hinged on what he believed was happening that evening and whether he was consciously disregarding a
known legal duty."' 12 5 This clearly suggests that the Court of Appeals
agreed with the willfulness standard set forth by the lower court,
which defined "willful" as intent plus knowingly violating a legal
duty.'

26

Instead of looking to the above cases, which all define "willful" as
a known violation of legal duty in the context of the Maryland wiretap
statute, the Deiblercourt engaged in a lengthy, unfocused discussion of
the many meanings of the term "willful" in various Maryland criminal
statutes.1 27 The court emphasized that "willful" appears 547 times in
the Maryland Constitution, Code, and Rules in many different contexts. 128 The court then looked to cases interpreting "willful" in various criminal statutes. From a mere five criminal cases-none of
which consider the definition of "willful" in the Maryland wiretap statute-the court concluded that the majority of Maryland criminal
cases define "willful" to mean "purposeful conduct, requiring neither
a bad motive nor knowing unlawfulness."' 29 This inquiry has little relevance because the court failed to consider "willful" in the context of
the Maryland wiretap statute. Despite other criminal statutes defining
"willful" as only requiring intent, the wiretap statute's unique legislative history requires the court to distinguish the meaning of "willful"
in the wiretap statute from the generic meaning used in other criminal statutes. 130

124. Fearnow, 342 Md. at 388, 676 A.2d at 77 (discussing the importance of whether the
defendant knew he was violating the wiretap statute).
125. Id.
126. Fearnow v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 104 Md. App. 1, 63, 655 A.2d 1, 31
(1995).
127. Deibler, 365 Md. at 192-95, 776 A.2d at 661-63.
128. Id. at 192, 776 A.2d at 661.
129. Deibler,365 Md. at 199, 776 A.2d at 665. The court also concluded that the majority
of the interpretations of "willful" are in accord with the definition set forth in a 1976 law
review article, which analyzed the term "willful" in federal criminal statutes as "requiring
only that the act be committed intentionally." Id. at 195, 776 A.2d at 663; see also S. Brogan,
An Analysis of the Term "Willful" in Federal Criminal Statutes, 51 NOTRE DAME LAw. 786, 786-88
(1976) (discussing the different meanings of "willful" in federal statutes).
130. See Fearnow, 104 Md. App. at 24 n.20, 655 A.2d at 12 n.20 ("We acknowledge, however, that the definition of willfulness to which we subscribe in the instant case is limited to
its meaning within the Maryland Wiretap Act. The pertinent background in this casefederal case law interpreting the pre-1986 federal statute's willfulness requirement . . .
leads us to our conclusion in this regard.").
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Without any such reference to Fearnow, Hawes, Earley, or Benford,
the court did not define "willful" in the context of the wiretap statute,
but merely engaged in a broad analysis of the different meanings of
the term in unrelated and irrelevant Maryland criminal statutes.
b. The Court Improperly Applied the Legislative History of the Federal Wiretap Statute to Determine the Definition of "Willful" in the Maryland
Wiretap Statute.-Although the Court of Appeals should have first examined other courts' interpretations of "willful" in the Maryland wiretap statute, it was proper for the Deibler court to consider the federal
wiretap statute's legislative history because the Maryland legislature
based the Maryland statute on the federal statute. However, the court
should have examined the legislative history of the 1968 federal wiretap statute, not the 1986 amended federal statute, because Maryland's
statute was based upon the 1968 version."3 '
(1) The Court Should Have Focused on the Legislative History
of the 1968 Federal Wiretap Statute.-When interpreting "willful" in Maryland's wiretap statute, the court should have limited its reliance to
the legislative history of the federal wiretap statute prior to 1977.
When Maryland enacted its statute in 1977, Maryland based the statute on the 1968 federal wiretap statute.' 3 2 The federal statute was interpreted as defining "willful" as requiring a violation of a known legal
duty.' 33 Accordingly, when determining the meaning of "willful" intended by the Maryland General Assembly, it is only appropriate for
the Court of Appeals to look to the definition of "willful" in the 1968
federal wiretap statute. However, in its analysis, the court improperly
focused on the legislative history pertaining to the 1986 amendment,
which eliminated "willful" and replaced it with "intentional."'3 4
The court's reliance on the 1986 legislative history for the federal
wiretap statute is illogical. When Maryland enacted its statute, it only
had available, and thus presumably relied upon, the legislative history
of the 1968 federal wiretap statute. There is no indication that Mary131, SeeRicksv. State, 312 Md. 11, 15, 537 A.2d 612, 614, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988)
(explaining that Maryland modeled its wiretap statute on the federal wiretap statute).
132. Id.
133. See Benford v. Am. Broad. Co., 649 F. Supp. 9, 10 (D. Md. 1986) (defining "willful"
prior to the 1986 amendment).
134. Deibler, 365 Md. at 197-99, 776 A.2d at 664-65. The Deibler court reported an abundance of legislative history surrounding the 1968 federal wiretap statute; however, it stated
that it seemed that Congress paid little attention to the use of "willfully." Id. at 196, 776
A.2d at 663. The court then devoted a majority of its discussion to the legislative history
surrounding the 1986 amendment to the federal statute, which replaced the term "willful"
with "intentional." Id. at 197-99, 776 A.2d at 664-65.
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land anticipated the 1986 federal amendment replacing "willful" with
"intentional" and, furthermore, the Maryland legislature has not since
changed its statute to include the term "intentional." ' 5 Moreover, it
has now been sixteen years since Congress amended the federal wiretap statute, and the Maryland General Assembly still has not changed
the language of its statute from "willful" to "intentional." The court's
reading of willful as "intentionally-purposely" is flawed because it interpreted "willful" in accordance with the 1986 amendment to the federal statute rather than interpreting "willful" in accordance with the
legislative history of the version of the federal statute upon which the
Maryland wiretap statute was based-the 1968 version. Thus, because
"willful" in the 1968 federal wiretap statute has been interpreted as
requiring a violation of a known legal duty, 13 6 the Maryland statute
also should be interpreted as defining "willful" as a violation of a
known legal duty.
(2) Manipulatingand Interpreting the Federal Wiretap Statute's Legislative History to Coincide with the Court's Interpretationof "Willful. "--By attempting to effectuate the "true intent" of Congress when
it enacted the original 1968 wiretap statute, the Court of Appeals erroneously based its opinion that "willful" meant "intentionally-purposely" on the legislative history surrounding the 1986 amendment to
the federal wiretap statute. 37 The court took the position that Congress amended the statute in 1986 to replace "willful" with "intentional" in order to return the standard to "what Congress initially had
in mind."' 3 8 This position provided a justification for the court's conclusion. However, it was not Congress's intent at the inception of the
wiretap statute to define the term "willful" as "intentional." There is
sufficient legislative history and cases interpreting the language of the
1968 statute to show that Congress intended "willful" to mean a violation of a known legal duty and not "intentional."' 3 9
The most instructive explanation of Congress's original intent
with regard to the 1968 meaning of "willful" appears in a Senate Judiciary Committee Report. 4 ° The Report listed "willful" as an element
of the federal wiretap statute and subsequently cited to United States v.
135. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &Jun. PROC. § 10-402(a) (1) (1998 & Supp. 2001).
136. See, e.g., Malouche v. JH Management Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 1024, 1026 (4th Cir.
1988); Citron v. Citron, 722 F.2d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1983).
137. See Deibler,365 Md. at 197-99, 776 A.2d at 664-65.
138. Id. at 198-99, 776 A.2d at 665.
139. See, e.g.,
Earley v. Smoot, 846 F. Supp. 451, 453 (D. Md. 1994) (viewing the 1986
amendment as "dilut[ing] the standard of proof from willfulness to mere intent").
140. See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 1093 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2181.
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Murdock. 4 ' The federal courts interpreted the reference to Murdock

to mean that Congress intended Murdock's definition of "willfully" to
apply to the federal wiretap statute. 14 2 Thus, the legislative history
suggests that Congress meant to define "willful" as "characteriz[ing] a
thing done without ground for believing it is lawful or conduct
marked
by careless disregard whether or not one has the right so to
''1 4 3
act.

Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged the Senate Report,
the court suggested that Congress did not intend the Murdock standard of willfulness to be an element of the wiretap statute. 4 4 Rather,
the court interpreted the 1986 elimination of "willful" as indicating
that federal courts misconstrued Congress's reference to Murdock in
the Senate Report, and that Congress did not intend for "willful" to
14 5
denote a knowing violation of a legal duty.
The court's interpretation of Murdock's relevance is unreasonable. Several federal courts have interpreted the reference to Murdock
1 46
by Congress as defining "willful" in the federal wiretap statute.
However, in disagreement, the court ignored these cases and did not
provide adequate explanation as to why those cases were not
14 7
instructive.
In support of its dismissal of those cases, the court used only one
law review article from 1968, which the court proclaimed to demonstrate that Congress did not intend for "willful" to have the restrictive
meaning given it by the federal courts attempting to discern the reference to Murdock in the federal wiretap law. 14 ' The article was authored by one of the draftsmen of the federal law and stated that
wiretap violations must be willful, and thus "good faith mistakes under
the statute will not be subject to criminal sanctions.' 1 49 However, this
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Malouche v. JH Management Co., 839 F.2d 1024, 1025-26 (4th Cir. 1988)
(defining "willful" as requiring a violation of a known legal duty and citing to Murdock to
support its definition).
143. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394-95 (1933) (citations omitted).
144. Deibler, 365 Md. at 196-97, 776 A.2d at 663-64. The court downplayed the importance of the Senate Report's reference to United States v. Murdock and stated that the Committee "simply noted the requirement that a violation of § 2511(1) be 'willful to be
criminal' and cited, in parenthesis and without explanation, United States v. Murdock." Id. at
196, 776 A.2d at 663.
145. Id. at 198-99, 776 A.2d at 665.
146. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
147. See Deibler, 365 Md. at 197, 776 A.2d at 664.
148. Id. (citing G. Robert Blakey & James A. Hancock, A Proposed Electronic Surveillance
Control Act, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 657 (1968)).
149. Id. (quoting Blakey & Hancock, supra note 148, at 666 n.19).
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statement can actually be read to support the argument that willful
requires some known violation of the law; in essence, good faith mistakes
are not "willful" because the offender does not knowingly violate the
law. Thus, the court's reliance on the article's "good faith" explanation of "willful" does not properly support the position that Congress
only intended "willful" to require intent. In fact, it bolsters the federal
courts' interpretation that "willful" is a violation of a known legal duty.
Further support offered by the court that "willful" is merely intent
is also unpersuasive. As part of its attempt to reject the Murdock reference, the court reasoned that it was always Congress's intent to have
"willful" mean "intentional."' 15 ' However, the consistent interpretation of "willful" prior to the 1986 amendment and the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland's opinion in Earley v. Smoot
suggest otherwise. 15 ' According to the Earley court, the amendment
"dilute [d] the standard of proof from willfulness to mere intent, after
holdings that the willfulness standard required proof of knowledge of
the unlawfulness of the interception."'' 52 To counter the Earley court's
position, the Deibler court relied on various House and Senate reports
from which it inferred that the federal courts had misconstrued Congress's legislative intent. 153 However, the legislative history regarding
the 1986 amendment is lean and does not give a direct explanation
for the omission of "willful." For example, when Congress amended
the federal wiretap statute in 1986, it never clearly stated whether it
omitted "willful" because the word had been given an improper meaning since its enactment, or because Congress's intentions had since
changed and it was updating the statute to reflect its intent that the
statute was more restrictive than the federal courts had interpreted it
to be. The Senate Report's only stated purpose for the amendment
was "to underscore that inadvertent interceptions are not crimes
154
under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act."'
The court's reliance on the Senate Report statement that "willful"
was always intended to mean intentional is problematic in two re150. Id. at 198-99, 776 A.2d at 665 (relying on comments made in Senate and House
reports that the federal courts had misconstrued Congress's original intent).
151. See Malouche v.JH Management Co., 839 F.2d 1024, 1026 (4th Cir. 1988) (explaining that "willful" in the federal wiretap statute means an intentional or reckless disregard
of a known legal duty); Citron v. Citron, 722 F.2d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1983) (defining the
pre-1986 amendment definition of "willful" as requiring at least an "intentional violation,"
or "reckless disregard of... a known legal duty"); Earley v. Smoot, 846 F. Supp. 451, 453
(D. Md. 1994) (same).
152. Earley, 846 F. Supp. at 453.
153. Deibler, 365 Md. at 198-99, 776 A.2d at 664-65.
154. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 23 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3577.
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spects. First, the statement inadequately supports the notion that
"willful" does not require knowledge of a violation of a duty. Second,
the statement does not suggest that Congress felt the federal courts
had misconstrued their intended meaning. The Senate Report only
suggests that the amendment was added to prevent the convictions of
those who mistakenly intercept another's conversation. This does not
suggest that the various federal courts' interpretation of "willful" as
requiring knowledge of the violation of a duty of was incorrect. In
fact, it is arguable that the 1968 definition afforded more protection
to the "good faith" interceptor and assured that these interceptors
would not be prosecuted. Under the 1968 standard, the interceptor
was protected more because it had to be proven both that he intentionally intercepted the conversation and that he did so knowingly violating a legal duty. 55 Certainly, the 1968 standard fits Congress's
purpose of ensuring that inadvertent interceptions are not prosecuted. Thus, the Court of Appeals's disagreement with Earley and its
finding that Congress always intended willful to only mean intentional
is unpersuasive.
Thus, by focusing on the 1986 federal wiretap statute and its legislative history, instead of the 1968 statute, the court incorrectly applied
the federal statute's current mens rea, even though it was not available
when Maryland adopted its own wiretap statute in 1977.
c. Further Indication that the Court of Appeals's Definition of
"Willful" in the Deibler Case Was Not Reflective of the Maiyland Legisla-

ture's Intent.--The Maryland General Assembly has amended the Maryland wiretap statute since Congress passed the 1986 federal
1
amendment, and the General Assembly retained the term "willful."'

56

In fact, the General Assembly amended the statute in 1998, after the
Fearnow and Hawes decisions that defined "willful" as requiring a
knowing violation of a legal duty. 157 In its 1998 amendment, the Ma5
ryland legislature specifically chose to leave "willfully" untouched.1 1
If the General Assembly disagreed with the definition of "willfully" ap155. See Citron, 722 F.2d at 16.
156. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUtD. PROC. § 10-402(a)(1) (1998 & Supp. 2001).
157. See Fearnow v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 104 Md. App. 1, 23-24, 655 A.2d 1,
12 (1995); Hawes v. Carberry, 103 Md. App. 214, 222, 653 A.2d 479, 483 (1995). When the
General Assembly amended the wiretap statute in 1998, both the Fearoow and Hawes decisions had been published for close to four years.
158. Compare MD. CODE A N., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(a)(1) (1998 & Supp. 2001),
with Act of July 1, 1977, ch. 692, 1977 Md. Laws. The General Assembly reenacted the
statute in 1998 and kept § 10-402 subparts (a) and (b), where the term "willful" appears
without change.
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plied by the Court of Special Appeals, the legislature would have replaced the term "willfully" with the term "intentionally." That the
General Assembly kept "willfully" strongly suggests that the legislature
approved of the courts' interpretation that "willful" required knowledge of a violation of a legal duty, thus indicating the inherent inaccuracies of the Deibler decision.
5. Conclusion.-In Deibler v. State, by holding that "willfully" in
the Maryland wiretap statute means an act is "done intentionally-purposely,"1 59 the Court of Appeals over-stepped its role and assumed the
role of the legislature.16 ° In so doing, the court allowed its sense of
morality to consume its sense of fairness under the law. While the
court's opinion arguably resulted in a morally just outcome, the court
should have refrained from redefining "willfull," and instead should
have fulfilled its judicial duty by writing an opinion alerting the General Assembly to the ambiguity of "willfull" and the need for legislative
clarification. While the outcome of this case serves society by punishing an immoral person for his undoubtedly wrongful acts, it also undermines the faith one may have in the judicial system. This decision
was unpredictable and suggests that it is within the court's power to,
without reason, ignore an abundance of past case law and take on the
role of the legislature to override these other courts.
BROoKE

E.

CAREY

159. Deibler, 365 Md. at 199, 776 A.2d at 665.
160. The Court of Appeals arguably changed the General Assembly's intent with regard
to the meaning of "willful." When the General Assembly reenacted the wiretap statute in
1998, it was most likely aware of the way Fearnow and Hawes had interpreted "willful" and of
Congress's change to the federal wiretap statute; however, the fact that the General Assembly reenacted "willful" without change suggests that it agreed with the courts' interpretations. Thus, when the Court of Appeals deviated and defined the term as only requiring
mere intent, it arguably overrode the intent of the Maryland legislature.

B. Defining Slot Machines: The Court of Appeals Refuses to Expand
Section 264B to Include Pull-Tab Dispensers
In Chesapeake Amusements, Inc. v. Riddle,1 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a pull-tab dispenser that contains a video screen
and plays musical notes when a winning ticket is dispensed is not a slot
machine as defined by Article 27, section 264B of the Annotated Code
of Maryland.2 While the court's holding is consistent with Maryland
law, the court declined to examine precedent and the legislative history of the statutory provision. In so doing, the court forfeited an opportunity to clarify the intent of section 264B and insist that any
regulation of pull-tab dispensers be promulgated by the General
Assembly.
1. The Case.--Chesapeake Amusements, Inc. is a for-profit corporation that operates a validly licensed commercial bingo establishment in Calvert County, Maryland.' In addition to live bingo games,
Chesapeake Amusements offers instant bingo games, also called "pulltabs" or "pull-tab tickets."'4 Customers may either purchase pull-tabs
from an employee or play a pull-tab ticket from an instant bingo machine.5 Prior to the filing of this action, Chesapeake Amusements of-

1. 363 Md. 16, 766 A.2d 1036 (2001).
2. Id. at 18-19, 766 A.2d at 1037. Article 27, section 264B of the Maryland Code provides that:
Any machine, apparatus or device is a slot machine within the provisions of this
section if it is one that is adapted for use in such a way that, as a result of the
insertion or deposit therein, or placing with another person of any piece of
money, coin, token or other object, such machine, apparatus or device is caused
to operate or may be operated, and by reason of any element of chance or of
other outcome of such operation unpredictable by him, the user may receive or
become entitled to receive any piece of money, coin, token or other object representative of and convertible into money, irrespective of whether the said machine,
apparatus or device may, apart from any element of chance or unpredictable outcome of such operation, also sell, deliver, or present some merchandise or money
or other tangible thing of value.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 246 (1996).

3. Riddle, 363 Md. at 19, 766 A.2d at 1037.
4. Id. Pull-tabs are paper tickets that are identical on the outside, but when the top is
peeled back reveal a combination of symbols. Brief for Appellant at app. 3, Riddle (No.
1131). If the symbols inside a ticket match a predetermined combination, the ticket is
considered a winner. Id. Pull-tabs are sold in "deals," which contain a finite number of
tickets and a predetermined number of winning tickets. Id.
5. Riddle, 363 Md. at 19, 766 A.2d at 1037.
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fered three types of instant bingo machines, the Play & Win, the Lucky
Tab II, and the Oasis.6
The Play & Win machine is simply a pull-tab dispenser that, upon
the insertion of money, removes a paper pull-tab from the top of a
stack and places it in a tray on the front of the machine. 7 The Lucky
Tab II also dispenses a paper pull-tab upon the insertion of money; in
addition, the machine uses a bar code located on the back of the paper ticket to display a video image of the symbols located on the inside
of the pull-tab. 8 If the pull-tab is a winning ticket, the Lucky Tab II
emits a musical signal.9 The Oasis does not dispense paper pull-tab
tickets, but instead operates entirely electronically. 1° Upon the insertion of money, the Oasis displays video images and keeps track using a
credit system of the number of winning electronic tickets a customer
has purchased."
In an unpublished letter dated February 27, 1996, in response to
a request from Senator Gloria Lawlah, the Attorney General's Office
opined that the "player enhancement features" of the Lucky Tab II
made it an illegal slot machine. 1 2 Based on this letter, the State's Attorney for Calvert County informed Chesapeake Amusements that its
instant bingo machines may be illegal. 3 In response, Chesapeake
Amusements filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court
for Calvert County to determine the legality of its instant bingo
machines.' 4
The circuit court ruled that the Play & Win machine was not a
slot machine, but that both the Lucky Tab II and the Oasis were illegal
slot machines.' 5 With respect to the Lucky Tab II, the circuit judge
held that because the machine "reads the printed card and tells the
player whether he or she has won" the ticket is "unnecessary except as
voucher to get payment of winnings." 6 This feature, the court con6. Id.
7. Brief for Appellant at app. 7, Riddle (No. 1131).
8. Id. at app. 8-10.
9. Id. at app. 10.
10. Id. at app. 11.
11. Id. at app. 11-12.
12. Riddle. 363 Md. at 18 n.2, 766 A.2d at 1037 n.2.
13. Id. In 1995, prior to the Attorney General's letter, the Calvert County State's Attorney's Office had indicated to Chesapeake Amusements that instant bingo machines with
video enhancement were legal. Brief for Appellant at app. 14, Riddle (No. 1131).
14. Riddle, 363 Md. at 18, 766 A.2d at 1037.
15. Chesapeake Amusements Inc. v. Riddle, No. CA 97-535, at 9 (Calvert County, Md.,
Cir. Ct. Apr. 1, 1998).
16. ld.
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cluded, made the Lucky Tab II an illegal slot machine."7 The court
relied on Clerk v. Chesapeake Beach Park,'" in holding that because the
Lucky Tab II is "a machine that furnishes gratification or reward to a
winning player other than further free plays," it is among those machines the General Assembly intended to ban through article 27, section 264B.'" Chesapeake Amusements appealed to the Court of
Special Appeals, but the Maryland Court of Appeals intervened, issuing a writ of certiorari sua sponte in order to consider whether the
20
Lucky Tab II machine qualified as an illegal slot machine.
2. Legal Background.-When considering whether the Lucky Tab
II can properly be classified as a slot machine under section 264B, it is
appropriate to consider several areas of law. Because the inquiry requires interpreting a statute, it is important to review the general rules
of statutory construction. In order to fully understand the legislative
intent of section 264B, the legislative history of the statute should be
examined. A thorough review of case law interpreting section 264B is
crucial to understanding how the Maryland courts have previously
dealt with similar issues. Finally, an examination of other jurisdictions' treatment of the same or similar machines provides instruction
when classifying the Lucky Tab II.
a. Statutory Construction.-Maryland
courts employ several
general rules of construction when interpreting a statutory provision.
The most important rule of statutory construction is to "ascertain and
effectuate legislative intent."2 The inquiry into legislative intent ordinarily begins and ends with the wording of the statute, provided that
the wording is plain and unambiguous.2 2 The legislative history of an
unambiguous statute may be consulted in order to better understand
17. Id.
18. 251 Md. 657, 248 A.2d 479 (1968).
19. Riddle, No. CA 97-535, at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. Riddle, 363 Md. at 23, 766 A.2d at 1039. The other two pull-tab machines, the Play
& Win and the Oasis, were not at issue on appeal. Id.
21. Mayor of Baltimore v.Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128, 756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000) (quoting
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Dir. of Fin., 343 Md. 567, 578, 683 A.2d 512, 517
(1996)); see also Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491, 632 A.2d 753, 757 (1993) (stating that
carrying out the true intention of the legislature is the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation); State v. Crescent Jaycees Found., Inc., 330 Md. 460, 468, 624 A.2d 955, 959 (1993)
(stating that effectuating legislative intent is the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation).
22. See Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995) (explaining that
when statutory language expresses a plain meaning the court will interpret the statute as
written); Mayor of Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 Md. 88, 93-94, 656 A.2d 757, 760 (1995) (stating that "where the ordinary and common meaning of the words.., is clear and unambiguous is it ordinarily unnecessary to go further").
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legislative intent;23 however, it should not be used to undermine or
24
contradict the plain meaning of the statute.
Courts must consider the plain language of a statute even when
the legislature has instructed the courts to construe that statute liberally.23 In Mayor of Baltimore v. Cassidy, the Court of Appeals interpreted the Workers' Compensation Act, 26 which mandates a liberal

interpretation.2 7 The court declared that it is "well settled... that the
court may not disregard the plain meaning of the Act in the name of
28
liberal construction."
Likewise, the court may not extend the meaning of the statutory
language beyond the bounds of common sense. In Condon v. State,
the court noted that a statute should not be construed using "forced
or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application., 29 In
Victor Sparkler Co. v. Gilbert, the court reasoned that even when construing a statute liberally, the court must still look to general rules of statutory interpretation and should not extend the coverage of a statute
beyond "the intent of the law. '"30
b. History of Section 264B.-In 1962, Governor Tawes announced his intention to abolish slot machines in Maryland. 3 1 Recognizing the economic impact this would have, the governor appointed
a committee to recommend procedures for banning slot machines in
four southern Maryland counties. 32 Known as the Emory Commission, 33 the committee examined the economic impact of slot ma34
chines in Anne Arundel, Calvert, Charles, and St. Mary's counties.
The committee determined that the abolition of slot machines re23. See Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 146, 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993) (reasoning that "[i]n
the interest of completeness" a court may look to the legislative history of an unambiguous
statute).

24. See, e.g., Chase, 360 Md. at 131, 756 A.2d at 993.
25. See, e.g., Cassidy, 338 Md. at 97, 656 A.2d at 762; Victory Sparkler Co. v. Gilbert, 160
Md. 181, 185, 153 A. 275, 276 (1931).
26. Cassidy, 338 Md. at 90, 656 A.2d at 758.
27. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-102(b) (1999) (stating that the rule of strict
construction is inapplicable to the Workers' Compensation title).

28. Cassidy, 338 Md. at 97, 656 A.2d at 762.
29. Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491, 632 A.2d 753, 758 (1993) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
30. Gilbert, 160 Md. at 185, 153 A. at 276.
31. RICHARD W. EMORY ET AL., SLOT MACHINE STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT 1 (1963).

32. See generally Clerk v. Chesapeake Beach Park, Inc., 251 Md. 657, 660-62, 248 A.2d
479, 481-82 (1968) (explaining the legislative history of section 264B).
33. The commission was named after its chairperson, Richard W. Emory. State v. 158
Gaming Devices, 304 Md. 404, 414, 499 A.2d 940, 945 (1985).
34. EMORY ET AL., supra note 31, at 7.
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quired the enactment of legislation prohibiting any machine that
could be used for gambling purposes, including "free play slot machines. ' 5 Prohibiting only traditional slot machines, the committee
found, would allow gambling in Maryland while depriving the state of
the revenues it enjoyed through legalized gambling. 6
c. Maryland Case Law Interpreting Section 264B.-The Court
of Appeals interpreted section 264B for the first time in Clerk v. Chesapeake Beach Park, Inc., a declaratory judgment action brought to determine whether machines that award winners free plays redeemable for
merchandise are slot machines as defined by the statute. 37 After reviewing the legislative history of section 264B,3 8 the court noted that
article 27, section 246 of Maryland Code requires that courts construe
gaming statutes liberally "so as to prevent the mischiefs which the Legislature sought to repress."3 9 The court also noted that a general rule
of statutory interpretation is to consider the intent of the legislature
and whenever possible "harmonize all parts of the statute" so the intent and interpretation remain consistent.4" With that in mind, the
court held that the phrase "representative of and convertible into
money" in section 264B should be interpreted to mean "representative of or convertible into money" in order to effectuate legislative intent.4 Because the machines in question allowed players to trade
their accumulated free plays for merchandise, thereby making the
free plays representative of money, the court concluded that the machines were illegal under section 264B.4 2
Five years later, the Court of Special Appeals interpreted section
264B in Allen v. State.4 3 The court held that both the shell of a console
slot machine with most of its inner workings removed and the reel
apparatus from another machine were not slot machines under sec35. Id. at 14.
36. Id.
37. Chesapeake Beach Park, 251 Md. at 659, 248 A.2d at 480.
38. Id. at 660-62, 248 A.2d at 481-82. The Emory Commission looked closely at the
problem of "free play" machines, noting that if they were not prohibited, the slot machine
business would continue without providing the counties the revenue that they once enjoyed. Id. at 660, 248 A.2d at 481.
39. Id. at 664-65, 248 A.2d at 483 (quoting Gaither v. Cate, 156 Md. 254, 258, 144 A.
239, 240 (1929)). Article 27, section 246 of Maryland Code provides: "The courts shall
construe the preceding sections relating to gambling and betting liberally, so as to prevent
the mischiefs intended to be provided against." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 246 (1996).
40. Chesapeake Beach Park, 251 Md. at 663-64, 248 A.2d at 483 (quoting State Dep't v.
Elliott-Brandt, 237 Md. 328, 335-36, 206 A.2d 131, 135 (1965)).
41. Id. at 667, 248 A.2d at 485.
42. Id. at 668-69, 248 A.2d at 485.
43. 18 Md. App. 459, 307 A.2d 493 (1973).
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tion 264B.44 The court noted that section 264B proscribes any machine "that is adapted for use as a slot machine."4 5 Although
acknowledging that gambling laws must be liberally construed, the
court declared that "common sense" must mark the limit of liberal
construction. 4 6 The court concluded that if the legislature intended
to proscribe machines that are "'adaptable' or 'easily adapted' for use
as slot machines" it could have used those terms; instead, the legislature chose more restrictive language.4 7 Finally, the court stated that if
the legislature was displeased with the court's holding, the remedy
would be to amend the statute. 48 The court refused to engage in what
it termed 'judicial embellishment" of the current language.4 9
The Court of Appeals revisited section 264B in 1985, holding in
State v. 158 Gaming Devices5" that machines equipped with knock-off
meters, odds mechanisms, or other indicia of gambling are illegal slot
machines under section 264B. 51 The court determined that when a
machine has been adapted for gambling, a free play can be considered an object "representative of or convertible into money" as prohibited by section 264B.5 2 The court refused to go further, however,
stating that section 264B does not prohibit a device that awards free
plays but is not adapted for gambling.53 In 158 Gaming Devices, as in
Allen, the court recognized that the legislature examined the language
of other jurisdictions' gambling statutes before enacting Maryland's
gambling statute. Again, the court concluded that the language of
section 264B was intentionally restrictive.5 4

44. Id. at 471, 307 A.2d at 500.
45. Id. at 465, 307 A.2d at 497 (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Id. at 469-70, 307 A.2d at 499.
47. Id. at 465, 307 A.2d at 497. The court looked to the legislature's consideration of a
New York statute when writing section 264B and noted that section 982 of the New York
Penal Laws defines a slot machine as "any machine ... that is adapted, or may readily be
converted into one that is adapted" for use as a slot machine. Id. at 466, 307 A.2d at 497.
The court used the legislature's knowledge of alternative statutes to infer that the restrictive language was chosen deliberately. Id. at 465, 307 A.2d at 497.
48. Id. at 471, 307 A.2d at 500.
49. Id.
50. 304 Md. 404, 499 A.2d 940 (1985).
51. Id. at 436, 499 A.2d at 956. Knock-off meters operate to remove the accumulated
free plays from the machine while maintaining a record of the total free plays actually won.
Id. at 409, 499 A.2d at 943. Odds mechanisms allow the player to change the odds of
winning by inserting more money. Id. at 416, 499 A.2d at 946.
52. Id. at 429, 499 A.2d at 953.
53. Id. at 432, 499 A.2d at 954.
54. Id., 499 A.2d at 955.
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Two years later, in State v. 149 Slot Machines,5 5 the Court of Appeals held that the phrase "any other gaming device," found in the
statute that permits charitable organizations to participate in certain
forms of gaming, does not include slot machines.5" The court stated
that it must "ascertain the intent" of the legislature in enacting the
statutes in order to interpret them correctly.5 7 After noting that section 246 calls for liberal construction of gaming statutes, the court
looked to the legislative history of section 264B to determine that the
General Assembly intended to completely ban slot machines from the
State of Maryland, including their use by non-profit organizations. 58
When interpreting section 264B, Maryland courts have attempted
to strike a balance between legislative intent and the mandate to construe all gaming statutes liberally. The courts have on several occasions refused to expand section 264B beyond the plain meaning of its
language, noting that the legislature had the opportunity to write a
more restrictive statute and chose not to do so. However, the courts
have also considered the original intent of section 264B-the complete abolition of slot machines-when determining what constitutes
a slot machine under the statute.
d.

Treatment of Pull-Tab Dispensers in OtherJurisdictions.(1) Federal Treatment of Pull-Tab Dispensers.-The federal
government has considered the legality of pull-tab dispensers in the
context of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).-5 Under the
provisions of the IGRA, Indian tribes can engage in certain forms of
gambling without state approval and may also use electronic or computer aids, labeled Class II devices, in conjunction with those forms of
gambling.6 ° However, tribes may not use electronic "facsimiles of any
game of chance,"61 labeled Class III devices,6 2 without a tribal-state
63

compact.

55. 310 Md. 356, 529 A.2d 817 (1987).
56. Id. at 365, 529 A.2d at 821. Article 27, section 255 of the Maryland Code allows
religious and other non-profit organizations to participate in fund raisers that include
"paddle wheels, wheels of fortune, chance books, bingo, or any other gaming device." MD.
art. 27, § 255(b) (2) (1996).
57. 149 Slot Machines, 310 Md. at 361, 529 A.2d at 819.
58. Id. at 362-64, 529 A.2d at 820-21 (noting the Emory Commission's failure to recommend any exemptions from the ban on slot machines in its report to the legislature and
the General Assembly's rejection of numerous amendments that would have exempted
certain non-profit organizations from section 264B).
59. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000).
60. Id. §§ 2703(7), 2710(b).
61. Id. § 2703(7) (B) (ii).
62. Id. § 2703(8).
63. Id. § 2710(d).
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In Cabazon Band Mission Indians v. NationalIndian Gaming Commission,6 4 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that a video machine that selects a pull-tab, opens the tab, and
displays the symbols found inside the card on the video screen constituted a Class III facsimile. 65 The court stated that the machine in
question was a "computerized" version of the game of pull-tabs and
was thus a facsimile.6 6 Similarly, in Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v.
Roache,67 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that a self-contained machine with a video monitor and a
printer was a Class III facsimile.6 8 The court reasoned that because a
player puts money into the machine and either loses the money or
receives a winning ticket, he or she plays "with the machine even
though not against it. '"69

In Diamond Game Enterprises, Inc. v. Reno,7 ° the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia had occasion to classify the same machine
at issue in Riddle, the Lucky Tab 11." The court held that the game
was an electronic aid, and therefore a Class II gaming device.7 2 The
court rejected the reasoning of the District Court for the District of
Columbia,7" which held that because the Lucky Tab II performs all
the functions of a player in a traditional pull-tab game, it is a facsimile
of a pull-tab game."4 The court instead distinguished the Lucky Tab II
from the game at issue in Cabazon, noting that unlike the machine in
Cabazon, the Lucky Tab II cannot function without the insertion of the
roll of paper pull-tabs.75 A player of the Lucky Tab II must present an
actual paper pull-tab to a clerk before obtaining any winnings, and
should a discrepancy exist between the paper pull-tab and the video
screen, the paper tab would control.7 6 This, the court held, makes the
Lucky Tab II "little more than a high-tech dealer .

.

. an aid to the

64. 14 F.3d 633 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1221 (1994).
65. Id. at 636.
66. Id.
67. 54 F.3d 535 (9th Cir. 1994).
68. Id. at 542.
69. Id. at 543 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. 230 F.3d 365 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
71. Id. at 366.
72. Id. at 370.
73. Id. at 371.
74. Diamond Game Enters., Inc. v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 13, 20-21 (D.D.C. 1998).
75. Diamond Game, 230 F.3d at 370.
76. Id.
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game of pull-tabs," and
thus a Class II electronic aid not requiring a
77
tribal-state compact.
(2) Other States' Treatment of Pull-Tab Dispensers.--Several
states address the issue of pull-tab dispensers through statutory regulation. For example, Texas prohibits the operation of more than five
pull-tab dispensers on one premises7 s and requires that a "bingo game
representation" be displayed on a ticket dispensed from a pull-tab dispenser. 79 The Texas statute also prohibits the dispensing of awards or
prizes by a pull-tab dispenser.8s
Louisiana specifically regulates "electronic pull-tab devices,"
which it defines as "any ...

device .

.

. that, upon insertion of cash,

produces electronic facsimiles of pull-tab tickets or cards and is available to play or simulate the play of the game of pull-tabs."8 " Among
other regulations, the statute requires the inspection of each machine,8 2 that machines be equipped to print a ticket voucher that includes the prize won in numbers and words, 3 and prohibits the
machine from accepting bills with a denomination over ten dollars.8 4
Like many other states, Pennsylvania permits non-profit organizations to raise funds using certain games of chance." Pennsylvania's
legislature defines games of chance as "punchboards, daily drawings,
raffles and pull-tabs," adding that "the assistance of any mechanical or
electrical devices or media other than a dispensing machine" is not
permitted. 6 The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania applied that
statute to the Lucky Tab 11 in Major Manufacturing Corp. v. Department
of Revenue.17 The court held that the Lucky Tab II's enhancements
"assist the play of the game" and its "active nature" supports the find-

77. Id. The court stated that it saw no discernible difference between the Lucky Tab II
and an electronic scanner entitled the "Tab Force Validation System," which simply reads a
paper pull-tab that has been dispensed by a clerk and displays the results on a video screen.
The National Indian Gaming Commission, the agency charged with implementing the
IGRA, has classified the Tab Force Validation System as a Class II aid. Id.
78. TEx. Occ. CODE AN. § 2001.410(c) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
79. Id. § 2001.410(d).
80. Id. § 2001.410(a) (3).
81. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 733(A)(2) (West 2000).

82. Id. § 733(B)(1).
83. Id. § 733(B) (5) (a) (iii-iv).
84. Id. § 733(B) (5) (b).
85. SeePA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 314 (West 2002) (regulating the use of games of chance
by nonprofit organizations).
86. Id. § 313.
87. 651 A.2d 204 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994), appeal denied, 665 A.2d 471 (Pa. 1995).
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ing that it is more than a passive dispensing machine, and therefore
illegal."8
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Chesapeake Amusements, Inc. v. Riddle, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the Lucky Tab II was
not an illegal slot machine as defined by Article 27, section 264B. 89
Chief Judge Bell, writing for the court, declared that the crucial question was whether the relevant statute permitted drawing a distinction
between pull-tab dispensers with enhancements and those without enhancements.9" The court concluded that the answer lies in how the
statutory phrase "by reason of any element of chance or of other outcome of such operation unpredictable by [the player]"91 is interpreted. 2 The court interpreted the phrase to mean that an illegal
slot machine must contain an element of chance that provides the
possibility of winning due to the "unpredictable operation of the machine.""' Because the Lucky Tab II dispenses pull-tabs off a roll in a
nonrandom fashion, and the game itself is played with the paper pulltabs, the court held that the element of chance required by section
264B is not present.9 4
The government argued that the legislative mandate to construe
gaming statutes liberally supported an interpretation of 264B that
95
considers the element of chance from the viewpoint of the player.
The government contended that whether a machine's visual and aural
enhancements lead a player to believe that the machine itself contains
the element of chance should be considered when determining if a
machine is prohibited by section 264B.9 6 The court rejected this argument, concluding that the language of section 264B is clear and unambiguous with regard to the chance element.9 7 The court
concluded that section 264B clearly states that for a machine to be
considered a slot machine, a player must provide consideration in return for the possibility of receiving a prize based upon "the unpredict88. Id. at 207-08.
89. Riddle, 363 Md. at 18-19, 766 A.2d at 1037.
90. Id. at 28, 766 A.2d at 1042.
91. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 264B (1996).
92. Riddle, 363 Md. at 28, 766 A.2d at 1042. The court defined the phrase above as the
"chance element" of the statute. Id.
93. Id. at 30, 766 A.2d at 1043.
94. Id. at 30-31, 766 A.2d at 1043.
95. Id. at 27, 766 A.2d at 1041.
96. See Brief for Appellee at 6, 9-13, Chesapeake Amusements, Inc. v. Riddle, 352 Md.
309, 721 A.2d 988 (1998) (No. 124).
97. Riddle, 363 Md. at 41, 766 A.2d at 1049.
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able operation of the machine.""8 The court concluded that because
the statute is unambiguous, general rules of statutory construction
prohibit its rewriting, even under the guise of liberal interpretation.9 9
In rejecting the government's argument, the court distinguished
previous cases that broadly interpreted section 264B.' ° While acknowledging that section 264B does require a liberal interpretation, 0 1 the court concluded that the previous cases all dealt with
either ambiguous language' 0 2 or ambiguity created by the juxtaposition of two separate statutes. 10 3 Although the court agreed that Clerk
v. Chesapeake Beach Park contains the broadest interpretation of 264B,
it concluded that because of the laxity surrounding the terms "and"
and "or", Chesapeake Beach Parkis an example of the court interpreting
ambiguous language.10 4
The court dismissed the government's argument that the court
should hold consistently with cases from other jurisdictions finding
pull-tab dispensers to be illegal slot machines.1 1 5 The court opined
that those cases were "not particularly persuasive" because they interpreted statutes containing different language.10 6 The court did find
the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in Diamond Game Enterprises, Inc. v. Reno
appealing, however, noting that it is "reminiscent of the appropriate
analysis in this case."' 1 7 The court quoted extensively from Diamond
Game, particularly noting the D.C. Circuit's reasoning with regard to
the similarities between a validation machine that simply reads a pulltab and the Lucky Tab 11."'8 The court concurred that there is no
legitimate difference between a machine that merely reads manually
purchased pull-tabs and the machine at issue in Riddle.' °9
The Court of Appeals concluded that the element of chance required by section 264B is in the paper pull-tabs and not in the opera98. Id. at 30, 766 A.2d at 1043.
99. See id. at 34, 766 A.2d at 1045 (stating that liberal interpretation, like all rules of
construction, exists to "construe an ambiguous statute, not to rewrite a clear one").
100. Id. at 32-36, 766 A.2d at 1044-46.
101. Id. at 32, 766 A.2d at 1044.
102. Id. at 33-36, 766 A.2d at 1045-46.
103. Id. at 33, 766 A.2d at 1044-45.
104. Id. at 35-36, 766 A.2d at 1046.
105. Id. at 36-39, 766 A.2d at 1046-48.
106. Id. at 38, 766 A.2d at 1048. The court found Major Manufacturing Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 651 A.2d 204 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994), particularly unpersuasive because
Pennsylvania's statute requires the court to ask whether a machine assists in the play of the
game, not whether the element of chance is required to be inherent in the operation of
the machine. Riddle, 363 Md. at 36-37, 766 A.2d at 1046-47.
107. Riddle, 363 Md. at 39, 766 A.2d at 1048.
108. Id. at 40-41, 766 A.2d at 1048-49.
109. Id.
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tion of the Lucky Tab 11.110 Because the court found the language of
264B clear and unambiguous, the court refused to recognize an interpretation of that provision that considers the element of chance from
the player's perspective."'
4. Analysis.-The court's holding in Chesapeake Amusements, Inc.
v. Riddle, that the Lucky Tab II does not fit within the statutory definition of a slot machine as provided by section 264B, is consistent with
Maryland law. Section 264B is clearly written, and the plain language
of the statute leads to the conclusion that the Lucky Tab II is not a slot
machine. It was appropriate, therefore, for the court to refuse to
adopt an interpretation that would be tantamount to a rewriting of
the statute. The court's decision would have been better supported,
however, by an examination of legislative intent with regard to pulltab dispensers. Legislative intent in this case supports the court's conclusion that section 264B should not be interpreted from the player's
perspective. Furthermore, Maryland precedent instructs against
adopting the government's position in situations where the courts
have declined to liberally interpret section 264B if the interpretation
proves contrary to legislative intent. However, the Court of Appeals
should have noted that previous courts have refused to interpret section 264B as liberally as possible when not supported by legislative
intent. The court also should have declared that the General Assembly possesses the only authority to amend the gaming statutes and regulate pull-tab dispensers. In failing to do so, the court has left the
door open to similar challenges charging that different types of pulltab machines are illegal slot machines.
a. Maryland Precedent Supports the Court's Interpretation of Section 264B.-In its brief to the court, the government argued that because gambling statutes are to be construed liberally, it is reasonable
to interpret the chance element of section 264B from the player's perspective. 112 Courts, however, have repeatedly refused to give section
264B the most liberal interpretation possible in the absence of legislative intent instructing them to do so.11' These cases support the Rid110. Id. at 41, 766 A.2d at 1049.
111. Id.
112. Brief for Appellee at 8-14, Chesapeake Amusements, Inc. v. Riddle, 352 Md. 309,
721 A.2d 988 (1998) (No. 124).
113. See, e.g., State v. 158 Gaming Devices, 304 Md. 404, 432, 499 A.2d 940, 954 (1985)
(holding that only those free play machines that have been adapted for gambling are illegal slot machines); Allen v. State, 18 Md. App. 459, 464-65, 307 A.2d 493, 496-97 (1973)
(holding that slot machines must actually be adapted for use rather than readily or easily
adapted for use).
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die court's refusal to accept the government's interpretation of section
264B.
For example, in State v. 158 GamingDevices, the Court of Appeals
could have interpreted section 264B as outlawing all machines that
award free plays, even those not adapted for gambling.1 14 Instead, the
court examined legislative history and determined that section 264B
was not intended to prohibit "a true amusement device which awards
only free plays."' 11 5 Rather than blindly adopt the most liberal interpretation possible, the court looked to the language and history of
section 264B to determine and effectuate legislative intent.11 6
In Allen v. State, the Court of Special Appeals had the opportunity
to interpret section 264B to include machines that are "adaptable" or
"easily adapted" for use as slot machines.1 17 Again, the court looked
to legislative history and determined that the language chosen by the
General Assembly was deliberately restrictive."' 8 The court held that
because the General Assembly chose the language "is adapted for use"
as a slot machine, section 264B does not proscribe pieces of machines
that are not currently adapted for use as a slot machine." 9 The court
looked to the legislative intent to bolster its interpretation of the plain
language of the statute and concluded that even when construing a
statute liberally, common sense must mark the boundaries of statutory
20
construction.

In Riddle, the Court of Appeals again rejected a liberal interpretation of section 264B that strayed outside the boundaries of common
sense. 121 The court rejected the government's argument that the
chance element of section 264B can be interpreted from the player's
perspective.
b. Legislative Intent Supports the Court's Interpretation of Section
264B.-Although not required to do so, the court should have examined the Emory Commission's Report. 122 The court could have
compared the language in the report to the language in section 264B
in order to fully comprehend the legislature's goal in enacting section
114. See 158 Gaming Devices, 304 Md. at 413, 499 A.2d at 945.
115. Id. at 432, 499 A.2d at 954.
116. Id., 499 A.2d at 954-55.
117. Allen, 18 Md. App. at 464-65, 307 A.2d at 496-97.
118. Id. at 465, 307 A.2d at 497.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 469-70, 307 A.2d at 499.
121. Riddle, 363 Md. at 40, 766 A.2d at 1049.
122. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (explaining the role of the Emory
Commission in enacting section 264B).
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264B. Additionally, the court could have confirmed the plain meaning of the statute.123 The Court of Appeals stated in Riddle that an
inquiry into legislative intent with regard to a clearly worded statute
usually begins and ends with the language of that statute. 124 However,
the history of an unambiguous statue may be consulted in order to
achieve a full awareness of the legislature's purpose in enacting that
statute. 125 Examining the legislative history of an unambiguous statute should serve only to confirm the intent made clear by the language, not contradict or expand it. 1 26 An examination of legislative
history in this case would have confirmed the plain meaning of the
statutory language. This confirmatory process would have strengthened the court's interpretation of section 264B.
The most informative piece of legislative history with respect to
section 264B is the Emory Commission's report. The report states that
its study includes "gambling legalized by local laws" and "Anne Arundel County commercial bingo establishments .. .because it would

seem inconsistent to abolish legalized gambling by machines and retain legalized gambling by commercial bingo establishments. "127 The
report examined the economic impact that a ban on slot machines
would have and considered extensively whether to include free play
machines in the overall ban.1 2 ' Finally, the report examined several
state statutes and the federal anti-gaming statute and recommended
the repeal of all local laws pertaining to "cash pay-off machines" as
29
well as the abolition of free play machines.1
-While it is clear from the Emory Commission's Report that it recommended the abolition of all forms of cash pay-off machines, including free play machines,13 0 the General Assembly chose not to do so.
Instead, the legislature used the language found in section 264B,
which bans only machines in which the user becomes entitled to re123. See Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 146, 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993) (stating that a court
may look to supplementary material when interpreting an unambiguous statute "[i]n the
interest of completeness"); see also State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 7, 629 A.2d 731, 734
(1993) (noting that the court may look to material that bears on legislative purpose even
when a statute is clear).
124. Riddle, 363 Md. at 28, 766 A.2d at 1042.
125. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing the court's ability to look to
supplementary material when interpreting a clearly worded statute).
126. See Mayor of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 131, 756 A.2d 987, 993 (2000) (noting that examining legislative history when interpreting an ambiguous statute is not done
in order to contradict the statute's plain meaning).
127. EMORY ET AL., supra note 31, at 2.
128. Id. at 3-14.
129. Id. at 14.
130. Id.
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ceive money or any object that may be converted into money. 1"' As
the Court of Special Appeals noted in Allen v. State, because the Emory
Commission detailed other, more sweeping legislation banning slot
machines, l1 2 there is a permissible inference that the General Assembly's choice of more restrictive language was not accidental.' 3 3 In the
case of pull-tabs, the General Assembly could have chosen to use language that would have prohibited all commercial bingo, including
pull-tab dispensers; it did not.'3 4 The legislature made a conscious
choice not to prohibit pull-tab dispensers. By examining the legislative history of section 264B and acknowledging that choice, the court
could have provided additional support for its decision.
c. Regulating Pull-Tabs Is a Function of the General Assembly.The Riddle court's holding would also have been strengthened by a
declaration that the legislature is the only branch of government with
the authority to regulate pull-tab dispensers. Additionally, the court
could have noted that if the General Assembly disagreed with the
court's ruling, the General Assembly could amend the statute accordingly.'3 5 Since the passage of section 264B, the General Assembly has
enacted legislation permitting commercial bingo in several Maryland
counties. ' By enacting this legislation, the General Assembly has expressed its willingness to regulate instant bingo machines. Other
states, such as Texas and Louisiana have been successful in regulating
the use of pull-tab dispensers through statutory enactments.137 These
states clearly define pull-tab dispensers and restrict their use through
statute. 3 8 In so doing, these states have provided an instructive example of successful regulation in its proper forum-legislative enact131. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 264B (1996).
132. The Florida and New York statutes quoted by the Commission banned any machine
whereby the operator, through some element of chance, may receive a thing of value or
"may secure additional chances or rights to use the machine." EN\oRY ET AL., supra note 31,
at 14.
133. Allen v. State, 18 Md. App. 459, 467, 307 A.2d 493, 498 (1973).
134. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 264B.
135. See Allen, 18 Md. App. at 471, 307 A.2d at 500 (declaring that if the legislature felt
the purpose of section 264B was construed too narrowly by the court, the remedy was to
amend the statute).
136. See MD. A NN. CODE art. 27, §§ 247-261. The statutes regulating commercial bingo
include a clause which states that the term "bingo" may in certain instances include the
game of "instant bingo" commonly referred to as pull-tabs. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27
§ 259A(a). Article 27, section 259A(a) regulates instant bingo in Calvert County, the location of Chesapeake Amusements. Id.
137. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (examining the statutes in Texas and
Louisiana that define and regulate pull-tab dispensers).
138. Id.
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ments. It is not the role of the judiciary to broaden the reach of a
statute in order to proscribe a machine not explicitly banned by the
39

legislature. 1

By failing to declare that any regulation of pull-tab dispensers
must be done by the General Assembly, the Court of Appeals has left
open the door for similar challenges of pull-tab dispensers under the
slot machine statute. The government could argue that machines that
differ only slightly from the machine at issue in Riddle are properly
characterized as slot machines, and the courts may find themselves
declaring pull-tab dispensers legal or illegal on a case-by-case basis.' 4 °
The Court of Appeals could have prevented such a scenario by clearly
stating that the legislature is the only body of government with the
1 41
authority to regulate any type of pull-tab dispenser.
5. Conclusion.-The decision by the Court of Appeals in Riddle
would have been strengthened by an examination of precedent and
the legislative history of section 264B. In so doing, the court would
have shown that its interpretation is supported not only by the plain
language of the statute, but also by legislative intent and precedent.
The court failed to state that the regulation of pull-tabs is the job of
the General Assembly and amending existing statutes to cover pulltabs is not within the court's powers. Because this was not clearly
stated, the court can expect the slot machine statute to continue to be
used to challenge the legality of pull-tab machines.
CARRIE J. WILLIAMS

139. SeeAllen, 18 Md. App. at 471, 307 A.2d at 500 (noting that the court's role is limited
to interpretation and its powers do not include amending existing statutes).

140. Cf Vicki J. Limas, Application of FederalLabor and Employment Statutes to Native American Tribes: Respecting Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency, 26 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 681, 740-46 (1994)
(arguing that courts have applied labor laws to Indian tribes on a case-by-case basis,
thereby creating inconsistency and the need for Congress to create a clear statutory
scheme).

141. Cf Thomas H. Boyd, Note, A Call to Reform the Duties of Directors Under State Not-forProfit CorporationStatutes, 72 IOWA L. REV. 725, 738 (1987) (discussing the problems arising
from a lack of statutes to guide decision-making, including case law based entirely on factspecific precedent).

X.

A.

TORTS

A New Special Relationship in Maryland-But Wen Does it Apply?

In Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc.,' the Court of Appeals of
Maryland considered whether a research institute has a duty to warn
its human subjects about the potential risks that may arise out of participation in a research study.2 In considering this question, the court
concluded that the nature of the relationship between researchers
and their human subjects "normally will" create a special relationship
out of which the duty to warn will arise. 3 However, the court noted
that in the future, the decision of whether a special relationship exists
must be determined on a case-by-case basis by the trier of fact.4 In
light of this fact specific application, the court should have provided a
more thorough analysis explaining why the particular factors on
which it relied are important in determining the existence of a special
relationship. This guidance by the court would have ensured consistent application of these factors in the future. Therefore, even
though the holding is appropriate to resolve the question presented
by the specific facts of this case, the court's lack of sufficient legal
support and guidance fails to provide a workable standard for future
application.
1. The Case.-In 1993, the Kennedy Krieger Institute (KKI) began a two-year research study that tested lead paint levels both in residential homes and in the children that lived in the homes.5 KKI
designed the research project to find the cost of the minimum level of
effective abatement that would ensure both safe and efficient means
1. 366 Md. 29, 782 A.2d 807 (2001).
2. Id. at 46, 782 A.2d at 818.
3. Id. at 113, 782 A.2d at 858.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 48-49, 782 A.2d at 819. The Environmental Protection Agency and the Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development provided joint sponsorship of
the study. Id. at 50, 782 A.2d at 820. The Environmental Protection Agency awarded KKI
$200,000 to fulfill its obligations under the research contract. Id. at 48, 782 A.2d at 819.
The Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development, through the Lead
Paint Abatement Program established by the Maryland General Assembly, provided loans
to the homeowners participating in the study to pay for the necessary maintenance and
repair. Id. at 52 n.15, 782 A.2d at 821 n.15. In addition, the Baltimore City Health Department and the Maryland Department of the Environment aided in the study. Id. at 50, 782
A.2d at 820.
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of ridding homes of dangerous levels of lead paint.6 In implementing
its study, KKI approached the landlords of low-income housing in Baltimore City, or the renters themselves, and solicited participation. 7
To be eligible, KKI required that a child in the developmental stage
reside in the home so that his or her blood could periodically be
taken and analyzed for lead content.8 Three main prerequisites had
to be satisfied prior to participation in the study: fulfillment of both
the property and occupant requirements, 9 a signed "informed consent form" acknowledging the family's willingness to participate in the
study,'" and an intent to remain in the residence for at least the two-

6. Id. at 42 n.6, 782 A.2d at 815 n.6. Presumably, the cost of total lead paint abatement was too expensive for low-income housing landlords to afford. Id. Therefore, one
goal of the project was to determine whether partial abatement caused the level of lead in
children's blood to exceed a level hazardous to their well-being. Id.
7. Id. at 36-37, 782 A.2d at 811-12. In the event that the landlord could not afford the
necessary repairs, KKI arranged for public funding in the form of grants or loans. Id. at 36,
782 A.2d at 812.
8. Id. at 36-37, 782 A.2d at 812.
9. Id. at 54, 782 A.2d at 822. To fulfill the property requirement, the researchers
focused on structurally sound, two-story, row houses constructed prior to 1941 and located
in Baltimore City. Id. at 54-55, 782 A.2d at 822-23. To fulfill the occupant requirement,
the researchers focused on households with at least one small child under the age of fortyeight months and older than five months at the beginning of the study. Id. at 55, 782 A.2d
at 823. Children that were mentally retarded, severely handicapped in any way that would
limit their physical movement, and those with sickle cell anemia were excluded from participation. Id.
10. Id. at 55, 782 A.2d at 823. The parents of each child agreed to sign a consent form
allowing their children to participate in the study. See id. at 56, 63, 782 A.2d at 824, 828.
The consent form stated in part:
PURPOSE OF STUDY:
As you may know, lead poisoning in children is a problem in Baltimore City and
other communities across the country. Lead in paint, house dust and outside soil
are major sources of lead exposure for children. Children can also be exposed to
lead in drinking water and other sources. We understand that your house is going to have special repairs done in order to reduce exposure to lead in paint and
dust. On a random basis, homes will receive one of two levels of repair ....
The
repairs are not intended, or expected, to completely remove exposure to lead.
We are now doing a study to learn about how well different practices work for
reducing exposure to lead in paint and dust. We are asking you and over one
hundred other families to allow us to test for lead in and around your homes up
to 8 to 9 times over the next two years provided that your house qualifies for the
full two years of study. Final eligibility will be determined after the initial testing
of your home. We are also doing free blood testing of children aged 6 months to
7 years, up to 8 to 9 times over the next two years. We would also like you to
respond to a short questionnaire every 6 months. This study is intended to monitor the effects of the repairs and is not intended to replace the regular medical
care your family obtains.
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year research period."1 Nowhere on the consent form did it indicate
the health dangers lead paint poses to children or the possibility of
2
contracting lead poisoning as a result of the study.'
a. The Research Study Protocol.-The research study consisted
of two main components (A and B) that were broken down into five
3
test groups, and each group consisted of about twenty-five homes.1
Component A was the experimental portion of the study and consisted of three test groups (Groups One, Two, and Three), each of
which received varying degrees of repair and maintenance. 14 Over
the course of its two-year study, KKI measured lead levels from the
homes in Component A by collecting children's blood samples, vacuum dust samples from the home, exterior soil samples, and drinking
water samples. 1 5 The children's blood samples and vacuum dust samples were to be taken at the following times: pre-intervention, immedi-

BENEFITS
To compensate you for your time answering questions and allowing us to sketch
your home we will mail you a check in the amount of $5.00. In the future we
would mail you a check in the amount of $15 each time the full questionnaire is
completed. The dust, soil, water, and blood samples would be tested for lead at
the Kennedy Krieger Institute at no charge to you. We would provide you with specific blood-lead results. We would contact you to discuss a summary of house test results and
steps that you could take to reduce any risks of exposure.
Id. at 57-58, 782 A.2d at 824-25 (footnote omitted).
11. Id. at 56, 782 A.2d at 823-24. It was necessary for the children to remain living in
their homes for the entire two-year period, even upon first detection of elevated lead levels
in their blood, because the accuracy and success of the test depended on data collection
over time. Id. at 55, 782 A.2d at 823.
12. See id. at 57-58, 782 A.2d at 824-25.
13. Id. at 50, 52, 782 A.2d at 820, 821. It should be noted, however, that according to
the record "only 108 houses actually participated in the study." Id. at 55 n.20, 782 A.2d at
823 n.20.
14. Id. at 52, 782 A.2d at 821. The repairs to Group One were capped at $1650. Id. at
53, 782 A.2d at 822. These repairs included:
wet-scraping of peeling and flaking lead-based paint and paint of unknown composition on all interior surfaces, including walls, trim, and doors; repainting of
treated surfaces; installation of window well caps; repainting of all exterior window trim, repainting of all interior window sills; vacuuming of all horizontal surfaces and window components with a high efficiency particulate (HEPA) vacuum;
and wet cleaning all horizontal surfaces.
Id. The repairs to Group Two were capped at $3500 and included all the repairs from
Group One and the "use of sealants and paints to make floors smoother and more easily
cleanable, and in-place window and door treatments to reduce abrasion of lead-painted
surfaces." Id. The repairs to Group Three were capped at $6000-$7000 and included "added window replacement and encapsulation of exterior door trim with aluminum, and the
use of coverings on some floors and stairs to make them smooth and more easily climbable." Id.
15. Id. at 54, 782 A.2d at 822.
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ately post-intervention, and at the one-, three-, six-, twelve-, eighteen-,
and twenty-four-month stages of post-intervention."6
Component B served as the control portion and consisted of the
remaining two test groups (Groups Four and Five).' KKI collected
similar lead measurements from Component B homes at similar time
intervals throughout the two-year study.' 8 Parents of the children subjects from both Component Groups were required to fill out a questionnaire at enrollment and again at six-month intervals. 9
b.

Facts Leading to the Causes of Action. (1) Ericka Grimes's Cause of Action.-In March 1993, KKI
representatives solicited ten-month-old Ericka Grimes to participate in
the study by visiting the home where she lived with her mother, Viola
Hughes. z° Following a conversation with KKI representatives discussing the nature, purpose, scope, and benefits of the study, Hughes
agreed to let her daughter participate and signed the required consent form on March 10, 1993.21 The consent form did not disclose
that Ericka might accumulate dangerous levels of lead in her blood as
22
a result of the experiment.
KKI implemented the study protocol and collected dust samples
from Ericka's home several times in the following months. 2 3 The first
24
dust sample from March 9, 1993 revealed "hot spots" in the home.
However, information about the sample was not supplied to Hughes
until almost ten months after the sample had been collected.2 5 KKI
also took blood samples from Ericka three times during the nine16. Id. at 53, 782 A.2d at 822. Although never specifically defined by the court, intervention appears to be the point in time that KKI began testing a house. See id. Soil samples
were to be taken pre-intervention, immediately post-intervention, and at twelve and twentyfour months post-intervention. Id. at 53-54, 782 A.2d at 822. Drinking water samples were
to be taken pre-intervention, and at twelve and twenty-four months post-intervention. Id.
at 54, 782 A.2d at 822.
17. Id. at 54, 782 A.2d at 822. Group Four consisted of homes built that were completely abated of lead paint and were not to receive any additional repairs. Id. Group Five
homes also were not to receive any additional repairs because they were constructed after
1980, and were thus presumed free of lead-based paint. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 56, 782 A.2d at 824. Ericka's home was assigned to the control groupGroup Four. Id. at 57 n.21, 782 A.2d at 824 n.21.
21. Id. at 56, 782 A.2d at 824.
22. Id. at 57, 782 A.2d at 824.
23. Id. at 58, 782 A.2d at 825.
24. Id. "Hot spots" are areas with a lead level higher than that found in a lead-abated
house. Id.
25. Id.
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month interval. 26 The results of the first test placed Ericka's blood
lead level in the "normal" range according to standards established by
the Centers for Disease Control.2 7 However, the two subsequent tests
indicated Ericka's blood lead level to be "highly elevated. ' 2' These
increased readings came after KKI had identified "hot spots" on the
property, but before it had informed Hughes of the potentially dangerous levels of lead in her home. 29 Hughes and Ericka subsequently
vacated the property in the summer of 1994 and no further testing
was performed.30
(2) Myron Higgins's Cause of Action.-In 1993, KKI asked
Laurence Polakoff, President of Chase Management, Inc., to enroll
one of his company's properties in the research study. 3 1 In December
of that year, KKI hired an outside contractor to examine the property,
which subsequently tested positive for lead paint and dust.3 2 Polakoff's row house was admitted into the study and assigned to Group
Two, undergoing the repairs required therein. 33 The repairs to the
house were completed sometime in April 1994. 34
In the spring of 1994, the Higgins family moved into the home.3 5
KKI approached Catina Higgins about participating in the study after
her family had moved into the partially abated home.3 6 On May 24,
1994, Higgins agreed to participate in the research study and signed a
consent form providing permission for her five-year-old son, Myron
Higgins, to participate.17 Similar to the consent form signed on behalf of Erika Grimes, nowhere did it indicate that Myron may be exposed to lead and might accumulate some lead in his blood as a result
of the experiment.3"
Pursuant to the study, KKI collected dust samples from the Higgins' home on May 17, 1994. 3 ' The post-intervention dust samples
were collected using both an experimental Cyclone collector and a

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 59, 782 A.2d at 825.
Id.
See id. at 59 n.23, 782 A.2d at 825 n.23.
Id. at 59, 782 A.2d at 825.
Id.
Id. at 60-61, 62 n.25, 782 A.2d at 826, 827 n.25.
Id. at 61, 782 A.2d at 826.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 61-62, 782 A.2d at 827.
Id. at 63, 782 A.2d at 828.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 62, 782 A.2d at 828.
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dust wipe technique, each registering different measurements of
lead.4 ° The Cyclone collector samples from the May 17, 1994 collection indicated lead concentrations above the Maryland clearance
level, while the dust wipe samples indicated lead concentrations significantly lower, below the clearance level. 4 However, KKI only informed Higgins of the dust wipe results, thus indicating that the lead
concentration found in the home was at an acceptable level.4 2
On July 25, 1994 and November 3, 1994, KKI again took dust
samples from the Higgins home. 43 The dust wipe samples indicated
lead concentrations above the clearance levels on both occasions.4 4
KKI informed Higgins of the elevated results by letter after each elevated result. 45 KKI also obtained blood samples from Myron Higgins
three times during his participation in the study.4 6 The results from
the first and third tests in June 1994 and November 1994 registered
Myron's blood lead level as "moderately elevated," and the second
test, in July 1994, indicated his blood lead level to be "highly elevated. 4' 7 KKI notified Ms. Higgins of the results by mail.48 KKI also
informed Ms. Higgins that the results of the second test had been
provided to the Baltimore City Health Department (BCHD) and that
she "should provide the test result to her child's primary health care
49
provider right away."
c.

ProceduralHistoy.-Viola Hughes filed a complaint in the

Circuit Court for Baltimore City alleging KKI to be negligent for failing to warn of the lead paint hazards that it had apparently discovered.5" KKI filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds
that it did not owe a duty to Grimes. 5 On July 26, 2000, the circuit
court granted KKI's motion and entered judgment in its favor.5 2 The
court stated that it did not find a special relationship, as defined by
40. Id. at 62 n.26, 782 A.2d at 827 n.26.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 63-64, 782 A.2d at 828.
43. Id. at 63, 782 A.2d at 828.
44. Id. at 64, 782 A.2d at 828.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id., 782 A.2d at 828-29.
50. Id. at 59, 782 A.2d at 825-26. KKI filed a third party complaint to add the owners of
the property, JJB, Inc., as an additional defendant. Id. at 60, 782 A.2d at 826. Grimes then
filed an amended complaint addingJJB, Inc. as an additional defendant. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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the courts of appeal, to exist between KKI and Hughes or Grimes that
imposed a duty on KKI.5 3 Grimes filed an appeal.5 4
Catina Higgins, individually and on behalf of her son Myron Higgins, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City alleging
KKI and Environmental Restoration, Inc.5 5 to be negligent on several
grounds.5 6 The complaint alleged that the defendants were negligent
in deciding to undertake the abatement and repair of Catina Higgins's home prior to and during the child's occupancy, the abatement
was performed negligently, which increased rather than decreased the
lead dust on the premises, and the defendants breached their duty to
warn Catina and Myron of the elevated lead levels in the home and in
Myron's blood. 57 KKI filed a motion for summary judgment asserting
that it did not owe a duty to Catina and Myron Higgins. 58 The circuit
court granted KKI's motion and entered judgment in its favor. 59 The
trial court stated that there was no duty on the part of KKI "to inspect
or test this premises or to test the individual."6 ° In fact, the court
classified KKI as an "institutional volunteer" to the community that
owed no raised duty under the law. 6 ' The Higginses filed a motion to
reconsider, which the court subsequently denied.6 2 Myron Higgins
and his mother filed an appeal.63
On February 8, 2001, prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari for both
cases.6 4 The court consolidated the cases to consider the circuit
court's decision in each case to grant KKI's summary judgment motions.6 5 The appellants contended in their appeal that despite the
53. Id. at 70, 782 A.2d at 832.
54. Id. at 60, 782 A.2d at 826. Ericka Grimes dismissed her claims againstJJB, Inc. at
the time she filed her appeal. Id.
55. Environmental Restoration, Inc. performed the repair work on Catina Higgins's
home. Id. at 61, 782 A.2d at 826.
56. Id. at 65, 782 A.2d at 829. The Higginses' complaint initially included only Lawrence Polakoff as a defendant. Id. The claim was later amended to add Chase Management, Inc. and CFOD-2 Limited Partnership (owners of the property after Polakoff
transferred his interests) as defendants. Id. at 65 & n.29, 782 A.2d at 829 & n.29. Higgins
dismissed the claims against Polakoff, Chase Management. Inc., and CFOD-2 Limited Partnership. Id. at 69, 782 A.2d at 831.
57. Id. at 65, 782 A.2d at 829.
58. Id. at 66, 782 A.2d at 829.
59. Id. at 69, 782 A.2d at 831.
60. Id. at 70, 782 A.2d at 832.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 69, 782 A.2d at 832.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 70-71, 782 A.2d at 832-33. On April 4, 2002, both houses of the Maryland
General Assembly passed legislation partly in response to this case. H.B. 917, 2002 Gen.
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trial court's holding, KKI did owe a duty to warn them of the presence
of lead paint and dust in their homes. 66 They based their claim, in
part, on the arguments that there was a special relationship between
the parties, and that the danger posed by lead paint was foreseeable.6 7
Specifically, the appellants contended that "KKI had an affirmative
duty to give [them] complete and accurate information concerning
the risks and hazards of participating in the study. . . ."68

2. Legal Background.-In Maryland, a cause of action in negligence requires the plaintiff to establish the following four elements:
(1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual harm or
loss, and (4) that the defendant's breach of duty proximately caused
the plaintiffs harm or loss.6 9 In West Virginia Central Railroad Co. v.
Fuller,7 the Court of Appeals established that absent a duty owed from
one person to another, there can be no cause of action in negligence. 7 Furthermore, the court stated that the duty owed varies according to the circumstances of each case and the relationship of the
parties involved. 72
a. The Duty Element in a Negligence Action.-Duty has been defined as, "an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and
effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another."73 The Court of Appeals, in Jacques v. FirstNational Bank of Maryland,7 4 stated that there are two necessary considerations in
determining whether a tort duty should be recognized: "the nature of
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2002). Delegate James W. Hubbard introduced the bill in light of
the Kennedy Krieger lead paint study and the death of a volunteer in a Johns Hopkins

asthma experiment. See David Nitkin, Senate OKs Bill to Tighten Rules on Human Research;
Governor Expected to Sign Legislation, BALT. SUN, Apr. 6, 2002, at lB. The legislation applies
the federal research standards outlined in 45 C.F.R. § 46 to all human experiments in
Maryland. H.B. 917, 2002 Reg. Sess. Additionally, the new law requires consent of the
human subject, review of the study by an Institutional Review Board (IRB) that includes a
nonvoting expert in the field of study, public exhibition of the minutes of the IRB, and the
ability for the Attorney General to intervene in studies that do not comply with the law. Id.
66. Grimes, 366 Md. at 71, 782 A.2d at 832-33.
67. Id. The appellants also claimed that KKI owed them a duty because a contractual
duty was created by the consent agreement and the relevant federal regulation. Id.
68. Id., 782 A.2d at 833.
69. See, e.g.,
Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., 335 Md. 58, 76, 642 A.2d 180, 188 (1994).
70. 96 Md. 652, 54 A. 669 (1903).
71. Id. at 666, 54 A. at 671.
72. Id., 54 A. at 672.
73. Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 357, 744 A.2d 47, 54 (2000) (quoting W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 356 (5th ed. 1984)).
74. 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986).
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the harm likely to result from a failure to exercise due care, and the
relationship that exists between the parties."7 5 The Jacques court
found that when economic loss is the only harm complained of, there
must be "an intimate nexus" between the parties to impose tort liability. 76 Conversely, when the harm is personal injury, the foreseeability
of harm becomes the determining factor.7 7
In addition to the foreseeability of the harm, the court, in
Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County,78 adopted several factors originally
proposed in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California79 that help
to determine whether a duty exists.8 0 These factors include: the foreseeability of harm, whether the plaintiff suffered an injury, the moral
blame of the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future
harm, the connection between the defendant's actions and the harm
suffered, the effect that imposing the duty will have on the community, and the cost and necessity of insurance for the risk.8 ' Nevertheless, the Ashburn court agreed with the Jacques court that, among these
factors, the foreseeability of harm in personal injury cases is the most
82
important consideration in determining the existence of a duty.
In applying the factor of foreseeability of harm, the court has
noted that the test is simply a reflection of the "current societal standards" about whether an individual should be held liable for actions
that result in harm or whether it is "highly extraordinary" that the
negligent conduct was the cause of the harm.8 3 Generally, the defendant will only be held liable when he should have reasonably known
that the plaintiff might suffer harm. 4
75. Id. at 534, 515 A.2d at 759.
76. Id. at 534-35, 515 A.2d at 534-35.
77. Id. at 535, 515 A.2d at 760. This principle first outlined in Jacques has since been
relied on in Weisman v. Connors, 312 Md. 428, 445-48, 540 A.2d 783, 791-93 (1988), and
more recently in Griesi v. Atlantic General HospitalCorp., 360 Md. 1, 12-14, 756 A.2d 548, 55455 (2000) and Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal v. Katz, 361 Md. 645, 658, 762 A.2d 582, 589
(2000). An increasing number of courts outside the State of Maryland, however, have
abandoned the distinction between the risk of economic loss and personal injury. Jacques,
307 Md. at 534 n.4, 515 A.2d at 760 n.4; see, e.g., Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663
P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983).
78. 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986).
79. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
80. Ashburn, 306 Md. at 627, 510 A.2d at 1083.
81. Id. (quoting Tarasoff 551 P.2d at 342).
82. Id. at 628, 510 A.2d at 1083.
83. Henley v. Prince George's County, 305 Md. 320, 334, 503 A.2d 1333, 1340 (1986)
(citing RESTATEMEN T (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965)).
84. See id. ("The application of the foreseeability requirement to determine the existence of a duty has in some cases spawned the belief that a duty will be found only in favor
of 'identifiable plaintiffs,' i.e., those within a foreseeable zone of danger whose identities
are known in advance.").
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The Court of Appeals took the application of duty one step further in Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co.,8 5 noting that "the determination of

whether a duty should be imposed is made by weighing the various
policy considerations and reaching a conclusion that the plaintiff's interests are, or are not, entitled to legal protection against the conduct
of the defendant.

86

Determining the existence of a duty has also been made by distinguishing between action and inaction, typically referred to as misfeasance and nonfeasance.8 7 Misfeasance occurs when the defendant
actively creates the risk of harm, whereas nonfeasance occurs when
the defendant has not done anything to create or complicate the
harm.8 8 Individuals can typically be held liable for negligence when
their actions injure or cause harm to another.8 9 However, the law has
been slow to accept the idea that an individual could be held liable in
tort law when he or she failed to act and that failure caused the
harm.9" Generally, courts have been reluctant to recognize a duty in
instances of omission or nonfeasance; accordingly, there is no duty to
come to the aid of another, to warn another of danger, or to control
the actions of another for the benefit of a third party.9 1 But courts
have acknowledged liability for nonfeasance when there is a special
relationship between the parties." "Until the door to duty, foresee85. 335 Md. 58, 642 A.2d 180 (1994).
86. Id. at 77, 642 A.2d at 189 (citations omitted). In Rosenblatt, the court considered
whether a subsequent purchaser of land is owed a duty by the landowners. Id. The court
held that such a duty is not imposed. In so concluding, the court found no relationship
between the parties that would have made it foreseeable that an act or omission on the
part of a prior owner would result in injury to the current owner. Therefore, the court
recognized for the first time the policy implications of imposing duties on parties. Id. The
court also pointed out that in this instance the subsequent landowner was in a position to
learn of the harm prior to purchasing the land. Id. at 78. The court deemed it unreasonable to assign a duty to the prior owner when the current owner was in a position to avoid
the harm altogether. Id.
87. See Mesmer v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund, 353 Md. 241, 254, 725 A.2d 1053, 1059 (1999).
While the "misfeasance" and "nonfeasance" terminology has fallen out of favor in Maryland courts, the distinctions between the two concepts are generally recognized. Id. at 256,
725 A.2d at 1060.
88. Id. at 254, 725 A.2d at 1059 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 92, at 614-15 (4th ed. 1971)).
89. See id.
90. See id. at 255, 725 A.2d at 1059.
91. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704, 716, 633 A.2d 84, 90 (1993).
92. Holson v. State, 99 Md. App. 411,420, 637 A.2d 871, 875 (1994) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965)). The Holson court recognized that a special relationship is created in one of two ways: (1) by law or (2) when a person voluntarily takes
custody of another and deprives him of the usual opportunities for protection. Id. In
Holson, the court did not find the presence of a special relationship. Id. at 421, 637 A.2d at
875-76. A police trooper pulled over a vehicle in which Holson was a passenger for an
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ability, ordinary care, etc., is opened by a custodial or other special
relationship, suits in negligence based upon negligent omission ...
cannot be successfully maintained. '9 3 Therefore, the court has stated
that foreseeability of harm follows from the creation of a special
relationship.9 4
b. Special Relationships and Situations that Give Rise to a Duty in
Mayland.-The Court of Appeals has stated that "the law is clear that
95
a person has no legal duty to come to the aid of another in distress.
However, the often recognized exception to this rule is when a special
relationship exists among the parties.9 6 Maryland courts have recognized, therefore, that as a matter of law, certain relationships impose
97
duties upon the parties because of the close nexus between them.
These relationships include, but are not limited to: landlord and tenant, jailer and inmate, and police officer and citizen.9 8 Although
these relationships are recognized by law, they do not automatically
impose a duty upon the parties. The factual context of each situation
determines the imposition of a duty. Two main factors that the courts
look to in determining the presence of a duty for special relationships
are control and reliance.
(1) Control or Custody.-In Scott v. Watson,99 the Court of
Appeals considered whether the special relationship between a landlord and tenant should impose a duty on the landlord to protect his
tenants from the criminal activity of third parties occurring in the
"common areas" of the building.' 0 0 In Scott, the plaintiff argued that
when the landlord has knowledge of criminal activity in the area surrounding his property, a duty to protect the tenants from criminal
assaults should be imposed."t l The court declined to impose such a
alcohol related offense. Id. at 413, 637 A.2d at 872. Holson alleged he was intoxicated at
the time of the offense. Id. The officer arrested the driver and left Holson at the scene,
where he later walked into the path of another vehicle and was struck. Id. The court held
that no special relationship existed between the parties, and therefore the state trooper
owed no duty to Holson. Id. at 414, 637 A.2d at 872.
93. Id. at 424, 637 A.2d at 878.
94. Id.
95. Griffith, 332 Md. at 716, 633 A.2d at 90.
96. See, e.g., Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 353 Md. 544, 552, 727 A.2d 947, 950-51
(1999) (stating that one does not owe a duty to protect another from criminal conduct by a
third party unless there is a special relationship between the two parties).
97. Id. at 552-53, 727 A.2d at 951.
Griffith, 332 Md. at 716-17, 633 A.2d at 90.
98. See, e.g.,
99. 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976).
100. Id. at 161, 359 A.2d at 550.
101. Id. at 164-65, 359 A.2d at 551.
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duty because the duty of a landlord toward his tenant is to simply "exercise reasonable care."' 2 The court found that "to impose a special
duty on a landlord ... would place him perilously close to the position
of insurer of his tenants' safety."' 0° However, the court took a different approach in answering a separate question posed by the plaintiff.' °4 In considering whether a landlord has a duty to protect his
tenants from criminal activity in common areas under the landlord's
control, where the landlord has taken deliberate measures to protect
his tenants, the court found that a duty is not created per se. 105 However, if the landlord voluntarily implemented security devices in common areas that the landlord controlled, improper performance of this
voluntary act would constitute a breach of a duty.'0 6
The court further explained when control between parties creates a duty in Lamb v. Hopkins.'°7 In this case, Russell Newcomer, Jr.,
was convicted of armed robbery, whereafter the court suspended a
portion of his sentence and placed him on parole. 0 8 Lamb was convicted of driving while intoxicated twice while on parole, but his parole was never revoked.' 0 9 Furthermore, Newcomer's parole
violations were never reported to the court."0 While still on parole,
Newcomer again drove while intoxicated and collided with another
car.1 11 As a result, five-month-old Laura Lamb was rendered a
quadriplegic.' 1 2 Laura's parents sued Newcomer and his probation
1
officers on her behalf. 3
The Lambs contended that when a person has control over another whom they know to be dangerous, that person owes a duty of
care to those plaintiffs foreseeably harmed by the failure to exercise
that care."' In analyzing this question, the court first adopted section
319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts into Maryland law. 1 5 That sec102. Id. at 167, 359 A.2d at 553.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 170, 359 A.2d at 554-55.
105. Id. at 171, 359 A.2d at 555.
106. Id.
107. 303 Md. 236, 492 A.2d 1297 (1985).
108. Id. at 239, 492 A.2d at 1299.
109. Id. Newcomer was also convicted of discharging a firearm and driving while his
license was suspended. Id. at 240, 492 A.2d at 1299. These violations were not reported to
the court. Id.
110. Id. at 239, 492 A.2d at 1299.
111. Id. at 240, 492 A.2d at 1299.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 241, 492 A.2d at 1300.
115. Id. at 245, 492 A.2d at 1302.
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tion, entitled Duty of Those in Charge of Person Having DangerousPropensities, states:

One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or
should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not
controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such
harm. 1 6
The court explained that this section applies to two situations.1" 7
First, it applies when the actor has control over persons who generally
have the tendency to act injuriously. Second, section 319 applies
when the actor has control of a third person who has a "peculiar tendency so to act of which the actor from personal experience or otherwise knows or should know." 1 8 In evaluating the application of this
section to the case at hand, the court found that the probation officers did not have control over Newcomer." 9 Likewise, the court
found that no special relationship existed between the parties, and
120
the probation officers owed no duty to the Lambs.
In Eisel v. Board of Education of Montgomery County,1 2 1 the Court of
Appeals considered whether a special relationship existed between a
school counselor and the parents of a child attending the school, such
that the counselor had a duty to intervene to attempt to prevent the
child's suicide.1 22 In analyzing this question, the court focused on
whether the school's control over the child imposed tort duties on the
school counselor.1 23 The court found that a special relationship may
have existed between the parties that would have imposed a duty on

the school counselor to intervene and attempt to prevent the student's suicide. 124 The court found the following factors to be indicative of the presence of a special relationship between the parties in
Eisel the victim was an adolescent, there was an in loco parentisrelation-

116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965).
117. Lamb, 303 Md. at 243, 492 A.2d at 1301.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 246, 492 A.2d at 1302.
120. Id. at 253, 492 A.2d at 1306.
121. 324 Md. 376, 597 A.2d 447 (1991).
122. Id. at 378, 381, 597 A.2d at 448, 450. The victim's father brought this wrongful
death suit against the school board after learning that the school counselor was aware of
his daughter's suicidal tendencies, but failed to discuss with him those concerns. Id. at 378,
597 A.2d at 448. The counselor did speak with the child about what he had heard from
other students, but the child denied that she had suicidal thoughts. Id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 381-87, 597 A.2d at 450-52.
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1 26
ship, 1 25 and there was a therapeutic relationship with the victim.

But instead of making a final determination, the court remanded the
case back to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to make the
ultimate decision of whether a tort duty existed between the
27
parties. 1

In Hartford Insurance Co. v. Manor Inn,' 28 the court again focused
on control and the relationship between the parties to determine
whether a duty existed. In this case, Robert Griffin was involuntarily
committed to the Springfield Hospital Center in Carroll County, Ma13
ryland. 1 29 Somehow, Griffin managed to escape from the hospital. 1

Three days later, he was found by the Montgomery County Police,
taken to the Manor Inn, and given a place to sleep. Springfield Hospital Center was not notified of Griffin's whereabouts. The next morning, a laundry truck with the keys left in the ignition was parked
outside the Inn.'
Griffin stole the truck and subsequently ran into a
car stopped at a stop sign.' 3 2 The insurance company insuring that
car sued the state and Manor Inn for negligence to recover what it
3

had paid out.1

The state conceded that Griffin was in its control when he was a
patient at the hospital, and therefore a special relationship existed
between the parties at that time. 13 4 However, in analyzing whether a
duty should be imposed on the state at the time of the accident, the court
found that no duty existed. 13 5 The court relied on the principle that a
party in control of another owes a duty only to "those within a foresee''
able zone of danger whose identities are known in advance.""6
Be-

125. "'Loco parentis' exists when a person undertakes care and control of another ..
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 787 (6th ed. 1990).

126. Eisel, 324 Md. at 383-85, 597 A.2d at 451-52 (discussing the factual differences between Eisel and those cases in which there was no duty to prevent suicide because there was
no special relationship).
127. Id. at 393, 597 A.2d at 456.
128. 335 Md. 135, 642 A.2d 219 (1994).
129. Id. at 139, 642 A.2d at 221. The hospital was owned and operated by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene for the state. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 139-40, 642 A.2d at 221.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 151, 642 A.2d at 227. The state thereby conceded that at that time it was
under a duty to prevent Griffin from causing physical injury to others. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 154, 642 A.2d at 228.
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cause the persons in the car hit by Griffin were not foreseeable
13 7
plaintiffs, no duty was imposed on the hospital to protect them.
In Shields v. Wagman, 13 8 the court stated that when a landowner
maintains control of an area, the landowner can be liable for injuries.1 3 1 In this case, landlord Wagman rented a commercial bay to
tenant Thomas. 40 Thomas kept a pit bull dog on the premises, and
on two different occasions the dog attacked patrons in the parking lot
of Thomas's automobile repair shop.1 4 1 Both patrons sued Thomas
and Wagman.142 The court considered whether the landlord owed a
duty to these patrons. 4 ' In finding that he did, the court recognized
that when a landlord knows or should know of a dangerous condition
in common areas, the landlord should be held liable for injuries occurring there.

t 44

(2)

Reliance on Protection.-In Ashburn v. Anne Arundel

County, t 45 the court considered whether a police officer and victim
have a special relationship because of the public's unique reliance on
the police department and police officers individually for protection.' 4 6 The Ashburn court held that although there is no general duty
to act for the benefit of another, 47 if it can "be shown that the local
government or the police officer affirmatively acted to protect the specific victim or a specific group of individuals like the victim, thereby
inducing the victim's specific reliance upon the police protection,"
then a special relationship may exist, and a negligence claim can be
supported. 148 The police officer in Ashburn sawJohn Millham behind
the wheel of a parked pickup truck and suspected that he had been
drinking and driving.141 Millham was legally drunk, but the officer
did not arrest him; instead, he instructed Millham not to drive that
137. Id. Just two years later, the Court of Special Appeals, in State v. Johnson, 108 Md.
App. 54, 670 A.2d 1012 (1996), recognized that a special relationship exists between a
jailer and inmate because of the control a jailer has over inmates. Id. at 65, 670 A.2d at
1017. The court specifically noted that a jailer has "exclusive control over the care and
confinement of prison inmates," which justifies the imposition of a special relationship. Id.
138. 350 Md. 666, 714 A.2d 881 (1998).
139. Id. at 673, 714 A.2d at 884.
140. Id. at 669-70, 714 A.2d at 882.
141. Id. at 671-72, 714 A.2d at 883.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 672, 714 A.2d at 884.
144. Id. at 682, 714 A.2d at 888.
145. 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986).
146. Id. at 631, 510 A.2d at 1085.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 619-20, 510 A.2d at 1079.
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evening.15 0 As soon as the officer left, Millham drove away and hit
John Ashburn, the plaintiff, a short distance later."' Ashburn lost his
leg as a result of the collision and sued the police department, alleg152
ing that the officer had a duty to detain all suspected drunk drivers.
The court found that although the police officer "affirmatively acted"
when he advised the drunk driver to stop driving, those actions did
not create a special relationship between the police officer and the
victim of the accident because the officer did not act for Ashburn's
benefit nor did Ashburn rely on the officer. 153 The court emphasized
protection, no special
that because Ashburn did not rely on any police
1 54
relationship was formed between the parties.
In Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore,155 the court again considered
whether reliance on police protection created a special relationship
between a citizen and a police officer. 1 56 Petitioner Mary Williams alleged that when Baltimore City Police Officer Edward Colbert arrived
at her home and promised to protect her and her family, and the
family relied on that promise, a special relationship was formed that
imposed a duty of protection on the officer. 157 Officer Colbert was
called to the Williams' home in response to a domestic violence incident involving Mary's daughter, Valerie Williams, and her boyfriend. 158 At some point when Officer Colbert left the Williamses'
home to get a camera to record the injuries to Williams's daughter,
the perpetrator entered the home shooting Williams and killing her
daughter.'5 9 The court found that there was enough genuine dispute
of facts concerning whether a special relationship existed between the
parties in this case to overrule the trial court's grant of summary judgment; however, the court recognized that the existence of a special
relationship was a decision for the trier of fact.160
The court then provided an analysis of when and how a special
relationship is formed. The court began by explaining the general
rule that a police officer does not typically have a special relationship
with the common citizenry unless the officer affirmatively acts and in150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 620, 510 A.2d at 1079.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 631-32, 510 A.2d at 1085.
Id.
359 Md. 101, 753 A.2d 41 (2000).
Id. at 108, 753 A.2d at 44.
Id. at 111-12, 753 A.2d at 46-47.
Id. at 109, 753 A.2d at 45.
Id. at 109-10, 753 A.2d at 45-46.
Id. at 141, 753 A.2d at 63.
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duces reliance upon the police protection.61 Next, the court provided a discussion of several cases that have followed this principle,
including cases from otherjurisdictions. 16 2 In its discussion, the court
cited to Melendez v. City of Philadelphia16 and the test that court created for determining whether a special relationship exists.16 4
In Melendez, a young man was shot in the face by his neighbor
during a racial conflict.16 5 Melendez and his parents sued the Philadelphia police department alleging that the boy's injuries occurred as
a result of nonfeasance by the police department because the department failed to act and protect the community once it learned of racial
violence in that area.' 6 6 After citing the general principle that police
officers have no duty to protect an individual person absent a special
relationship, the Melendez court recognized that a special relationship
exists between a police officer and citizen when the police officer
takes the responsibility of protecting the citizen.1 67 The court then
outlined a three-part test used to determine the presence of a special
relationship: (1) the police must have been aware of the citizen's particular situation; (2) the police must have had knowledge of the potential for harm; and (3) the police must have voluntarily assumed to
protect the individual from the harm.16 s Because in this instance the
Melendez family never contacted the city or police department and
reported racial violence in their neighborhood, the first prong of the
test was not satisfied.' 6 9 The police had no knowledge or awareness of
the racial violence in the Melendez's neighborhood. 7 0 Therefore,
the police could not have entered into a special relationship with the

161. Id. at 144, 753 A.2d at 64-65.
162. Id. at 145-50, 753 A.2d at 65-68. The court mentioned in its discussion Holson v.
State, 99 Md. App. 411, 637 A.2d 871 (1994), where the Court of Special Appeals held that
unless a police officer exerts control over an inebriated citizen, no special relationship
exists between the parties that requires the officer to protect the person. Id. at 428, 637
A.2d at 879.
163. 466 A.2d 1060 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
164. Williams, 359 Md. at 148-49, 753 A.2d at 67.
165. Melendez, 466 A.2d at 1061.
166. Id. at 1061-62.
167. Id. at 1063.
168. Id. at 1063-64.
169. Id. at 1064. The court also pointed out that in the Melendezes' depositions they
admitted they had no knowledge of any other racial conflict in the community. There was
no evidence that the police even knew the shooter had a gun or the propensity to use it.
Furthermore, the Melendezes' son acknowledged that "the police patrolled the area 'a
couple of times a day,'" and that the police arrived only seconds after the shooting. Id.
170. Id.
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Melendez family to protect them from harm of which they had no

knowledge. 171
The Williams court concluded, based in part on this Melendez discussion, that there was sufficient evidence to find the presence of a
special relationship because the officer had knowledge and awareness
of the peril of the situation. 1 72 The question for the trier of fact would
be whether the officer voluntarily assumed protection of the Wil173
liamses and whether they relied on that promise.
c. Researcher-Human Subject Relationships in Other Jurisdictions.-In Blaz v. Michael Reese HospitalFoundation,'74 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois decided whether a
physician in charge of a hospital research study had a duty to warn
75
human subjects of the risk associated with radiation treatments.
From 1930 to 1960, 5000 patients, including Joel Blaz, "were treated
with X-ray therapy for some benign conditions of the head and neck"
at Michael Reese Hospital and Medical Center. 76 In 1987, doctors
determined that Blaz had developed a neural tumor. Blaz later sued
the hospital's successor and one of the hospital's doctors. He contended that they failed to notify him that he may be at greater risk of
developing neural tumors because of his earlier participation in the
hospital's study. 177 The doctor in charge of the research study argued
that because he was not Blaz's treating physician, he had no such
duty.1 78 The court, however, held that the doctor did owe a duty to
79
inform Blaz of the risk associated with the study.'
In Illinois, a duty to warn exists when there is "unequal knowledge and the defendant, possessed of such knowledge, knows or
should know that harm might occur if no warning is given."' 8 ° The
court determined that the physician's affiliation with the hospital
sponsoring the research study, of which Blaz was a part, created a special relationship between the physician and Blaz. Thus, the physician
had a duty to warn Blaz of the potential dangers of participating in the
study." 8 ' Additionally, the court relied on the notion that a reasona171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See id.
Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 150-51, 753 A.2d 41, 68 (2000).
See id.
74 F. Supp. 2d 803 (N.D. Il1. 1999).
Id. at 804.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 805 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 806.
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ble physician would foresee the risks of tumor development associated
with the study and would warn his patients of such risks.'1 2 The court
also recognized that the doctor was in a position to acquire information concerning the risks to Blaz and could easily pass the information
along to Blaz. l s5
In reaching its conclusion, the court essentially engaged in a balancing test of various policy considerations rather than applying formalistic rules.' 8 4 The court recognized the potential problem
associated with finding a duty absent the traditional physician-patient
relationship, yet remained concerned about the chilling effect the
holding may have on future research projects.18 5 Any potential negative implications were outweighed by the concern that researchers
may try to advance their own personal goals or desire for the prestige
of making new discoveries in the field of medicine at the expense of
the subjects of a potentially dangerous study.' 8 6
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute,
Inc., the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered whether a special
relationship exists between a research institute and a human subject. 87 In answering this question the court held that a special relationship may exist between the parties on three bases. First, the court
held that informed consent agreements may, under certain circumstances, be deemed a contract and, as a matter of law, such a contract
may constitute a special relationship.1 8 Second, the court held that
the very nature of human subject research will "normally" create a
special relationship between the subject and the researcher."8 ' Third,
the court recognized that government regulations may create duties
researchers owe to human subjects out of which a special relationship
may arise. 19° Whether such a special relationship has been created is
a question the court determined to be properly answered on a case-bycase basis by the trier of fact.1"9 ' Therefore, the court held that the

182. See id. at 805-06.
183. Id. at 806.
184. See id. at 807 ("In determining whether a duty exists, the Illinois Supreme Court
sensibly conducts a policy analysis rather than applying a cookie cutter.").
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 366 Md. at 47-48, 782 A.2d at 818-19.
188. Id. at 113, 782 A.2d at 858.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 113-14, 782 A.2d at 858. In addition, the court held that a parent may not
consent to a child's participation in a human research study when the study could potentially pose a risk to the child's well being. Id. at 113, 782 A.2d at 858.
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lower courts' decisions to grant KKI's motions for summary judgment
was erroneous because ample evidence existed to support a finding of
a special relationship on the basis of a contract, the nature of the research, or government regulations. 9 2 The Court of Appeals thus vacated the circuit courts' grants of summary judgment and remanded
the cases back to the circuit court to further determine whether such
1 93
a duty was created in these cases.
Judge Cathell, writing for the majority, engaged in a general discussion of experimentation using humans as subjects. 194 The court
then explained the history of nontherapeutic research and the significance of the relationship between a researcher and his human subjects through a discussion of the Nuremberg Code.1 95 The court
looked to the Code because it was judicially crafted in response to the
scientific atrocities that occurred during the Holocaust and World
War II era and used legal thought and principles, as opposed to medical or scientific principles.1 9 6 The court recognized that the Code was
the "most complete and authoritative statement of the law of in'
formed consent to human experimentation." 197
Furthermore, the

court noted that "[t]he Code requires that the informed, voluntary,
competent, and understanding consent of the research subjects be obtained" before experimentation on humans would be allowed.' 98
The court then expanded on its historical discussion by providing
examples of scientific research studies that have been conducted inappropriately in the United States, even since the implementation of the
Code. First, the court described a recent incident that involved genetic experimentation on a Pennsylvania citizen.' 99 Jesse Gelsinger
consented to participation in a study at the University of Pennsylvania's Institute of Human Gene Therapy.2 °° Gelsinger died as a
result of the study because he had a different type of the disease than
192. Id. at 114, 782 A.2d at 858.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 74-78, 782 A.2d at 834-37. Judges Eldridge, Wilner, Harrell, Battaglia, and
Karwacki joined in the majority opinion. Id. at 35, 782 A.2d at 811. In addition to this
discussion, the majority noted that it was unaware of any law or court decision that prevented the finding of a special relationship between a researcher and a human subject. Id.
at 73-74, 782 A.2d at 834.
195. Id. at 74-78, 782 A.2d at 834-37. The Nuremberg Code is the international common law standard for experimentation on humans and is composed of ten points explaining the duties researchers owe to their human subjects. Id. at 74-75, 782 A.2d at 835.
196. Id. at 74, 782 A.2d at 835.
197. Id. at 75, 782 A.2d at 835 (quoting George J. Annas, Mengle's Birthmark: The Nuremberg Code in United States Courts, 7J. CoNrEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 17, 19-21 (1991)).
198. Id. (quoting Annas, supra note 197, at 19-21).
199. Id. at 80-81, 782 A.2d at 838-39.
200. Id. at 80, 782 A.2d at 838.
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that addressed by the research.2 0 1 His brand of disease was under
control; therefore, it was impossible that the research conducted
would benefit him. 2 The court recognized that Gelsinger was subject to nontherapeutic research, as were the children in the case at
bar.20 3 Likewise, the court noted that there were problems with the
extent of informed consent given by Gelsinger.2 °4
Second, the court discussed a research experiment that occurred
prior to World War II at the State University of Iowa.2 °5 The leader of
the experiment, WendellJohnson, was a stutterer.20 6 Johnson hypothesized that stuttering is a product of environmental causes and conditioned in children by criticism from their parents. 2 7 Johnson knew
that no parent would willingly agree to allow their child to be subject
to his testing methods. So, Johnson approached a nearby orphanage
and under the guise of trying to improve the orphans' speech, he
"conditioned" the children to stutter. Only minimal and unsuccessful
attempts were made to cure the children. Those children, who had
not been stutters prior to the experimentation, remained stutterers
for life. The court recognized that in this study, just as with the case at
bar, children were "deliberately placed in a potentially harmful experimental environment for the good of science in order to test a theory
that, if proven, might have helped many more children." 20 The court
was also quick to point out that the University of Iowa, the successor to
the State University of Iowa, acknowledged the impropriety of the experiment, whereas "KKI continues to assert the propriety of a study
that is inherently inappropriate ....
The court then discussed the legal basis for the appellants' claim
that KKI was negligent.2 1 0 Reviewing the elements necessary to establish a claim of negligence under Maryland law, 1 the court noted that
the important inquiry was whether KKI had a duty to protect its sub201. Id. at 81, 782 A.2d at 838. It was not until after Gelsinger's death that the United
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) halted the rest of the human gene therapy
experiments at the University of Pennsylvania and elsewhere. Id. at 80, 782 A.2d at 838.
The FDA took action after it learned of problems in the University's informed consent
procedures and general unethical treatment of the experimental human subjects. Id.
202. Id. at 81, 782 A.2d at 838.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 82 n.32, 782 A.2d at 839 n.32.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 83 n.32, 782 A.2d at 840 n.32.
209. Id.
210. See id. at 84, 782 A.2d at 841.
211. Under Maryland law, to establish a claim for negligence the plaintiff must establish
the following elements: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty; (2) the defendant
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jects from injury.2 12 On this point, the court reached the conclusion
that the evidence in the record suggested that a special relationship
involving a duty of care "would ordinarily exist, and certainly could
exist, based on the facts and circumstances of these individual
cases."2 ' The court reached its conclusion despite the fact that the
Annotated Code of Maryland and prior case law fails to identify the
researcher and human subject relationship as one that creates a
duty. 2 14 Furthermore, the majority recognized that the decision to define duties of care under tort law is one that the courts typically will
defer to the legislature. 2 15 However, in the absence of legislative policymaking, and considering the vulnerability of using child human
subjects in scientific research, the court held that "special relationships, out of which duties arise, the breach of which can constitute
negligence, can result from the relationships between researcher and
2

research subjects."

16

In finding that a special relationship may have existed between
the parties, the court specifically established that a nexus may not always exist between researchers and their human subjects. 2 17 However,
the court pointed to certain factors as being indicative of the existence of a special relationship, including recruitment, age, and participation in a nontherapeutic study that is potentially dangerous to the
health of the participant. 21" The court stressed that the creation of a
scientific study that used otherwise healthy human subjects and interacted them with potentially dangerous conditions for the purpose of
testing scientific hypotheses "would normally warrant or create such
special relationships as a matter of law."' 21 9 Finally, the court refuted
the proposition that institutional volunteers should, for public policy
220
reasons, be precluded from liability.
In a separate opinion,Judge Raker concurred in the judgment of
the court only, agreeing that the lower courts erred in granting sumbreached that duty; (3) the plaintiff suffered injury or harm; and (4) the loss proximately
resulted from defendant's breach. Id. at 85, 782 A.2d at 841 (citations omitted).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 87-88, 782 A.2d at 842-43.
214. Id. at 87, 782 A.2d at 842.
215. Id. at 93, 782 A.2d at 846. However, the court later noted that "[t]he determination of whether a duty exists under Maryland law is the ultimate function of various policy
considerations as adopted by either the Legislature, or, if it has not spoken ... by Maryland
courts." Id. at 100, 782 A.2d at 850.
216. Id. at 93-94, 782 A.2d at 846.
217. See id. at 92-93, 782 A.2d at 845-46.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 93, 782 A.2d at 846.
220. Id.
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mary judgment to KKI.2 21 Judge Raker also agreed with the majority's
conclusion that enough facts existed to recognize a special relationship between the parties in these cases. 2 22 She further agreed that this
special relationship gives rise to a duty of care that, if breached, could
support a negligence claim. 223 Judge Raker articulated, "I agree with
the majority that this duty includes the protection of research subjects
from unreasonable harm and requires the researcher to inform research subjects completely and promptly of potential hazards resulting from participation in the study. ' 2 24 However, she did not agree
with the majority's determination that the tort duty arising out of a
special relationship is a question for the trier of fact.2 25 Instead, Judge
Raker felt that "Maryland case law established that existence of a duty
of care is a legal question to be determined by the trial court, in the
first instance, and [the Court of Appeals] on appeal. ' 22 6 Judge Raker
did not think it was appropriate to "create an express exception" to
this rule that allows the existence of a special relationship to be determined by the trier of fact. 2 27 Additionally, Judge Raker criticized the
majority for expanding the narrow question presented to the court
and inappropriately concluding that KKI had breached the duty owed
to its subjects, and that the research undertaken by KKI was "per se"
inappropriate, unethical, and illegal.2 28 Judge Raker also critiqued
the majority's holding that parents do not have the right to consent to
229
their child's participation in nontherapeutic research studies.
On October 11, 2001, the court denied a motion for reconsideration, specifying that the only conclusion they held as a matter of law
was that "summary judgment was improperly granted" by the circuit
courts in these cases.2 3 °
4. Analysis.-In Grimes, the Court of Appeals did not provide adequate support for its holding that a "special relationship, out of
which duties arise, the breach of which can constitute negligence, may
221. Id. at 114-15, 782 A.2d 858-59 (Raker, J.,concurring in the result).
222. Id. at 115, 782 A.2d at 859.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 115-16, 782 A.2d at 859.
226. Id. at 116, 782 A.2d at 860.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 118, 782 A.2d at 861.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 119, 782 A.2d at 861. Judge Raker dissented from the denial of the motion
for reconsideration, reiterating that the court's "statements are a declaration of public policy that, in the posture of this case, are best left to the General Assembly." Id. at 120, 782
A.2d at 862.
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result from the relationship between researcher and human subjects. ' In explaining its holding, the court found three factors necessary to consider when determining the presence of a special
relationship: recruitment by the researchers, the age of the human
subject, and participation in a nontherapeutic study that is dangerous
to the subject's health.2" 2 These factors provide a workable standard
for the trier of fact on remand to find the existence of a special relationship in this particular case. However, the court should have provided more guidance by explaining these factors and analyzing how
they should be applied in similar negligence claims.2 3 3 Additionally,
although Grimes was a case of first impression, the court failed to support its analysis of when special relationships are created by not citing
to any legal authority. 234 To provide a more complete analysis and
ensure consistent findings in the future, the court should have included as factors: foreseeabilty of harm, control, and reliance. Moreover, the court should have referenced the voluminous case law in
Maryland that identifies these factors as indicators of the presence of a
special relationship.
a.

23 5

The Grimes

Court's Factors.-The court's opinion in

Grimes failed to thoroughly analyze the individual factors that create a
special relationship between a researcher and a human subject, thus
making future application of its holding particularly difficult. The
court stated that the legislature is generally the appropriate forum to
resolve potential exceptions to the rules of tort law, but the legislature
had not yet addressed the issue of whether a researcher owes a duty to
his human subject. 236 In order to provide the lower courts with gui-

dance in resolving these cases, the court felt compelled to speak on
the issue. In so doing, the court found three factors that indicate
when a special relationship between a researcher and a human subject
231. Grimes, 366 Md. at 94, 782 A.2d at 846.
232. Id. at 93, 782 A.2d at 845-46.
233. The need for a workable standard is evidenced by more recent instances of negligence by medical researchers in the State of Maryland. See Lawrence K. Altman, FD.A.
FaultsJohns Hopkins Over Process in Fatal Study, N.Y. TiMES, July 3, 2001, at A12 (describing
the death of Ellen Roche, a healthy asthma volunteer who died during participation in an
experimental drug trial atJohns Hopkins).
234. The court did not cite to one case or legal authority in its discussion of special
relationships. See generally Grimes, 366 Md. at 90-94, 782 A.2d at 844-46.
235. See supra notes 99-173 and accompanying text.
236. Id. at 93-94, 782 A.2d at 846. Ironically, the Maryland legislature adopted H.B. 917
in what appears to be a response to this case. See supra note 65. The new law requires
consent of the human subject, review of the study by an IRB, public exhibition of the
minutes of the IRB, and allows the Attorney General to intervene in studies that do not
comply with the law. See Nitkin, supra note 65.
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is created as a matter of law: active recruitment of participants by the
researcher; specific recruitment of children "whose consent is furnished indirectly"; and participation in a "potentially hazardous, dangerous, or deleterious" nontherapeutic study.23 7 The court found
these factors indicative of a special relationship between researcher
and subject solely through a public policy argument that participating
in a potentially dangerous study "for the purpose of creating statistics
from which scientific hypotheses can be supported, would normally
warrant or create such special relationships as a matter of law."23 s Despite the court's identification of these three factors, its failure to provide justification unnecessarily makes the reader assume that public
policy warrants the finding of a special relationship in this instance.
The court should have explained why these three factors are necessary
to the finding of a special relationship between a researcher and
human subject.
The court first delineated recruitment by the researchers as an
important factor to be considered.23 9 In recognizing this factor, the
court appeared to highlight the importance of holding researchers
legally accountable for when they actively recruit people to participate
in a research study. Although this factor appears to be appropriate,
the court should have explained why it chose recruitment to be a fundamental element instead of simply relying on public policy concerns.
This could have been accomplished in several ways.
Earlier in its opinion the court discussed a scientific study where
orphans from Iowa were "conditioned" to stutter.2 40 Specifically, the
court admonished the study because the children were actively sought
out to participate in a study that only had the potential to benefit
science and not the children individually. 24 1 The court should have
referenced this study as an example of why recruitment by researchers
should be indicative of a special relationship. The recruitment and
participation in this study left those children stutterers for life.24 2 The
power of researchers to recruit people to participate in their studies
should be subject to tort duties to prevent the sort of lifetime injuries
that occurred to the orphans in Iowa.
In Scott v. Watson, the court explained that a special relationship
would have been recognized between a landlord and tenant if the
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Grimes, 366 Md. at 92-93, 782 A.2d at 845-46.
Id. at 93, 782 A.2d at 846.
Id., 782 A.2d at 845.
Id. at 82-83 n.32, 782 A.2d at 839-40 n.32.
Id.
Id.
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landlord voluntarily implemented a security system in common areas
of the apartment complex.2 4 3 The court pointed out that it was the
voluntariness of the landlord's actions that required the finding of a
special relationship between the parties. 244 The Scott court recognized
that it was the active involvement by the landlord that required imposition of tort duties.2 45 Likewise, the court in Crimes should have referenced this case to show that it was the active recruitment of the
human subjects that may lead a trier of fact to find the presence of a
special relationship.
The second factor offered by the court was the age of the children in question. 24 6 A child is in a particularly vulnerable position in
a researcher-subject relationship because he or she must rely on his or
her parent or guardian to act in his or her best interest. 24 7 The court
again grounded its reliance on this factor in public policy concernssafeguarding children who cannot otherwise protect their best interests-rather than prior case law recognizing age as an appropriate
consideration.2 4 8
The court has previously found age to be a factor in determining
whether a special relationship exists. In Eisel v. Board of Education of

Montgomery County, the court held that if the relying party was an adolescent, a special relationship requiring the other party to exercise a
duty of care may exist. 24 9 Ericka Grimes and Myron Higgins's ages
and potential vulnerability certainly suggest that finding a special relationship is warranted.
The final factor recognized by the court was participation in a
potentially dangerous nontherapeutic study. 25 ° The court should
have stated that this factor is the crucial element in the court's test
because it recognizes that only researchers can be aware of the potential harm of the research study. The court could have accomplished
this by identifying the inherent subparts of this factor: knowledge and
foreseeability. The knowledge component, either actual or construc243. Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 171, 359 A.2d 548, 555 (1976).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Grimes, 366 Md. at 93, 782 A.2d at 845.
247. See id. at 100, 782 A.2d at 850 ("We do not feel that it serves proper public policy
concerns to permit children to be placed in situations of potential harm, during nontherapeutic procedures, even if parents, or other surrogates, consent.").
248. See id.
249. Eisel v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County, 324 Md. 376, 393, 597 A.2d 447, 456
(1991).
250. Grimes, 366 Md. at 93, 782 A.2d at 846. Nontherapeutic research is designed to test
and study a condition for the benefit of society and not for the specific benefit of the
research subject. Id. at 36 n.2, 782 A.2d at 811 n.2.
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tive on the part of the researcher, is inferred because it explains that
the only way a research study can be potentially dangerous is if it is, or
should be, identified as such by a reasonable researcher. Moreover,
knowledge is a factor that the court previously has employed numerous times as an indicator of a special relationship.2 5 ' Use of the term
knowledge also implies that foreseeability of the harm should be assessed. If a researcher knows or should know of potential harm, then
that harm is foreseeable. Because the foreseeability of harm has also
previously been recognized as an element in determining the presence of a special relationship, the court should have referenced that
case law. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, the court should have explained its final factor-participation in a potentially dangerous nontherapeutic study-in terms of knowledge and foreseeability, terms
which the court has previously used in explaining the presence of a
special relationship.
To support its third factor, the Grimes court could have cited Blaz
v. Michael Reese HospitalFoundation. In that case, the court pointed out

that a special relationship between a researcher and subject exists, giving rise to a duty to warn, when there is "unequal knowledge and the
defendant, possessed of such knowledge, knows or should know that
harm might occur if no warning is given. 25 2 In Blaz, the court found
that a special relationship existed between the researching doctor and
his human subject because the doctor had knowledge that the subject
might develop tumors as a result of participating in the study.2 53 The
court also found that the physician breached his duty when he failed
254
to warn Blaz of this potential danger.
The court also could have relied on Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore

to support its third factor. In Williams, the court stated that a special
relationship does not exist between a police officer and citizen unless
the officer acts and induces reliance on police protection.2 5 5 In explaining this principle, the court referenced Melendez v. City of Philadelphia.2 56 Melendez created a three-part test for determining the
existence of a special relationship between parties: awareness, knowledge, and voluntary protection by the police. 257 The Melendez court
recognized that duties cannot be imposed on a party unless they have
251. See supra notes 83-84, 168-173 and accompanying text.
252. Blaz v. Michael Reese Hosp. Found., 74 F. Supp. 2d 803, 805 (N.D. 111.1999) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 151, 753 A.2d 41, 68 (2000).
256. Id. at 148-49, 753 A.2d at 67.
257. Melendez v. City of Philadelphia, 466 A.2d 1060, 1064 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
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knowledge of the potential for harm and fail to warn of that harm. 258
Because the police did not have knowledge of the racial violence in
the Melendez's neighborhood, the court found no special relationship between the parties. 259 Conversely, in Williams, the police officer
did have knowledge of the potential domestic harm to Mary and Valerie Williams, so the court ruled that a trier of fact may find the presence of a special relationship in that instance. 26 ° Likewise, there is
ample evidence that the KKI researchers had knowledge of the potential of harm to warrant the finding of a special relationship.
The researchers in the KKI study had knowledge that partial lead
paint abatement in homes would be potentially dangerous to the participants. A previous article written by the researchers stated, "Exposure to lead-bearing dust is particularly hazardous for children
because hand to mouth activity is recognized as a major route of entry
of lead into the body and because absorption of lead is inversely related to particulate size. ''26 1 It is abundantly clear, therefore, that this
sub-element would have been satisfied.
Implied in the knowledge of the potential for harm is the notion
that the harm is foreseeable. The foreseeability of harm has long
been a recognized factor for determining the presence of a duty. In
Jacques v. First NationalBank, the court recognized that the foreseeability of harm helps determine the imposition of a duty.2 6 2 That principle was also recognized in Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County when the
court found that the foreseeability of harm might be the most important factor in determining whether a duty is owed to another.263 The
court continued to explain that just because a harm is foreseeable
does not mean that a duty is automatically imposed, for there must
also be a special relationship between the parties. 26 4 Because the police officer did not have a special relationship with the victim in
Ashburn, no duty existed.2 6 5 It therefore directly flows that the foreseeability of harm may be a factor in determining the presence of a
special relationship. Because the researchers in Crimes obviously had
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Williams, 359 Md. at 150-51, 763 A.2d at 68.
261. Grimes, 366 Md. at 37-38, 782 A.2d at 812 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
262. Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank of Md., 307 Md. 527, 534, 515 A.2d 756, 759 (1986).
263. Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 628, 510 A.2d 1078, 1083 (1986).
The Ashburn court also cited Tarasoffv. Regents of University of California,551 P.2d 334 (Cal.
1976), which listed the foreseeability of harm as a factor used to determine whether a duty
exists. Ashburn, 306 Md. at 627, 510 A.2d at 1083.
264. Ashburn, 306 Md. at 628, 510 A.2d at 1082.
265. Id.
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follows that they recognized

the foreseeability of harm. Indeed, if a trier of fact finds that the researchers had the requisite knowledge for the potential harm and
foresaw the possibility of that harm, a finding of a special relationship
between the parties would be necessary. The Grimes court should have
explained that these two elements are dispositive of a special relationship between a human subject and researcher.
b. Continued Application of the Test.-In developing this
three-factor test, the court failed to clearly establish whether all of the
factors, a majority of the factors, or just one factor are necessary to
prove a special relationship between a researcher and his human subject. This oversight by the court may lead to varied applications of the
test in the future. To avoid this problem the court should have indicated that the test it proposed was not exhaustive. In so doing, the
court should have stated that the third factor-participation in a potentially dangerous nontherapeutic study-is the crucial factor and
must be present to make a finding of a special relationship between a
researcher and his human subject. It is this factor that strongly suggests that a special relationship exists between researchers and human
subjects because a researcher would have knowledge of the harm,
thereby making it foreseeable, and thus implicating a responsibility on
behalf of the researcher to warn the subject of potential risks. 6 7
The other two factors are simply indicators of a special relationship between a researcher and human subject. Recruitment by the
researchers and age are not necessarily required for a finding of a
special relationship, but may be analyzed as factors if they happen to
be present. These two elements are important to this case because
Grimes and Higgins were actively recruited to participate in the research experiment and were minors. 26' However, other reasonably
possible scenarios would not include these two indicators, but still require the finding of a special relationship.2 6 9
266. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
267. If a researcher has actual or constructive knowledge of the potential for harm and
recognizes that such harm is foreseeable, it is unconscionable to think that such information would not create a special relationship and impose on the researcher the duty to warn
of potential harm. This is the unique qualifier of the human subject-researcher relationship that warrants the finding of a special relationship.
268. Grimes, 366 Md. at 93, 782 A.2d at 845.
269. An example of this may arise if an adult volunteers to participate in a research
study, but is nevertheless injured. According to the Grimes analysis, such an individual
would not have a special relationship with the researcher, and therefore would be unable
to bring a tort claim against that researcher.
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c. Control and Reliance-Additional Factors the Court Should
Have Included.-The court should have also discussed indicators of a
special relationship identified in prior case law, namely control and
reliance. The court first recognized control in Scott v. Watson, stating
that when a landlord voluntarily takes control over a common area, he
enters into a special relationship with those tenants using that common area and owes them a duty of protection.2 7 ° This principle was
again employed in Shields v. Swagman, where a property owner was
found to hold a special relationship and owe a duty to those citizens
who are injured in common areas.27 1
Likewise, the researchers in Grimes took control over the lead
paint content in the Grimes and Higgins homes.2 7 2 The researchers
were in complete control of the abatement of those homes, and therefore, according to Scott and Shields, entered a special relationship with
those families. The Grimes court should have included this analysis in
its opinion, thereby providing another indicator of a special relationship for courts to use in the future.
Furthermore, the court should have included a discussion explaining why reliance is an indicator of a special relationship generally
and in this case. In Ashburn the court first articulated that when a
citizen relies on police protection because of affirmative action by an
officer, a special relationship may exist between those parties.2 7 3 This
notion was then reiterated and emphasized in Williams, where the
court again recognized that when an officer induces reliance, he owes
a duty of protection to those who rely on him.27 4 The court was remiss in not including this discussion, thereby providing another indicator of a special relationship for future courts.
In the case at hand, both Erika Grimes's and Myron Higgins's
mothers alleged that they relied on KKI to provide complete and accurate information regarding the study.27 5 The fact that Erika and

270. Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 171, 359 A.2d 548, 555 (1976). This ideology was
expanded in Lamb v. Hopkins and Hartford Insurance Co. v. Manor Inn to include situations
when a person actually has control or custody over another. In those instances, the person
with the control owes a duty to third parties to protect them from the harm that may arise
from the person being controlled. See Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn, 335 Md. 135, 150,
642 A.2d 219, 226-27 (1994); Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 245, 492 A.2d 1297, 1302
(1985). However, in the case at hand, one person did not have control over another.
271. Shields v. Wagman, 350 Md. 666, 673, 714 A.2d 881, 884 (1998).
272. See Grimes, 366 Md. at 52-54, 782 A.2d at 821-22 (describing the physical lead paint
abatement repairs to the participating homes).
273. Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 631, 510 A.2d 1078, 1085 (1986).
274. Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 144, 753 A.2d 41, 64-65 (2000).
275. Grimes, 366 Md. at 60, 64-65, 782 A.2d at 826, 829. Ms. Higgins contended that KKI
withheld information of the potential dangers of the study and only informed her of the
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Myron's mothers detrimentally relied on the misleading information
given to them serves as another indicator that a special relationship
existed in this case.
The court in Grimes provided three factors that may indicate the
presence of a special relationship between a human subject and researcher. However, in light of the court's decision to leave the ultimate decision to the trier of fact, a more thorough analysis of the
three factors was necessary. Moreover, the court should have looked
to prior case law and incorporated factors already delineated by the
court, namely control and reliance, into its discussion. Finally, the
court should have recognized that participation in a potentially dangerous nontherapeutic study was the crucial factor in determining
whether a special relationship exists between human subject and researcher. It is this factor that exemplifies whether a researcher has
knowledge of the potential harm that may occur because of participation in the study.
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals, in Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc., failed to set a clear methodology for evaluating
whether a special relationship exists between a researcher and his or
her human subject. The court's finding of certain factors to be dispositive of a special relationship and concurrent failure to adequately
discuss their implementation renders the court's analysis incomplete
and has the potential to lead to inconsistent application of the court's
three factors in the future. Rather than basing its analysis on broad
policy goals, the court needed to provide a more thorough analysis of
how tort law precedent provides an appropriate conclusion in this
case. Thus, while the court's conclusion is correct, its analysis only
confuses an already inconsistent factual determination.
KATHARINE

0.

ADAMs

"lower [of the two] results of the samples collected by dirt wipe methodology." Id. at 64-65,
782 A.2d at 829. Ms. Higgins maintained that this was "misleading to her as a participant
in the study," and that "it gave her a false sense of security that there were no potential
lead-based paint or dirt hazards in her house." Id. at 65, 782 A.2d at 829. Although reliance is often difficult to prove, it is reasonable to assume that both mothers relied on KKI
to fulfill their obligations under the contract and provide them with the results of the dust
wipe and blood tests taken in their homes.

B.

EliminatingPre-Seizure Conduct of a Law Enforcement Officer from
Review Under Constitutionaland Tort Law

1
In Richardson v. McGriff,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed whether a jury that was assessing a police officer's actions
under Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the common law principles of self-defense and gross negligence should have
been able to consider the actions of the police officer that occurred
antecedent to the seizure of an individual in its analysis.2 The Court
of Appeals concluded that the jury should not have been able to consider the pre-seizure actions of the police officer in its analysis of the
police officer's actions under Article 26, self-defense, and gross negligence. 3 The court found that the pre-seizure actions of a police officer are not relevant to the examination of a police officer's conduct
pursuant to Article 26 or common law self-defense and gross negligence, and therefore cannot be considered in the analysis of a police
officer's action under those principles of law.4 What the Court of Appeals failed to realize in justifying the restriction on the scope of the
jury's examination, however, is that while all pre-seizure actions are
irrelevant to, and should thus be excluded from, an analysis under
Article 26, the principles of self-defense and gross negligence provide
that some pre-seizure actions may be relevant to, and thus should be
included in, an analysis of an officer's conduct. Fortunately for the
Court of Appeals, Richardson is one of those cases where the preseizure actions of the police officer are not relevant to the self-defense
and gross negligence analyses. Thus, while the court's conclusion was
correct, its reasoning was flawed.

1.

The Case.-

a. The Facts.--On January 12, 1996, Baltimore City Police
Officer Horace McGriff received an emergency call indicating that
there were several male individuals in an abandoned apartment and
that shots had been fired.5 After arriving at the apartment, Officer
1. 361 Md. 437, 762 A.2d 48 (2000).
2. Id. at 451-52, 762 A.2d at 56.
3. Id. at 465, 762 A.2d at 63.
4. See id. at 452-53, 762 A.2d at 56 (asserting that the Fourth Amendment standard
would govern the resolution of the issue under Article 26, self-defense, and gross negligence); id. at 458, 762 A.2d at 59 (adopting the view of courts that have excluded preseizure actions from review); id. at 465, 762 A.2d at 63 (affirming the trial court's exclusion
of the pre-seizure actions).
5. Id. at 442, 762 A.2d 50.

1074

2002]

COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

1075

McGriff requested the presence of another officer and was joined at
the scene by Officer Donald Catterton.6 Once the officers located the
abandoned apartment, they determined that the apartment needed to
be "checked" and proceeded to conduct a room-to-room search.
During this search, the officers heard a noise and entered the
kitchen.' The officers determined that a closet was the only possible
hiding place in the kitchen.9 Officer McGriff positioned himself in
front of the closet door with his weapon drawn and the flashlight
pointed at the closet. Both officers announced that they were going
to open the closet door. No one responded."0 When both officers
were in position, Officer Catterton opened the closet door.1 1 At this
point, Officer McGriff saw Taurrance Richardson holding what appeared to be a weapon' 2 and fired a shot at Richardson, severely
wounding him.' 3
b.

ProceduralHistory.-

(1) The Trial.--Approximately one year after the shooting, Richardson filed a lawsuit against numerous city officials and Officers McGriff and Catterton, alleging that they committed tortious
acts and violated Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights. 4 All claims except those brought against Officers McGriff and
Catterton were dismissed.' 5 Additionally, Officers McGriff and Catterton filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted as to
6. Id.
7. Id. at 443, 762 A.2d at 51. The petitioner, Taurrance Richardson, disputed hearing
the officers announce their presence in the apartment. Id. at 443 n.2, 762 A.2d at 51 n.2.
8. Id. at 444, 762 A.2d at 51.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id., 762 A.2d at 51-52. Richardson was actually holding a vacuum cleaner pipe. Id.
at 442, 762 A.2d at 50.
13. Id. at 444, 762 A.2d at 52. It was not until after Officer McGriff fired the shot that
he realized the object was a vacuum cleaner pipe. Id.
14. Richardson v. McGriff, No. 5396, slip op. at 2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 3, 1999).
Richardson alleged that the various parties were liable in tort for: (1) assault and battery;
(2) false arrest and imprisonment; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) gross
negligence; (5) civil conspiracy; (6) negligence (only against Officer McGriff, the Police
Commissioner, Baltimore City, and the State of Maryland); and (7) malicious prosecution
(only against officers McGriff and Catterton). Id. Article 26 states that "all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are
grevious [grievous] and oppressive; and all general warrants... without naming or describing the place . . . are illegal, and ought not to be granted." MD. DECL. OF RTS. art. 26.
Article 24 states that "no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold,
liberties or privileges.... or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of
his peers, or by the Law of the land." MD. DECL. OF RTs. art. 24.
15. Richardson, No. 5396, slip op. at 2-3.
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the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, and malicious prosecution.16
Prior to the trial on the remaining counts, the officers filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude Richardson from introducing evidence pertaining to allegations that the officers violated proper police
procedures. 1 7 After initially denying the motion in limine, the circuit
court eventually granted the motion.'" Subsequently, the trial judge,
in keeping with the motion in limine ruling, also concluded that Richardson was precluded from questioning Sergeant Laron Wilson regarding the alternatives available to Officer McGriff during the
incident and the deadly force training given to city police officers.'"
With the circuit court having definitively ruled on Richardson's
ability to introduce the alleged violations of police procedures in the
battery, gross negligence, and Article 26 claims, the case was sent to
the jury with only the three claims against Officer McGriff remaining.2 ° The trial court instructed the jury that, in determining whether
Officer McGriff was justified in using deadly force against Richardson,
it was to determine "whether a reasonable police officer under the
same or similar circumstances" could have believed that Richardson
"pos[ed] a significant threat of death or serious physical injury" to the
officer or others.2 ' The court further instructed the jury that they
were to judge the reasonableness of the use of force in light of "all of
the circumstances as they appeared to the officer at that time. "22 After questions by the jury, the circuit court also concluded that the jury
was restricted to examining "the circumstances as they existed at the
moment the force was used, which means ... as you found them to be
when that door was opened .... ,,23 On the basis of this clarification,

the jury concluded that Officer McGriff had acted reasonably in his

16. Id. at 3.
17. Id.; see also Richardson, 361 Md. at 446, 762 A.2d at 53. Essentially, Richardson
wanted to use the police procedures and regulations in order to demonstrate that the
officers' actions were unreasonable. See id.
18. Richardson, No. 5396, slip op. at 3.
19. Richardson, 361 Md. at 450-51, 762 A.2d at 54-55.
20. Richardson, No. 5396, slip op. at 4. The three causes of action against Officer McGriff were the only remaining counts because the circuit court granted summary judgment
in favor of Officer Catterton as to all the allegations against him and in favor of Officer
McGriff as to the negligence, false imprisonment, and false arrest allegations. Id.
21. Id. at 450-51, 762 A.2d at 55.
22. Id. at 450, 762 A.2d at 55.
23. Richardson, No. 5396, slip op. at 5.
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use of deadly force. 24 The jury did not find Officer McGriff liable25 to
Richardson for battery, gross negligence, or Article 26 violations.
(2) The Court of Special Appeals.-The Court of Special
Appeals, in an unreported opinion, affirmed the decision of the circuit court. 2 6 With regard to Richardson's argument that the officers

excluded jurors solely based on race, the Court of Special Appeals
concluded that the circuit court did not err in determining that the
officers' counsel sufficiently demonstrated that all of the peremptory
strikes were made on race-neutral grounds.2 7 In addition, the Court
of Special Appeals held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the motion in limine,28 denied the petitioner the
opportunity to examine witnesses regarding the training and reasonable alternatives available to Officer McGriff, 29 and instructed the jury
to only consider Officer McGriffs actions at the time the deadly force
was used when assessing the reasonableness of his actions.
The court determined that an "objective reasonableness" test
should govern the analysis of Richardson's Article 26, battery, and
gross negligence claims." Therefore, the court concluded that any
actions or events that occurred prior to Officer McGriff s use of
deadly force were not relevant to the ultimate determination of
whether Officer McGriff was liable to Richardson under any of the
three remaining legal claims.3 2 Consequently, the Court of Special
Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision regarding the motion in
limine" the denial of testimony,3 4 and the jury instruction.3 5
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and determined that
Richardson's appeal presented two primary questions for resolution:
whether the conduct of a police officer that occurred prior to the actual seizure should be considered when attempting to analyze and determine whether the police officer's actions during the seizure were
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 7, 10, 12, 14-15.
27. Id. at 7.
28. Id. at 10.
29. Id. at 12.
30. Id. at 14-15.
31. Id. at 9-10. According to the Court of Special Appeals, the "objective reasonableness" test not only covers an alleged violation of Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights, but also applies to an analysis of a police officer's use of force under the common
law causes of action of battery and gross negligence. Id. at 10.
32. Id. at 10.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 12.
35. Id. at 14-15.
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reasonable;3 6 and whether the circuit court committed reversible error when it permitted the officers' peremptory challenges to the
7

jurors.

2. Legal Background.a. Interpretation of Excessive Force During a "Seizure" in Claims
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.(1) The "Objective Reasonableness" Test.-The United
States Constitution contains various provisions that protect citizens
and individuals from being subjected by the government to such
things as "unreasonable searches and seizures."38 The Constitution,
while providing these protections, does not provide an avenue to seek
redress for violations of these protections. Thus, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was
enacted.3 9 Section 1983 established that every citizen or person can
seek redress against a government actor who deprives that person of a
40
right, privilege, or immunity.
The use of excessive force by a law enforcement official during an
arrest, investigatory stop, or other type of "seizure"4 1 has been found
by courts to infringe upon constitutional rights. 42 Furthermore, in
Graham v. Connor,the Supreme Court found that a police officer's use
of force should be subjected to an examination under the Fourth
Amendment's "reasonableness" test.4
The Court held that lower
courts should determine "whether the officers' actions are 'objectively
reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them,
without regard to their underlying intent or motivation."4 4
36. Richardson, 361 Md. at 441, 762 A.2d at 50.
37. Id. at 451-52, 762 A.2d at 56. This issue is not the focus of this Note. As a result, it
will be addressed only in a cursory fashion throughout the remainder of the Note.
38. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. amend IV.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
40. Id.
41. Seizures, which include arrests and investigatory stops, occur "only when government actors have, 'by means of physical force or show of authority, . . . in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.'" Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989)
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)). Shooting a suspect is a seizure. Bella
v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251, 1255 (10th Cir. 1994).
42. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (holding that the use of deadly
force to prevent an apparently unarmed felon from fleeing violated the Constitution).
43. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
44. Id. at 397. The Supreme Court noted that the "reasonableness" inquiry in the
Fourth Amendment is an objective inquiry that requires an examination of the facts and
circumstances "from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with
the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. at 396. The Court indicated that the "reasonableness"
inquiry should examine "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id. at 396.
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(2) Pre-Seizure Actions of a Law Enforcement Officer and the
"Objective Reasonableness" Test.(a) Graham's Treatment of the Pre-Seizure Actions of a Law
Enforcement Officer.-Although the decision in Graham v. Connorclearly
established that a § 1983 case alleging impropriety during the course
of a "seizure" must be analyzed under the "objective reasonableness"
test, the decision did not definitively establish the assessment parameters.45 In particular, the Graham decision did not establish whether
the actions and conduct of a law enforcement officer that occurred
prior to the actual "seizure" should be included in the determination
of whether the amount of force applied by the officer was reasonable
or excessive.4 6 The Graham court instead restricted the review to that
of a reasonable officer on the scene and provided a non-exclusive list
of factors to consider in this examination.
(b)

Excluding Pre-Seizure Actions.-

(i) The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.-Following the Graham decision, some courts have established a
"time frame" to be used when assessing the reasonableness of a police
officer's actions.4 8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit addressed this "time frame" issue in Greenidge v. Ruffin.49 In
Greenidge, an officer was accused of using excessive force when she
shot the plaintiff during a seizure. 5 ' The Fourth Circuit concluded
that the officer's actions prior to the "seizure" were irrelevant to the
examination of her decision to use deadly force. 5 ' According to the
court, under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" test,
the officer's actions prior to the seizure were "not probative of the
reasonableness of Officer Ruffin's decision to fire the shot."52 Thus,
the Fourth Circuit limited the inquiry under the "objective reasona-

45. See id. at 395-97.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 396.
48. See Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that a police officer's
actions prior to a seizure were irrelevant to the objective reasonableness assessment);
Schulz v. Long, 44 F.3d 643, 649 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it excluded the actions of a police officer that occurred prior to a
constitutional "seizure" from its reasonable analysis).
49. 927 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1991).
50. Id. at 790.
51. Id. at 792.
52. Id.
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bleness" test to the officer's actions occurring immediately prior to or
during the seizure.53
Greenidge is not the only case in which the Fourth Circuit has excluded the pre-seizure conduct of a police officer from assessment
under the "objective reasonableness" test. Two years after Greenidge, in
Drewitt v. Pratt,54 the Fourth Circuit again excluded the pre-seizure

conduct of a police officer from assessment, holding that an officer's
failure to display his badge prior to a shooting was irrelevant as to
whether the officer was reasonable in using deadly force. 55
(ii) Other United States Courts of Appeals.--Other appellate courts have also established a similar time frame for the analysis of
a law enforcement officer's actions under the "objective reasonableness" test.56 For example, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
in Cole v. Bone,57 determined that the actions taken by a law enforcement officer prior to a constitutional seizure should not factor into
the assessment of the objective reasonableness of the officer's actions
at the moment of and during the seizure.5 8
Two years later, in Schulz v. Long, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
time-frame parameters that were established in Cole, holding that "evidence that [the] Officers .

.

. created the need to use force by their

actions prior to the moment of seizure is irrelevant to the issues
presented here, and therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it."'59 In Schulz, the plaintiff argued that the law
enforcement officers, who eventually shot him, essentially created the
need to use deadly force by: (1) not waiting for backup, and (2) becoming tangled in a barricade that was erected by the plaintiff for the
purpose of keeping the officers away.6" The Eighth Circuit, however,
agreed with the trial court and concluded that the Supreme Court's
decision in Graham, along with the court's previous decision in Cole,

53. Id. The majority in Greenidgeplaced particular importance upon the statement in
Graham that "'reasonableness' meant the 'standard of reasonableness at the moment."' See
id.
54. 999 F.2d 774 (4th Cir. 1993).
55. Id. at 780.
56. See, e.g., Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the pre-seizure
actions of an officer were irrelevant in determining whether the officer acted with objective
reasonableness in shooting an individual).
57. 993 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1993).
58. Id. at 1333.
59. 44 F.3d 643, 649 (8th Cir. 1995).
60. Id. at 646, 648.
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warranted excluding the evidence pertaining to the actions of the officers prior to the seizure."
(c) Setting a Time-Frame that Includes Pre-Seizure Actions.Other courts have been unwilling to adopt a strict time-frame parameter. The Seventh Circuit, after initially adopting a standard that excluded pre-seizure actions from review,6 2 reversed its position in
Deering v. Reich.6" In Deering, the Seventh Circuit held that pre-seizure
actions were not exempt from judicial review during an investigation
into the reasonableness of a seizure. 6 4 Unlike the Fourth and Eighth
Circuits, the Seventh Circuit determined that the "totality of the circumstances" included the actions prior to the moment of the
seizure.1

5

The First Circuit, in Saint Hilairev. City of Laconia,6 6 and the Third
Circuit, in Abraham v. Raso,6 7 more explicitly rejected the limitations
imposed by the Fourth and Eighth Circuits. In Saint Hilaire, the First
Circuit indicated that the exclusion of a police officer's conduct occurring prior to the moment of a shooting violated tenets established
by the Supreme Court.6 8 Consequently, the First Circuit concluded
that actions taking place prior to a seizure should be included in any
assessment or examination of the reasonableness of the use of force
by the officer during the seizure.6 9 Similarly, in Abraham, the Third
Circuit concluded that pre-seizure events were relevant because the
"totality of the circumstances" implies that "reasonableness should be
sensitive to all of the factors bearing on the officer's use of force."7
Furthermore, in the opinion of the Abraham court, excluding preseizure events not only contradicted Supreme Court precedent, but
also created logistical and theoretical problems for assessing an officer's reasonableness.7 1
61. Id. at 649.
62. See Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment [does not] prohibit[ ] creating unreasonably dangerous circumstances . . . . The
Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures not unreasonable, unjustified or outrageous conduct in general.").
63. 183 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1999).
64. Id. at 649-51.
65. Id. at 650.
66. 71 F.3d 20 (lst Cir. 1995).
67. 183 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1999).
68. St. Hilaire, 71 F.3d at 26.
69. Id.
70. Abraham, 183 F.3d at 291.
71. Id. The Abraham court was unclear as to how the reasonableness of a particular use
of force would be assessed if pre-seizure actions were not examined, and was concerned
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As the above cases demonstrate, the Graham opinion has been
interpreted differently with respect to whether the actions of a police
officer prior to a seizure should factor into the assessment of the overall reasonableness of the police officer's actions.
b.

Claims Brought Pursuantto Article 26 of the MarylandDeclara-

tion of Rights. -Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures,7 2 has long been
considered to be the state equivalent of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.73 Thus, courts in Maryland give great deference to the decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the Fourth
Amendment when assessing a claim brought pursuant to Article 26."
c. Utilizing the Pre-Seizure Actions of a Law Enforcement Officer
Under Common Law Principles.(1)

Pre-Seizure Actions Analysis Under Self-Defense. -- Over

time, Maryland has incorporated the doctrine of self-defense into its
common law. 7 5 Under the doctrine of self-defense, as articulated by
the Court of Appeals of Maryland, an individual will be absolved from
liability for a homicide or assault if:
(1) The accused.., had reasonable grounds to believe himself in apparent imminent or immediate danger of death or
serious bodily harm from his assailant or potential assailant;
(2) The accused must have in fact believed himself in this
danger;
(3) The accused... [was] not ... the aggressor... [and did

not] provoke[ ] the conflict; and
that excluding these actions would result in every shooting being unreasonable because
the officer's rationale for shooting could not be considered. Id.
72. MD. DECL. OF RTs. art. 26. Article 26 provides:
That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or
to seize any person or property, are grevious [grievous] and oppressive; and all
general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons,
without naming or describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal, and
ought not to be granted.
73. See Gadson v. State, 341 Md. 1, 8 n.3, 668 A.2d 22, 26 n.3 (1995) (stating that
"Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is in pai materia with the Fourth
Amendment").
74. Id.
75. SeeJones v. State, 357 Md, 408, 430, 745 A.2d 396, 407 (2000) (holding that selfdefense precludes a finding of reckless endangerment); Baltimore Transit Co. v. Faulkner,
179 Md. 598, 600, 20 A.2d 485, 487 (1941) (stating that a person who acts in self-defense
based on a reasonable belief of immediate danger is immune from civil or criminal
liability).
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(4) The force used . . . [was] not unreasonable and excessive, that is, the force [was] not . . .more force than the
exigency demanded.76
While Maryland courts have not had the opportunity to apply the
law of self-defense to the use of deadly force by a law enforcement
officer, they have addressed the question of what evidence is admissible to prove self-defense in other types of actions. In particular, Maryland courts have been willing to allow acts that occurred prior to the
use of force to be considered when a defendant claims self-defense. 7 7
For. example, courts have allowed the prior acts of the victim to be
introduced into evidence.7 8 Furthermore, courts have indicated that
acts of the person claiming self-defense that occurred prior to the use
of force can be relevant to a self-defense claim. In Cunningham v.
State,79 for instance, the Court of Special Appeals relied on the preforce acts of the person attempting to avoid liability on the basis of
self-defense in concluding that the individual was an aggressor and
had not established that he acted in self-defense."
Despite these
cases, which are instructive on what may be considered in assessing
whether a defendant acted in self-defense, courts have not definitively
determined what evidence will be acceptable in self-defense cases involving the use of force by law enforcement officers.
(2) Utilizing Pre-Seizure Actions in an Analysis Under Gross
Negligence.-Under Maryland law, causes of action for negligence require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant owed the plaintiff a
duty or obligation; that the defendant breached this duty; and that the
plaintiff suffered a harm as a proximate result of the defendant's
breach of his or her duty.8 ' In particularly egregious cases, a plaintiff

76. State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482, 485-86, 483 A.2d 759, 761 (1984). Although the
doctrine of self-defense requires all four elements to be present, the defendant need only
demonstrate that there is "some evidence" which suggests that he or she acted in selfdefense. Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 216, 571 A.2d 1251, 1256-57 (1990).
77. See Gunther v. State, 228 Md. 404, 410, 179 A.2d 880, 883 (1962) (admitting evidence regarding the character of the victim);Jones v. State, 182 Md. 653, 659-61, 35 A.2d
916, 919-20 (1944) (finding that evidence pertaining to the "victim's" character was admissible); see also Colleen K. Heitkamp, Note, Evidence of Prior Convictions, 49 MD.L. REv. 671,
678 (1990) (stating that Maryland self-defense law recognizes that "the victim's prior acts
are relevant to establish the defendant's state of mind").
78. See Gunther, 228 Md. at 410, 179 A.2d at 883; Jones, 182 Md. at 660-61, 35 A.2d at
919-20.
79. 58 Md. App. 249, 473 A.2d 40 (1984).
80. Id. at 257, 473 A.2d at 43.
81. See, e.g., Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc., 335 Md. 135, 14748, 642
A.2d 219, 225 (1994).
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may have a cause of action for gross negligence.8 2 In addition to the
causation and harm requirements, gross negligence requires that the
conduct of the defendant amount to a wanton or reckless disregard
for others.8 '
Prior to Richardson, the Court of Appeals has had the opportunity
to determine whether certain actions of a police officer amounted to
gross negligence. In State v. Albrecht,84 the Court of Appeals examined
whether an officer was grossly negligent when he applied force that
ultimately resulted in the death of an individual.8 5 The court concluded that the officer's actions prior to the use of deadly force could
be included in a determination of whether the law enforcement officer was guilty of grossly negligent conduct.8 6 According to the court,
Officer Christopher Albrecht's actions prior to his use of deadly force,
which included "drawing and racking a shotgun fitted with a bandolier and bringing it to bear, with hisfinger on the trigger,on an unarmed

individual who did not present a threat to the officer or to any third
parties, in a situation where nearby bystanders were exposed to danger," supported a finding that a reasonable officer in a similar situation would not have taken those actions.8 7 Consequently, there was a
sufficient basis for a finding that Officer Albrecht was grossly negligent, and therefore guilty of involuntary manslaughter.8 8
In 1999, in Lovelace v. Anderson,8 9 the Court of Special Appeals
addressed whether an officer's pre-seizure conduct could be considered in assessing whether the officer acted with gross negligence.9" In
Lovelace, the plaintiff asserted that the officer, who at the time of the
shooting, was working as a private security guard, engaged in grossly
negligent conduct prior to and contemporaneous with the use of
deadly force. 9 ' Some of the actions from which the plaintiff asserted
the officer's gross negligence could be inferred were actions that occurred prior to the seizure of suspects.9 2 The Court of Special Ap82. See Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 579, 594 A.2d 121, 132 (1991) (asserting that in
order to "charge Trooper Titus with gross negligence, the plaintiffs must have pled facts
showing that Trooper Titus acted with a wanton and reckless disregard for others").
83. Id.
84. 336 Md. 475, 649 A.2d 336 (1994).
85. Id. at 477-78, 649 A.2d at 337.
86. Id. at 505, 649 A.2d at 350-51.
87. Id.
88. Id., 649 A.2d at 351.
89. 126 Md. App. 667, 730 A.2d 774 (1999).
90. Id. at 696, 730 A.2d at 788.
91. See id. at 696, 730 A.2d at 790-91 (providing the facts of the encounter upon which
Lovelace claimed the inference of gross negligence could be drawn).
92. Id. at 701, 730 A.2d at 792.
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peals rejected the plaintiff's contention that the officer's actions,
which occurred prior to the seizure, were relevant to whether the officer was grossly negligent.9 3 The Court of Special Appeals concluded
that the officer's failures were not relevant to the liability determinanot immediately prior to or contemtion because those actions were
94
shooting.
the
with
poraneous
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Richardson, the Court of Appeals
addressed whether the actions of a law enforcement officer that occurred prior to a "seizure" were relevant to, and could be included in,
an assessment of whether the officer violated Article 26 by effecting an
unreasonable seizure, whether the officer acted with gross negligence,
or whether he acted in self-defense. 9 5 The Court of Appeals first determined that, in this case, the "objective reasonableness" test employed in Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure jurisprudence was
the test that would govern the issues of self-defense and gross negligence.96 Based on this determination, the court concluded that the
linchpin of the analysis would be whether the police officer's anteceunder the Fourth Amendment's "objective
dent actions are admissible
97
reasonableness" test.
Having concluded that the "objective reasonableness" test was the
guidepost for the court's resolution, the Court of Appeals examined
Fourth Amendment cases in which the "objective reasonableness" test
was applied.9" Writing for the majority, Judge Wilner concluded that
Fourth Amendment precedent established that the actions of a law
enforcement officer occurring prior to the moment of seizure were
not relevant to the assessment of the reasonableness of the officer's
actions or use of force during a seizure.9 9 Based on this conclusion,
the Court of Appeals then held that the circuit court did not commit
reversible error when it: (1) granted a motion in limine filed by the
police officer, (2) excluded certain testimony that related to the officer's actions prior to the officer's discharge of deadly force, and (3)
instructed the jury to only consider those circumstances and facts that

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See
Id.
See
Id.
See
See
See

id., 730 A.2d at 792-93.
Richardson, 361 Md. at 451-53, 762 A.2d at 56.
at 452-53, 762 A.2d at 56.
id. at 453, 762 A.2d at 56.
id. at 453-58, 762 A.2d at 57-59.
id. at 458, 762 A.2d at 59.
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existed at the moment when the officer decided to use deadly
1 00
force.
Judge Harrell, joined by Chief Judge Bell"" and Judge Eldridge,
dissented. 0 2 The dissent first rejected the notion that the "objective
reasonableness" test of the Fourth Amendment prohibited an exami0 3
nation of a police officer's conduct that occurred prior to a seizure.
Rather, the dissent argued that preventing the reasonableness analysis
from factoring in the pre-seizure conduct artificially limited the cir10 4
cumstances that could be examined.
After concluding that the "objective reasonableness" test should
include an analysis of the police officer's actions prior to the moment
of seizure, the dissent determined that the circuit court erred by issuing a jury instruction that prevented the jury from considering the
officer's pre-seizure actions in their assessment of the reasonableness
of the officer's use of deadly force.10 5 Furthermore, Judge Harrell
opined that the trial court had erred when it granted the motion in
limine and prevented the introduction of certain testimony related to
the Article 26 and self-defense claims. 10 6
Despite his opinion that the trial court erred by not admitting
certain evidence related to the Article 26 and self-defense claims,
Judge Harrell concluded that a police officer is not liable for gross
negligence because he enjoys public official immunity; thus, the
guidelines that proved gross negligence, even if improperly excluded,
would not have aided Richardson in his claim.'0 7 Therefore, Judge
Harrell determined that the exclusion of the guidelines was harmless

100. Id. at 465, 762 A.2d at 63. The court also rejected the plaintiffs Batson challenge,
finding that the failure to make a timely claim caused the challenge to be waived. Id. at
466-67, 762 A.2d at 63-64.
101. Chief Judge Bell joined the dissent except for Part IIID, in which the dissenters
opined that a finding of gross negligence would not "[pierc]e public official immunity,"
and the Batson issue, on which he wrote a separate opinion. Id. at 523-26, 762 A.2d at 95-96
(Bell, C.J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 467, 762 A.2d at 64 (Harrell, J., concurring and dissenting).
103. See id. at 502-03, 762 A.2d at 83-84 (stating that "a standardized time frame or line
of demarcation for considering deadly force reasonableness would be contrary to the spirit
of Graham"). The portion of Judge Harrell's concurrence and dissent prior to the above
conclusion consisted of a review of the procedural and factual history of the case and a
review of previous cases that dealt with the setting of a "time-frame" under the "objective
reasonableness" test set forth in Graham v. Connor.
104. Id. at 501, 762 A.2d at 83.
105. Id. at 503, 762 A.2d at 84.
106. Id. at 509, 517, 762 A.2d at 87, 91.
107. Id. at 523, 762 A.2d at 95. Chief Judge Bell did notjoin in the dissent with regard
to this issue. Id.
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error, which did not prejudice Richardson." °8 Based on his conclusion regarding the assessment of pre-seizure conduct in the reasonableness analysis, Judge Harrell would have reversed the rulings of the
trial court.'0 9
4.

Analysis.-In Richardson, the Court of Appeals concluded that

the acts of a police officer that preceded the actual seizure of an individual could not be used to determine whether that police officer violated the unreasonable seizure portion of Article 26 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights." The court also held that the acts of a police
officer that preceded the actual seizure could not be used to determine whether that police officer was entitled to use a certain amount
of force in self-defense, or whether that police officer's actions were
grossly negligent.1 1' This holding was not completely appropriate.
The court was correct in excluding the pre-seizure actions from the
Article 26 analysis because the pre-seizure actions are not relevant to
the Fourth Amendment and its "objective reasonableness" examination. The Court of Appeals was incorrect, however, in excluding the
pre-seizure actions of the police officer from the analysis of the officer's actions under the common law principles of self-defense and
gross negligence. The pre-seizure actions of a police officer can be
relevant to an examination of an officer's actions under the self-defense and gross negligence tests. Conversely, however, the Court of
Appeals was correct in excluding the particular pre-seizure actions at
issue in Richardson because those actions were not relevant to the examinations under the self-defense and gross negligence principles.
a. Pre-Seizure Actions: Irrelevant to and Excluded by the Fourth
Amendment and its "Objective Reasonableness" Test.-In excluding the

pre-seizure actions of Officer McGriff from the seizure analysis under
Article 26,'12 the Court of Appeals reached an appropriate decision
because the pre-seizure actions of police officers are irrelevant to the
analysis of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
108. Id. Judge Harrell also stated that because he would dispose of the case on the
issues previously addressed, he declined to address the Batson issue. Id. Chief Judge Bell
authored a separate dissent that addressed the Batson issue. Id. at 523-24, 762 A.2d at 95
(Bell, C.J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 509, 517, 762 A.2d at 87, 91 (Harrell, J., concurring and dissenting).
110. Richardson, 361 Md. at 465, 762 A.2d at 63.
111. See id. at 451-53, 465, 762 A.2d at 56, 63 (concluding that the trial court did not err
by excluding pre-seizure actions).
112. Id.
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The United States Supreme Court, which in Graham v. Connorestablished that the Fourth Amendment and its "objective reasonableness" test would govern the assessment of seizures by police officers,
did not explicitly set forth whether pre-seizure actions would be included in this examination.' 1 3 The "objective reasonableness" test articulated by the Supreme Court, however, as many United States
Courts of Appeals have asserted, excludes these actions from the assessment because these actions are irrelevant." 4
First, the Supreme Court, in its discussion of the reasonableness
analysis, indicated that the reasonableness test focuses on "reasonableness at the moment."' 1 5 Reasonableness at the moment implies that
reasonableness is judged at the moment of the seizure, and therefore
should only focus on the actions of the police officer at the moment
of the seizure and should not take into account pre-seizure actions."'
Second, in establishing that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness test would employ an objective perspective, the Supreme Court
articulated that the determination would be made "in light of the facts
and circumstances confronting" the officers."' This language also
seems to contemplate that the "objective reasonableness" examination
would only factor in those "facts and circumstances" that exist at the
moment of a seizure and not any "facts and circumstances" that existed prior to the moment of the seizure." 8 By focusing on the facts
confronted at the moment of the seizure, the Court appears to be
ignoring the pre-seizure actions of the police officer.
In fact, the Graham Court's non-exclusive list of items that should
be factored into the examination did not include any actions of police
officers that would precede a seizure.'
Instead, the Court addressed
only those actions of the seized individuals that should factor into the
113. 490 U.S. 386, 395-97 (1989).
114. See Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that pre-seizure
events are not examined under the Fourth Amendment); Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d
789, 792 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that events prior to the seizure are not relevant and are
inadmissible).
115. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
116. See Greenidge, 927 F.2d at 792 (focusing on the Supreme Court's emphasis in Graham on "reasonableness at the moment" in concluding that the pre-seizure actions of the
officer were not relevant to the examination of the seizure under the "objective reasonableness" test).
117. Grahan, 490 U.S. at 397.
118. See Cole, 993 F.2d at 1333 ("In analyzing the reasonableness of [the] decision to use
deadly force, we examine the information that [was] possessed at the time of [the]
decision.").
119. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
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reasonableness assessment. 12 1 While the failure to mention the preseizure actions of police officers as factors in the reasonableness examination does not definitively mean that the Court intended those acts
to be excluded, it certainly indicates that actions of the seized individual, as opposed to the pre-seizure actions of the officers, was at the
forefront of the Justices' minds. This fact, when combined with the
above-mentioned language in the Graham opinion, would seem to bolster the position of those courts that have focused on the Supreme
Court's use of "at the moment" and "split-second judgment" as reasons for excluding the pre-seizure actions from the reasonableness
examination.1

21

Still, despite the opinion in Graham, there are some courts that
feel that the "objective reasonableness" examination, which takes into
account the totality of the circumstances,1 2 2 must include the preseizure actions of police officers.12 ' The Fourth Amendment itself,
however, counsels against this interpretation. The Fourth Amendment, as courts that have excluded pre-seizure actions realize, "prohibits unreasonable seizures, not unreasonable or ill-advised conduct
in general." 124 Consequently, actions of a police officer that take
place prior to the actual "seizure" are not relevant to, and should not
be included in, an examination of a claim of excessive force during a
seizure, whether it be under the auspice of the Fourth Amendment or
Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
b. Pre-Seizure Actions: Can Be Relevant to the Examination of a
Police Officer's Conduct Under Self-Defense.-In Richardson, the Court of

Appeals determined that the pre-seizure actions of a police officer
should not be included in an examination of a police officer's use of
force under self-defense. 125 The court reasoned that the pre-seizure
actions should not be included in the self-defense examination because the pre-seizure actions are not relevant to the review of a police
officer's conduct under the common law principle of self-defense.12 6
In reaching this determination, however, the court failed to recognize
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Schulz v. Long, 44 F.3d 643, 648 (8th Cir. 1995) (using the Graham language to support the exclusion of the pre-seizure actions).
122. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
123. See, e.g., Deering v. Reich, 183 F.3d 645, 649-50 (7th Cir. 1999).
124. Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Schulz, 44 F.3d at 648.
125. See Richardson, 361 Md. at 465, 762 A.2d at 63.
126. See id. at 453, 762 A.2d at 56 (concluding that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness test also controls the self-defense and gross negligence issues).
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that pre-seizure actions of a police officer may be relevant to the selfdefense analysis.
The potential relevance of the pre-seizure actions of a police officer to the self-defense analysis is derived from the third element of
the self-defense test-"the defendant must not have been the aggressor or provoked the conflict."' 2 7 This element may, in certain situations, permit the introduction of a police officer's conduct antecedent
to the seizure because implicit in this element is the fact that the actions of the accused prior to the critical moment-the moment when
deadly force is used-will have to be investigated. 128 In order to determine whether an individual (viz, a police officer) provoked a conflict that ultimately led to that individual using deadly force, it is
necessary for the fact-finder to examine actions prior to the moment
when the force at issue was used. 129 Consequently, if there is a suggestion that a police officer provoked a conflict that led to a use of force
contemporaneous to a seizure, it is necessary to investigate the of1 30
ficer's actions prior to the seizure.
The Court of Appeals justified the exclusion of pre-seizure actions in the self-defense context by concluding that the self-defense
principle in Maryland requires an "objective reasonableness" examination. 31 According to the majority's rationale, the self-defense test excluded the pre-seizure actions because the Fourth Amendment, which
also applied an "objective reasonableness" test, excluded the preseizure actions.' 32 Using this reasoning was incorrect, however, because in so doing the court was implicitly concluding that the normal
four-part test for self-defense had been replaced solely by an "objective

127. Jones v. State, 357 Md. 408, 422, 745 A.2d 396, 403 (2000).
128. See Street v. State, 26 Md. App. 336, 339-40, 338 A.2d 72, 74 (1975) (looking at the
actions prior to a shooting in determining that the accused was the aggressor in the conflict and could not claim self-defense).
129. See id.
130. See id. The existence of this aggressor element in the self-defense test, while certainly implicating some pre-seizure actions of police officers, does not mean that every preseizure action of a police officer will be relevant to the self-defense analysis. There will be
some pre-seizure actions of a police officer that will have no relation to whether the officer
provoked the conflict, and those actions would not be relevant to the aggressor element or
the self-defense analysis. See infra notes 164-168 and accompanying text (discussing why
the pre-seizure actions in Richardsonwere not relevant to and were properly excluded from
the self-defense analysis).
131. Richardson, 361 Md. at 453, 762 A.2d at 56.
132. See id. at 453-58, 762 A.2d at 56-59 (concluding that the common law of Maryland
would apply an "objective reasonableness" examination and that those courts that had excluded pre-seizure actions from the "objective reasonableness" inquiry were correct).
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reasonableness" examination when the conduct of a police officer is at
issue. 13 3 Contrary to the court's suggestion, this has not occurred.
In reaching the conclusion that a test similar to the Fourth
Amendment's "objective reasonableness" test, instead of the traditional self-defense test, governs the assessment of a police officer's
conduct under self-defense, the Court of Appeals relied upon a statement made by the court in Boyer v. State.' 34 The Richardson majority
focused on the statement in Boyer that a "police officer's conduct
should be judged not by hindsight but should be viewed in light of
how a reasonably prudent officer would respond faced with the same
'
According to the Richardson court, it
difficult emergency situation." 135
was this statement which indicated that the objective reasonableness
examination would serve as the standard by which to assess a police
officer's actions under self-defense.' 36 This statement in Boyer did not
establish such a principle.
First, the statement in Boyerwas made in the context of assessing a
police officer's actions under the common law principle of negligence.137 It was not made in the context of a general discussion of
how to assess a police officer's actions or in a discussion of a police
officer's actions under self-defense. 1 38 Instead, it was articulated solely
within the confines of a negligence discussion, 1 39 and thus should be
limited to that area of law. Second, the statement by the Boyer court
was only intended to guide the trial court in its resolution of the question pertaining to whether the police officer in Boyer breached a duty
of care, 140 and was not intended to replace the methods by which a
police officer's actions would be analyzed under other principles.
The Court of Appeals merely wanted to indicate two things: (1) the
negligence examination should not be based on the end result of the
officer's actions (hindsight),' and (2) the reasonable examination in
the negligence context should be from that of a police officer and not
a normal person because the behavior of police officers and normal
133. See id. at 453, 762 A.2d at 56 (asserting that the "objective reasonableness" standard
was the standard that would govern the analysis of Officer McGriffs actions under selfdefense).
134. Id.
135. Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 589, 594 A.2d 121, 136 (1991).
136. Richardson, 361 Md. at 453, 762 A.2d at 56.
137. Boyer, 323 Md. at 588-91, 594 A.2d at 136-37.
138. See id. (assisting the trial court in determining whether there was a breach of a duty
of care).
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 589, 594 A.2d at 136.
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people are judged according to different standards. 1 42 It does not
seem that the Boyer court would have wanted to assert that the traditional self-defense test was replaced by an objective reasonableness
examination.
Instead, it seems logical to conclude that the examination of a
police officer's actions under the common law principle of self-defense would retain the traditional four-part analytical framework, including both an objective reasonableness and anti-aggressor element.
Such a test implicates and makes relevant certain pre-seizure actions
of a police officer.
c. Pre-Seizure Actions: Can Be Relevant to the Examination of a
Police Officer's Conduct Under Gross Negligence.--In Richardson, the Court

of Appeals also determined that the pre-seizure actions of a police
officer should not be included in an examination of a police officer's
conduct under gross negligence. 14 ' Again, the court asserted that the
examination of a police officer's conduct under gross negligence
should not include the pre-seizure actions of the police officer because the actions of a police officer antecedent to a seizure are not
relevant to the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness"
test.14 4 Similar to the principle of self-defense, and unlike with Article
26, what the court failed to realize in justifying its exclusion of the preseizure actions from the examination in Richardson is that some preseizure actions of a police officer may be relevant to the gross negligence analysis.
While it is true that an analysis of a police officer's actions under
the principle of gross negligence in Maryland employs an "objective
reasonableness" examination, 4 5 the factors and reasons that warrant
the exclusion of the pre-seizure actions of police officers from the
Fourth Amendment examination are not present in the gross negligence context. Thus, there is no reason to conclude that the preseizure actions of police officers are not relevant to the gross negligence analysis of a police officer's actions on the basis that those same
pre-seizure actions are not relevant to, and excluded from, an analysis
of a police officer's use of force under the Fourth Amendment.
142. See id. ("The officer is not to be held to the same coolness and accuracy of judgment of one not involved in an emergency vehicle pursuit.").
143. See Richardson, 361 Md. at 453, 762 A.2d at 56 (concluding that the standard for
assessing a police officer's conduct under the Fourth Amendment-the "objective reasonableness" test-was the same standard that would guide the assessment under the principle
of gross negligence).
144. See id. at 465, 762 A.2d at 63.
145. State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 500, 649 A.2d 336, 348 (1994).
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In the context of the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" test, there are two main factors that warrant the conclusion that
pre-seizure actions are not relevant to the assessment of a use of force
during a seizure. First, the Fourth Amendment only regulates and
pertains to seizures. 14 6 According to the Eighth Circuit, for example,
"The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures, not unreasonable or ill-advised conduct in general. ... Consequently, we scrutinize only the seizure itself, not the events leading to the seizure, for
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment."' 4 7 The second factor
is the formulation of the "objective reasonableness" test in Graham v.
Connor. As the Fourth Circuit indicated in Greenidge v. Ruffin, the use
of language such as "at the moment" and "split-second judgments" in
Graham implies that the pre-seizure events "are not relevant [to]
1 48
and . . . inadmissible" from the "objective reasonableness" test.
Neither of these two factors, however, are relevant to the examination
of a police officer's use of force under the common law principle of
gross negligence even though that principle also applies an "objective
reasonableness" examination.
First, the common law gross negligence principle does not solely
focus on or pertain to the regulation of seizures.' 4 9 The common law
principle of gross negligence instead focuses on all conduct. 5 ° Thus,
because the gross negligence principle, even with its "objective reasonableness" examination, does not focus on or solely regulate seizures,
there is no reason to conclude that pre-seizure actions of police officers should be excluded from that examination based on the exclusion of those actions from a Fourth Amendment inquiry.
Second, the focus of the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" test on those actions contemporaneous with the seizure is not
relevant in the gross negligence context because the gross negligence
test, even in regards to police officers, was not formulated in such a
way as to make irrelevant and excludable the pre-seizure actions of
police officers.' 5 ' Instead, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in defining the gross negligence test, has merely indicated that: (1) allega-

146. See Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993).
147. Id.
148. Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 792 (4th Cir. 1991).
149. See Albrecht, 336 Md. at 500, 649 A.2d at 348 (stating the gross negligence test).
150. See Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 578-80, 594 A.2d 121, 131-32 (1991) (examining
whether there were sufficient facts alleged to establish gross negligence).
151. Compare Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-97 (1989) (establishing the test for
assessing claims that a police officer used excessive force), with Albrecht, 336 Md. at 500, 649
A.2d at 348 (explaining the gross negligence test in the context of examining the actions
of a police officer).
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tions of gross negligence should examine whether the conduct of an
individual deviated so far from that of a reasonably prudent person
that the conduct could be considered wanton and reckless; 152 and (2)
in the context of police, the reasonably prudent person should be a
police officer in similar circumstances.15 3 The Court of Appeals, in
formulating this test, unlike the Supreme Court, has never utilized
restrictive terms like "reasonableness at the moment," which could
and have been interpreted to limit the functional period of review and
thereby exclude pre-seizure actions.15 Instead, the only limitations
placed upon the gross negligence test by the Court of Appeals are
those based on whether an action is wanton and reckless or the legal
cause of a harm. Thus, because the gross negligence test has not been
set-up to exclude pre-seizure actions, there seems to be no reason to
remove those actions from the gross negligence examination based on
the exclusion of those actions from the Fourth Amendment's test.
d. The Pre-Seizure Actions in Richardson Were Not Relevant to
the Self-Defense and Gross Negligence Tests.-While always excluding the
pre-seizure actions of the police officer in Richardson from the selfdefense and gross negligence analysis was incorrect,1 5 5 the exclusion
of the particular pre-seizure actions in Richardson 56 was appropriate.
The exclusion of the particular pre-seizure actions in Richardson was
appropriate because those actions were irrelevant to the examination
of Officer McGriff's actions under either the self-defense or gross negligence tests.' 5 7
In the context of a claim of gross negligence, in order for the preseizure actions of the police officer in Richardson to be relevant, those
actions would have to have made it more probable that Officer McGriff acted in a wanton and reckless manner.1 5 8 The pre-seizure ac152. Albrecht, 336 Md. at 500, 649 A.2d at 348.
153. Id. at 501, 649 A.2d at 349.
154. See, e.g., Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 792 (4th Cir. 1991).
155. See Richardson, 361 Md. at 453, 762 A.2d at 56 (determining that the standard for
assessing a police officer's use of force under self-defense and gross negligence parallels
that of the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" test); id. at 453-58, 762 A.2d at
57-59 (adopting the reasoning of those courts that have precluded the pre-seizure actions
of police officers from the Fourth Amendment examination).
156. Id. at 465, 762 A.2d at 63.
157. In order to be "relevant," a particular piece of evidence must "hav[e] any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." MD. R. EVID. 5401.
158. See MD. R. EVID. 5-401 (defining relevance); State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 500, 649
A.2d 336, 348 (1994) (defining gross negligence).
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Lions in Richardson,15 9 however, did not make this more probable.
The pre-seizure actions-failing to wait for adequate back-up and failing to turn on the kitchen lights1 6 -would not have made the determination of whether Officer McGriff acted in a wanton and reckless
manner more or less probable. The pre-seizure conduct, both by itself and when combined with the actions contemporaneous to the
seizure-firing a gun after opening a closet and seeing a person holding what appeared to be a long, gun-like object 6 '-would not have
been sufficient as a matter of law to find that Officer McGriff acted in
a grossly negligent manner. The pre-seizure conduct would not have
been sufficient to establish gross negligence because those actions,
when compared with the actions of police officers in previous cases,
like in State v. Albrecht, where the Court of Appeals found that that an
officer who pointed a "shotgun fitted with a bandolier" at an "unarmed individual," "with his finger on the trigger' was grossly negligent, 16 2 and Boyer v. State, where the Court of Appeals determined that
an officer engaging in a high speed chase with a suspected drunk
driver was not grossly negligent,1 63 were clearly not wanton and reckless. Consequently, because the Richardson pre-seizure actions would
not have made it more probable that Officer McGriff would have been
found to have acted in a wanton or reckless manner, the pre-seizure
actions in Richardson were not relevant in the gross negligence
context.
Similarly, in order for actions to be relevant in the self-defense
context, those actions would have to have made it more or less probable that one of the four elements in the self-defense test either would
have or would have not been met. 1 64 The pre-seizure actions would
have to have made it more or less probable that: (1) the person who
used deadly force had a reasonable belief in imminent danger of
death at the time he used deadly force; (2) the person who used
deadly force had a subjective belief that he was in immediate danger;
(3) the person who used deadly force was not the aggressor of the
conflict that gave rise to the need to use deadly force; or (4) the force
used was not unreasonable.' 6 5 Given the specific scenario in Richardson, the only pertinent question in determining whether the preseizure actions were relevant is whether the inclusion of the pre159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See Richardson, 361 Md. at 451-52, 762 A.2d at 56 (articulating the issue in the case).
Id. at 444-45, 762 A.2d at 52.
Id. at 444, 762 A.2d at 51-52.
Albrecht, 336 Md. at 505, 649 A.2d at 351.
Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 579-80, 594 A.2d 121, 132 (1991).
See MD. R. EVID. 5-401 (defining relevance).
See State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482, 485-86, 483 A.2d 759, 761 (1984).
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seizure actions would have made it more probable that Officer McGriff provoked the situation that led to the use of deadly force.
Officer McGriffs pre-seizure actions would not be sufficient to
establish that Officer McGriff was the aggressor because, when compared with the actions of individuals in other cases that were sufficient
to establish that that individual was the aggressor, the actions appear
completely benign. In Cunningham v. State,'6 6 for example, the actions that warranted finding that the defendant was the aggressor in
the conflict consisted of the defendant pulling a loaded gun. la 7 In
Richardson, on the other hand, actions allegedly making the officer the
aggressor were failing to wait for back-up and failing to turn on the
kitchen lights. 6 ' When compared with pulling a gun on a potential
victim, these actions clearly are not sufficient to warrant a finding that
the person who undertook those actions provoked the conflict. Instead, it seems logical to conclude that these actions were completely
benign, and therefore irrelevant to not only the aggressor section of
the self-defense examination, but also the self-defense examination as
a whole. This determination, when combined with the lack of relevance of these actions in the gross negligence context, permits the
conclusion that while the Court of Appeals' reasoning was incorrect,
the decision to exclude the pre-seizure actions from the self-defense
and gross negligence examinations was correct.
5. Conclusion.-In Richardson v. McGriff the Court of Appeals of
Maryland affirmed the decision of the circuit court that excluded preseizure actions of police officers from the review of a police officer's
actions under Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, selfdefense, and gross negligence. 16' The court determined that this exclusion of pre-seizure actions was appropriate because pre-seizure actions of police officers are irrelevant to the analysis of a police officer's
use of force under these legal doctrines. 17 In reaching this conclusion, however, the court did not recognize that pre-seizure actions of
officers, while always irrelevant to and excluded from an Article 26
examination, may be relevant to an examination of self-defense and
gross negligence. Consequently, while the Court of Appeals appropriately affirmed the trial court's exclusion of pre-seizure actions from an
Article 26 analysis, the court inappropriately affirmed the trial court's
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
Article

58 Md. App. 249, 473 A.2d 40 (1984).
Id. at 254, 256, 473 A.2d at 42, 44.
Richardson, 361 Md. at 451-52, 762 A.2d at 56.
Id. at 465, 762 A.2d at 63.
See id. at 451-53, 762 A.2d at 56 (analogizing the Fourth Amendment test to the
26, self-defense, and gross negligence tests).
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exclusion of pre-seizure actions from the self-defense and gross negligence analyses. The Court of Appeals should have realized that preseizure actions may be relevant to the self-defense and gross negligence examinations and affirmed the trial court's exclusion of the actions in Richardson on the basis that the particular pre-seizure actions
of the police officer in Richardson were irrelevant to the self-defense
and gross negligence examinations. Had the Court of Appeals followed this course, the court would have not only reached the proper
decision, but also used the proper reasoning.
JASON M. WHITEMA

Recent Decisions
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
I.
A.

CvrVL PROCEDURE

Reaffirming the Effectiveness of TraditionalPersonalJurisdiction
Doctrine in Light of Virtual Contacts

In ChristianScience Board of Directors of the First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Nolan,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the exercise of personal jurisdiction over an Arizona
defendant based on his contributions to a website created and maintained by a North Carolina co-defendant.2 The Fourth Circuit held
that the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant was proper because he had deliberate, specific contacts with the forum state such
that he should have anticipated defending a lawsuit in North Carolina.3 In so holding, the court properly analyzed Nolan's contacts
with North Carolina under traditional personal jurisdiction doctrine,
rather than applying the "sliding scale" analysis introduced in Zippo
Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., under which the permissible
scope of personal jurisdiction "is determined by the level of interactivity and commercial nature" of the defendant's Internet use.4 Moreover, by deciding the case under traditional personal jurisdiction
doctrine, the court demonstrated that the proposed alternatives to asserting personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based on
Internet contacts are unnecessary and unduly burdensome.
1. The Case.-In February 1999, David Nolan, an Arizona resident, founded the University of Christian Science (UCS), an online
university allowing Christian Scientists to study the teachings of the
Church's founder, Mary Baker Eddy, and to exchange ideas about the
organization. 5 Nolan struggled with the technicalities of setting up
1. 259 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2001).
2. Id. at 212.
3. See id. at 216-17.
4. 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
5. Nolan, 259 F.3d at 212-13. In 1872, Mary Baker Eddy founded The First Church of
Christ, Scientist (TFCCS). Id. at 212. TFCCS is a Boston-based, international religious
organization governed by a Board of Directors who supervise and control the Church's
publishing enterprise, The Christian Science Publishing Society. Id. TFCCS distributes
publications and products "which bear federally registered and common law trademarks
owned by the Board." Id.
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the website so, in the spring of 1999, he enlisted the help of David
Robinson, a North Carolina resident.6 Robinson obtained a domain
name for the online university and posted the information supplied to
him by Nolan.7 As the "webmaster" of the site, Robinson was responsible for "physically creat[ing] and maintain [ing] the [web]site," as well
as the billing and the administrative aspects of the enterprise.' Nolan
was responsible for drafting and making decisions regarding the content of the UCS website, but he could not remove the contents of the
website without the assistance of Robinson.9
Throughout the spring of 1999, Nolan and Robinson remained
in constant contact, and Nolan periodically sent revisions of the site's
content to Robinson, which Robinson posted. 0 In addition to other
features, the website contained information about the UCS library,
live chat rooms, a weekly lecture series, video tape productions of seminars, published articles and literary productions on the religion, and
a campus book store that sold items related to Christian Science and
Mary Baker Eddy. 1 '
In July 1999, the Board of Directors of TFCCS (the Board) filed a
trademark infringement suit in the Western District of North Carolina
against Robinson, Nolan, and the two entities with which they were
affiliated, The Roan Mountain Institute of Christian Science and UCS,
respectively.1 2 Despite the fact that Nolan and Robinson are active
Christian Scientists, their beliefs diverge significantly from those advocated by TFCCS.' 3 The Board claimed that the defendants were using
marks belonging to the Board without their permission or marks "confusingly similar thereto" in violation of the Lanham Act.' 4

6. Id. at 213.
7. Id.
8. Id.; see also Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. v. Robinson, 123 F. Supp. 2d 965, 969
(W.D.N.C. 2000).
9. Nolan, 259 F.3d at 213.
10. Id.
11. Robinson, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 974.
12. Nolan, 259 F.3d at 213.
13. Id. at 212.
14. Id. at 213-14 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Lanham Act states that to
establish a trademark infringement claim, the plaintiff must show the defendant's "use in
commerce" of a registered mark "in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000). The Board alleged that the
defendants used the terms "Church of Christ, Scientist" and "Board of Education of the
Church of Christ, Scientist" on the website and in printed materials knowing that the use
of these terms would cause confusion. Nolan, 259 F.3d at 213.

1100

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

61:1098

Complaint and summons were served on Robinson, but the attempts to serve Nolan were unsuccessful.' 5 Because Nolan failed to
respond to the Board's complaint, the Board moved the district court
for an entry of defaultjudgment against Nolan.' 6 OnJuly 6, 2001, the
district court entered an order declaring that Nolan was in violation of
the Lanham Act for infringing on certain registered trademarks and
permanently enjoined him from using the marks." Subsequently, the
Board moved to have Nolan held in contempt for his failure to comply with the injunction order and to cease using the registered trademarks.'" On September 6, 2000, the district court entered another
order, finding that although Nolan received notice of the default
judgment, he continued to violate its terms and provisions by not removing the infringing marks from the website." 9 Nolan was ordered
to appear on September 25, 2000 to show cause why he should not be
adjudged in civil contempt.

20

When Nolan finally appeared before the North Carolina district
court, he argued that the default judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction or for invalid service of process, thereby barring the
order of contempt. 21 The district court rejected both of Nolan's assertions, stating "that no exceptional circumstances were present to justify setting aside the Default Judgment. "22 Nolan immediately
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
and concurrently moved in the district court to stay enforcement of

15. Nolan, 259 F.3d at 213. The Board tried unsuccessfully to notify Nolan by certified
mail. Id. When that failed, the Board enlisted the services of a private investigator to help
locate him. Id. The investigator determined that Nolan was living in Modesto, California,
but the process server was unable to serve Nolan at that location. Id. Finally, the Board
sought to serve Nolan by publication in The Modesto Bee newspaper, which is generally circulated in the area of Modesto. Id. at 213-14. Nolan failed to respond to the publication. Id.
at 214.
16. Id. at 214; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (stating that a judgment by default may be
entered "[w] hen a party against whom ajudgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed
to plead or otherwise defend").
17. Nolan, 259 F.3d at 214.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part:
[T]he court may relieve a party or party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect;... (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged ...or (6) any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
22. Nolan, 259 F.3d at 214 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the injunction pending appeal. 23 At the contempt hearing, the district court considered Nolan's motion for a stay and the Board's motion to find Nolan in contempt of the default judgment.2 4 On
October 4, 2000, the district court ruled in favor of the Board on both
motions.

25

Nolan appealed the district court's contempt order. 6 On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered
whether the district court had a sufficient basis to assert personal jurisdiction over Nolan based on his contacts with North Carolina. 7
2. Legal Backgound.--Personaljurisdiction, originally a territorial-based doctrine, has evolved to permit the assertion of jurisdiction
based on a defendant's minimum contacts with the forum state. 28 Recently, however, the introduction of the Internet has challenged
courts to evenhandedly assert personal jurisdiction. 29 One court's response to the difficulty of assessing contacts over the Internet was to
develop a three-part "sliding scale" to categorize the quality of com-

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. v. Robinson, 123 F. Supp. 2d 965, 976-78 (W.D.N.C.
2000).
26. Nolan, 259 F.3d at 215.
27. Id. The appeal encompassed both the September 22, 2000 order for Rule 60 relief
and the October 4, 2000 rulings on the motion for a stay and motion to find Nolan in
contempt of the defaultjudgment. See id. In addition to the issue of personal jurisdiction,
the Fourth Circuit decided four issues on appeal that will not be discussed at length in this
Note. First, the court determined that Nolan's argument that he was never properly served
was without merit. Id. at 219. According to the court, the steps taken by the Board to
locate and serve Nolan were appropriate under Rule 4(jl) of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure, which sets forth the requirements for effective notice by publication. Id.;
see also N.C. R. Civ. P. 4(jl) (stating that a party that cannot be served by personal delivery
or registered or certified mail may be served by publication). Second, the court was not
persuaded by Nolan's contention that he was entitled to Rule 60(b) relief from the default
judgment. Nolan, 259 F.3d at 219. Third, the court concluded that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Nolan's motion to stay the injunction pending appeal.
Id. Finally, the court, in agreement with the district court, held that even after Nolan
modified the website and included a disclaimer about his affiliation with the Board, the site
still did not comply with the terms of the default judgment, and therefore rendered his
conduct contemptuous. Id.
28. Compare Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) (discussing how the ability of a
court to assert jurisdiction over a party is "restricted by the territorial limits of the State"),
with Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (explaining that a defendant
need not be present in the forum state so long as he has minimum contacts).
29. See Allan R. Stein, The UnexceptionalProblem ofJurisdictionin Cyberspace, 32 INT'L LAW.
1167, 1191 (1998) (stating that cyber-jurisdictional case law suggests some "workable standards by which to measure jurisdiction," but to date "there is [no] ... consistency in the
decisions").
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mercial contacts occurring over the Internet.3° While many courts
have adopted and applied this scale, the results have been inconsistent, illustrating the difficultly of classifying contacts made over the
1
Internet.

3

a. The Development of Contemporary PersonalJurisdiction Doctrine.-Before a court can adjudicate a claim over a nonresident defendant, it must first establish personal jurisdiction over that
defendant to the extent permissible under state law.3 2 The test for a
court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
requires the court to consider the application of both the state's long
arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution."3
Prior to 1945, a court's ability to assert personal jurisdiction over
a defendant depended on that defendant's presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.3 4 However, due to increased interstate
communication and mobility, as well as the rise of the corporation,
the notion of "presence" became difficult to define.35 The Supreme
Court's decision in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington redefined the
notion of "presence" by developing a more flexible test to determine
whether personal jurisdiction exists.3 6 According to the International
Shoe Court, the "capias ad respondendum," or physical arrest of the person, no longer constituted the accepted means of giving notice.3 7 In30. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
31. Compare Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419-20 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a defendant's passive website merely accessible to Arizona residents is not
sufficient to assert personal jurisdiction over him), with TELCO Communications v. An
Apple a Day, 977 F. Supp. 404, 407 (E.D. Va. 1997) (holding that posting allegedly defamatory press releases on the Internet allows a court to exercise jurisdiction).
32. SeeAsahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108 (1987); Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985).
33. See, e.g, Stover v. O'Connell Assocs. Inc., 84 F.3d 132, 134 (4th Cir. 1996); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (stating, in relevant part, "nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). Nearly every state has a
long-arm statute that authorizes its courts to exercise jurisdiction over non-resident defendants based on a defendant's contacts with the forum state. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
Jun. PROC. § 6-103 (1998).
34. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) ("The authority of every tribunal is
necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.").
35. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) ("As technological progress has
increased the flow of commerce between States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase."); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 31619 (1945) (discussing the criteria by which a court determines that a corporation has subjected itself to a lawsuit in a particular state).
36. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17.
37. Id. at 316.
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stead, the Court made it constitutionally permissible for a court to
assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant so long as he maintained
certain "minimum contacts" with the state, such that the maintenance
of the suit did not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

38

The Court determined that the minimum contacts test is satisfied
when there are "continuous and systematic" contacts with the state
that give rise to the lawsuit.39 On the other hand, the minimum contacts test is not met via "casual presence" or isolated activities for suits
unrelated to the contacts. 4 ° Finally, the Court stated that there are
some contacts that "because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of their commission, may be deemed sufficient to render
the [defendant] liable to suit."4 1 Thus, the InternationalShoe Court
created a test that was not solely dependant on the defendant's physical presence within the forum state, but rather considered the defendant's contacts with the forum state.
Several courts in the post-InternationalShoe era have further developed the minimum contacts doctrine and provided additional methods of gauging whether these minimum contacts exist. For example,
in McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co.,42 the Supreme Court held
that California's jurisdiction over a Texas based insurance company
was proper even though the only contact the insurance company had
with California was mailed correspondence. 43 The Court determined
that there was a "substantial connection" between the defendant insurance company and the forum state, and that California had a
strong interest in protecting its citizens who could be severely disadvantaged if they had to "follow the insurance company to a distant
State in order to hold it legally accountable."4 4
In Hanson v. Denckla,45 the Supreme Court further elaborated on
the requirements needed to establish minimum contacts for purposes
of asserting personal jurisdiction.4 6 In Hanson, the Court held that a
Delaware trustee's contacts with Florida were insufficient to warrant
the exercise of personal jurisdiction because the trustee had no office
in Florida and did not transact any business there; therefore, the
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. (quoting, in part, Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
Id. at 317.
Id.
Id. at 318.
355 U.S. 220 (1957).
Id. at 223.
Id.
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
See id. at 251-53.
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cause of action could not be said to have arisen out of the business
done in Florida.4 7 Despite the fact that the potential heirs to the trust
resided in Florida, the Court noted that the more "flexible" requirements for jurisdiction set forth by the InternationalShoe Court did not
signify the "demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of
state courts," and emphasized that despite the ease of defending in
the forum state, the defendant cannot be called upon to do so unless
he has the requisite minimum contacts with that state. 48 The Court
also noted that when assessing the nonresident defendant's contacts
with the forum state, "it is essential in each case that there be some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails [him]self of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."4
In Calder v. Jones,5 the Supreme Court established another
method for evaluating the existence of minimum contacts. The Calder
Court analyzed personal jurisdiction based on the effects of the defendant's tortious conduct in the forum state rather than on his physical
presence within that state. 5 ' In Calder, the plaintiff brought suit in
47. Id. at 251.
48. Id. at 251, 254.
49. Id. at 253. Case law is conflicting surrounding the "purposeful availment" inquiry.
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). The Asahi Court split on
the issue of whether placing a product into the stream of commerce with knowledge that it
would reach the forum state constituted minimum contacts. Id. at 105. Justice O'Connor,
who was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell and Scalia in Part II-A, suggested that some additional activity was necessary to constitute minimum contacts, and the
"placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State." Id. at 112 (plurality opinion).
justice Brennan disagreed, stating that "[a]s long as a participant in this process is aware
that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit
there cannot come as a surprise." Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)
(stating that the "purposeful availment requirement ensures that a defendant will not be
haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
50. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
51. See id. at 789. It is this analysis that subsequent courts have termed the Calder "effects test." See IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 261 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding
that the plaintiff could not rely on the Calder effects test to assert specific jurisdiction over
the defendant). This test has been clarified to require the plaintiff to establish that
(1) the defendant committed an intentional tort;
(2) the plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm in the forum such that the forum can
be said to be the focal point of the harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of that
tort;
(3) the defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the forum such that the
forum can be said to be the focal point of the tortious activity.
Id. at 265-66 (footnote omitted). When Calder was decided in 1984, the Internet was not
yet a foreseeable phenomenon, but this has not stopped courts from analyzing the "effects
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California, claiming that she had been libeled in an article written and
edited by the defendants in Florida. 5 2 The defendants argued that
"they [were] not responsible for the circulation of the article in California," but the Court determined that the defendants' actions were
intentional and that they had knowledge of the "potentially devastating impact upon [the plaintiff]" in California:
Other forms of classification have developed to help reconcile
the doctrine of personal jurisdiction in addition to tests that determine whether a defendant has the requisite minimum contacts within
the forum state. Today, courts classify personal jurisdiction as either
"general" or "specific," and the constitutional limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction differ depending on which type of jurisdiction the
court seeks to assert. 54 The basic distinction between general and specific jurisdiction centers around whether the contested claim arises
out of or is related to the defendant's contacts with the forum.5 5 If

the claim and the defendant's contacts are unrelated, then the court
exercises general personal jurisdiction.56 If57they are related, then the
exercise of personal jurisdiction is specific.
Courts have adopted a three-part analysis to determine whether
to exert specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. "
First, the defendant must have sufficient "minimum contacts" with the
forum state in which the defendant purposefully availed himself of the
privilege of doing business in the forum state. 59 Second, the claim
asserted against the defendant must arise out of those contacts.' Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction must be fair."' The "fairness" inquiry
test" in the context of the Internet. See, e.g., Amway Corp. v.Procter & Gamble Co., No.
1:98-CV-726, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 372, at *13-16 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2000) (using the
effects test and finding that an intentional tort was committed when the respondent posted
defamatory information about petitioner on a website).
52. Calder,465 U.S. at 784. "The article was published in a national magazine with a
large circulation in California." Id.
53. Id. at 789.
54. See Helic6pteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8-9
(1984) (explaining the distinction between specific and general jurisdiction). See generally
Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. TrautmanJuisdictionto Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis,
79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1136-63 (1966). Professors von Mehren and Trautman were the
first to articulate the distinction between specific and general jurisdiction. See id.
55. See Helic6pteros, 466 U.S. at 414 nn.8-9.
56. Id. at 414 n.9.
57. Id. at 414 n.8.
Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1221-22 (3d
58. See, e.g.,
Cir. 1992).
59. Id. at 1221.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1222.
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ensures that the defendant is not subject to unjust or inconvenient
litigation.6 2 In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,6" the Supreme
Court delineated five factors implicit in the fairness inquiry:
[T]he burden on the defendant... ; the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute ... ; the plaintiffs interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief... ; the interstate
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several
States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies ....64
The Supreme Court indicated the potential value of the fairness
analysis in Burger King v. Rudzewicz65 when it stated that "[the fairness]
considerations sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required."6 6 The Court elaborated by stating that a
defendant who objects to jurisdiction, but "who purposefully directed
his activities at forum residents," will bear the burden of presenting a
compelling case that the assertion of jurisdiction would be
67
unreasonable.
Due to technological advancements and the increase in interstate
travel, the ability to assert personal jurisdiction over nonresidents has
evolved from a territorial-based inquiry to one that considers both the
defendant's efforts and intentions as well as the reasonableness of requiring a party to defend in a foreign jurisdiction. Despite this adaptability, courts have not been entirely consistent with their response to
the uncertain territory of the Internet.
b. The Effect of the Internet on the Assertion of PersonalJurisdiction.-The bulk of personal jurisdiction disputes relating to the Internet did not arise until the mid to late 1990s.6" Since that time,
courts have inconsistently asserted personal jurisdiction over defendants whose only contacts with the forum state are via Internet use.

62. See id.
63. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
64. Id. at 292 (citations omitted).
65. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
66. Id. at 477.
67. Id.
68. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (W.D. Pa.
1997) ("[T]he development of the law concerning the permissible scope of personal jurisdiction based on Internet use is in its infant stages. The cases are scant.").
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(1) Early Internet Cases.-In early Internet cases, courts
inconsistently asserted personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants based on the defendant's virtual contacts with the forum state. In
Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc.,69 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri considered the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a California defendant who operated a website on the
Internet that was accessible to citizens in Missouri as well as all over
the world.7" The defendant's website merely provided information
about CyberGold's upcoming service, yet the court upheld jurisdiction because the "contacts [were] of such a quality and nature, albeit a
very new quality and nature for personal jurisdiction jurisprudence,
that they favor the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant."7 1
Similarly, in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 72 the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut upheld jurisdiction over a Massachusetts corporation based on the corporation's Internet advertising. 73 The court found that advertising the
corporation's activities as well as a toll-free number over the Internet
was the equivalent of purposefully availing itself of the privilege of
doing business within Connecticut; therefore, the Massachusetts corporation could reasonably anticipate the possibility of being haled
into court in Connecticut.74 The court, concerned about the breadth

of the Internet, distinguished Internet advertising from other forms of
advertising, stating that "[u] nlike television and radio .. .or newspapers . .. advertisements over the Internet are available to Internet
75

users continually."
However, in 1996, on facts nearly identical to those of Inset Systems, Inc., Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King 6 held that a Missouri jazz
club owner did not purposefully avail himself of the benefits of New
York law by posting a passive website on the Internet providing general information about the club and a telephone number.77 The
court stated that there was no evidence that the defendant desired to

69. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
70. Id. at 1330.
71. Id. at 1333. CyberGold's upcoming service included maintaining a mailing list of
Internet users, some of whom were possibly Missouri residents. Id. at 1330.
72. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
73. Id. at 165.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 163.
76. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), afjfd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
77. Id. at 301.

1108

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

61:1098

attract New York residents to his website, nor did he conduct any business in New York.78
TELCO Communications v. An Apple a Day7 9 further illustrates
courts' disagreement about the relationship between the Internet and
personal jurisdiction. In TELCO, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia adopted the analysis of the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut in Inset Systems,
Inc., holding that a Virginia court could assert personal jurisdiction
over a defendant who simply posted two press releases over the Internet allegedly defaming the plaintiff.8" The court in TELCO specifically rejected the Second Circuit's decision in Bensusan, indicating the
divergence among courts over what virtual contacts allow the assertion
of personal jurisdiction.8"
(2) The Introduction of the Zippo "SlidingScale" and Courts'
Disagreement Over How to Apply It.-In 1997, the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania decided Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc.82 The Pennsylvania corporation,
Zippo Manufacturing Company (Manufacturing), brought an action
against California-based Zippo Dot Coin (Dot Coin), alleging trademark dilution, infringement, and false designation." Manufacturing
objected to Dot Com's use of the word "Zippo" in their domain name
and in numerous other places on the website.8 4
Recognizing the world-wide breadth of the Internet, the district
court concluded that "the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be
constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and
quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet. ''8 5 The court then formulated a "sliding scale," consistent with
established personal jurisdiction principles, to categorize Internet
contacts. 86 At one end of the scale are "situations where the defen78. Id. The district court expressly adopted Justice O'Connor's "stream of commerce"
argument from Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion), by stating that "[c]reating a site, like placing a product into the stream of

commerce, may be felt nationwide-or even worldwide-but, without more, it is not an act
purposefully directed toward the forum state." Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301.
79. 977 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. 1997).
80. Id. at 406-08.
81. See id. at 406.
82. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
83. Id. at 1121.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1124.
86. Id.

2002]

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

1109

dant clearly does business over the Internet."87 According to the
court, entering into contracts with residents in foreign jurisdictions
and repeatedly transmitting computer files would constitute "doing
business," and therefore would be an appropriate occasion to assert
personal jurisdiction."8 The other end of the Zippo sliding scale are
situations when the defendant simply posts information on a website.8 9 According to the Zippo court, these "passive" websites are not
grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction because they do "little more than make information available to those who are interested
in it."9 Finally, the court identified the scale's middle ground, which
consists of interactive websites that allow users to exchange information with each other.9 According to the court, the exercise of jurisdiction in the middle group of Internet personal jurisdiction cases is
determined by "examining the level of interactivity and commercial
nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site
[between the user and the host computer] .92
After Zippo, many courts implemented the "sliding scale" in an
effort to make sense of the emerging group of Internet cases involving
personal jurisdiction issues.9 3 Despite the helpfulness of viewing Internet personal jurisdiction cases along a spectrum, courts' applications of the "sliding scale" have produced widely different
conclusions. This inconsistency results from the Zippo court's failure
to define what constitutes "interactive" and "passive" web sites.9 4 For
example, courts have disagreed over the definition of a "passive" website and whether a passive website constitutes purposeful availment toward a particular forum so as to justify the exercise of personal
jurisdiction.9 5 Some courts, like the district court in TELCO, held that

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. Wilkins, 142 F. Supp. 2d 703, 708 (D. Md. 2001); AlitaliaLinee Aeree Italiane v. Casinoalitalia.com, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340, 349-50 (E.D. Va. 2001).
94. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124; see also Veronica M. Sanchez, Comment, Taking a
Byte out of Minimum Contacts: A Reasonable Exercise of PersonalJurisdictionin Cyberspace Trademark Disputes, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1671, 1687 (1999) (stating that the Zippo court's categorization is not always helpful because the second and third scenarios, the passive and the
interactive websites, "are not as clear as the court makes them out to be").
95. Compare TELCO Communications v. An Apple a Day, 977 F. Supp. 404, 407 (E.D.
Va. 1997) (holding that the defendant's passive website posting allegedly defamatory press
releases rises to the level of doing business in the State of Virginia), with ALS Scan, 142 F.
Supp. 2d at 708-09 (holding that the defendant's website was passive and therefore not
sufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant).
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a passive website does meet the requirements for personal jurisdiction
because continuously advertising over the Internet constitutes a "persistent course of conduct" that "rise [s] to the level of regularly doing
or soliciting business." 6 However, other courts, adopting the Zippo
line of reasoning, decline to assert jurisdiction over a site that is essentially passive in nature.9"
In addition to the disagreement about what constitutes a passive
website under the Zippo analysis, there is also concern that the Zippo
analysis is underinclusive. In ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, L.L.C.,9s
the court explained that in addition to categorizing a website as interactive or passive, the "critical issue for the court to analyze is the nature and quality of commercial activity actually conducted by an entity
over the Internet in the forum state."9' 9 Applying this consideration,
the court declined to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant because of the lack of commercial activity conducted over the defendant's website.1t ° Notwithstanding the concerns that at least one
court has expressed about the vagueness of the Zippo sliding scale,
many circuits have expressly followed the Zippo line of reasoning.
(3) The Circuits' Reaction to Zippo.-After Zippo, the
United States Courts of Appeals have considered seven personal jurisdiction cases where contact with the forum state occurred over the
Internet. Three of these decisions expressly follow the reasoning in
Zippo.
In 1997, the Ninth Circuit decided Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell,
Inc.,1" 1 in which it expressly adopted the Zippo court's reasoning that
the constitutionality of exercising personal jurisdiction based on Internet contacts is "proportionate to the nature and quality of the commercial activity that an entity conducts." ' 2 In Cybersell, the plaintiff
alleged that certain marks on the defendant's website providing mar-

96. TELCO, 977 F. Supp. at 407; see also Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 5
(D.D.C. 1996) (implying in dicta that a toll-free phone number included in a website may
represent the type of electronic contacts that are sufficient to exercise personal
jurisdiction).
97. See, e.g., Virtuality L.L.C. v. BATA Ltd., 138 F. Supp. 2d 677, 684 (D. Md. 2001);
Amberson Holdings, L.L.C. v. Westside Story Newspaper, 110 F. Supp. 2d 332, 336-37
(D.N.J. 2000).
98. 34 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D.S.C. 1999).
99. Id. at 330-31.
100. Id. at 331.
101. 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
102. Id. at 419 (quoting Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124
(W.D. Pa. 1997)).
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keting and advertising services constituted trademark infringement. 10 3
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the website was "essentially passive"
because the defendant did not engage in any commercial activity with
the residents of the forum state; thus, the defendant had not purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum
state. 10 4 As a result, the court held10 that
personal jurisdiction could
5
not be asserted over the defendant.
One year after its decision in Cybersell, the Ninth Circuit decided
PanavisionInternational,L.P. v. Toeppen,' 6 holding that the defendant
was subject to the court's jurisdiction because his acts occurring in
cyberspace were "aimed at [the plaintiff] in [the forum state] and
caused it to suffer injury there." °7 The defendant claimed that any
contact he had with California, the forum state, was insignificant because it was based on the registration of a domain name, which he did
in Illinois.10 8 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, but rather
than use the Zippo "sliding scale" analysis, the court applied the "effects test" to determine that the assertion of personal jurisdiction was
proper and that the defendant should have anticipated being haled
into court in California. 10 9 The court also noted that the effects doctrine "was not applicable in [its] Cybersell case."1 1
In 1999, the Fifth Circuit decided Mink v. AAAA Development,
L.L.C., "' in which it determined that the defendant's website advertisements, which included information about the defendant's services,
mail-in order forms, a telephone number, a mailing address, and an email address, did not provide sufficient justification for asserting personal jurisdiction.' 1 2 The lack of business conducted by the defendant over the Internet persuaded the court to categorize the site on
the "passive" end of the Zippo spectrum, which the court concluded "is
not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction."1 1' 3
The Tenth Circuit indicated its approval of the Zippo "sliding
scale" when it decided Soma Medical Internationalv. Standard Chartered
103. Id. at 415-16.
104. Id. at 419-20.
105. Id. at 420; see also 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (citing Cybersell for the proposition that passive websites are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction and thereby adopting the logic of Zippo).
106. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
107. Id. at 1318.
108. Id. at 1322.
109. Id. at 1322-24.
110. Id. at 1321.
111. 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999).
112. Id. at 337.
113. Id. at 336-37.
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Bank."4 In Soma, the Tenth Circuit found that the defendant's passive website, which "merely provided information to interested viewers," was insufficient to assert personal jurisdiction because it did not
constitute purposeful availment." 5
In 2000, the Tenth Circuit faced another case involving the exercise of personal jurisdiction based on virtual contacts, Intercon, Inc. v.
Bell Atlantic Internet Solutions, Inc." 6 Here, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a Delaware defendant was proper because the defendant continuously routed emails through an Oklahoma mail server, even after he was put on notice that his actions were unauthorized." 7 The court likened the scenario to the portion of the Zippo "sliding scale" where the defendant
enters into contracts with the forum state via transmission of computer files.

1 18

The District of Columbia Circuit, on the other hand, decided a
case involving personal jurisdiction and the Internet without mentioning the Zippo sliding scale. In GTE New Media Services Inc. v. BellSouth
Corp., 9 the court found that it could not assert personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant based solely on the ability of D.C. "residents to access the defendants' websites."' 2 ° The plaintiff alleged
that the defendant "transact[e] d business" in the District of Columbia
when the defendants' Yellow Pages website was accessed by D.C. residents."' The D.C. Circuit likened the ability to access a Yellow
Pages website to searching a telephone book, which, according to the
court, did not constitute a business transaction. 122 The D.C. Circuit
found that the advent of technology should not "vitiate long-held and
1 23
inviolate principles of federal court jurisdiction."
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In ChristianScience Board of Directors of
the First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Nolan, the Fourth Circuit held that
114. 196 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1999).
115. Id. at 1299.
116. 205 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2000).
117. Id. at 124748.
118. Jd. at 1248.
119. 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
120. Id. at 1349. The court rejected the plaintiffs theory that "mere accessibility" of a
website establishes the requisite minimum contacts for asserting personal jurisdiction. Id.
at 1349-50. Furthermore, the court noted that if it applied this theory, "personal jurisdiction in Internet-related cases would almost always be found in any forum in the country."
Id. at 1350.
121. Id. at 1350.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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a North Carolina court could exercise personal jurisdiction over an
Arizona defendant based on the defendant's contributions to a website created and maintained in North Carolina."2 4
Judge King, writing for the court, 1 25 set forth the two conditions
that must be satisfied before a court can validly assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. "First, the exercise of jurisdiction must be authorized by the long-arm statute of the forum state,
and, second, [it] must also comport with Fourteenth Amendment due
process requirements."' 126 The court recognized that like many other
states, North Carolina's long-arm statute is interpreted to extend jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the full extent permitted by
the Due Process Clause. 1 27 Therefore, the court concluded that the
"dual jurisdictional requirements collapse into a single inquiry as to
whether the defendant has such 'minimal contacts' with the forum
state that maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.' "128
The court next considered whether Nolan could be subjected to
general or specific jurisdiction.' 29 Agreeing with the district court,
Judge King observed that Nolan was "not engaged in such 'substantial'
or 'continuous and systematic' activities in North Carolina to subject
[himself] to the district court's general jurisdiction."' 3 ° Rather, the
court concluded that the analysis should be based "on whether the
Board's trademark infringement suit sufficiently ar[ose] from, or relate[d] to, Nolan['s] . . . contacts with North Carolina to support the
exercise of specific jurisdiction."''
The court analyzed the appropriateness of exercising specific jurisdiction considering the factors discussed by the Supreme Court in
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz.' 3 2 With respect to the first factor, the
extent to which a defendant purposefully avails himself of the privi-

124. Nolan, 259 F.3d at 212.
125. Id. Judges Williams and Traxler joined in Judge King's opinion. Id.
126. Id. at 215.
127. Id. (citing Century Data Sys., Inc. v. McDonald, 428 S.E.2d 190, 191 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993)).
128. Nolan, 259 F.3d at 215 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945)).
129. See id. at 215-16.
130. Id. at 215 (citation omitted).

131. Id. at 215-16.
132. Id. at 216. The Court in Burger Kingstated that the important factors for consideration are to what extent the defendant "purposefully availed" himself of the privileges of
conducting activities in the forum state, whether the plaintiff's claims arose out of the
defendant's activities, and whether the exercise ofjurisdiction was reasonable. See Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-77 (1985).
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leges of conducting activity in the forum state, the court concluded
that Nolan's contact with North Carolina was deliberate; therefore, he
"purposefully availed [himself] of the privileges of conducting activity
in [the state] .

.""' Nolan insisted that he "passively" accepted
*.".

Robinson's offer to develop and maintain the website, but the court
found that Nolan knew his actions would affect residents in North
Carolina and rejected his contention that 13a4 defendant must initiate
the relevant contacts with the forum state.
The second factor the court examined to determine whether the
exercise of specific jurisdiction was appropriate focused on whether
5
the Board's claims arose out of Nolan's activities in North Carolina.1
The Fourth Circuit, in agreement with the district court, concluded
that the material transmitted by Nolan "formed the basis for the alleged infringement" in North Carolina, thereby satisfying the second
factor.' 3 6
The third factor the court examined was whether the exercise of
jurisdiction was constitutionally reasonable.' 3 7 Characterizing the issue of constitutional reasonableness as a "somewhat nebulous concept," the court confidently concluded that the district court's
assertion of personal jurisdiction over Nolan did not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." ' 8 The court then
evaluated "the burden on the defendant, the forum State's interest in
adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."' 3 9 In addition to recognizing North Carolina's interest
in adjudicating the suit and deterring trademark infringement within
its borders, the court stated that the inconvenience for Nolan to de140
fend the suit in North Carolina was not violative of due process.
Rather, the court felt that North Carolina was a "relatively sensible"
location in terms of promoting judicial efficiency, and thought that
the Board's decision to bring the suit in North Carolina instead of in
its home state of Massachusetts was reasonable because it imposed no
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Nolan, 259 F.3d at 217 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 216-17.
Id. at 216.
Id.
Id. at 217.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985)).
Id. at 217-18.
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additional burden on Nolan and at the same time reduced the burden
41
on his co-defendant Robinson.1
Finally, the court disagreed with Nolan's reliance on the "sliding
scale" test discussed in Zippo.' 42 The Fourth Circuit recognized that
exercising jurisdiction over a defendant whose only contact with the
forum state consists of a website accessible by residents of the forum
state is a debated issue among courts. 4 3 However, the court avoided
the controversy because, unlike other cases where the defendant's
only contacts with the forum state came from a website accessible to
the forum's residents, Nolan had specific contacts with North Carolina, which provided an independent basis for personal jurisdiction.'4 4
The court stressed that it was Nolan's periodic revisions to the website's contents, rather than the accessibility of the website in North
Carolina, that served as the basis for its holding, and explained that it
would be much more hesitant to allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Nolan if the Board had brought the suit in a forum other
14 5
than North Carolina.
4. Analysis.-In Nolan, the Fourth Circuit properly upheld the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant based on traditional personal jurisdiction doctrine, rather than on the application of
the Zippo sliding scale. 14 6 Although some commentators argue that
the advent of the Internet requires the traditional, territorial-based
due process doctrine to be reevaluated, 147 the Nolan court's decision
reaffirms not only the relevance of traditional personal jurisdiction
doctrine in the modern age, but also the notion that not every personal jurisdiction case involving virtual contacts necessitates the appli14
cation of the Zippo "sliding scale."' 1
a. It Was Appropriatefor the Fourth Circuit to Analyze Nolan in
Terms of Classic PersonalJurisdictionDoctrine and not the Zippo "Sliding

141. Id.
142. Id. at 218.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 218 n.1l.
146. Id. at 216-18.
147. See, e.g., Susan Nauss Exon, A New Shoe is Needed to Walk Through CyberspaceJurisdiction, 11 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 1, 48-55 (2000) (describing alternatives to analyze personal
jurisdiction cases involving the Internet that would yield more consistent results).
148. See Nolan, 259 F.3d at 215 (explaining that the issue can be adequately addressed by
simply examining whether Nolan had specific contacts with North Carolina such that
maintaining the suit would not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice").
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Scale. "-The Fourth Circuit prudently focused the personal jurisdiction debate on the substance and direction of the defendant's contacts with North Carolina, rather than on the medium by which they
occurred. Although it was unclear whether the website was directed at
North Carolina residents, the court in Nolan determined that North
Carolina had an interest in adjudicating the dispute, 4 9 Nolan was in
contact with North Carolina when he sent periodic revisions to Robinson via e-mail to be uploaded onto the website.' 5 ° Therefore, as the
Fourth Circuit recognized, in addition to the website, Nolan had specific contacts with North Carolina satisfying the first prong of the personal jurisdiction analysis. 151 Furthermore, the assertion of
jurisdiction was fair. According to the court, "North Carolina's interest in deterring trademark infringement is implicated by the postings
of allegedly infringing materials by a North Carolina resident to a website accessible through a North Carolina-based domain."' 52 In addition to considering North Carolina's interest in the suit, the court also
53
contemplated the ability of Nolan to defend in North Carolina.
The court held that although defending in North Carolina was not
the best alternative for Nolan, "the inconvenience was not so grave as
to offend constitutional due process principles."' 154 Thus, the court
did not have to go through an inquiry especially designed for Internet
cases because Nolan's virtual contacts lended themselves to a traditional personal jurisdiction analysis.
Because courts have traditionally tested contacts with the forum
state in terms of physical boundaries, some commentators argue that
the Internet's absence of physical boundaries requires the advent of a
new doctrine to assist in classifying the appropriateness of asserting
jurisdiction. 15 5 Nolan indicates, however, that there are instances
where virtual contacts can be analyzed as specific contacts as well, thus
permitting the application of traditional personal jurisdiction doctrine. Similar to Nolan, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Panavisionillustrates the point that the existence of virtual contacts does not
preclude the application of personal jurisdiction doctrine. In Panavision, the defendant claimed that he had no physical or specific contact
149. Id. at 218 & n.10. The Fourth Circuit explained that the district court suggested
that the Nolan defendants "targeted" North Carolina by using a website accessible through
a North Carolina domain. Id. at 218 n.10.
150. Id. at 213.
151. Id. at 218.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 217-18.
154. Id. at 217.
155. See Exon, supra note 147, at 48-55.
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with the forum state of California when he registered the plaintiffs
trademarks on the Internet and posted them on a website. 1 56 However, the Ninth Circuit concluded his acts were aimed at California,
and thus he was subject to personal jurisdiction by way of the "effects
test. ' 157 By focusing on the effects of the contacts rather than on their
virtual nature, the Ninth Circuit prudently analyzed the defendant's
contacts with California under a traditional model of personal jurisdiction. Like Nolan, Panavisionillustrates that the existence of virtual
contacts between parties does not necessitate a unique personal jurisdiction analysis. Rather, the traditional inquiry that encompasses the
"effects test" is sufficient.
b. Although Inapplicablein Nolan, the Zippo "SlidingScale" Provides a Useful Analysis.-In Nolan, the Fourth Circuit recognized the
significance of the sliding scale of interactivity set forth in Zippo, but
appropriately declined to apply the Zippo analysis because Nolan was
subject to personal jurisdiction based on his specific contacts with
North Carolina. 158 Although the court in Nolan declined to apply the
Zippo spectrum analysis, the three-part inquiry, in certain Internet-use
personal jurisdiction cases, is still valuable.
When the nonresident defendant's sole contacts with the forum
state arise from a website accessible by residents of the forum, the

Zippo sliding scale is a useful jumping off point for the courts. 1 59 Without specific, non-virtual contacts or apparent intentional behavior, the
Zippo analysis facilitates the classification of a passive website not worthy of personal jurisdiction versus an interactive website where the defendant should be subject to jurisdiction.
The Christian Science Board of Directors essentially sidestepped

the Zippo analysis by bringing the dispute in North Carolina, rather
than in its home state of Massachusetts. 6 ° If the claim was brought in
Massachusetts, the Zippo analysis would have been useful because the

156. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998).
157. Id. at 1321-22.
158. Nolan, 259 F.3d at 218. According to the court, the Zippo analysis was irrelevant to
the inquiry because in addition to the website, Nolan had specific contacts with North
Carolina sufficient to subject him to personal jurisdiction. Id. The Fourth Circuit admitted it has not addressed the Zippojurisdictional dilemma, but it did note the importance of
the inquiry. See id.
159. See, e.g.,Jeffers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 913, 923 (S.D. W. Va. 2001)
(holding that the defendant's website was passive in nature and thus fell at the bottom of
the Zippo scale of interactivity).
160. See Nolan, 259 F.3d at 218 n.1 1 ("Had the Board brought suit in another, unrelated
forum-South Carolina, for instance-we would be more hesitant to allow the exercise of
personal jurisdiction ....").
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sole basis for jurisdiction would have been the defendant's website.
The only contact that Nolan would have had with the forum state of
Massachusetts would have been his website, accessible by Massachusetts residents. In the future, if the Fourth Circuit faces a situation
where the sole basis for jurisdiction arises from an informational website, like the one designed by Nolan and Robinson, Zippo would be a
useful guidepost upon which to judge the virtual contacts.
c. Why Classic PersonalJurisdiction Is Still Applicable in Internet
Cases.-The requirement of personal jurisdiction is an attempt to mediate the conflict between the interests of the forum state and the
interests of the defendant.1 6 ' The defendant's interest in the adjudication has historically centered around the burden of defending in
the forum state.' 6 2 On the other hand, the state's interest has centered around whether the harm complained of occurred within state
borders. 1 63 Therefore, while convenience has traditionally been a
proxy for the defendant's interest in a nonresident dispute, territorial
boundaries have been the proxy for the state's interest. Because it has
no physical boundaries, the Internet has essentially displaced the territorial proxy for the state. 16 4 However, an even more fundamental
state interest remains. At the heart of every dispute lies the state's
interest in protecting its citizens and presiding over the litigation that
is brought before its courts. 6 5 The rise of the Internet, therefore,
does not preclude the inquiry as to whether the complained of activity
has implicated a state's interest, and thus does not preclude the application of traditional personal jurisdiction doctrine.
5. Conclusion.-In Nolan, the Fourth Circuit appropriately applied traditional personal jurisdiction doctrine to a case involving vir161. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (stating
that the requirement of minimum contacts protects defendants from litigating in an inconvenient forum and ensures that the states "do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on
them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system").
162. See id. at 292 (stating that the burden on the defendant is "always a primary
concern").
163. See Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (stating that a defendant's
"presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was a prerequisite to its rendition of
a judgment personally binding him"); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) (stating
that the "authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the
State in which it is established").
164. See generally David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
165. See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292 (listing the forum state's interest in adjudicating the
dispute as one of the factors to consider in determining the reasonableness of the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over a defendant).
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tual contacts. The court determined that the Zippo analysis was
unnecessary because Nolan had specific contacts with North Carolina
such that traditional personal jurisdiction could be asserted without
offending due process.1 66 The Zippo sliding scale is helpful when the
defendant's sole contact with the forum state is by way of the Internet,
but that was not the situation in Nolan. Therefore, by focusing on
Nolan's specific contacts with North Carolina rather than on his website's virtual contacts, the Fourth Circuit illustrated the resilience of
classic personal jurisdiction doctrine in the age of the Internet.
MEGAN

166. See Nolan, 259 F.3d at 218.

K.

GREENE

II.

A.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

One Step Backward: The Loss of a "Totality of the Circumstances"
Approach in the Fourth Circuit's State Action Analysis

In Mentavlos v. Anderson,' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit considered whether two upperclass students at The
Citadel, a state-supported military college in South Carolina, acted
under color of state law for purposes of a sexual harassment and discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 The plaintiff, Jeannie
Mentavlos, a female freshman, alleged that the actions of two upperclass male students forced her to withdraw from the college.' Analyzing the upperclass students' actions under the tests for state action
promulgated by the United States Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina and concluded that the students' private actions were not "fairly attributable" to the State of South Carolina.'
Wbhile the court in Mentavlos arrived at the correct decision, its analysis
reflects a subtle retreat in the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the
state action doctrine. Prior to Mentavlos, the Fourth Circuit adhered
to a totality of the circumstances analysis for determining state action.5 However, the Mentavlos court returned to a more rigid and formalistic approach, applying the facts of Mentavlos's case to a series of
isolated tests. Although not explicitly rejecting the totality of the circumstances approach, the Mentavlos court's emphasis on individual,
formal tests marks an effective regression from the totality of the circumstances approach and runs contrary to the holistic understanding
of the state action doctrine expressed by the Supreme Court most recently in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondaiy School Athletic Ass'n.'
1. The Case.-The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, is a state-supported institution that receives both financial and
1. 249 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2001).
2. Id. at 305.
3. Id. at 306. Specifically, Mentavlos claimed that several upperclass cadets subjected
her to sexual harassment, intimidation, and abuse. Id.
4. Id. at 323. Accordingly, the court was not required to consider whether the cadets'
actions "deprived Mentavlos of a right secured by federal law." Id. at 323 n.8.
5. Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 348 (4th Cir. 2000).
6. See 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (recognizing that "[w]hat is fairly attributable [as state
action] is a matter of normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity").
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other assistance from the state. 7 In the fall of 1996, The Citadel abandoned its 154-year-old policy of admitting only male students to its
student body, known as the "South Carolina Corps of Cadets."8
The Citadel operates on a highly restrictive military model, subjecting students to military style rules and living conditions; however,
its objective is to produce community leaders, not enlisted soldiers.'
Under what is known as the "Fourth Class System," freshmen must
adhere to a strict set of disciplinary and behavioral rules.' Further,
the Fourth Class System creates an environment where upperclassmen
possess a large degree of authority over freshmen."1 The Citadel's operation is dependent upon this cadet chain of command, where senior students mentor and supervise the students below them."2 While
mild harassment of freshmen at The Citadel is not uncommon, 3 the
4
school expressly prohibits hazing or other abuse of freshmen.' Discrimination on the basis of gender is also expressly prohibited by The
Citadel, and freshmen have formal rights to appeal discriminatory
treatment.'5

7. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 305. The Fourth Circuit recognized that The Citadel is listed
among state-supported colleges and universities in section 59-101-10 of the Code of Laws of
South Carolina, and that aspects of The Citadel's operation are governed by sections 59121-10 to 450 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 319. The
court also noted that The Citadel's treatment in the South Carolina Code is "no different
in any material respect" from the treatnent of other state-supported South Carolina colleges and universities, like the University of South Carolina and Clemson University. Id.
The Citadel is also designated a "senior military college" by the federal government and
consequently receives certain federal benefits. Id. at 317.
8. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 305-06. Although voluntary, The Citadel's decision followed
a legal challenge by a female applicant whose admission was revoked, Faulkner v. Jones, 10
F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993), and came in the wake of a Supreme Court decision finding a
similar male-only admissions policy at the Virginia Military Institute to be unconstitutional,
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
9. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 307, 314-15. In fact, only about one-third of The Citadel's
cadets ultimately enter military service. Mentavlos v. Anderson, 85 F. Supp. 2d 609, 622
n.18 (D.S.C. 2000).
10. Men tavlos, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 616. The school's official policy is contained within
several written manuals, including the "Blue Book," a copy of which is given to each student. Id.
11. Id. For example, freshmen must come to attention when an upperclassman enters
their barracks or speaks to them and are allowed only limited, formal responses to upperclassemen. Id. at 617.
12. Id. at 616.
13. Id. at 617. The district court noted that the types of acceptable harassment freshmen commonly face at The Citadel might include mild verbal aspersions or the requirement to perform menial tasks, such as polishing an item for extended periods of time. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 618.
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Jeannie Mentavlos was one of the first four women to be admitted
to The Citadel in the fall of 1996.6 Four months after her arrival,
however, Mentavlos withdrew, alleging that the commanding senior
administrative officer and several upperclass cadets had "successfully
conspired to perpetuate the former all-male Corps of Cadets by driving her from the school."' 7 Specifically, she alleged the men subjected her to "sexual harassment, intimidation, and abuse" in the form
of "insults, indignities, physical assaults and humiliating treatment."'
Mentavlos brought suit against The Citadel, her commanding administrative officer, Captain Richard Ellis, and five upperclass cadets,
alleging that Ellis and the cadets acted in concert to deprive her of
her constitutional right to equal protection in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985.1" All of the defendants settled the
claims except for Cadets John Anderson and James Saleeby and one
cadet who was in default.2 With Captain Ellis no longer a party to the
suit, Mentavlos was allowed to amend her complaint to allege that
each cadet was a state actor individually and to proceed solely on her
§ 1983 claim. 2 '
Mentavlos cited specific incidents that she alleged indicated a
kind and degree of harassment that was more severe than that experienced by similarly situated male cadets.22 Mentavlos alleged that defendant Saleeby lit her clothing on fire twice, once putting it out with
his feet; once kicked her in the legs after commenting that she "likes
to be kicked"; and once entered her room shirtless.13 Mentavlos alleged that defendant Anderson once began "ranting and raving" at
her and then pushed cardboard into her face and chin; once disciplined her more severely than male classmates; and once threatened

16.
17.
18.
19.

Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 306.
Id.
Id.
Id. Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizens of the United States or other persons within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Section 1985 provides a civil action for those whose rights have
been deprived by a conspiracy to obstruct justice. Id. § 1985(2).
20. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 306.
21. Id.; see also Mentavlos v. Anderson, 85 F. Supp. 2d 609, 611 (D.S.C. 2000) ("Prior to
[this] amendment, [Mentavlos's] state actor allegations depended on proof that the cadet
defendants acted in concert with one or more members of the college's faculty or

staff .. ").
22. See Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 306.
23. Mentavlos, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 612-13.
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to physically harm or kill Mentavlos or her brother, another upperclass cadet. 24 All of the incidents violated official written school policy
and were fully disciplined by The Citadel's administration when they
were brought to its attention.2 5
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,26 the
district court granted summary judgment to Anderson and Saleeby,
holding that they were not liable under § 1983 because they did not
act under color of state law. 27 The district court certified the case as
one appropriate for immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),
28
and the Fourth Circuit consented to hear the appeal.
2. Legal Background.--Originally constructed by the Supreme
Court as a legal device to overcome the limited application of the
Fourteenth Amendment's protections to state entities,29 the muchmaligned state action doctrine has become one of the most confused
areas of constitutional law.3 °
a. Section 1983 Generally.-42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that a
person who, under color of state law, deprives the "rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws," is liable to the injured party." Congress enacted § 1983 "to aid enforcement of the
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,' 3 2 and, like the
Fourteenth Amendment itself, it is well-established that the "color of

24. Id. at 613.
25. Id. at 614.
26. Id. at 612 (noting that "because this matter is before the court on [the] defendants'
motion for summary judgment, the court must view the record in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff").
27. Id. at 628.
28. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 307.
29. The language of the Fourteenth Amendment limits its prohibitions to the states.
See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XlV, § 1.
30. See Kevin Cole, Federal and State "State Action ": The UndercriticalEmbrace of a HypercriticizedDoctrine, 24 GA. L. REv. 327, 327 (1990).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Section 1983 was originally passed as section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, in response to the terrorism against African-Americans by the Ku Klux
Klan throughout the South. Robert L. Phillips, Comment, Peer Abuse in Public Schools:
Should Schools Be Liable for Student to Student Injuries Under Section 1983?, 1995 BYU L. REV.
237, 238.
32. Ashley Smith, Comment, Students HurtingStudents: Who Will Pay?, 34 Hous. L. REv.
579, 586 (1997); see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) ("[Section]
1983 ... was enacted pursuant to the authority of Congress to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibit[ing] interference with federal rights under color of state law.").
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law" requirement excludes private conduct, no matter how wrongful,
from its reach.33
Over time, however, it gradually became clear that state-supported discrimination often presented itself in the guise of private action, and the Supreme Court began recognizing situations when a
private party may be deemed a "state actor," and thus subject to liability under Fourteenth Amendment claims.
b. Key United States Supreme Court Cases that Shaped the Tests for
State Action Doctrine.(1)

Early Development.-The Supreme Court began shap-

ing its modern state action doctrine in the 1920s. One of the first
Supreme Court cases to rely on the state action doctrine was Nixon v.
Herndon,34 in which the Court held that a private voting committee
was prohibited from discriminating against blacks because, although
not operated by the state, it was performing a state function. 5 In
Marsh v. Alabama, 6 the Court held that a privately owned company
town, by virtue of its similarities to a public municipality, was prohibited from discriminating.3 7 In Shelley v. Kraemer,3" the Court held that
a state court's enforcement of a private race-restrictive covenant was
sufficient to constitute state action because the covenant at issue could
only take effect with the affirmative action of the state court. 39 In Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority,4" the Court looked at the symbiotic

relationship between a private lessee operating on state-leased property and held it subject to the Fourteenth Amendment's proscriptions."

The Court held that the lessee in question, a privately owned

coffee shop, was operated as an "integral part of a public building,"
33. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982)). Section 1983's "color of law" requirement has "consistently been treated as the same thing as the 'state action' required under the Fourteenth
Amendment." Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 838 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787,
794 n.7 (1966)).
For the origins of this limited interpretation, see the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 6
(1883) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment only places prohibitions on states, not
private parties). " [C] ivil rights .. .cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals,
unsupported by state authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual .. .is simply a private wrong .
Id. at 17.
34. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
35. Id. at 541.
36. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
37. Id. at 507-08.
38. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
39. Id. at 20.
40. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
41. Id. at 726.
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and that the state, by its inaction, had placed its "power, property and
prestige" behind its lessee's discrimination.4 2 In Evans v. Newton,4 3 the
Court held that a private park, "municipal in nature,"' 4 4 could not remain segregated, even after the appointment of private trustees, because the city remained "entwined in the management or control of
5
4

the park.

(2) June 25, 1982-The Court's PrinciplesDefined.-On a
single day in 1982, the Court decided three major state action cases:
Blum v. Yaretsky, 46 Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.,4 7 and Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn." While these cases finally provided the doctrine with articulable principles, the sense of formality suggested by these principles
had the effect of deceptively simplifying a very complicated doctrine.4 9
In Blum, the Supreme Court held that a private nursing home was
not a state actor, even though it could make decisions that led the
state to reduce patient medical payments.5" Alternately, in Lugar, the
Supreme Court found that a lessee was a state actor when he misused
a state statute.51 Indicating that the ultimate issue in a state action
determination is whether the infringement of federal rights is "fairly
attributable to the State, 5 2 the Lugar Court found that the lessee's
procurement of an ex parte writ of attachment pursuant to a state stat53
ute and executed by a sheriff satisfied the state action requirement.
Finally, in Rendell-Baker, the Supreme Court found that a private
school's acceptance of state-funded students and public funds did not
make it a state actor when it fired a teacher. 54 The Court held that
even though the school was virtually dependent on government fund-

42. Id. at 724-25.
43. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
44. Id. at 301.
45. Id.
46. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
47. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
48. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
49. See Mindy A. Kaiden, Note, Albert v. Carovano: The Second Circuit Redefines Under
Color of State Law for Private Universities, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 239, 241 (1989) (noting that
"[t]he Court's decisions in these cases ... failed to clarify the confusion surrounding state
action").
50. 457 U.S. at 1012. Ultimately, the Court failed to find that the state was responsible
for patient discharge and transfer decisions made by the nursing home. Id. at 1008-09.
51. 457 U.S. at 941.
52. Id. at 937.
53. Id. at 942.
54. 457 U.S. 830, 841-43 (1982).
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ing, its decision to discharge Rendell-Baker was sufficiently distant
from any influence by the state.5 5
The Supreme Court's analysis in Blum provided a comprehensive
summary of its interpretation of the state action doctrine, as the Court
reviewed its precedent and attempted to formulate the three situations in which a private party has been classified as a "state actor"
under a § 1983 claim.5 6 The Court began by noting that the overarching state action question has remained "whether [the private party's]
conduct has sufficiently received the imprimatur of the State so as to
make it 'state' action." 7 Then the Court laid out three principles to
help future courts make that determination. First, the Blum Court
suggested that the state action requirement would be met where
"there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter
may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. ' 58 Next, the Court
recognized as state action those situations in which the state "has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement,
either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be
that of the State.

'59

Finally, the Court explained that the "required

nexus may be present if the private entity has exercised powers that
60
are 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State."'
While the evolution of the state action doctrine has been thoroughly documented, even the Justices themselves have at times conceded that the "cases deciding when private action might be deemed
that of the state have not been a model of consistency."'6' Still, this
difficult Blum analysis has persisted as the fundamental inquiry in a
state action determination.6 2
c. The State Action Doctrine Today.-While the Supreme
Court recently reaffirmed the use of its Blum analysis in Brentwood
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n,63 the Brentwood
55. Id. at 840-41.
56. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982).
57. Id. at 1003.
58. Id. at 1004 (quoting Jackson v. Metro Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). The
Fourth Circuit, in Haavistolav. Community Fire Co., 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993), characterized
the first of the three principles as the "symbiotic relationship." Id. at 215.
59. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
60. Id. at 1005 (quotingJackson, 419 U.S. at 353).
61. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
62. See Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 314 (noting that the Supreme Court still relies on the
Blum principles).
63. 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001).
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Court also indicated that there is no exclusive test that can be used to
identify state actions, that the criteria "lack rigid simplicity," and that
the ultimate determination remains one of normative judgment.6 4 In
Brentwood, a statewide association designed to regulate inter-scholastic
athletic competition among both public and private secondary schools
was held to be a state actor due to the "pervasive entwinement of state
school officials in the structure of the association."6 5 The Sixth Circuit applied the three Blum criteria and found no state action,6 6 but
the Supreme Court reversed that decision.6 7 The Court indicated that
the principles it has promulgated in the past serve only as examples of
state action, representing its past identification of facts relevant to a
"close nexus" analysis and not a formal, bright-line testing apparatus.6" In effect, the Court reached beyond the Blum tests and announced a new criteria of "entwinement," which it justified through
an analysis of prior state action findings.69
d. The Fourth Circuit'sState Action Analyses.--The Fourth Circuit has used a variety of tests in making its state action determinations. In Andrews v. Federal Home Loan Bank,7" the court held that a
regional bank, although set up and regulated by the federal government, was not a state actor when it fired an employee because its conduct did not fall into one of the four categories that characterize a
private party's actions as "fairly attributable" to the state.71
Two other Fourth Circuit state action cases, Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. 7 2 and Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 73 further
illustrate the Fourth Circuit's understanding of the Supreme Court's
64. Id. at 295. The Court's emphasis on a nonformalistic approach is not limited to
post-Blum cases. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)
(stressing the importance of "sifting facts and weighing circumstances" when a court makes
a state action determination).
65. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 291.
66. Id. at 294.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 295-98.
69. Id. at 298.
70. 998 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1993).
71. Id. at 220. The four categories the court noted were:
(1) when the state has coerced the private actor to commit an act that would be
unconstitutional if done by the state; (2) when the state has sought to evade a
clear constitutional duty through delegation to a private actor; (3) when the state
has delegated a traditionally and exclusively public function to a private actor; or
(4) when the state has committed an unconstitutional act in the course of enforcing a right of a private citizen.
Id. at 217.
72. 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993).
73. 218 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2000).
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close nexus analysis. Both cases concerned summary judgments
granted to local fire companies for § 1983 discrimination actions, and
both dealt with the question of whether privately incorporated fire
companies could be state actors. 4 However, their respective analyses
show significantly different applications of the state action doctrine.
(1) Haavistola.-In Haavistola, a female volunteer alleged that the Community Fire Company's refusal to reinstate her after the criminal complaint she filed against a colleague was resolved
constituted sexual discrimination. 75 The lower court considered each
of Haavistola's state action arguments independently, applied the
facts of her case to the individual state action tests promulgated by the
Supreme Court in Blum, 76 and granted summary judgment to the fire
company, finding that it was not a state actor.77 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not have the factual
record necessary for its grant of summary judgment to the defendant
fire company and remanded without making a state action determination. 78 Although noting that a "[r] eview of the preceding precedents
and decisions does little to simplify the issue of when a private entity assumes the role of state actor," and stressing the need for a "factually
intense analysis,"7 9 the court held tightly to the Supreme Court's Blum
analysis, suggesting that the three Blum principles are the sole indicators of when private conduct constitutes state action.8 °
(2) Goldstein.-In Goldstein, the Fourth Circuit was more
clear as to how a state action inquiry should incorporate Blum,
stressing a totality of the circumstances approach to state action analy-

74. Id. at 339-40; Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 213-14.
75. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 214.
76. Haavistola v.Cmty. Fire Co., 812 F.Supp. 1379, 1392-99 (D. Md. 1993).
77. Id,at 1400.
78. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 222. The court's decision to remand has been heavily criticized. See RonaldJ.Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch:An Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302, 328-32 (1995).
Professor Krotoszynski argues:
[T]he Fourth Circuit goofed... although the subsidiary facts necessary to determine whether the Rising Sun fire company was a state actor were within the province of the jury, the legal significance of those facts was a question of law,
appropriately reserved to the court. Because the parties in Haavistola did not
dispute any of the subsidiary questions of fact, there was no role for the jury in
determining whether the fire company was a state actor.
Id. at 330 n.141.
79. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 218 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 215.

2002]

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

1129

sis at the outset.8" The plaintiff in Goldstein, who was suspended from
the Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Company,, alleged a violation of his
First Amendment rights.8 2 Consequently, the court was faced with determining whether the fire company's decision to terminate the plaintiff was under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.3 Rather than
directly applying the Blum analysis, however, the Goldstein court conducted its own review of Supreme Court precedent in an attempt to
identify past situations where the Court found that government authority so dominated a private party's action that it could be viewed as
an action of the state.8 4
Through its examination of previous cases, the Goldstein court
identified four contexts in which a private party's conduct may be
state action: (1) if the government is more than passive toward the
private conduct; (2) if the conduct stems from state-delegated obligations to a private party; (3) if the government has conferred sovereign
power on the private party; and (4) if state officials help in the private
use of state procedures.8 5 Noting the heavily fact-based nature of the
state action analysis, the Goldstein court indicated that "[a]t bottom,
the state action determination requires an examination of all the relevant circumstances, in an attempt to evaluate the degree of the Government's participation in the private party's activities." 6 As it had in
Haavistola,the Goldstein court acknowledged that the central principle
that inspires any state action analysis is a factual inquiry into the government's relationship with the private party," which iscentral to all
of the promulgated tests and principles.
Noting that the tests it identified are incomplete by themselves,""
the Goldstein court listed four additional factors that the Fourth Circuit had considered in the past in making determinations of state action: (1) if the injury is "aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of
government authority"; (2) the "extent and nature of public assistance" given to the private party; (3) the "extent and nature of govern81. Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 2000).
A "totality of the circumstances" approach is supported by Professor Krotoszynski, who
advocates forcing courts to "go beyond the mechanical application of the traditional tests
to determine if, in the totality of the circumstances, a particular private entity is a state
actor." Krotoszynski, supra note 78, at 304.
82. Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 339.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 341-43.
85. Id. at 342.
86. Id. (quoting, in part, Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614
(1989)) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Id. at 342-43.
88. See id.
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mental regulation" over the private party; and (4) "how the state itself
views the entity."8 9 The court immediately qualified the use of these
factors, stressing that no one test alone can identify state action;
rather, the factors merely help to inform a court's resolution of state
action questions.9 °
The court then turned to the facts of the case, addressing Goldstein's argument that the Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Company
was a state actor because it performed a function traditionally and exclusively reserved to the government. 9 ' While suggesting that the fire
company might not qualify as a state actor based solely on its performance of traditional government functions, the Goldstein court noted its
duty to examine the "totality of the circumstances." 9 2 The court stated
that its doubts were mitigated by the fact that, along with its government function, Chestnut Ridge received substantial state assistance,
was subject to extensive state regulation, and was considered to be a
state actor by the state itself.9"
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Mentavlos v. Anderson, the Fourth
Circuit held that the upperclass cadets were not state actors, unanimously affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment to
the defendant cadets on de novo review.9 4
The Fourth Circuit reviewed and ultimately rejected three of
Mentavlos's arguments: (1) that the district court applied the wrong
test for state action by applying the Haavistolaanalysis instead of Goldstein;9 5 (2) that The Citadel's cadets are analogous to cadets at the
United States military service academies because these institutions
perform the traditional government function of training civilians for
the military and are entitled by the government to certain benefits,
and therefore their cadets should all be considered "in the military"
for purposes of the color of state law requirement of § 1983;96 and (3)
that the cadets' actions are "fairly attributable to the state" because the
state provides financial assistance to The Citadel and extensively regulates its military programs.9 7
89.
factors
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 343 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The court pulled these
exclusively from Supreme Court precedent-and Haavistola. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 345-48.
Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 305.
Id. at 312-14.
Id. at 314-18.
Id. at 318-23.
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a. First Argument: The "Wrong Test. "--Mentavlos argued that
the district court applied the wrong test for state action because
Haavistola,on which the district court relied for its three-part test, had
been implicitly overruled by the Fourth Circuit's subsequent decision
in Goldstein." Mentavlos asserted that the upperclass cadets' actions
met Goldstein's "totality of the circumstances" test, and therefore were
taken under color of state law. 9
The court noted that although cases determining state action
may not be entirely consistent, 0 0 the "critical inquiry"-whether the
conduct is "fairly attributable to the state"-has remained constant. 1 '
Acknowledging that prior panels of the court have used different tests
and factors when determining whether a challenged action is fairly
attributable to the state, 10 2 the Mentavlos court explained that the
Goldstein decision merely summarized precedent and did not overrule
03
Haavistola.1
Consequently, the court held that the district court did
not apply the wrong test by relying on Haavistola's Blum analysis.'0 4
b. Second Argument: "TraditionalGovernment Function."-The
court rejected Mentavlos's next argument that The Citadel, like the
United States service academies, performs traditional government
0 5
functions, such that its cadets' actions were under color of state law.1
First, Mentavlos attempted to analogize cadets at The Citadel to cadets
at the United States military service academies, who have previously
been deemed state actors under "the Feres doctrine."'0 6 While the
court accepted that training civilians for military service, as done by
the United States military service academies, is a traditional govern98. Id. at 312. The Fourth Circuit rejected Mentavlos's argument that Haavistola had
actually been overruled by the Goldstein decision, noting that only a panel of the court
sitting en banc, or the Supreme Court, can overrule a prior appellate decision. Id. at 312
n.4.
99. See id. at 312.
100. Id. at 313.
101. Id. (quoting Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021 (4th Cir. 1984)).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 313-14. The Mentavlos court also noted that Haavistola summarized the standard set by the Supreme Court in Blum, which the Supreme Court recently relied on in
Brentwood. Id. at 314.
104. Id. at 314.
105. Id. at 316.
106. Id. at 314. The Feres doctrine, announced in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146
(1950), bars members of the military services from bringing claims against the government
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for service related injuries. Noting that the Seventh
Circuit applied the Feres doctrine to cadets at the United States military academies in Collins v. United States, 642 F.2d 217, 220-21 (7th Cir. 1981), Mentavlos reasoned that cadets at
those military institutions and, by analogy, The Citadel should be viewed as state actors.
Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 314.
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ment function,""7 it distinguished The Citadel's "business" as one of
only using a military-style environment to produce community leaders
rather than training soldiers.'
The court recognized that educating civilians for leadership is
not the exclusive prerogative of the state"0 ' and found pivotal that
nowhere in The Citadel's mission statement is the objective to "train
soldiers for the military."'1 0 Even though the Seventh Circuit, in Collins, applied the Feres doctrine to a United States Air Force Academy
cadet,''' the Fourth Circuit sufficiently distinguished Air Force Academy cadets, who are considered members of the Air Force, from students at The Citadel who are not "in the military. '"112
Mentavlos next argued that The Citadel's designation by the federal government as a "senior military college," and its entitlement to
special state and federal benefits, mandates that actions by its cadets
be considered state action.'
Noting that the public function test is
"carefully confined,""' 4 the Mentavlos court held that the relevant
question is "whether the 'function performed has been traditionally
the exclusive prerogative of the State."" 15 Ultimately, the court refused to equate Congress's delegation of legislative benefits to The
Citadel with the delegation of a traditional, exclusive government
6
function to its non-enlisted, non-military cadets."
c.

Third Argument: Government Assistance and Regulation.-

Lastly, the Fourth Circuit rejected Mentavlos's contention that the actions of the defendant cadets were attributable to the state because
South Carolina provides financial assistance to The Citadel and extensively regulates its programs.l17

107. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 314.
108. Id. at 314-15.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 315.
111. See Collins, 642 F.2d at 220-21.
112. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d. at 315-16.
113. Id. at 316-17. This federal designation is noted in the Senior Reserve Officers'
Training Corps Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2111a(f) (2000). State special recognition is provided in
S.C. CODE ANN. § 25-1-520 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
114. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 317 (quoting Goldstein v. Chesmut Ridge Volunteer Fire
Co., 218 F.3d 337, 348 (4th Cir. 2000)).
115. Id. (quoting Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 318-19. The Fourth Circuit went on to cite Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-41,
for the proposition that "a private party's dependence upon the state for assistance, even if
substantial, does not transform its actions into actions of the state." Mentavlos, 249 F.2d at
319.
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First, the court found South Carolina's financial assistance to The
Citadel to be no different than its financial support of the University
of South Carolina and Clemson University.'"
The court noted that
while The Citadel's receipt of state assistance might factor into a determination of whether The Citadel itself is a state actor, the financial
relationship was not relevant to the significantly narrower question of
whether students at The Citadel are state actors." 9 Noting that
Mentavlos had not argued that The Citadel's students independently
received any type of direct financial assistance from the state, the
Mentavlos court refused to "view the unauthorized actions of private
students to be state action merely because they attend a state-supported college and receive the benefit of public funds. '' 12 °
The court also rejected Mentavlos's claim that the state's regulation of The Citadel should lead to the conclusion that the students
"
acted under color of state law. 12
' Reviewing the authority of upperclass cadets to discipline freshmen, the court found instructive that
The Citadel expressly prohibits abusive treatment or discrimination,
and that the abuses that Mentavlos reported were punished when she
1 22
brought them to the attention of The Citadel's administration.

118. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 319.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. Recognizing that a court may consider the extent and nature of government
regulation over an institution as a factor in its state action analysis, the Mentavlos court
clarified its position by explaining that "state regulation unrelated to the alleged constitutional violation, even if extensive," will not transform private action into state action. Id. at
320 (quoting Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 347 (4th Cir.
2000)).
122. Id. at 320. Additionally, the court noted that "Mentavlos presented no contrary
evidence that any member of The Citadel administration, faculty, or staff ever encouraged,
endorsed, participated in, refused to prevent, or acquiesced in the challenged actions." Id.
The court also rejected Mentavlos's argument that The Citadel's prohibition of the
cadets' actions was irrelevant under United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941), where
the Supreme Court held that state officials can act under color of state law even if they
abuse their official capacities. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 321. Mentavlos specifically cited the
Fourth Circuit's holding in Scott v. Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238, 241 (4th Cir. 1973), where two
county employees who had been deputized by a local sheriff were still considered state
actors when they misused the law enforcement power granted to them by the state. Id.
The Mentavlos court reasoned that, unlike the defendants in Classic and Scott, the cadets
were not state officials or employees, and that a "public school or college student is not
fairly transformed into a state official or state actor merely because the school has delegated to that student or otherwise allowed the student some limited authority to act."
Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 322. The Mentavlos court declined to find the authority granted to
the upperclass cadets by The Citadel analogous to the broad authority given to police
officers found to constitute state action in Scott. Id.

1134

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

61:1120

As further support, the court cited its holding in Milburn v. Anne
Arundel County Department of Social Services,' 2 3 where it refused to find
abusive foster parents to be state actors under § 1983, even though
the individuals were licensed and authorized by the state to care for
the abused child. 12 4 The court stressed that where the state does not
in any way encourage or coerce the specific conduct at issue, it has
125
declined to find the private conduct state action.
Finally, the Mentavlos court distinguished its decision from the Supreme Court's holding in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,'2 6
where a student-led, student-initiated invocation was deemed government speech.1 2 7 In contrast to the actions in Doe, which were explicidy authorized and endorsed by the school, the Mentavlos court
reiterated that the cadets' harassment of Mentavlos "was not coerced,
compelled, or encouraged by any law, regulation or custom of the
28
State of South Carolina or The Citadel."'
4. Analysis.-While the Fourth Circuit's decision in Mentavlos
was correct, its retreat from the "totality of the circumstances" analysis
it applied in Goldstein represents a significant regression in the Fourth
Circuit's application of the state action doctrine. The Mentavlos court
29
did not explicitly reject a totality of the circumstances approach.
Indeed, it acknowledged the fact-based nature of the state action question and suggested that the guidance provided by Goldstein is consistent with, if not analogous to, the approach it borrowed from
Haavistola.3 0 The court is correct,13 1 but its analysis in Mentavlos exposes an application of the state action tests that is far more mechanical than the spirit of its understanding in Goldstein, as well as the view
123. 871 F.2d 474, 479 (4th Cir. 1989).
124. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 320.
125. Id.
126. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
127. Id. at 310.
128. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 323. The court's opinion ended with a footnote recognizing
that its conclusion that the cadets did not act under color of state law precluded a need to
decide whether their alleged actions actually deprived Mentavlos of a right secured by
federal law. ld. at 323 n.8.
129. See id. at 313-14.
130. Id. The court noted that the factors it identified as relevant in Goldstein represented a summary of the Fourth Circuit's precedent, and as such is compatible with Haavistola's summary of the Supreme Court's Blum tests. Id.
131. The court's pronouncement that Goldstein did not overrule Haavistola is true. Foremost, only a panel of the court sitting en banc, or the Supreme Court, can overrule a prior
appellate decision. Id. at 312 n.4. By ultimately turning to the "close nexus" inquiry, the
Fourth Circuit correctly asserted that itis guided-not controlled-in this complex area
"by the factors which have been described by the Supreme Court in prior precedents and
which are pertinent to the circumstances of this case." Id. at 314.
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expressed by the Supreme Court in Brentwood. While the court may
have reached the same outcome using an analysis more in line with
Goldstein, its formalistic approach to state action is a significant step
backwards.
a. Overlooking Goldstein's Contribution to State Action Analysis. -The Mentavlos court's suggestion that Goldstein was merely a summary of precedent that was not meant to espouse anything new12 is
an inaccurate characterization of the significant step the Goldstein
court took to recognize the proper context of a state action analysis.
Moreover, it blatantly glosses over the fact that Goldstein's importance
lies not so much in the type of tests it applied, but in its applicationof
33

the tests it chose.1

In Goldstein, after applying the "traditional government function"
test, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that doubt might still exist that
the Chestnut Ridge fire company unequivocally performed traditional
and exclusive state functions. 134 However, noting that the Supreme
Court "has admonished the lower courts to examine the totality of the
circumstances, ''

35

the Goldstein court stated that any such doubts must

be assuaged by a series of other factors that suggest that the state delegated authority to the fire company.1 36 By reaching outside of a single
state action test and exploring the "totality of the circumstances," the
Goldstein court confidently held that Chestnut Ridge was a state
actor.

13 7

The Goldstein approach differs markedly from the analysis performed by the Fourth Circuit seven years earlier in Haavistola. In
Haavistola,the Fourth Circuit suggested that a finding of state action
depends entirely on satisfying one of the three Blum tests.13 8 Nowhere
in the opinion did the court mention a totality of the circumstances
approach.
The flexible analysis advanced by the Goldstein court is precisely
what the Supreme Court itself has come to promote. In Brentwood, the
Court explicitly stated that the state action determination "is a matter
132. Id. at 313-14.
133. See supra notes 81-93 (discussing Goldstein's application of the state action tests).
134. 218 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2000).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 345-48.
137. Id. at 348.
138. See Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co., 6 F.3d 211, 215 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating definitively
that "[t]he Supreme Court has identified three situations in which particular conduct by a
private entity constitutes 'state action"').
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of normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity."' 3 9
Moreover, the notion that the state action tests can be applied in rigid
isolation has been squarely rejected by academics.14 °
The Mentavlos court's state action analysis was deficient in many
respects: there was no discussion of "totality of the circumstances," no
implied consideration of how various factors might influence each
other, and no suggestion that the court was doing anything but viewing each test as a solid, stand-alone operation. In fact, there is a noticeable absence of any reference to any of the principles the court
laid out in Goldstein-all the more striking because Mentavlos herself
raised the issue. 141
Instead, the Mentavlos court fragmented its opinion into wholly
separate analyses under each of the Blum tests relevant to Mentavlos's
case. 142 Beginning with the "traditional governmental function" test,
the court applied the case's facts and found no state action.' 4 3 Then,
the court switched gears and searched for state action under the "government funding and regulation" test, again failing to find state
action.144

What the court never did, overlooking the significance of Goldstein, was to recognize the possibility that, even without passing the
individual state action tests it applied, the facts of the Mentavlos case
could, in the totality of the circumstances, still suggest state action.
Finding neither test satisfactorily met, the Mentavlos court concluded
that the cadets' actions could not be attributed to the state. 4 5 However, its failure to step back from the separate tests to view the facts
holistically, examining all of Mentavlos's arguments in a broad inquiry
for a "close nexus," runs counter to the progressive understanding of
139. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295-96
(2001).
140. See, e.g., Krotoszynski, supra note 78, at 305. Professor Krotoszynski suggests:
The federal courts' use of the various state action tests as formulaic shorthands that yield quick and easy answers represents an inappropriate application
of the Supreme Court's state action precedents. Such jurisprudence has the unfortunate effect of insulating from constitutional scrutiny behavior fairly attributable to the state and is significantly underprotective of constitutional rights.
Id.; see also Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "StateAction, "Equal
Protection, and California'sProposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 88 (1967) (declaring that
"there were and are no clear and concrete tests of state action; the concept is notoriously,
scandalously lacking in these; it is itself nothing but a catch-phrase").
141. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 311-14.
142. See id. at 314-21.
143. Id. at 314-18.
144. Id. at 318-21.
145. Id. at 323.
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the doctrine that the Fourth Circuit expressed in Goldstein and is even
more unsettling in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Brentwood.
b. Seeking "Entwinement"--The Implications of Brentwood.--If
there had been any doubts that the tests promulgated by the Supreme
Court in Blum were meant to serve only as guidelines within a broader
analysis and not as finite tools for independent analysis, the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Brentwood should have mitigated them.
Scouring its precedent to uncover a connection between private actor
and state that it labeled "entwinement,"' 4 6 the Supreme Court in
Brentwood went to great lengths to stress that state action cannot be
determined by the application of separate tests:
What is fairly attributable is a matter of normative judgment,
and the criteria lack rigid simplicity. From the range of circumstances that could point toward the State behind an individual face, no one fact can function as a necessary condition
across the boardfor finding state action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely sufficient, for there may be some countervailing reason against attributing activity to the
government.' 4 7
While the Brentwood Court did not specifically use the phrase "totality of the circumstances," it did instruct that "no one criterion must
necessarily be applied."' 4 8 However, given that the facts in Brentwood,
while not passing any one of the individual Blum tests, could still lead
to a finding of state action by virtue of "entwinement," the Supreme
Court has indicated an unwillingness to be bound by the kind of rigid
analysis applied in Mentavlos. 4 9
Mentavlos herself did not argue that the cadets' actions were so
"entwined" with the state as to compel a finding of state action, most
likely because the Brentwood decision was announced after the argument of her case before the Fourth Circuit. 5 Even so, the Fourth
Circuit acknowledged its awareness of Brentwood, citing it in its discussion of Goldstein's relationship to the Fourth Circuit's state action pre-

146. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 297 (2001).
147. Id. at 295-96 (emphasis added). The Mentavlos court actually quotes this exact language, but does not use it in its analysis. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 311. In fact, the court
stressed the last portion of the quote, noting that the presence of a set of circumstances
"might not be conclusive of the state action issue." Id. at 312.
148. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 303.
149. See id. at 295-98.
150. Mentavloswas argued onJanuary 25, 2001, while Brentwoodwas decided on February
20, 2001. Compare Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 301, with Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 288.
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cedent. 5 ' Yet what is most strange about the Mentavlos court's
decision to cite Brentwood was its reason for doing so-not to apply the
broad understanding so clearly promulgated by Brentwood,1 52 but to
support the proposition that the Blum analysis used by the Haavistola
court was still being relied upon by the Supreme Court and therefore
remained a valid analytical tool.15
The Mentavlos court relied on Brentwood to support its contention
that Haavistola's "Blum" approach, and not Goldstein's totality of the
circumstances approach, reflects the Supreme Court's modern state
action doctrine. 154 A correct reading of Brentwood, however, can only
support the exact converse of the Mentavlos court's understanding.
While Brentwood does indeed cite Blum, the citation merely serves as a
small part of the Court's review of its past findings of state action, and
the Court puts no more emphasis on Blum than on any of its other
precedent. 155
In Mentavlos, the Fourth Circuit ignored Brentwood's preference
for the "practical certainty" provided by an outside-of-the-tests approach over the "formal clarity" provided by a strict adherence to the
tests themselves. 15 6 Consequently, the Supreme Court's move towards
evaluating the circumstances of a case for state action without being
restricted by the artificial limitations set by individual tests is lost in
the Mentavlos decision.
c. What Might Have Been-How the Mentavlos Court Could
Have Applied a "Totality of the Circumstances" Analysis.-Whether the
outcome of the case would have changed had the Mentavlos court held
more closely to a totality of the circumstances approach is not likely,
although certainly arguable, given that Mentavlos based her appeal on
exactly that argument. 157 Although the Mentavlos and Goldstein ap-

151. See Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 310 (citing Brentwood repeatedly).
152. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 295-96.
153. See Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 314 (citing to Brentwood as evidence of the validity of the
Blum tests).
154. Id.
155. See Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296.
156. Id. at 301 n.4. The Supreme Court noted that
if formalism were the sine qua non of state action, the doctrine would vanish owing
to the ease and inevitability of its evasion, and for just that reason formalism has
never been controlling. For example, a criterion of state action like symbiosis...
looks not to form but to an underlying reality.
Id.
157. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 312-14.

20021

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

1139

proaches may have ultimately produced similar outcomes in this case,
158
the differences between the approaches are nonetheless significant.
Mentavlos argued that the cadets were state actors, both because
they performed a traditional government function and because the
government regulated and funded The Citadel's programs. 159 The
court, applying the tests in isolation, found neither argument compelling. 6 ° A totality of the circumstances analysis need not become a
complicated jumble of tests that loses the functional advantages of the
Blum analysis; rather, as the Fourth Circuit did in Goldstein, the court
could have analyzed the facts of Mentavlos's situation under each test
and then, after finding neither test sufficiently met, provided an additional prong of analysis acknowledging that all of the evidence, when
viewed in the totality of the circumstances, either did or did not suggest that the cadets' actions were fairly attributable to the state.
If the court believed that, even in the totality of the circumstances, state action still did not exist, the additional analysis need not
be lengthy nor complex-it must only recognize that the court has at
least considered the circumstances of the case holistically. 6 1 The fact
that neither test was fully met should not automatically preclude the
possibility that the portions of each test that were met, when viewed
together, could compel a finding of state action. 6 2
Given the Supreme Court's analysis in Brentwood, it would be improper to hold that a set of facts, although suggesting elements of
state action under each of the Court's constructed tests, cannot ultimately compel a finding of state action simply because none of the
tests are fully met independently. Only when the Fourth Circuit begins to routinely and explicitly examine the facts of its cases under a
totality of the circumstances approach can it ensure that it is providing a state action analysis fully in line with Supreme Court precedent.
5. Conclusion.-The Mentavlos court's retreat from the totality of
the circumstances analysis that the Fourth Circuit advocated in Goldstein and further supported by the Supreme Court in Brentwood is a
subtle but significant regression in the Fourth Circuit's understanding
158. See supra notes 132-145 and accompanying text.
159. Mentavlos, 249 F.3d at 314, 318.
160. Id.
161. See Krotoszynski, supra note 78, at 335-46.
162. Id. at 337. Professor Krotoszynski notes that had the lower court in Haavistolaconsidered all of the connections between the state and the fire company "conjunctively,
rather than singly and in isolation," it might have held differently. Id. at 330. Krotoszynski
later suggests more generally that "[iln many instances, if courts applied the tests in tandem, the state action requirement would be satisfied." Id. at 336.
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of the state action doctrine. By choosing to apply isolated tests to the
Mentavlos facts and ignoring the genuine connections between the various factors that might illustrate state action, the Mentavlos decision
illustrates a return to an interpretation of the doctrine that is more
formal, more rigid, and less reasonable.
ALAN J. SACHS

B.

The Court Begins to Journey on the Path of Establishment
Clause Nullification

In Ehlers-Renzi v. Connelly School of the Holy Child, Inc.,' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the constitutionality of Montgomery County, Maryland Zoning Ordinance section
59-G-2.19(c) 2 under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.3 The court held that the ordinance was valid under the Establishment Clause, reversing the decision of the district court.4 The
court reasoned that by providing parochial schools an exemption
from local zoning ordinances, Montgomery County "permissibly accommodated religion."5 Further, the court determined that allowing
parochial schools to build without acquiring a special exemption was
consistent with prior Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit rulings.' The
Ehlers-Renzi court, in upholding the constitutionality of a provision
that provides special benefits to religious institutions, acted in a manner that constituted government endorsement of religion. 7 The
Fourth Circuit's misapplication of the Lemon test,' and its failure to
apply the "neutrality principle" set out by the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Helms,9 resulted in a finding that paves the way toward the dilution of the Establishment Clause. The court failed to recognize that
1. 224 F.3d 283 (4th Cir. 2000), ceri. denied, 531 U.S. 1192 (2001).
2. MONTGOMERY COUNT'Y, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 59-G-2.19 (c) (2001). The zoning
ordinance states:
The requirements of this section shall not apply to the use of any lot, lots or tract
of land for any private educational institution, or parochial school, which is located in a building or on premises owned or leased by any church or religious
organization, the government of the United States, the State of Maryland or any
agency thereof, Montgomery County or any incorporated village or town within
Montgomery County.
Id.
3. Ehlers-Renzi, 224 F.3d at 284. The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause state, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. Ehlers-Renzi, 224 F.3d at 292.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See id.at 293 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (stating that "Count), Zoning Ordinance
§ 59-G-2.19(c) was not enacted with the legitimate secular purpose of avoiding governmental interference with the free exercise of religion").
8. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principle or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
9. 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000). The neutrality principle upholds "aid that is offered to a
broad range of groups or persons without regard to their religion." Id.
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by allowing the exemption to the zoning permit to be premised on
religious ownership of the land, it created an exemption that constitutes the support and aid of religion, an action that the Establishment
Clause is specifically intended to prohibit. By deviating from past rulings which held that there is an obligation for the government to provide equal benefits to both the secular and the religious, the court
validated aid that goes only to religious institutions, thereby resulting
in unconstitutional discrimination.
1. The Case.-Vincent Renzi and his wife Birgit Ehlers-Renzi
were homeowners in Montgomery County, Maryland." ° They lived
across the street from a Roman Catholic school, the Connelly School
of the Holy Child (Connelly School), that wished to make structural
improvements and additions to its school building.1 1 The school advocates Christian values, and both the institution and the property on
which it is located are owned by a religious corporation, the Society of
the Holy Child Jesus, Inc. 2 Before beginning construction, the
school notified the surrounding community that it would not seek a
special exception to make its construction renovations.' 3 Under the
Montgomery County Zoning Ordinance, a special exception is ordinarily required for a private educational institution's construction on
land that is in a residential zone. 4 However, the zoning ordinance
contains an exemption from the need to obtain a special exception
for private and parochial schools that are located on property owned
or leased by a religious organization. 5 Zoning Ordinance § 59-G2.19(c) exempts any lot or tract of land used "for any private educational institution, or parochial school, .

.

. located in a building or on

premises owned or leased by any church or religious organization," or
any federal, state, or local government in Montgomery County,
Maryland.' 6
10. Ehlers-Renzi, 224 F.3d at 284.
11. Id. at 284-85.
12. Id. at 285. The Society of the Holy Child Jesus, Inc. functions under the sponsorship of the Roman Catholic Church. Id.
13. Id. Obtaining a special exception would have required a private school to file a
detailed application with the county. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 59G-2.19(b)(1) (2001). The application approval process demands public notice and the
opportunity for a public hearing. Id. § 59-A-4.41 (a). In addition, the Board of Appeals
may grant a special exception based on its findings on matters including, but not limited
to, potential nuisances or effects on nearby community development caused by the use of
the land, as well as the ability of the building itself to blend in with surrounding structures.
Id. § 59-G-2.19(a).
14. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 59-C-1.31 (d).
15. Id. § 59-G-2.19(c).
16. Id.
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The Renzis opposed the school's failure to obtain a special exception for its renovations and asked that Montgomery County determine
whether the Connelly School was required to obtain the special exception.' 7 The County ruled that the Connelly School was indeed exempt from the special exception requirement, and the Renzis
subsequently filed an administrative appeal with the Montgomery
County Board of Appeals.'" The Renzis then withdrew that appeal
and filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland. 9 The Renzis asked for a declaratory judgment that the religious exemption from the generally required exception was unconstitutional under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.2 °
The district court found for the plaintiffs on the grounds that
section 59-G-2.19(c) of the ordinance, which provided for the religious exemption, violated the Establishment Clause. 2 ' In finding that
section 59-G-2.19(c) violated the Establishment Clause, Chief Judge
Motz relied on the Lemon test, which is used to decide if a challenged
22
government action unlawfully advances religion.
Judge Motz stated that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it "fails to be neutral in a context where neutrality is possible.
By favoring sectarian schools over most other non-profit private educational institutions, it belies any secular purpose and has a principle
effect of advancing religion. '23 Judge Motz further explained that in
order for section 59-G-2.19(c) to become lawful, the county must extend the same exception to all private nonpublic schools no matter
who owns the land.2 4
The Connelly School appealed the district court's decision to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to determine
whether the statutory zoning exemption violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.23

17. Ehlers-Renzi, 224 F.3d at 285.
18. Id.
19. See id.; seealso Renzi v. Connelly Sch. of the Holy Child, 61 F. Supp. 2d 440 (D. Md.
1999).
20. See Renzi, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 441. Additionally, the Renzis sought injunctive relief to
stop the school from continuing its renovations. Id. Montgomery County intervened as a
defendant. Id. Each of the parties filed cross-motions seeking summary judgment. Id.
21. Id. at 448.
22. Id. at 443.
23. Id. at 444. The court allowed the school to finish work on the construction that was
already in progress, but enjoined the Connelly School from engaging in any further construction. Id. at 448.
24. Id.
25. See Ehlers-Renzi, 224 F.3d at 285.
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2. Legal Background.--Courts have struggled with the proper application of the Establishment Clause.2 6 Through the years, the
United States Supreme Court has derived basic principles to use in
the interpretation of the Establishment Clause; however, these guidelines continue to evolve.2 7 The Court's cases can be classified into two
categories: "early" Establishment Clause cases in which the Court
struggled to define the meaning of separation of church and state,
and the "modern" Establishment Clause cases in which the Court has
sought to define a conclusive test to determine what constitutes the
endorsement of religion.
a. Early Establishment Clause Cases: The Court's Struggle to Define the Meaning of Separationof Church and State.-The Court's struggle
to define the meaning of the Establishment Clause began in Everson v.
Board of Education. 8 In Everson, the Court delivered its first decision
that dealt specifically with the standards that control when government aid may be given to religious schools.2 9 The Everson Court upheld a statute that provided state-funded transportation to both public
and parochial schools.3" The Court explained that providing bus
transportation to all children did not violate the "high and impregnable" wall of separation between Church and State because it did no
more than create a program that helped students get to school "regardless of their religion."3 In holding that the state-funded transportation was constitutional, the Court reasoned that the First
Amendment requires the neutral treatment of religion and secular
institutions, thus indicating that "[s] tate power is no more to be used
so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them."3 2
The Court's decision to uphold programs that offered aid to both
public and parochial students, despite the fact that it may increase the
likelihood of parochial school attendance, was revisited and reaf26. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 392 (1983) (expressing the difficulty presented
in interpreting the Establishment Clause); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612
(1971) (stating that the "language of the Religion Clause of the First Amendment is at best
opaque, particularly when compared with other portions of the Amendment"); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (explaining that there is no bright-line test
that can be used to determine the existence of an Establishment Clause violation).
27. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (providing the factors courts need to consider to
determine whether the Establishment Clause has been violated); see also Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793, 807-09 (2000) (reviewing the evolution of Establishment Clause
interpretation).
28. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

29. See id. at 14-16.
30. Id. at 18.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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firmed in Board of Education v. Allen. "3 In Allen, the Court held that a
New York law that required public school officials to freely lend textbooks to both public and parochial school systems did not violate the
First Amendment. 4 The Court reasoned that although the state law
might make it more probable that more students would attend parochial schools, it did not constitute unlawful aid of a religious establishment because the statute provided benefits to all students-both
those who attended private schools and those who did not.3 5 In
reaching its conclusion, the Court stated that "the Establishment
Clause does not prevent a State from extending the benefits of state
laws to all citizens without regard for their religious affiliation."3 6
The Court extended this line of reasoning one year later in Walz
v. Tax Commission of New York." In Walz, the Court upheld a property
tax exemption to religious organizations, even though the exemption
provided an indirect economic benefit to religious organizations. 38
The Walz decision differed from previous cases because it determined
that a law that extended benefits to only the religious, as opposed to
both the religious and the secular, did not violate the Establishment
Clause.3 9 In upholding the property tax exemption statute, the Court
used a two-pronged analysis: first, what is the intention behind the
statute; and second, does the statute result in "excessive governmental
entanglement with religion."4 The Court found that the exemption
did not violate the Establishment Clause because it did not create
"sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." 4 1 The Walz Court further explained that,
33. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
34. Id. at 238.
35. Id. at 243-44.
36. Id. at 242.
37. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
38. Id. at 680.
39. See id. The New York City tax exemption was granted to religious organizations for
properties used exclusively for religious purposes. Id. at 666-67.
40. Id. at 674.
41. Id. at 668, 679-80. The Court noted that the Framers of the Constitution, when
writing the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, believed that "'establishment' of a
religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign
in religious activity." Id. at 668. The Court reasoned that granting the tax exemption did
not support any church because the government refrains from gathering its financial support from organized religions. Id. at 675. The Court noted that the exemption reduces
the pecuniary relationship between churches and the state and serves to disentangle the
two. Id. at 676. The Court stressed the impossibility of complete separation between
church and state and explained that tax exemptions for religious organizations have been
commonplace in American history. Id. at 676-78. The majority then noted that the long
history of government tax exemptions for churches has not led to the establishment of a
religion. See id. at 678.
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while there are factors to consider, there is no bright-line test to determine an Establishment Clause violation.42 Therefore, courts must
look at each statute on a case-by-case basis to determine if a provision
is "intended to establish or interfere with religious beliefs and practices." 43 The Walz Court explained that following "the policy of neutrality that derives from an accommodation of the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses has prevented the kind of involvement that
would tip the balance toward government control of churches or governmental restraint on religious practice."44
b. Modern Establishment Clause Cases: The Court Seeks to Define a
Conclusive Test to Determine What Constitutes the Endorsement of Religion.The landmark case of Lemon v. Kurtzman4 5 created a three-pronged
test to determine the constitutionality of government benefits granted
to religious groups.4 6 The Court's decision in Lemon led to Establishment Clause interpretative reform in subsequent cases. However,
Lemon is still the foundation for present day Establishment Clause
analysis.4 7
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court formulated a test that marked a
consolidation of the Court's prior analysis of Establishment Clause
cases.48 In Lemon, the Court found that Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statues that either reimbursed or supplemented a portion of the
costs involved in teaching secular subjects at "nonpublic" schools violated the twin religion clauses of the First Amendment-the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.4 9 In its analysis, the Lemon
Court created the following test: "First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must
not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion."5 °
42. See id. at 669.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 669-70.
45. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
46. See id. at 612-13.
47. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807 (2000).
48. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The Lemon Court did not specify the origin of every
prong of its three-prong test came. See id. at 612. It did state that the test was based on
prior Supreme Court rulings. Id.
49. Id. at 607. The Rhode Island statute permitted the state to add up to 15% of teachers' salaries in private religious and nonreligious elementary schools if the instructors did
not teach a religion course. Id. at 607-08. The Pennsylvania statute reimbursed private
elementary and secondary schools for some of the expenses of secular education. Id. at
609. These expenses included textbooks, teaching materials, and secular teachers' salaries.
Id. Under both statutes, aid was given to "church-related" schools. Id. at 607.
50. Id. at 612-13 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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The Court reasoned that the Constitution requires religion to be an
individual, private matter; therefore, the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania laws that provided secular financial assistance to religious
schools were prohibited.51
Lemon left undecided the question of whether direct state aid to
students, rather than to parochial schools, also violated the Establishment Clause. Meek v. Pittenger52 addressed this question when the
Court considered a portion of a Pennsylvania law that provided for
the direct lending of secular textbooks to students.5 3 A plurality of
the Court explained that there was no reason to believe that the textbooks purchased with government funds, for the purpose of lending
them to nonpublic schools, would be used for anything but secular
education.54 Consequently, in Meek, the Court upheld a provision
that provided funds for the lending of textbooks to nonpublic
55
schools.
In contrast, the Court invalidated other provisions of the same
law that provided funds for the lending of general instructional materials and secular support staff to nonpublic schools. 56 The loans for
instructional materials were deemed unconstitutional "direct aid" to a
religious institution.5 ' The Court maintained that providing statefunded secular support staff to religious or nonpublic schools posed
"the danger that religious doctrine will become intertwined with secular instruction" because when instructional materials and support staff
are provided there remains a risk that the secular instruments will be
used to further religious indoctrination.5 8
The Court continued on its path of Establishment Clause interpretation in Wolman v. Walter. 9 In Wolman, the Ohio legislature, in an
effort to comply with the Court's decision in Meek, amended its school
aid program to provide for aid to nonpublic schools for field trip
transportation. 60 The majority, relying on the reasoning in Meek,
found the portion of the statute providing state funds for field trip
transportation unconstitutional because it would encourage field
51. See id. at 625. Justice White disagreed with the Court's conclusion, asserting that
the First Amendment does not forbid legislation that provides state funds to exclusively
finance the teaching of secular subjects. Id. at 670 (White, J., dissenting).
52. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
53. Id. at 351.
54. See id. at 361-62.
55. Id. at 362.
56. Id. at 366, 372.
57. Id. at 366.
58. Id. at 370-71.
59. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
60. Id. at 233.
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trips, thus constituting "impermissible direct aid to sectarian education."" The Court reasoned that because field trips are such a vital
component of the curriculum, they pose the unavoidable consequence of being used by a teacher in a parochial school to further the
62
encouragement of religion, thus creating "excessive entanglement."
The Court next considered the Establishment Clause in a pair of
companion cases, School District of GrandRapids v. Ball,6 3 and Aguilar v.
Felton.6 4 In Ball, the Court considered whether a program that provided remedial and enrichment courses to children taught by publicly
employed teachers in nonpublic schools was valid under the Constitution.6 5 In Aguilar, the program at issue was very similar to the one in
Ball, except that it provided for monitoring of the funded classes to
ensure they were not used for religious indoctrination.6 6 The Court
held that both programs were invalid under the Establishment
Clause.6 7 In Ball, the Court based its decision on three factors: the
program would allow teachers to advocate particular religions at the
state's expense; state-funded education in religious buildings conveyed a symbolic message of state support for religion; and the program amounted to a subsidy to religious schools.6 8 In Aguilar the
Court found that the monitoring system put into place to prevent religious indoctrination would actually result "in the excessive entangle69
ment of church and state.
The Supreme Court considered what the government can permissibly do in order to accommodate religion in the case of Corporationof

61. Id. at 254-55. The Court also considered and upheld other portions of the statute
providing nonpublic school students with books, standardized tests, test scoring services,
and diagnostic and therapeutic services. Id. at 255. The Wolman Court upheld aid in the
form of textbooks because such aid provided the same safeguards as the textbook programs approved by the Court in Meek. Id. at 238. Further, the Wolman Court found the
supplying of testing and scoring services to nonpublic schools constitutional because the
nonpublic schools had no control over the context of the text or its scoring, thus preventing the school from using it as a tool of religious teaching. Id. at 240-41. Additionally, the
Wolman Court upheld the statutory provision providing for diagnostic and therapeutic services because it did not have the effect of aiding or enhancing religion. Id at 244, 248.
However, the Court found the statutory provisions providing for the lending of instructional materials and equipment to parents and students of nonpublic schools unconstitutional because it was deemed similar to a cash grant. ld. at 251.
62. Id. at 254.
63. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
64. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
65. Ball, 473 U.S. at 375-77.
66. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 408-09.
67. See Ball, 473 U.S. at 397-98; Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 414.
68. Ball, 473 U.S. at 397.
69. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409.
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Presiding Bishop v. Amos. 7 In Amos, the Court stated that there are
times when the government is allowed to accommodate religion-and
there are even certain circumstances when the government may actually be required to do so-without violating the Establishment
Clause.7" The Amos Court held that an exemption for religious organizations from the requirements of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prohibiting religious discrimination does not violate the Establishment Clause.72 The Court used the Lemon test to differentiate between constitutional accommodation of religion and unconstitutional
establishment of religion.7 3 The Court validated the exemption for
religious institutions on the basis that it qualified under each of the
three prongs of the Lemon test.7" The Court found that the exemption's purpose of reducing government interference with religious de75
cision-making was a valid "secular purpose" as required by Lemon.
Further, the Court held that the second prong of the Lemon test-that
a law's main effect may not be to advance or inhibit religion-was met
because the exemption did not improve the religious organization's
ability to foster religious indoctrination. 76 The Court dismissed any
challenge to the exemption under the third prong of the Lemon test
by stating that it "cannot be seriously contended" that the exemption
"impermissibly entangles Church and State. '7 7 In fact, the Court determined that the statute's exemption of all of an institution's activities actually "effectuates a more complete separation [of Church and
State]

.,7

In Agostini v. Felton,79 the Court reconsidered its interpretation of
the Establishment Clause. ° In Agostini, the Court considered New
York's plan for dispersing federal education funds that were to be
used to provide all students, both public and private, with the same
level of education regardless of wealth.8" The Agostini Court held that
70. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
71. Id. at 334.
72. See id. at 329-30.
73. See id. at 334-35.
74. See id. at 335-39.
75. Id. at 335-36.
76. Id. at 336-37.
77. Id. at 339.
78. Id.
79. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
80. See id. at 218-22.
81. Id. at 209-10. The City of New York had difficulty deciding how to use the funds to
have public teachers provide help to private school children while not running afoul of the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 210. Previously, the City experimented with transporting private school children to public schools for after-school instruction, but experienced poor
results. Id. Next, the City tried to provide the instructional service within the parochial
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New York City's plan that provided public employees to parochial
schools on a neutral basis to teach remedial classes was constitutional
under the Establishment Clause "when such instruction is given on
the premises of sectarian schools by government employees pursuant
to a program containing safeguards."8 2 The Agostini Court reached its
decision by using the Lemon test and by placing emphasis on the first
two prongs-whether a statute has a secular intent and whether the
statute has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.8 3 In
clarifying the Lemon test, the Court reasoned that the third prongthe creation of excessive entanglement between government and religion-was really one of the considerations applicable to understanding the effect of a statute, and not itself indicative of an Establishment
Clause violation.84 Using this modified test, the Court upheld the
New York statute as constitutional because it did not result in "governmental indoctrination[,] define its recipients by reference to religion [,] or create an excessive entanglement."85 Although Agostini was
reflective of the more recent view of the Supreme Court on the Establishment Clause, it did not overrule cases like Meek and Wolman, leaving the Court to address the dilemma in Mitchell v. Helms.86
The Mitchell Court restated the modification to the Lemon test articulated in Agostini when it determined whether government aid to
religious schools violated the Establishment Clause.8 7 Justice Thomas,
announcing the judgment of the Court, explained that the government aid was constitutional because it passed the "purpose and effect"

schools, with certain safeguards to remove the risk that the state-funded teachers were
advancing a religion. Id. at 210-11. However, the Supreme Court eventually ruled that this
plan violated the Establishment Clause in Aguilar. Id. at 212. After Aguilar was decided,
the Supreme Court's rulings in other Establishment Clause cases suggested its Aguilar decision had been overruled. Id. at 208-09. As a result, the City of New York initiated the case
to allow federally funded teachers to instruct inside parochial schools under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). Id. at 209.
82. Id. at 234-35.
83. See id. at 232-34.
84. Id. at 233.
85. Id. at 234.
86. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
87. Id. at 801, 808. In Mitchell, a plurality of the Court held that Chapter 2 of the
Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, as applied in Jefferson Parish,
Louisiana, did not advance or endorse the establishment of religion. Id. at 835. Chapter 2
aid is a program in which "the Federal Government distributes funds to state and local
governmental agencies, which in turn lend educational materials and equipment to public
and private schools, with the enrollment of each participating school determining the
amount of aid that it receives." Id. at 801.
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test articulated in Agostini.8 s Looking to Agostini for guidance, Justice
Thomas outlined the factors used when deciding a statute's effect:
"[G] overnment aid has the effect of advancing religion [if it] . . .result[s] in governmental indoctrination; define Is] its recipients by reference to [their] religion; or create[s] an excessive entanglement. "89
Furthermore, Justice Thomas explained that deciding whether a statute causes indoctrination necessitates an examination of whether indoctrination can be attributed to the state. 90 In order to make this
determination, the neutrality principle must be applied.9" The "neutrality principle" focuses on the principle that the government program must be equally available to both the secular and the religious,
thus not advancing religion.9 2
Justice Thomas, for the plurality, concluded that even "direct
aid," if it is neutral and it reaches religious schools as the result of
private choice, is still valid under the Religion Clause of the First
Amendment.9 3 The plurality acknowledged that abandoning the "direct-aid" doctrine contradicted Ball, but explained that Agostini had
already rejected the rule relied on in Ball.9 4 Using the principle of
neutrality, the plurality upheld the statute, reasoning that it offered
aid to a wide variety of people without regard to their religion, and
therefore it did not constitute support of a religion. 95 Finally, Justice
Thomas also explicitly overruled any part of Meek and Wolman that
96
conflicted with his decision.

88. Id. at 801, 808. Justice Thomas noted that the secular purpose of Chapter 2 aid was
not challenged in the suit, and therefore the only issue before the Court was the effect of
the statute. Id. at 808.
89. Id. (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234).
90. Id. at 809.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 809-10.
93. Id. at 816.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 829.
96. Id. at 835. Meek and Wolman had created a distinction between government-supplied textbooks and "other in-kind aid." Id. at 805. In these decisions, the Court ajudged
the textbook program constitutional under the Establishment Clause while the in-kind aid
was found to be unconstitutional. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362 (1975) (holding
that direct state aid to students in the form of governmentally loaned textbooks is valid
under the Constitution); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254-55 (1977) (holding that
government funding for field trips violated the Constitution). In Mitchell, Justice
O'Connor concurred, along with Justice Breyer, and argued that the majority opinion
placed too much emphasis on the neutrality principle. 530 U.S. at 836-38 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). In addition, Justice O'Connor stated that she did not think
the Chapter 2 program constituted a "true private choice program." Id. at 842. In Justice
O'Connor's view, the neutrality of the aid was only one factor of many that would need to

1152

MARYIAND

LA-W REVIEW

[VOL. 61:1141

[

c. The Fourth Circuit's Clarificationof the Lemon Test. -In Forest Hills Early Learning Center, Inc. v. Grace Baptist Church,9 7 the Fourth
Circuit applied the Court's reasoning in Amos to the question of
whether a state can impose licensing requirements on churches that
provide daycare and education programs.9" The educational programs that were in question in ForestHills were not overtly religious.9 9
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court's clarification of
the Lemon test in Amos required it to analyze the situation differently
than it had under the "old" Lemon test. ° ° The Forest Hills court explained that the type of litigation burdens that the Court sought to
alleviate in Amos, namely to protect religious organizations from having to explain their faith and practice before religiously uneducated
judges, were the exact burdens that Forest Hills faced in this suit. 1'
Therefore, the court explained that to force the church to submit to
state licensing requirements placed a "difficult and intrusive burden"
on the church because it forced the church "to persuade a secular
court of the sincerity and centrality of the beliefs they consider
threatened by governmental licensing."' 2 Furthermore, Forest Hills
interpreted Amos to mean that the avoidance of "interference with the
execution of religious missions in a nonprofit area in which a church
operates" is a legitimate legislative purpose."°3
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Ehlers-Renzi v. Connelly School of the
Holy Child, Inc., the Fourth Circuit held that Montgomery County, Maryland Zoning Ordinance section 59-G-2.19(c) did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.' 4 Judge Niemeyer wrote
5
the opinion for the court, which Judge Widener joined.1'1
In his opinion, Judge Niemeyer stated that the Establishment
Clause mandates that the government act neutrally toward religion." 6
However, he reasoned that under the Establishment Clause the government is allowed to take measures to accommodate religion and
be examined in order to determine a statute's constitutionality. See id. at 839. However,
she did concur that the statute was valid. Id. at 867.
97. 846 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1988).
98. Id. at 261.
99. Id. at 262.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 263.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Elders-Renzi, 224 F.3d at 292.
105. Id. at 284.
106. Id. at 287.
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that sometimes this accommodation is mandatory." 7 He stated that
the Supreme Court has recognized that "this Nation's history has not
been one of entirely sanitized separation between Church and State,"
and that the Court has never desired or thought it would be able to
demand a political system that fostered total separation. °8 Judge
Niemeyer also noted that the Supreme Court has determined that
there is a recognized principle that a government program that provides a benefit to a religious institution is not, solely for that reason,

unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause. 0 9
Judge Niemeyer explained that without some government accommodation of religion, the government would unconstitutionally be advocating an absence of religion rather than the practice of it.'") He

reasoned that there is a "line between benevolent neutrality and permissible accommodation, on the one hand, and improper sponsorship or interference, on the other, [that] must be delicately drawn
both to protect the free exercise of religion and to prohibit its
establishment." 11
Judge Niemeyer explained that in the recent Supreme Court decision of Mitchell v. Helms, the Court established guidelines for Establishment Clause jurisprudence by employing a modified version of the
Lemon test.1' 2 While acknowledging that the Lemon test had been
modified, Judge Niemeyer applied the "old" Lemon test because it was
not overruled by Mitchell.' '

Judge Niemeyer

analyzed

Using the Amos version of the Lemon test,

the

constitutionality

of the

zoning

ordinance." 14
Under the first prong of the Amos-Lemon test-the legislative purpose prong-the court questioned whether the ordinance had the
secular purpose of minimizing the interference of Montgomery
County with the religious mission of the Connelly School.'15 Judge

107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
760 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Lynch v.Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984); Sch. Dist. of Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)).
111. Id. at 287-88.
112. See id. at 288.
113. Id. The Lemon test has three prongs. The first two require a statute to have a sectular purpose that does not inhibit or advance religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612 (1971). The third prong, which received very little analysis from the Amos Court, requires that a statute not result in the excessive entanglement of government with religion.
Id. at 613; see also Corp. of Presiding Bishop v.Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987).
114. Ehlers-Renzi, 224 F.3d at 288.
115. Id. at 288-89.
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Niemeyer then explained that this prong "presents a fairly low hurdle," and that it was possible to satisfy this prong if the legislation had
a facially plausible secular purpose.1 16 The court found such a secular
purpose in the arguments made by the Connelly School that the zoning exemption allows Montgomery County to avoid interfering with
the school's "religious missions" that could result from the "scrutiny
and procedures" that would otherwise be required by the zoning
law. 11 7 The court, drawing analogies to Amos and Forest Hills Early
Learning Center, Inc. v. Grace Baptist Church, found that the special exemption kept the school from having to rationalize to a civil authority
its unique religious needs that prompted a building structure change,
and relieved the school of having to persuade zoning authorities that
its architectural modifications conformed with the neighborhood
characteristics. 118

In applying the second prong of the Lemon test-the purpose of
the statute may not advance or inhibit religion-the Renzi court, quoting Amos, stated that the exemption's effect of "simply allowing a religious school to 'better... advance [its] purposes"' does not violate the
prong. 1 9 Further, in analyzing the third prong of the Lemon testexcessive entanglement-the court acknowledged that the Supreme
Court has reasoned that this prong is violated only when direct funds
are supplied to parochial schools or teachers in parochial schools. 2 '
Judge Murnaghan wrote a dissenting opinion, stating that while
he agreed with the court's reasoning, he disagreed with where it chose
to draw the line between permissible and impermissible aid to religion. 12 ' Furthermore, he felt that the exemption at issue violated the
Establishment Clause. 1 22 Judge Murnaghan believed that applying
the special exception procedures to the Connelly School "would not
significantly interfere with the school's ability to define and carry out
its mission."' 23 He explained that there is a critical distinction between a regulation that affects an institution's programs and employees, and a regulation that merely affects the progress of the
institution's physical amenities. 1 24 Further, he indicated that what occurs inside a church building is substantially more important than
116. Id. at 288 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

117. Id.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.at
Id.at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

289.
291 (quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987)).
291-92.
292 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).

123. Id.
124. Id.at 293.
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what the physical building of the institution looks like. 125 He indicated that enforcing the zoning ordinance does not allow Montgomery County to become involved in the regulation of the school's
religious missions. 126 Judge Murnaghan further reasoned that by
neglecting to create a significant barrier between what is a "significant" and what is an "incidental" intrusion of religious institutions'
activities, the majority expanded the principle established in Amos so
significantly that it is "traveling down a path that will ultimately render
the Establishment Clause meaningless.""2 7
In support of his finding, Judge Murnaghan explained that the
ordinance language does not foster the suggested secular purpose of
escaping government interference with the church's mission. 28 This
is because Montgomery County Zoning Ordinance § 59-G-2.19(c) is
applicable to both private secular schools operated on land owned or
leased by religious organizations, as well as similarly situated religious
schools. 12 He noted that if Montgomery County intended the ordinance to legitimately avoid government interference with religious
schools' religious activities, it would have been written in a manner
that would have limited its benefits only to schools engaged in religious teaching. 13 He explained that "[t]he overinclusive language of
the ordinance belies the legislative purpose accepted by the majority.' 13' He therefore concluded that the ordinance was not enacted
for the permissible purpose of removing government interference
from the workings of religious institutions. 32 He also distinguished
Ehlers-Renzi from Amos and Forest Hills, stating that in those cases the
Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit acted to allow religious institutions to run their programs absent substantial government interference. In Ehlers-Renzi, he did see "any such genuine effort"; rather, he
1
perceived religious favoritism.

3

1

4. Analysis.-In Ehlers-Renzi, the Fourth Circuit misapplied the
Lemon test and failed to adhere to the "neutrality principle" set out by
the Supreme Court. The court's analysis of the pertinent case law resulted in a finding that stands to eventually eviscerate the implications
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id. at 292.
Id. at 293.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of the Establishment Clause.' 3 4 The Ehlers-Renzi court failed to recognize that the Montgomery County zoning ordinance constituted advancement of religion violative of the Establishment Clause.1 1 5 By
deviating from precedents that obligate the government to provide
equal benefits to both the secular and the religious, the court validated aid that goes only to private schools owned by religious organizations. Consequently, the court's holding rendered constitutional an
ordinance that provides an incentive for religion, an act the Establishment Clause prohibits.
a. Deviationfrom Past Case Law-A Failureto Apply the Neutrality Principleas Articulated by the Supreme Court.-The court in Ehlers-Renzi
failed to apply the established neutrality principle to the zoning ordinance in question. In Mitchell, a plurality of the Supreme Court articulated a neutrality principle that must be followed when analyzing
whether a government program violates the Establishment Clause.1" 6
Under this principle, the court must analyze the government program
in question to see whether it provides the same benefit to both the
religious and the secular.'3 7 Accordingly, any government program
that provides an exclusive benefit to a religious organization violates
the Establishment Clause. 13 8 The Mitchell Court used the neutrality
principle to uphold a statute because the challenged statute offered
aid to a wide variety of people without regard to their religion.' 3 9
However, the Ehlers-Renzi court upheld a statute that provides benefits
to schools owned by a religious institution. 4 The Fourth Circuit's
decision to uphold the exemption is at odds with the Court's holding
in Mitchell because, by allowing the exemption to the special zoning
exception to be premised on the qualification of religious ownership
of the land rather than a neutral or secular basis, the exemption constituted the support for and aid of religion that the Establishment
Clause is specifically intended to prohibit.
In the same manner that the Ehlers-Renzi court ignored the dictates of Mitchell, it also ignored the Supreme Court's teachings in Walz
134. See id. (stating that such an expansion of Amos will result in "traveling down a path
that will ultimately render the Establishment Clause meaningless").
135. See id. (stating that the portion of the Montgomery County zoning ordinance in
question constitutes religious favoritism).
136. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000).
137. See id. at 809-10.
138. Cf id. (asserting that dispersal of government aid for a secular purpose without
regard to religion is required to show that the government does not seek to indoctrinate
citizens with religion).
139. Id. at 829.
140. Ehlers-Renzi, 224 F.3d at 286.
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v. Tax Commission of New York. The Court in Walz explained that "establishment of a religion connote [s] sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."''
The
zoning exemption in Ehlers-Renzi is an example of the sponsorship of
religious activity that the Court has specifically prohibited. 142 The majority in Ehlers-Renzi, though recognizing this clear standard set by the
Court in Walz, dismissed its applicability to the Ehlers-Renzi case by rationalizing that in the history of the United States there has not been
an "entirely sanitized separation between Church and State.' 1 43 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit explained that if a state law functions in
a manner that benefits religious institutions, the law "does not, for
that reason alone, violate the Establishment Clause.' 4 4 However, the
court failed to recognize that although it is historically true that
church and state have not been strictly separated, 45 there is a great
difference between a law that allows the state to provide a benefit to
religious groups and a law which mandates that a state provide a benefit extending exclusively to religious organizations.
The exemption in Ehlers-Renzi provided an exclusive benefit to
religious institutions, a benefit that is not simultaneously extended to
secular institutions.' 4 6 Consequently, it is difficult to justify the court's
finding that a law that benefits only religious organizations is consistent with precedent allowing for only limited, neutral government involvement with religious groups.
The Ehlers-Renzi court correctly stated that the Establishment
Clause requires "neutrality toward religion and among religions."147
In addition, the court explained that this neutrality may be a "benevolent neutrality" that allows the government to aid religious institutions.' 48 Therefore, the court reasoned that under the Establishment
Clause, the government might take steps to accommodate religious
institutions. 1 49 However, the steps taken to accommodate the religious institution cannot support or establish a religion and must be
available to all groups, both religious and secular, as stated by the
141. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
142. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (prohibiting laws that aid
one religion or all religions).
143. Ehlers-Renzi, 224 F.3d at 287 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 293 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Montgomery County
zoning ordinance smacks of partiality toward religious landowners).
147. Ehlers-Renzi, 224 F.3d at 287.
148. Id. (quoting Walz v.Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
149. Id.
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Court in the seminal Establishment Clause case Everson v. Board of
0
Education.15
In Ehlers-Renzi, the court acted completely contrary to the doctrine set out in Everson. In Everson, the Court established the principle
that government aid provided to all groups irrespective of religion
must not violate the "high and impregnable" wall of separation between church and state.' 5 1 In contrast, the Ehlers-Renzi court validated
a law that granted a privilege to a party specifically and exclusively
because of its religious affiliation, not in spite of the organization's or
1 52
school's affiliation.
The court's holding, which provides a benefit exclusively to religious organizations, not only violates the requirement of neutrality as
explained most recently by Mitchell, but also dilutes the purpose of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
b. The Ehlers-Renzi Court's Evaluation of the Zoning Ordinance
Under Amos Fails to Consider Practical Effects.-The Ehlers-Renzi court
misapplied the Lemon test in its analysis by choosing to follow the application of the Lemon test as formulated in Amos, 15 without regard to
the fact that the Supreme Court later modified the Lemon test in Agostini and Mitchell.'1 4 The Fourth Circuit erred in using the older Amos
version of the test, rather than applying the more revised articulation
of Lemon provided by the Supreme Court in Mitchell.
In looking at the first prong of the Lemon test, the Fourth Circuit
asked, following precisely the modification in Amos, whether the government had "abandon [ed] neutrality and act[ed] with the intent of
promoting a particular point of view in religious matters." '5 5 Finding
that the government did not "abandon neutrality," the Ehlers-Renzi
court then explained that it viewed the first prong as a "fairly low hurdle," and that it was possible to satisfy this prong if the ordinance had
a facially plausible secular purpose, which the court found it did. 56
150. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (stating in its explanation of the
neutrality principle that "State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions
than it is to favor them").
151. Id.
152. See Ehlers-Renzi, 224 F.3d at 293 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
153. See Ehlers-Renzi, 224 F.3d at 288 (concluding that Amos's formulation of the Lemon
test provides a better structure for analyzing "religious exemption [s]").
154. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807-08 (2000) (stating that Agostini clarified
Establishment Clause jurisprudence by revising the Lemon test and specifically by revising
criteria that determine a statute's effect).
155. Ehlers-Renzi, 224 F.3d at 288 (quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 335 (1987)) (alterations in original).
156. Id.
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By providing an exception to religious organizations, the court found
that the local government is kept from scrutinizing religious schools
in a manner that could lead to interference with the schools' religious
mission, and thus is kept from violating the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment.1 57 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit opined that this
158
reasoning was in accord with the Supreme Court's decision in Amos.
What the Ehlers-Renzi court did not acknowledge, however, is that
the ordinance exemption at issue goes further than a "hands-off policy" of allowing a religious institution to function without undue interference from the government. The ordinance on its face actually
"indicates a purpose to favor religious landowners.

'159

Thus, endorse-

ment of religion results because the ordinance goes further than allowing a religious institution to build without interference from the
government; the ordinance actually provides a special exemption to
any institutions located on property owned by a religious organization. 160

For example, if a beauty school was located on a lot owned by a
church, it would be exempt from the zoning ordinances, whereas a
beauty school located on property not owned by a church would be
subject to the regular zoning laws.' 61 This is bias in favor of religious
institutions, and a law that has a bias in favor of religion does not
satisfy the Lemon test's requirement of a secular legislative purpose.
The court erroneously rejected this argument, stating that the
Ehlers-Renzi's arguments were based on hypotheticals, such as the
above one, and that because the court did not have those situations in
front of it currently, it would not consider them.162 The court based
its reasoning on the "traditional rule ... that one to whom a statute
157. See id. Giving the school this special exemption keeps the school from having the
burden of rationalizing, to a civil authority, the school's unique religious requirements that
prompted the need to change the building structure. Id. at 289.
158. See id. at 288-89. The Ehlers-Renzi court stated that upholding the exemption to the
zoning ordinance, based on the fact that it has a valid secular purpose, is also consistent
with the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Forest Hills Early Learning Center v. Grace Baptist
Church. Id. at 289. In Forest Hills, the Fourth Circuit stated that an exemption has a legitimate secular purpose if it results in the avoidance of state interference in the "execution of
religious missions in a nonprofit area in which a church operates." Forest Hills Early
Learning Ctr., Inc. v. Grace Baptist Church, 846 F.2d 260, 263 (4th Cir. 1988). The Forest
Hills court reasoned that "the Court distinguished laws such as those invalidated in Lemon
which positively aid, endorse, and advance religion, from laws which, by adopting a handsoff policy, leave the way open for churches to advance their own teachings." Id.
159. Ehlers-Renzi, 224 F.3d at 290.
160. Id. at 289-90.
161. See id. at 290 (stating that the Renzis argued that a cosmetology school located on
church owned land would be entitled to the special exemption).
162. Id.
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may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the
ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others
in situations not before the court."' 6 3 This rejection of the hypothetical analysis by the court is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause evaluation in Mitchell because in Mitchell the Court
determined that understanding a statute's practical implications
shows something vital about the nature of the statute itself.'64
In Mitchell, the Supreme Court discussed the relevance of a hypothetical situation in which a teacher could use Shakespeare's King
Lear to teach the importance of the Fourth Commandment-honor
thy father and mother-and the relevance this hypothetical had on
the validity of a statute permitting aid in the form of secular books to
religious schools. 6 5 Therefore, hypotheticals are appropriate and
have been used in Establishment Clause jurisprudence when deciding
on the validity of laws that provide benefits to religious institutions.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit should have analyzed the implications of the
hypotheticals presented because the hypothetical situation would have
helped the court in deciding whether the ordinance truly had a secular purpose. Had the court analyzed the hypothetical, it would have
been in a better position to determine the statute's practical implications. By looking at the hypotheticals, the court would have realized
that it was doing more than "stepp[ing] out of the way of religion";. 6 6
it was actually acting to endorse religion.
Conclusion.-In Ehlers-Renzi v. Connelly, the Fourth Circuit's
misapplication of the Lemon test and total failure to apply the "neutral5.

ity principle" set out by the Supreme Court in the recent decision of
Mitchell v. Helms incorrectly resulted in the validation of the zoning
ordinance's exception on the grounds that it was consistent with the
purpose of the Establishment Clause.' 6 7 The Ehlers-Renzi court's reasoning diverges from past Supreme Court rulings that require the government to provide equal benefits to both the secular and the
religious in order to ensure that religion is neither advanced nor inhibited by acts of the state. In Ehlers-Renzi, the court should have examined the statute's practical effects as the Court in Mitchell did when
163. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
164. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 824-25 (2000).
165. Id. The Court introduced this hypothetical to counter the dissent's contention that
the textbooks under consideration in Board of Education v. Allen were not "readily
divertible" for religious uses. Id. The Mitchell plurality presented the Shakespeare hypothetical to show that a secular writing could be put to religious uses. Id.
166. Ehlers-Renzi, 224 F.3d at 289.
167. See id. at 292 (upholding the zoning ordinance).

2002]

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

1161

it analyzed the statute in question in that case.' 68 It is only through an
examination of the practical implications of a statute, which can be
achieved by looking at such things as hypotheticals, that the EhlersRenzi court could have properly determined the constitutionality of
the exemption at issue.
ROCHEL Z. SCHNUR

168. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 824.

III.

COPYRIGHT

A. The Fuzzy Test Is Appropriatefor Barney: The Fourth Circuit Casts
Aside Adult Reasoning in Determining the Substantial Similarity Between
the Famous Purple Dinosaur and an Imposter
In Lyons Partnership, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc.,1 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that in distinguishing the similarities between Barney, the copyrighted children's character, and Duffy, a purple dinosaur rental costume accused of infringing
on Barney, the proper audience to consider was not the adults
purchasing the costume, but rather the children who would see the
costume in action.2 The Fourth Circuit reached this result by applying the novel test it had created in a previous case-seeking the judgment of the "intended audience"-rather than applying the "objective
observer" test used by most courts to determine the similarities of
copyrighted works.3 In applying the intended audience test, the court
overlooked constraints imposed on the test in Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc.4 In doing so, the court created a precedent that is likely to
burden courts considering copyright infringement by opening the
door to litigation over the identification of a work's intended audience. The court should have identified the adult purchasers of the
Duffy costume as the intended audience of the adult-sized purple dinosaur costume, rather than two- to five-year-old children who did not
purchase or wear the Duffy costume, but who watch Barney on television and play with Barney products. The court could have reached
the same result without breaching policy concerns and creating administrative difficulties.
1. The Case.-Plaintiff Lyons Partnership, L.P., a Texas limited
partnership, owned all of the intellectual property rights to the children's entertainment character Barney, 5 "a purple, highly stylized 'Tyrannosaurus Rex' type dinosaur character with a friendly mien, a
swath of green down his chest and stomach, and green spots on his
back."6 Since his debut on the Public Broadcasting System on April 5,
1. 243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2001).
2. Id. at 803.
3. Id. at 801. For examples of the "objective observer" test, see PeterPanFabrics,Inc. v.
Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468
(2d Cir. 1946).
4. 905 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990).
5. Morris, 243 F.3d at 795.
6. Lyons P'ship v. Giannoulas, 14 F. Supp. 2d 947, 949 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
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1992, Barney was a national television star among the targeted audience of two- to five-year-old children.7 At the time of the suit, "Barney
and Friends" was viewed weekly by 14 million children, and more than
50 million copies of Barney-related videos had been sold.8
To protect the "wholesome" Barney image it created, Lyons
closely controlled live appearances by Barney.9 Five people were
trained by a single choreographer to wear the Barney costume, and
only one person provided Barney's characteristically nasal baritone
voice.' ° However, Lyons licensed the Barney image on toys, clothes,
books, and other paraphernalia, holding hundreds of copyrights to
the Barney name and the character's depiction."'
Morris Costumes, Inc., a North Carolina corporation principally
owned by Philip Morris and Amy Morris Smith, operated a costume
rental retailer in Charlotte, North Carolina.12 Among its collection
were three alleged Barney look-a-like costumes: a purple dinosaur
manufactured by National Discount Costume (NDC) Company; "Hillary the Purple Hippopotamus," also manufactured by NDC and altered by Morris Costumes; and "Duffy the Dragon," a purple creature
13
manufactured by Alinco Costumes, Inc.
On May 2, 1997, as part of a nationwide campaign to protect the
Barney image,' 4 Lyons sued Morris Costumes, Inc., Philip Morris, and
Amy Morris Smith in the United States District Court for the Western
7. Morris, 243 F.3d at 795. "Barney is readily recognizable to young children, who
repeatedly parrot his song, 'I Love You,' often testing the patience of nearby adults." Id.
(footnote omitted). The song's lyrics, sung to the tune of "This Old Man," a well-known
children's song among Barney's fans' parents, are: "I love you. You love me. We're a happy
family. With a great big hug and a kiss from me to you, won't you say you love me too." Id.
at 795 n.i. Lyons acquired the song rights from Lee Bernstein of Schererville, Indiana in
1993 and slightly modified it to the current, well-known version. Favia v. Lyons P'ship, No.
94 CIV. 3277 (SS), 1996 WL 194306, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 1996).
8. Morris, 243 F.3d at 795.
9. Id. "[Lyons] claims that it would be unable to prevent would-be Barneys from behaving in a decidedly un-Barney-like manner and tarnishing his wholesome reputation."
Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.; see also Lyons P'ship v. AAA Entm't, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 0475DABMHD, 1999 WL
1095608, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1999) (reporting that Lyons owned 176 copyrights on a
variety of films, home videos, audio recordings, radio programs and plush toys that feature
the Barney character).
12. Morris, 243 F.3d at 795.
13. Id. at 795-96.
14. See Lyons P'ship v. Center Stage Novelties, Inc., No. 98 C0406, 1999 WL 33893
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 1999); AAA Entm't, 1999 WL 1095608; Lyons P'ship v. Giannoulas, 14 F.
Supp. 2d 947 (N.D. Tex. 1998); Brooke A. Masters, Protecting Barney's Image From Bogus
Beasts, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1998, at BI (discussing lawsuits filed by Lyons nationwide).
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District of North Carolina, alleging copyright and trademark infringe15
ment and violations of state law.
After a four-day bench trial, the district court found in favor of
Morris on all claims. 1 6 Regarding the Duffy-related claims, Lyons offered as evidence first-hand accounts by adults describing children's
actual reactions mistaking the Duffy costume for Barney and newspaper articles in which reporters mistook Duffy for Barney. The court
disregarded the evidence as hearsay.' 7 The court determined that the
Duffy costume did not infringe on Lyon's copyright because the plaintiff failed to prove that Duffy was "substantially similar" to the protected Barney character. 8 The court based the holding on its finding
that the average adult renting the Duffy costume would not mistake it
for Barney.1 9 Lyons appealed on several grounds, challenging the
lower court's disposition of claims against all three costumes.20
The Fourth Circuit considered whether the infringement actions
regarding the first two costumes-the NDC dinosaur and Hillaryoccurred outside the statute of limitations or whether they were
barred by laches. 2 ' Regarding the Duffy costume, the court deliberated over whether the lower court misapplied the "substantial similar22
ity" test by considering the views of the wrong "intended audience.
2. Legal Background.-The authority for federal copyright protection is found in the United States Constitution, which grants Congress the power "[t] o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. '23 In exercising
this power, Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976,24 protecting
"original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expres-

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Morris, 243 F.3d at 795.
Id. at 796.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 802.

20. Id. at 796.
21. Id. at 794. Regarding the NDC dinosaur and Hillary costumes, the district court
found that Morris had infringed against Lyons's copyrights and trademarks, but denied
Lyons a remedy because the claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations and
laches. Id. at 796. The court also found that Morris's infringement was not willful and
denied injunctive relief because Morris was no longer renting the costumes. Id.
22. Id. at 801.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
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sion .... 25 With the ultimate goal of advancing ideas for the public
good, the Act has a dual aim of encouraging authors and inventors to
create by giving them the benefit of a monopoly over their work for a
period of time, while simultaneously promoting the sharing of the authors' and inventors' ideas to further advance art and science. 26 To
that end, the Act protects an author's creative expression, but not the
ideas that are imbedded in that expression. 2 ' The Act leaves the
courts to determine exactly how to decipher expression from idea and
protect one while promoting the sharing of the other. This puzzle has
plagued courts for decades. 21 While the notion of protecting expression, but not idea, is axiomatic in copyright law, the test for doing so is
not. 29 The Supreme Court has not clarified the rule.3" What the
courts are left with are a variety of analyses developed by the United
States courts of appeals and district courts that attempt to solve the
problem. 3 '

25. Id. Works of authorship include: literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; sound recordings; and architectural works.
Id. § 102(a)(1)-(8).
26. Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991); Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); sec also Computer Assoc. Int'l,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992) (describing the delicate balance between providing an incentive for authors and preventing "monopolistic stagnation"); Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir.
1977) ("This principle attempts to reconcile two competing social interests: rewarding an
individual's creativity and effort while at the same time permitting the nation to enjoy the
benefits and progress from use of the same subject matter."); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1976) (discussing copyright law's attempts to reconcile an interest in "rewarding an individual's ingenuity" with society's interest in allowing
others to make improvements).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). "In no case does copyright protection for an original work...
extend to any idea ... [or] concept ... regardless of the form in which it is . . . embodied .... " Id.
28. In attempting to distill the expression from the idea of two plays in 1930, Judge
Learned Hand introduced the "abstractions test." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); see infra note 45 and accompanying text (quoting the abstractions test). Courts have continued to cite the test, both for its analytical value and its
comment on the conundrum facing courts trying to decipher idea from expression. See,
e.g., Kroff, 562 F.2d at 1163; Reyher, 533 F.2d at 91 (discussing the test).
29. Judge Learned Hand noted famously that the test for infringement was "of necessity vague." Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960). "Obviously no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond the
'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc."
Id.
30. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(E)(1)
(2002) [hereinafter NIMMER]. "[T]he authority for the audience test emanates exclusively
from the inferior courts .... " Id.
31. See, e.g., Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying
the "intended audience" test to compare two works of music); Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164
(establishing a two-prong test to separate the objective similarities of a work's idea from its

1166

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

61:1162

Each analysis lays its foundation in "substantial similarity": The
copyright-owning plaintiff can either offer direct evidence to prove
copying, which is rare, or the plaintiff can show that the defendant
had access to the protected work and that the two works are "substantially similar." Proof of the latter creates a rebuttable presumption
that the defendant copied. 2 The variance between circuits lies primarily in how they establish "substantial similarity."3 3 Most courts rely on
some form of an audience, or "objective observer" test.34 The Second
and Ninth Circuits have developed the "objective observer" test, influ35
encing other courts' analyses, including the Fourth Circuit.
a. Limited Guidance from the Supreme Court.-The Supreme
Court did not begin examining copyright cases with regularity until
recent decades. The Court has not specifically addressed the issue of
substantial similarity;36 however, the landmark case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 37 may provide some instruction
3
on the Court's viewY.
In Feist, the Court considered the claim of a
telephone company that appropriated an alphabetical list of names
and numbers and published them in another phone book. 39 The
Court held that facts are not original work and may not be protected
by copyright, but the arrangement of facts can be protected.4" Even
though the plaintiff had a copyright on the phone book, and the defendant copied exact listings from the plaintiffs book, the Court
found that the defendant's copying was not infringement because the
"constituent elements" that the defendant appropriated did not rise
to the minimum standard of originality required for copyright protection.4 1 The Court did not use the objective observer test for copying

expression); Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (creating an abstraction test to help find the point at
which the expressions of a work are no longer protected by copyright).
32. See, e.g., Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 581-82 (4th Cir. 1996) (applying the "substantial similarity" test when only circumstantial evidence was available); Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1162
(same); Reyher, 533 F.2d at 90 (same).
33. See supra note 31 (comparing the tests offered by several courts).
34. 4 NIMMER, supra note 30, § 13.03(E) (1).
35. See, e.g., Kroffi, 562 F.2d at 1164 (discussing the role of the ordinary reasonable
person in determining whether an expression is substantially similar); Dawson, 905 F.2d at
733 (stating that "Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), provides the source of
modern theory regarding the ordinary observer test").
36. 4 NIMMER, supra note 30, § 13.03(E)(1)(b).
37. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
38. 4 NIMMER, supra note 30, § 13.03(E) (1) (b).
39. Feist, 499 U.S. at 343.
40. Id. at 350-51.
41. Id. at 362. The plaintiff had entered phony telephone listings into its book to detect copying. The defendant copied those false entries. Id. at 344; see also 4 NIMMER, supra
note 30, § 13.03(E) (1) (b) (discussing Feist).
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that the circuits had been applying for decades, but it did not reject
the test in express terms.42 Feist remains in tension with the circuits'
practice of comparing not only the constituent elements of a work
that are original, as the Court did in Feist, but also the unprotected
ideas and expressions inherent in works.4 3
b. The Second and Ninth Circuit Lead the Development of the
"Substantial Similarity" Test.-The substantial similarity test of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit can be traced to three opinions, written over three decades, two by the renowned Judge Learned
Hand. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., a 1930 case, involved an author of a play who brought an infringement action against the producer of a motion picture.4 4 In determining whether the similar
elements between the works were substantial enough to be considered
infringement of expression, and not merely fair use of ideas, Judge
Hand described what has been named the "abstractions test":
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number
of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as
more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what
the play is about, and at times might consist of only its title;
but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they
are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright
could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, 4apart
from
5
their expression, his property is never extended.
Sixteen years later, the Second Circuit, considering the similarities between musical compositions in Arnstein v. Porter,46 announced a
bifurcated test for infringement: proof of copying followed by proof
that "the copying ... went so far as to constitute improper appropriation."4 7 Copying was shown either by direct evidence of the defen42. 4 NIMMER, supra note 30, § 13.03(E) (1) (b).
43. Id. The Feistdecision influenced a change in what was required to establish a prima
facie case in many of the circuits. According to Feist, to prove copyright infringement, a
plaintiff must show: "(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent
elements of the work that are original." 499 U.S. at 361 (emphasis added); see also Williams v.
Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 587 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying the Feist prima facie case analysis).
44. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1930).
45. Id. at 121. Judge Hand noted, "Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary,
and nobody ever can." Id.
46. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
47. Id. at 468. The Ninth Circuit used this bifurcated test to create its two-prong test
for substantial similarity in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). 4 NIMMER, supra note 30, § 13.03(E)(3). The Fourth
Circuit later analyzed both cases to derive its "intended audience" test in Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733-35 (4th Cir. 1990).
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dant's access to the protected work or by circumstantial evidence of
access and similarities between the works.4" The determination that
copying rose to the degree of unlawful appropriation was based on
the response of the ordinary lay hearer.4 9
Finally, in 1960, Judge Hand considered the similarities between
two printed designs on cloth in Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner
Corp.5" He suggested that the test in the case of a visual work such as
the design on cloth at issue-as opposed to the verbal or audile works
of Nichols and Arnstein-should be more intangible, requiring consideration of the scrutiny observers would give the cloth design when
they used it as a garment. 51 The court found that even though the
patterns were not identical, the designs were of the same general
color, with arches, scrolls, and rows of symbols. 52 The court found
that "the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities,
would be disposed to overlook them ....

"-5'

Any differences in the

patterns, the court said, were irrelevant to the purpose for which the
design was intended.5 4
The Second Circuit has continued to follow the principles of the
"vague test" using expert opinion and the view of the ordinary observer set out by Judge Hand to help it distill the unprotectible idea
from the protected expression in copyright infringement cases. Reyher
v. Children's Television Workshop,5 5 decided in 1976, built on these principles. Faced with the challenge of deciphering the similarities between a children's book and a children's magazine story, the Reyher
court noted that it needed an additional test to handle the less complex inquiry.5 6 It borrowed the "total concept and feel" test created by

48. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
49. Id. The Second Circuit found that the similarities between the compositions were
sufficient to allow the issue to go to the jury if the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence of
the defendant's access to the composition. Id. at 469. The observer, or audience test, is
said to have originated from Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132 (S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,552), a
case in which the court considered two movie scenes, both involving a railroad track where
someone tied to the track was released in the nick of time. The Daly court set out the
standard for determining whether works are similar, which began by determining if the
differences would be recognized by the spectator. 4 NIMMER, supra note 30, § 13.03(E) (2).
50. 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).
51. Id. at 489. The cloth was intended to be used in women's dresses. Id. at 488.
52. Id. at 489.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1976).
56. Id. at 91.
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the Ninth Circuit 7 and determined that the book about the relationship between a Ukraine girl and her mother was different in "mood,
details [and] characterization" from the magazine story about a boy
and his mother in an African village.58
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has also been instrumental in developing copyright law and the tests for substantial similarity. In 1977, the Ninth Circuit, in Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,5 determined that the widely accepted rules guiding copyright infringement decisions were "boilerTherefore, the
plate" and liable to produce "untenable results."6
court amended the requirements necessary to establish a prima facie
case of copyright infringement.6 1 Seeking a clearer way to distill unprotected ideas from protected expression, the court broke down the
substantial similarity inquiry into two steps.6 2 The first step was an
"extrinsic test" to compare the works' ideas. The second step was an
"intrinsic test" to compare the expression used. 6' The extrinsic test
would look at specific criteria, expert opinion, analysis, and dissection,
while the intrinsic test would depend on the response of the ordinary
reasonable person and not on external criteria and analysis.64 The
intrinsic inquiry would focus on whether the allegedly copied work
captured the "total concept and feel" of the protected work." 5

57. See Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970)
(announcing the "total concept and feel" test for graphic works). But see 4 NIMMER, supra
note 30, § 13.03(A)(1)(c) (critiquing the total concept and feel test). Nimmer writes:
The phrase is geared towards simplistic works that require only a highly "intrinsic" (i.e. unanalytic) evaluation; .... [T]he touchstone of "total concept and feel"
threatens to subvert the very essence of copyright, namely the protection of original expression .... [T]he addition of "feel," ... being a wholly amorphous referent, merely invites an abdication of analysis.
Jd. (footnotes omitted).
58. Reyher, 533 F.2d at 92.
59. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
60. Id. at 1162. Using the hypothetical of a cheaply manufactured plaster statue of a
nude, the court said that should a manufacturer own a copyright to such a thing, future
manufacturers of statues of nudes would "face the grave risk" of being infringers because
the two statues would "in all probability be substantially similar." Id. at 1162-63; see also
490266, at *3 (4th Cir.
Hennon v. Kirkland's Inc., 64 F.3d 657, No. 94-2595, 1995 WtrL
1995) (discussing the case of two dolls-one cheaply made, the other of better qualitythat were found dissimilar).
61. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1163-64.
62. Id. at 1164.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1167.
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In Aliotti v. K? Dakin & Co., 6 6 the Ninth Circuit recognized that
the new bifurcated test did not always sufficiently sift the unprotected
elements from the protected ones. 67 To solve the problem, Aliotti announced that analytical dissection, previously reserved for the objective, extrinsic prong of analysis, may be performed during the intrinsic
analysis to ensure that the substantial similarities found when the ordinary, reasonable person views both protected and unprotected elements are not based solely on the use of common ideas, which are not
protected.6" The court recognized, as have other circuits, that some
elements of a work necessarily follow from the use of an idea.6 9 In
applying the modified inquiry, the court, comparing two stuffed dinosaur toys, said the test could not be effectively executed by simply comparing the dolls' physiognomy and gentle, cuddly nature, as these
elements are dictated by the idea of stuffed animals.7v
c. The Fourth Circuit Develops the "IntendedAudience" Test.-In
1990, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc.,7 adopted a two-part substantial similarity analysis
similar to that announced by the Ninth Circuit in Krofft. 72 As the Dawson court described it, the test involved two prongs. The first, objective prong, incorporates expert testimony and analytical dissection to
determine if the similarities between two works are sufficient to prove
copying.73 The second, subjective prong, had previously relied on the
ordinary lay person's consideration of the "total concept and feel" of
the works. 74 However, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the "objective observer" formulation-particularly scrutinizing its application in Amstein and Kroff-and ultimately rejected the test as too broad. 75 The
court determined that Arnstein demanded a comparison of the works

66. 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
67. Id. at 901.
68. Id.
69. Id. "No copyright protection may be afforded to the idea of producing stuffed
dinosaur toys or to elements of expression that necessarily follow from the idea of such
dolls." Id.; seealso Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th
Cir. 1971) (finding the idea and expression ofjeweled bee pins to be inseparable).
70. Aliotti, 831 F.2d at 901.
71. 905 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1990).
72. Id. at 733.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 733-36.
75. Id. at 733-35. "Although Arnstein established a sound foundation for the appeal to
audience reaction, its reference to 'lay listeners' may have fostered the development of a
rule that has come to be stated too broadly." Id. at 734.
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by the intended audience. 76 The court noted that the Krofft court also
suggested an intended audience test by making special note of the
fact that it was considering characters aimed at children. 7 Finally, the
court announced the new rule that when conducting the subjective
inquiry, the court must consider the nature of the intended audience
of the plaintiff's work. 78 Furthermore, to avoid creating an overly burdensome standard, the court warned trial courts to be "hesitant"
before finding that any audience other than the lay public is
appropriate.79
Six years later, in Towler v. Sayles,s ° the court applied the "intended audience" test when it reviewed the finding of the District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia that two screenplays were not
similar.8 " In the first step, the court looked at the similarities in the
"plot, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, [and] sequence" of the
play and movie at issue.8 2 Finding only that both involved "a black
female character and white female character who [were] friends," the
court determined that the plaintiff could not copyright such a general
idea.83 Next, the court looked at the "total concept and feel" of the
play and movie through the eyes of the "movie-going public," the intended audience of the screenplays, and found the works to be "completely different. '"84 Thus, the plaintiff failed to prove substantial
similarity.8 5 Identifying the "movie-going public" as the audience cast
a wide enough net that it represented the lay public, so the court was,
in fact, "hesitant" to view the works through the eyes of a more specific audience.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Lyons Partnership,L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., the Fourth Circuit held that the district court misapplied
76. Id. at 734. "Although Arnstein does not address the question directly, we read the
case's logic to require that where the intended audience is significantly more specialized
than the pool of lay listeners, the reaction of the intended audience would be the relevant
inquiry." Id.
77. Id. at 734-35.
78. Id. at 736. The court included children among those audiences who may have
specialized expertise. Id. at 735.
79. Id. at 737.
80. 76 F.3d 579 (4th Cir. 1996).
81. Id. at 581.
82. Id. at 584. The first prong of the court's analysis is to determine whether the plaintiff has proved, with aid of expert testimony, that the works "contain substantially similar
ideas that are subject to copyright protection." Id. at 583.
83. Id. at 584.
84. Id.
85. Id. "[N]o member of the public reading or viewing the screenplays could reasonably decide the works are substantially similar." Id.
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the intended audience test by identifying adults rather than children
as the proper audience for considering the similarities between the
protected Barney character and the defendant's Duffy the Dinosaur
rental costume.8 6
The court recognized that the lower court had no evidence on
the record that children directly influenced adults' decisions to
purchase the Duffy costume and noted that there was substantial evidence of actual confusion by children who witnessed the Duffy costume. 87 The court then turned to the proposition that copyright
infringement actions are designed to protect the profits of copyright
holders by preventing an unauthorized person from selling copies of
the protected work and pirating what would otherwise be the creator's
profits.8 8 The court found that the evidence tended to show that the
target audience for both Barney and Duffy was children aged two to
five. 8 9 The court further found that the "economically important"
viewpoint was not that of the parents or adults renting, buying, and
wearing the Duffy costume, but that of the children who witnessed
Duffy once it was purchased and who influenced the adults to rent
and wear the costume to entertain them. 90 The court reasoned that
economic damage would result if the children mistook Duffy for Barney and the adult wearing the Duffy costume behaved in a manner
contrary to the wholesome image Lyons Partnership had built, promoted, and protected. The court reasoned that "[s]uch a 'Barney' at
the mall, at school, or at local promotions might quickly erode the
good will of the true Barney on PBS and adversely affect Lyons' sales
of copyrighted toys, clothes, and videotapes."91 The court rejected the
lower court's reasoning that the child's perspective was irrelevant because only adults were known to rent the adult-sized costume and children were not present when the costumes were rented.9 2 Instead, the
86. Morris, 243 F.3d at 802-03. In addition, regarding the claims surrounding two other
costumes-the NDC dinosaur and Hillary-the court held that the statute of limitations
did not bar Lyons's recovery for the infringement that occurred within the time allotted;
that Morris had no defense of laches; and that Morris's acts of infringement were, as the
lower court found, not willful. Id. at 797-99. The court said Lyons could receive an injunction even though Morris was no longer renting the offending costumes and remanded the
case to award Lyons statutory damages based on the unwillful infringement. Id. at 801,
805.
87. Id. at 802.
88. Id. "Put more directly, copyright law is concerned with those 'knock-offs' that
could actually diminish a copyright owner's profits, and that threat only arises when the
owner's customers or potential customers believe that the new work is in fact a 'copy.'" Id.
89. Id. at 802-03.
90. Id. at 803.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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court concluded that it was ultimately the child's determination that

influenced the adults' purchases. 3
The court recognized the risk of considering the perspectives of
young children because of their "reduced ability .

.

. to distinguish"

between different objects. 4 However, the court opined that the children's reduced reasoning in the second, subjective prong of the substantial similarity test would be ameliorated by the court's objective
investigation under the first prong. 5 The court noted that if considering children's perspectives extended liability, it would only be to the
degree that actual confusion and economic loss resulted. 6
4. Analysis.-The Fourth Circuit's application of the "intended
audience" test was flawed for several reasons. First, the court did not
follow the instruction it set out in Dawson v. Hinson Music Inc. that
courts should hesitate before identifying an intended audience more
specific than the lay public.9 7 Second, in naming young children as
the intended audience,98 the court failed to recognize the serious doctrinal implications the reduced judgment of a young child could have
on copyright protection. Additionally, the court overlooked the obvious, intended audience-the adult purchaser of goods for young children. It is this audience that, in reality, economically impacts the
market. Finally, by failing to recognize the obvious market and overstepping the limiting principle of the intended audience test, the
court may have invited the increase of litigation it attempted to avoid
in Dawson, and may have complicated what had been an easily administrable inquiry.
a.

The Fourth Circuit Misapplied Its Intended Audience In-

quiy.(1) Children Are Not an Audience with Specialized Expertise
that Lies Beyond the Lay Public's General Knowledge.--By focusing on children as the intended audience, the Fourth Circuit ignored its own
warning in Dawson that courts should be hesitant when considering an
intended audience more specific than the lay public.9 9 The Dawson
court created the intended audience test in a case that required the
93. Id. The district court had noted, "many of these adults rented these costumes with
the intent of confusing their young children." Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1990).
98. Morris, 243 F.3d at 803.
99. Dawson, 905 F.2d at 737.
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trial judge, who did not read music, to decipher two pieces of sheet
music using the "ordinary observer" test.100 After experts determined,
in the first prong, that the ideas of the two spiritual arrangements
were substantially similar, the judge determined in the second prong
that no reasonable person would confuse one piece of sheet music for
the other; thus, no copyright was infringed.10 1 Dawson presented a
situation in which the lay public failed the task of discerning between
the works. Only an expert knowledgeable in music could read the
notes and tell the difference between the sheets of music. The lay
public similarly fails in cases involving computer software and other
high-tech works that require the ability to read computer languages
and complex code. 10 2 Dawson's specialized "intended audience" test
appears to resolve the failures in those cases by providing the opportu103
nity for an expert knowledgeable in the field to decipher the works.
Morris, however, does not present the same situation as Dawson.
Barney, with its purple fur, exaggerated features, and contrasting
bright colors, is not highly technical. 10 4 Nor does his audience possess
"specialized expertise"1 0' 5 by which they properly recognize him.10 6 In
fact, the opposite is true. Children between the ages of two and five
do not have greater knowledge or understanding about their toys
than the general public. In fact, courts have recognized a child's reduced understanding in many contexts.1 07 Like the movie-going public in Towler v. Sayles,10 8 or the figurine purchaser in Hennon v.
100. Id. at 733.
101. See id. at 737.
102. See, e.g., Whelan Assoc. Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab. Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3d Cir.
1986) (involving computer programs so complicated that no lay jury or judge could be
expected to make comparisons for substantial certainty without expert help); see also 4
NIMMER, supra note 30, § 13.03(A) (1) (d) ("In the field of software infringement, some
courts have viewed the [existing] tests as inadequate, and have formulated new approaches
to determining substantial similarity.").
103. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 30, § 13.03(E)(4). "One court, acutely conscious of the
difficulties inherent in seeking the 'ordinary observer's' reaction to computer software, has
resolved the dilemma not by discarding the audience test, but by refocusing it." Id. (citing
Dawson).
104. Morris, 243 F.3d at 795.
105. Dawson, 905 F.2d at 736.
106. See Morris, 243 F.3d at 802.
107. See, e.g., Schleifer v. Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing examples
of how the law affords children more limited rights than adults, such as children are subject to compulsory school attendance laws and are excluded from gainful employment by
labor law); see also Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 140
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (finding that a minor is not competent to enter into a valid contract);
Mumford v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 63 (D. Md. 1957) (concluding that an 8-year-old
child is not held to the same measure of care as an adult).
108. 76 F.3d 579, 584 (4th Cir. 1996).
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Kirkland's Inc.," °9 the adult purchaser of toys for young children is a
general, broadly defined group that is no more specific than the "lay
public" audience that Dawson instructs should serve as the intended
audience to test similarity. By defining the intended audience more
narrowly than the adult purchaser, the court ignored Dawson's warning to avoid specifically defining the audience.
Other courts have been able to come to reasonable conclusions
about the subjective similarity of children's toys without resorting to
the judgments of the children themselves. In Williams v. Crichton,t 10
the Second Circuit weighed the "total concept and feel" of two books
about dinosaur parks to come to the conclusion that they were not
subjectively similar."' The court then turned to the more concrete
elements such as "theme, setting, characters, time sequence, [and]
plot" to determine that the works also were not objectively similar.'" 2
The court ultimately found that any substantial similarity between the
two books was based only on the "unprotectible idea of a dinosaur
zoo.""' 3 In Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., the Ninth Circuit compared the H. R. Pufnstuf television char1 1 4
acters with the McDonaldland television commercial characters.
Recognizing that both characters were directed at child audiences,
the court modified its version of the subjective inquiry.' 1 5 By evaluating the factual similarities between the characters without being overly

109. 64 F.3d 657, No. 94-2595, 1995 AL 490266, at *3 (4th Cir. 1995).
110. 84 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1996).
111. Id. at 588. In comparing a set of children's books about a modem dinosaur park
with the novel and movie version of Jurassic Park, the court sought to determine whether
the "total concept and feel" of each was different. While the JurassicPark works were "hightech horror stories with villainous characters and gruesome bloodshed" in which danger
arises "because of the evils of humans," the Dinosaur World series were "adventure stories . .. suspenseful in places [with] happy endings," in which the "wild nature of dinosaurs" causes threats that are "intended to educate children" about dinosaurs. Id. at 589.
"The total concept and feel of the JurassicParkworks is of a world out of control, while...
Dinosaur World is well under control." Id. Interestingly, while the Dinosaur World books
were aimed at children and the 400-page Jurassic Park novel was more likely aimed at
adults, the court did not discuss the different audiences.
112. Id. at 589.
113. Id.
114. 562 F.2d 1157, 1165-69 (9th Cir. 1977). H. R. Pufnstuf was a popular Saturday
morning television show involving a boy named Jimmy who lived in a fantasyland with
moving trees and talking books. Id. at 1161. McDonaldland was an advertising campaign
launched in 1971, which also involved an imaginary world inhabited by fanciful creatures
and talking trees. Id.
115. Id. at 1166. "The present case demands an even more intrinsic determination because both plaintiffs' and defendants' works are directed to an audience of children. This
raises the particular factual issue of the impact of the respective works upon the minds and
imaginations of young people." Id.
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particular and placing greater weight on the intrinsic similarities, the
court took the child audience into consideration without eliminating
the adult perspective completely.1 1 6 The McDonaldland characters
failed the subjective inquiry-they were found to be intrinsically similar, to have "captured the 'total concept and feel' of the Pufnstuf
show."' 1 7 In Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc.,"' the court did not
even consider childrens' perspectives when it appraised a battle between a Barbarian comic book superhero and He-Man, an overly muscular action figure." 9 The court asked whether the "lay observer
would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from
the copyrighted work"' 2 ° and determined that no reasonable trier of
fact could conclude that the protected elements of Conan and HeMan were substantially similar.' 2 ' As shown through these courts' reasoned opinions, there is nothing magical about children's toys and
characters that takes them outside the realm of adult understanding.
No "specialized expertise" is required to measure their similarities.
Likewise, the Morris court had no reason to take the inquiry out of the
hands of reasonable adults and give it to children.
Furthermore, the court failed to satisfactorily account for the obvious weakness of allowing a pre-school aged child's view to determine
similarities. The court recognized that allowing young children-who
have a "reduced ability.., to distinguish between objectively different
items and concepts"t 2 2-to determine the subjective similarity prong
might broaden liability for infringement because children are more
likely than the average lay person to find similarity. The court reasoned that the objective prong of the substantial similarity test, in
which the trier of fact looks to experts and uses comparative analysis
to determine the objective similarity of the works, would mitigate the
116. The court noted that "the ordinary reasonable person, let alone a child, viewing
these works will [not] even notice that Pufnstuf is wearing a cumberbund while Mayor
McCheese is wearing a diplomat's sash." Id. at 1167.
117. Id.
118. 712 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
119. Id. at 355.
120. Id. at 360 (quoting Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc., 633 F. Supp. 706,
711 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). "In the words of Judge Learned Hand, two works are substantially
similar when 'the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be
disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same."' Id. at 360
(quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)).
121. Id. at 361; see also Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Int'l, Inc., 724 F.2d 357, 360 (2d Cir.
1983) (denying infringement liability when the only similarity between the parties' dolls
was the idea of "a superhuman muscleman crouching in what since Neanderthal times has
been a traditional fighting pose").
122. Morris, 243 F.3d at 803.
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problem and reduce the risk of extended liability.'12 The court further found that if viewing the subjective test from a child's perspective
did broaden the risk, it would only be to the extent of the "reality of
124
the confusion and actual economic loss to the copyright owner.'
The court misidentified the risk. What actually is at risk is the protection of expression rather than idea. If children cannot discern between objectively different items, how is their judgment about the
more subtle subjective qualities of an object to be trusted?
Copyright law allows the copying of general ideas, such as that of
a purple dinosaur, but does not allow copying of protected expression,' 25 such as that of a chubby purple dinosaur with green spots and
a friendly mien. The two-prong test was designed to separate those
two elements.1 26 The objective prong determines, based on expert
testimony, whether the works contain substantially similar ideas that
are protected. 1 27 The second, subjective prong-which the Fourth
Circuit in Morris has given to children-determines whether the expression of those ideas is similar.' 28 Deciphering between idea and
expression is notoriously difficult. 1 29 Handing the task to a two to fiveyear-old child, Barney's target television market, seems ill-advised.
Prone to folly, preschool children are known to stretch their imaginations and blur reality. A little girl dressed in a tiara becomes a princess. A blanket over two chairs is an impenetrable fort. Monsters live
under the bed. Santa Clause exists. Every purple dinosaur can look
just like the real Barney. This is no legal standard. It, in fact, violates
the protections the Constitution allows. If the court is going to put
the question of similarity to children-those same princesses in tiaras
and frontier defenders under blankets-it might as well not ask the
question at all. Discounting the similarity test, the court is left with
only the answer to the first inquiry, which is merely proof that the two
works have similar ideas in common. Under the court's new test, the
expression, the heart of what is protected, has not been examined.

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); see also supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (discussing the protection of expression but not ideas).
126. See, e.g.,
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977).
127. Morris, 243 F.3d at 801.
128. Id.
129. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) ("Nobody
has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.").
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(2) The Court Should Have Looked to the Adults Buying for
Children as the "IntendedAudience. "-Adults buying the Duffy costume
to entertain children should have been designated as the "intended
audience" for the same reasons that the court posited they should not:
evidence that no child decided to rent the costume and the consequent economic impact that the adults, as buyers, affected. First, the
court noted that children "went wild" when they saw the Duffy costume presented to them as Barney, and in fact, parents rented the
adult-sized costume precisely to fool young children. 3 ° Furthermore,
there was no evidence that any child actually took an active part in the
decision to rent the costume. 31 The evidence the court used to determine the children's role also shows why adults chose to rent the
costume. The adults buying with children in mind provides a sufficient intended audience for the court to inquire into similarity. If the
lower court erred in applying the similarity test, perhaps it was in not
considering more specifically the adult buying with the child in
mind-which is still a lay public audience 1 32-and only considering
133
the average adult renter.
The other reason the court gave for not finding the adult purchaser to be the intended audience is that the adult does not have the
"economically important" view in terms of protecting Lyons's copyright.13 4 However, the adult purchaser holds the purse strings and
makes the ultimate decision on whether to buy a product. It is ultimately the adult purchaser who inflicts any economic damage, especially in the case in which the adults are purchasing items in the
absence of children, as was the case in Morris.13 5
Lyons apparently was concerned about people who were renting
Barney-like costumes and behaving in manners not consistent with the
136
Barney image, such as removing the head of the costume to smoke,

130. Morris, 243 F.3d at 802-03.
131. Id. at 802.
132. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text (discussing the lay public audience
in other Fourth Circuit cases).
133. See Morris, 243 F.3d at 802. There is also an argument to be made that the court
should not look to evidence in determining the intended audience to avoid unnecessary
complications of the judicial inquiry.
134. Id. at 803.
135. Generally, a preschool-aged child wields no economic power of her own; she is only
as strong as her parent's will. However, as marketing executives will attest, the will of the
child is a strong one.
136. Masters, supra note 14; Julie Deardorff & Flynn McRoberts, "%en it Comes to Mannequins, We Can Be Dummies, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 16, 1999, at 2.
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or disco dancing and brawling.1 1 7 The Fourth Circuit opined that
such a performance by an imposter Barney could negatively impact
the child, who might no longer want to play with the Barney it considers tainted after the bad experience, stop asking her parents to buy
Barney, and thus adversely impact the profits of Lyons. 3 ' However,
the adult protector of the child is just as likely, if not more so, to
remove a toy from a child if the adult thinks it will have a bad influence on the child. Furthermore, the Morris court reasoned that
knock-offs only cause economic harm when the potential customers
believe the new work is in fact a copy, thus diminishing the copyright
owner's profits."3 9 The parents and adult purchasers did believe Duffy
to be a copy-at least one close enough to fool their children-and
rented it for the purpose of presenting it as Barney. ' Still, instead of
recognizing this obvious audience of purchasers, the court went an
extra step in its analysis and identified an audience with "specialized
expertise," contrary to its own instruction to practice "hesitancy" when
14
doing so. '
b. The Court's Decision Will Likely Have Problematic Consequences.-In naming children as the intended audience with specialized expertise, the Fourth Circuit has set an ill-advised precedent that
invites litigation that Dawson aimed to avoid. Where Dawson sought to
limit the use of specialized intended audiences," 2 Morris uses a specialized audience without hesitation.143 Such a precedent invites new
litigation on the issue of audience expertise where it previously had
not been warranted. Also, Morris indicated that the court is willing to
hear evidence to determine whether the intended audience is special-

137. Lyons P'ship v. Giannoulas, 14 F. Supp. 2d 947, 950 (N.D. Tex. 1998). Lyons sued
Giannoulas, who is also known as "The Famous San Diego Chicken," which performs at
baseball games, for a skit in which the chicken danced and fought with a Barney look alike.
I& The court determined that Giannoulas's use of the Barney image was a fair use for
parody. Id. at 955.
138. Morris, 243 F.3d. at 803.
139. Id. at 802. The court noted that copyright only protects "the creator's economic
market and resulting financial returns." Id. The effect in this case would have been more
attenuated than the usual "knock-off" situation because Lyons did not manufacture Barney
costumes for use by the general public. Parents were not choosing between an authentic
Barney costume and a knock-off, but rather between a purple dinosaur or another
character.
140. Id. at 803.
141. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1990).
142. Id.
143. Morris, 243 F.3d at 802.
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ized.""' This precedent threatens to make the simple audience inquiry a complicated evidentiary investigation.
(1) Overlooking the Obvious Intended Audience Invites More
Complicated Litigation.-If the court had accepted adult purchasers of
the Duffy costume as the intended audience, it would have avoided
broadening the narrow exception it drew in Dawson."45 Dawson created a test in which a specialized expert may be consulted in cases
where the court compares works that are beyond the comprehension
of a lay audience. 4 6 The court was careful to make the query exceptional; "specialized expertise" was to "rise to the level of the possession
of knowledge that the lay public lacks.""' 7 Trial courts were to hesitate before seeking the specialized audience to avoid creating a burdensome, litigious test."' 8 However, Morris crossed the line of
hesitancy with impunity. Even though an adequate lay audience was
available-that of adult purchasers-the court sought the "specialized" audience of children."' 9 In Dawson, the improper intended audience was the "lay public"judge who did not know how to read sheet
music; the correct audience was the "specialized" musician who
could.' 5 ' The situation in Dawson was not analogous to that in Morris.
The "lay public" audience in Morris was adult purchasers; the "specialized" audience was children.15 ' However, each audience possessed
the same knowledge: someone wearing the Duffy the Dinosaur costume will fool children into thinking he or she was Barney. 2 The
specialized audience did not have any expertise that surpassed the lay
public's knowledge.
The Morris court expanded the application of the "specialized expertise" exception that Dawson allowed. It expanded the intended audience with specialized expertise from one with knowledge "that lay
people would lack"' 53 to one that should be consulted "when it is clear
that the work is intended for a more particular audience.'

15

" The

144. See id. (noting the "substantial" evidence of children's misidentification of the
Duffy costume as Barney and concluding that the lower court incorrectly identified adults
as the intended audience).
145. Dawson, 905 F.2d at 736-37.
146. Id. at 737.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 736-37.
149. Morris, 243 F.3d at 803.
150. Dawson, 905 F.2d at 733.
151. Morris, 243 F.3d at 802.
152. Id. at 803.
153. Dawson, 905 F.2d at 736.
154. Morris, 243 F.3d at 801.
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court did not "hesitate" as Dawson instructed it to. 155 In leaping too

quickly from the "lay public" to the "specialized" intended audience,
the Morris court may have opened the door to the increased litigation
Dawson foresaw. 156 In demanding a more specific test, Dawson recognized that it was making a further demand on the court.157 Instead of
analyzing the substantial similarity from the bench orjury box as regular "lay" people, the court would now have to inquire into and draw
conclusions about the nature of the works and their intended audiences. 158 The Fourth Circuit wisely noted:

That burden would be a substantial one if our holding were
read as an invitation to every litigant in every copyright case
to put before the court the seemingly unanswerable question
of whether a product's audience is sufficiently specialized to
justify departure from the lay characterization ....
[C]oncerns about copyright actions becoming unwieldy are
legitimate. 159
The Morris court ignored the warning. Instead, it chose a specialized
audience, based on evidence and economic concerns, when a proper
lay audience was available. This sets the stage for future copyright
holders who might similarly benefit by the expertise of an intended
audience to put before the court arguments and evidence about their
product's audience and economic target.
(2) The Audience Inquiry Might Become a Complicated, Evidentiay Inquiy.-By making an evidentiary issue out of the intended

audience inquiry, the court has made what was an easily administrable
test into one that could bury courts in audience inquiries. The subjective, second prong of the substantial similarity test has long been a
system of reasoning by the trier of fact. 6 ' By its nature, the second
prong of the test did not require expert testimony; in fact, it shunned
the use of experts.1 6 ' The trier of fact determined exactly how similar
two works were.' 6 2 After the Morris decision, the second prong of the
155. Dawson, 905 F.2d at 737.
156. Id. at 736.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 736-37.
160. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (describing the second
prong of the substantial similarity test as "an issue of fact which a jury is peculiarly fitted to
determine").
161. See id.
162. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting that the subjective test for similarity is "uniquely suited
for determination by the trier of fact").
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substantial similarity test has the potential of being anything but
straightforward. Morris has opened the door for parties to argue not
only over the defendant's access to a work and the substantial similarity of the works, but also over who the intended audience is and
whether they have specialized expertise.
Worse, Morris suggests that the Fourth Circuit is willing to weigh
evidence to independently determine whether the audience is sufficiently specialized.' 6 3 The Court of Appeals reviewed evidence that
had been disregarded by the lower court. That evidence was used to
determine that because children reacted to the Duffy costume as if it
were Barney, they must have some specialized knowledge of the similarity of the costumes that adults did not have. 164 The court provided
no boundary for determining when such a review was appropriate. In
doing so, the court may have summoned future copyright litigators to
present similar evidence on specialized audiences, thus adding a new
inquiry to the already illusive substantial similarity inquiry.
5. Conclusion.-The Fourth Circuit failed to consider the repercussions of naming preschool-aged children as the specialized, intended audience. A young child's impressions are as fanciful as
Barney; therefore, a child's judgment cannot be legally trusted. The
parent or guardian, as he or she does in the child's life, should act as
the child's spokesperson in the "intended audience" test if it must be
aimed at youngsters. In failing to recognize the adult purchasers as
the obvious lay audience for satisfying the intended audience inquiry,
the court has overstepped the limiting principle it built into the test
and threatened trial courts with an overly burdensome, litigious copyright infringement doctrine.
KRISTEN KLICK

163. See Morris, 243 F.3d at 802.
164. Id.

IV.
A.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

The Fourth CircuitHolds Firm Against a Stream of Decisions in Other
Circuits Requiring Active Disposalfor Superfund Liability

1
In Crofion Ventures Ltd. Partnership v. G & H Partnership,
the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered
whether the term "disposed of' in the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) includes the
passive leaking of hazardous material into soil as well as the physical
placement of hazardous material onto property.2 The Fourth Circuit
held that liability under CERCLA can result from passive "disposal" in
addition to active "disposal," and that the trial court erred when it
required Crofton Ventures Limited Partnership (Crofton) to show
that the defendants "placed or dumped" trichloroethylene (TCE) on
the site.' The court reasoned that CERCLA defined "disposal"
broadly to include not only the placement of hazardous waste on a
site, but also waste that leaks or spills.4 By continuing to recognize
CERCLA liability for passive "disposal," the Fourth Circuit acted contrary to a group of decisions in other circuits requiring active "disposal" by a prior owner to trigger liability.5 The Fourth Circuit reached
the correct decision by finding that liability may result from passive
"disposal."6 A broader definition of "disposal" allows the statute's
terms "leaking" and "spilling" to have their plain meaning. 7 Decisions
in other circuits that narrowly limit liability to active "disposal" are
flawed.

1. 258 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2001).
2. Id. at 296.
3. Id. at 300. The Court of Appeals also found that the district court erred when it
"apparently believed that the defendants could not be liable for Crofton's response costs
absent evidence linking the TCE used by the defendants and the TCE that was buried in
the drums at the site." Id.
4. Id.
5. See United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 705 (6th Cir. 2000) (requiring
that a spill must occur by "human intervention" in order to be considered a disposal); ABB
Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech. Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 359 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding the site
operators not liable under CERCLA for "mere passive migration"); United States v. CDMG
Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 714 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that leaking and spilling "require
affirmative human action").
6. But see Craig May, Note, Taking Action-Rejecting the Passive Disposal Theory of Prior
Owner Liability under CERCLA, 17 VA. E,,v[L. L.J. 385, 385 (1998) (arguing that active "disposal" has properly become the position of the majority of circuits).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2000).
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The Case.-

a. Hazardous Waste Discovered.--In 1995, Crofton discovered
that a portion of a thirty-two acre parcel in Anne Arundel County,
Maryland contained 285 fully or partially buried 55-gallon drums.8 After testing five of the drums, Crofton discovered that four of them
contained a mixture of asphalt and TCE,9 which is a "hazardous substance" under CERCLA. ° Crofton notified the Maryland Department
of the Environment and cleaned the site under the department's supervision."' After cleaning the site, Crofton sued G & H Partnership
and prior owners and operators of the parcel in order to recover all or
part of its cleanup costs. a2
b. The Crofton Site.-The land involved in the Crofton case
(the Crofton Site) was originally held as part of a larger tract of land
in Anne Arundel County (the Tract).1" From 1930 to 1967, Alan E.
Barton conducted hot-mix asphalt manufacturing on the Crofton
Site.' 4 On the portion of the Tract adjacent to the Crofton Site, other
landowners and operators had hot-mix asphalt operations from 1977
onward.1 5 E. Stewart Mitchell, Inc., which operated an asphalt plant
on the adjacent site from 1977 to 1980, sold its asphalt business in
1981 to a corporation controlled by Harry Ratrie. In 1985, another
Ratrie organization, G & H Partnership, purchased the entire Tract
from Mitchell, Inc. 6 G & H Partnership then entered into an agreement to sell the Crofton Site portion of the Tract to C & H Properties,
subject to an inspection to determine the absence of hazardous
waste. 17 By 1991, C & H Properties obtained an engineering study
certifying the absence of hazardous materials," C & H Properties

8. Crofion, 258 F.3d at 294.
9. Id.
10. 40 C.F.R. § 261.24 (2001). TCE is a hazardous waste based on its toxicity at concentrations equal or greater than 0.7 milligrams per liter. Id.
11. Crofton, 258 F.3d at 294.
12. Id. at 295. Crofton also filed claims based on fraudulent misrepresentation and
breach of warranty. Id. The district court dismissed these claims with prejudice because
Crofton failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence "that G&H [Partnership]
knew, or should have known, of the hazardous waste." Crofton Ventures Ltd. P'ship v. G &
H P'ship, 116 F. Supp. 2d 633, 645 (D. Md. 2000).
13. Crofton, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 635.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 636.
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then assigned its right to purchase the property to Crofton, and
Crofton purchased the property in 1991. 9
c. A Potential Source of Contamination.-Eachof the asphalt
paving businesses 2° typically generated an asphalt TCE mixture when
testing batches of asphalt on site prior to the customer's acceptance. 2 '
Each test used approximately two to three pints of TCE to dissolve a
"two-hockey puck" sized sample of finished asphalt. 2 2 After the test,
the asphalt-TCE mixture was placed into a fifty-five gallon drum for
disposal. 23 While some of the drums discovered during the clean up
of the Crofton Site had fully corrugated sides, evident of drums in use
during the 1930s and 1940s, most of the drums had just two corrugations on the side, indicative of those manufactured beginning in the
late 1970s. 24 The discovered drums were "'rusted,' 'crushed,' 'split
open,' 'leaking,' and 'broken."' 25 Testing revealed high levels of TCE
in the soil and groundwater at the Crofton Site.2 6 While not legally
obliged to do so, the last owner of the Site, Bituminous Construction
Inc., did not retain any records of its TCE disposal and did not produce any witnesses "who could recall, with any specificity, the manner
of disposal of TCE waste. 27
d. District Court Trial.-During the four-day trial in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, Crofton's attorney argued for liability under CERCLA based on allegations that G
& H Partnership and other owners placed the hazardous substance on
the site or that the hazardous substance leaked out of the drums while
G & H Partnership owned the property." Near the end of closing
argument, "one of Crofton's lawyers said, 'I want to take a step
back.., and kind of drop a bomb shell on this Court."29 Crofton's
19. Id.; Crofton, 258 F.3d at 294 n.l.
20. Alan E. Barton operated on the Crofton Site from about 1930 to 1967. E. Stewart
Mitchell, Inc. and Ratrie's Bitumous Construction, Inc. operated on the adjacent site from
1977 to 1980, and beginning about 1981, respectively. Crofton, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 635.
21. Id. at 636.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 637.
24. Id. at 641.
25. Crofton, 258 F.3d at 294.
26. Id. at 295.
27. Crofton, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 642.
28. Crofion, 258 F.3d at 298 n.3.
29. Id. at 301 (Michael,J, dissenting). Judge Niemeyer characterized the "bomb shell"
differently when he stated that counsel for Crofton was not advancing a new theory of
liability, but was instead advising the district court that the court was reading "disposal" too
narrowly. Id. at 298 n.3.
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attorney then explained that G & H Partnership should be liable for
both active and passive disposal. 3 ' The defense attorney objected to
the passive disposal argument, stating that they had no notice that
Crofton would use a passive disposal theory.3'
After listening to Crofton's counsel make a passive liability argument based on leaking hazardous waste, the district court found that
passive "disposal" was not acceptable as an additional argument because passive "disposal" was a different theory and deprived Crofton
and other defendants of adequate notice.3 2 The district court judge
stated, "The question before this Court is whether the Court can find,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that Bituminous Producers
dumped their TCE waste on the Site."'3 3 The district court found that
Crofton did not present enough circumstantial evidence to permit a
finding that any of the asphalt production companies placed drums
containing TCE on the site.3 4 The district court dismissed all of
Crofton's claims with prejudice and concluded that Crofton failed to
meet its burden of proof for all claims.33 Crofton appealed, challenging the district court's legal and factual findings on the CERCLA
claim.3 6 The Fourth Circuit granted certiorari to consider whether G
& H Partnership was liable for the passive "disposal" of a "hazardous
substance" under CERCLA.3 7
2. Legal Background.a. CERCLA and RCRA.-The Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA)" 8 and CERCLA 39 are complimentary statutes because both seek to address the problems associated with hazardous
substances.4 ° RCRA regulates the management of hazardous substances from creation through disposal.4 1 CERCLA imposes strict
30. Id. at 301 (Michael, J., dissenting).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Crofton Ventures Ltd. P'ship v. G & H P'ship, 116 F. Supp. 2d 633, 643 (D. Md.
2000) (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 639.
35. Id. at 645.
36. Crofton, 258 F.3d at 296.
37. Id. The Fourth Circuit also heard Crofton Venture's common law claim for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's rulings on those claims. Id. at 294.
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6965 (2000).
39. Id. §§ 9601-9675.
40. Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir. 1992).
41.

ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY

201 (3d ed. 2000).
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joint and several liability on responsible parties to clean up sites that
42
are contaminated with hazardous substances.
CERCLA attaches liability for response costs to four categories of
parties: current owners and operators of the facility, prior owners and
operators at the time of disposal, persons who arranged for disposal,
and transporters of hazardous substances to the facility.4" The prior
owner or operator must have been the owner or operator at the time
of disposal to be liable.4 4 CERCLA gives "disposal" the same meaning
as RCRA.4 5 RCRA defines "disposal" as "discharge, deposit, injection,
dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous
waste into or on any land or water ....""
A party who is liable under CERC[A may seek contribution from
any other person who is liable under CERCLA.47 In order to recover
contribution, the liable party must establish that it incurred costs that
were both necessary and consistent with the national contingency
plan, in response to a "release" or "threatened release" of a "hazardous substance," and that the defendant was liable for response costs.4 8
In order for the defendant to be liable in an action for contribution, there must have been a "release. 4 9 CERCLA defines "release" as
"any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into
the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant) ....
In order for CERCLA to apply, the released material must have
been a "hazardous substance."' 51 CERCLA defines "hazardous substance" broadly to include "hazardous waste" under RCRA and materi42. Id.; see also Nurad, 966 F.2d at 841.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4).
44. Id. § 9607(a) (2).
45. Id.§ 9601(29).
46. Id.§ 6903(3). The complete definition reads:
(3) The term "disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land
or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof
may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any
waters, including ground waters.
Id.
47. Id. § 9613(f) (1). Parties who may be liable under CERCLA are commonly referred
to as "potentially responsible parties" (PRPs). 40 C.F.R. § 35.6015(32) (2001).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 9 607(a) (4).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 9601(22).
51. Id.§ 9607(a).
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als designated as hazardous under other specified environmental
laws.5 2
CERCLA provides limited defenses to liability, including an innocent owner defense.5 3 CERCLA provides that there is no liability for
PRPs if the party can establish by
a preponderance of evidence that the release or threat of
release of a hazardous substance ... [was] caused solely by-

(1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or omission of
a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship ....51
The conditions for an innocent owner defense are set out in
§ 9601(35), defining a "contractual relationship. '5 5 In order to use
the innocent owner defense, the defendant must acquire title or possession "after the disposal or placement of the hazardous substance."5 6
For a private party to use the innocent owner defense, the defendant
must establish by preponderance of evidence that he "did not know
and had no reason to know" that any hazardous substance was disposed on the property, or that he "acquired the facility by inheritance
or bequest. ' 57 For a defendant to establish that he "had no reason to
know" about the hazardous substance, "the defendant must have undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the
previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good
commercial or customary practices in an effort to minimize
liability.

58

b.

Federal Circuit Split Over the Meaning of 'Disposal."-The

federal circuits are split in their interpretation of the term "disposal."
As noted above, "disposal" is defined in CERCLA by referring to the
definition in RCRA. 59 The dispute between the circuits centers over
whether the terms "spilling" and "leaking" in the RCRA definition
52. Id. §9601(14).
53. Id. § 9607(b); Catherine S. Stempien, Sins of Omission, Commission, and Emission:
Does CERCLA 's Definition of "Disposal" Include Passive Activities?, 9 J. EN'VrL. L. & LITIG. 1, 3
(1994) (describing the limited defenses to a CERCLA action).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
55. Id. § 9601 (35) (A). Contractual relationship "includes, but is not limited to, land
contracts, deeds or other instruments transferring title or possession, unless the real property on which the facility concerned is located was acquired by the defendant after the
disposal or placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility .
Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 9601 (35) (B).
59. /d.§ 9601 (29).
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carry their ordinary meaning 60 or whether these terms should be read
more narrowly as requiring some action by a person that causes a
"hazardous substance" to spill or to leak. 6
(1) Fourth Circuit Decisions Imposing Liability for Passive
Disposal.-The Fourth Circuit first found that "disposal" included passive "disposal" in United States v. Waste Industries,Inc.6 2 In that case, the
EPA sought injunctive relief against a leaking landfill to prevent further contamination of a community's acquifer.6" The court found
that "disposal" was not limited to active conduct because limiting the
meaning of "disposal" "would so frustrate the remedial purpose of the
Act as to make it meaningless."64
Eight years later in Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co.,6 5
the Fourth Circuit used Waste Industries as the basis to find that CERCIA "imposes liability not only for active involvement in the 'dumping' or 'placing' of hazardous waste at the facility, but for ownership
of the facility at a time that the hazardous waste was 'spilling' or 'leaking.' "66 In Nurad, the owner of property in Baltimore sued prior owners for contribution to recover the costs it incurred to remove several
leaking underground storage tanks and the "hazardous waste" in
those tanks.6 7 The court reasoned that some of the terms in the definition of "disposal," such as "leaking" and "spilling" have a passive
meaning. 68 The court found that by requiring active "disposal" to impose liability, the district court arbitrarily deprived the words of their
passive meaning.6 9 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court's interpretation of "disposal" was at odds with the strict liability emphasis of CERCLA.7 °
(2) Decisions in Other Circuits Requiring Active "Disposal"
for CERCLA Liability.-In United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 7' the Third
Circuit found that "disposal" should be read to require "affirmative
60. See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (describing Nurads interpretation of
"disposal").
61. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (describing the CDMG court's use of
noscitur a sociis to limit "leaking" and "spilling" to meanings requiring human action).
62. 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984).
63. Id. at 163.
64. Id. at 164.
65. 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992).
66. Id. at 846.
67. Id. at 840.
68. Id. at 845.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 846.
71. 96 F.3d 706 (3d Cir. 1996).
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human action. "72 In CDMG, the EPA and New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection and Energy brought suit under CERCLA
against HMAT Associates, Inc., CDMG Realty, and other prior owners
to clean up a ten-acre site, which was once part of a larger landfill.7 3
CDMG was not the owner at the time of the government-ordered
cleanup because it had sold the property to HMAT. 7 ' HMAT sued
CDMG for contribution under CERCLA under an active and a passive
"disposal" theory.75 Using an active "disposal" theory, HMAT alleged
that CDMG actively disposed of the contaminants when CDMG drilled
soil testing bore holes that caused the contaminants to spread. Using
a passive "disposal" theory, HMAT also alleged that CDMG's failure to
stop the migration of hazardous waste constituted "disposal. ' 76 In examining the definition of "disposal," the court used the canon of construction noscitur a sociis,77 which requires an inference of the
meaning of a word based on the surrounding words. 7' The court reasoned that the words that surround "leaking" and "spilling"-"discharge," "deposit," "injection," "dumping," and "placing"-all require
a human actor. 7' Because the majority of the terms in the definition
of "disposal" require a human actor, the Third Circuit found that
Congress intended "leaking" and "spilling" to have solely an active
meaning.8 " The court thus concluded that the passive migration of
waste at issue did not constitute "disposal."8 ' The court reinforced its
interpretation of "disposal" by examining the statutory language "release" and "at the time of disposal. 8s2 Finally, the court examined
both the structure of CERCLA-specifically the innocent owner defense-and CERCLA's general purpose-"to facilitate the cleanup of
potentially dangerous hazardous waste sites ...

and to force polluters

to pay the costs associated with their pollution"-to support its interpretation of "disposal.""

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 714.
Id. at 711-12.
Id. at 712.
Id.

76. Id.
77. Noscitur a sociis translates as "it is known by its associates." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1684 (7th ed. 1999).
78. CDMG, 96 F.3d at 714.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 714-16.

83. Id. at 716-18.
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In ABB Industrial Systems, Inc. v. Prime Technology, Inc.,84 the Second Circuit applied the reasoning used by the CDMG court.8" In ABB
IndustrialSystems, the Second Circuit found that a landowner was not
liable for the underground passive migration of hazardous chemicals.86 In dicta, however, the court stated that it had no opinion on
whether prior owners would be liable "if they acquired a site with leaking barrels even though the prior owner's actions are purely
passive.""
The Sixth Circuit took the analysis in CDMG one step further in
United States v. 150 Acres of Land8 by applying the rule of CDMG and
ABB Industrial Systems to leaking barrels found on the surface of the
land, instead of to leaking underground storage tanks.8 9 The Sixth
Circuit held that the district court improperly granted a motion for
summary judgment against the landowners under CERCLA when the
landowners "raised a genuine issue of material fact as to each element
of the CERCLA 'innocent landowner' defense."9 The court found
CDMG and ABB IndustrialSystem's reasoning persuasive and concluded
that "disposal" should be interpreted in this case as "spills occurring
'
by human intervention." 91
While the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has not considered whether CERCLA liability should be limited to active "disposal," the Seventh Circuit district court case United States v. Petersen Sand
& Gravel, Inc.92 required active "disposal" for CERCLA liability.93 In
Petersen Sand, the United States government cleaned a contaminated
site and sued the previous owner, Petersen Sand and Gravel, on theories of active and passive "disposal."9 4 The district court denied the
government's motion for summary judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the corporation was the

84. 120 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1997).
85. See id. at 358 ("We are persuaded by the Third Circuit's reasoning, and rather than
reinventing the wheel, we simply summarize .. .what we believe to be the Third Circuit's
most persuasive arguments.").
86. Id. at 359.
87. Id. at 358 n.3.
88. 204 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2000).
89. Id. at 706.
90. Id. at 711.
91. Id. at 705. In his concurring opinion,Judge Jones argued that the majority opinion
went too far in restricting the meaning of "disposal." Id at 711 (Jones, J.,concurring).
Judge Jones instead proposed defining "disposal" "to encompass spills produced by human
agency, including those precipitated by willful neglect." Id.
92. 806 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. Ill.
1992).
93. Id. at 1352.
94. Id. at 1348.
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owner and operator at the time of "disposal."9 5 The court found that
passive "disposal" did not trigger liability for former owners and operators. 96 The court reasoned that by using the distinct terms "release"
and "disposal," Congress intended there to be a difference in their
meanings.9 7 Because "release" includes more terms in its definition
than "disposal," the court stated that Congress intended "release"the definition of which includes the passive migration at issue in Petersen Sand-to be more inclusive than "disposal. '""8
Petersen Sand also drew on the language of CERCLA's innocent
owner defense in its argument against liability for passive "disposal."99
In the Superfund Amendments Reauthorization Act (SARA) in 1986,
Congress added the innocent owner defense to CERCLA. l°° The innocent owner defense relieves liability if a purchaser acquired the
contaminated land "after the disposalorplacement of the hazardous substance" and at the time the defendant acquired the property "the defendant did not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous
substance which is the subject of the release or threatened release was
disposed of, on, in, or at the facility." '
The court in Petersen Sand
reasoned that if "disposal" included passive "disposal," the innocent
owner defense would have limited utility because if "disposal" through
leaking was a continual process, almost no purchasers could use the
innocent owner defense.'0 2 In order for the defense to be triggered,
the defendant would have to purchase property where the "hazardous
substance" was not leaking.10 3
(3) Ninth CircuitAttempts to Move Beyond the Active/Passive
Distinction.-In an October 2001 en banc opinion, the Ninth Circuit
reversed itself and found that the migration of contaminants across
property does not fall within the definition of "disposal."' °4 In doing
so, the Ninth Circuit retreated from its initial support for CERCLA
liability based on passive "disposal." 0 5 Property owner Carson Harbor
95. Id. at 1353.
96. Id. at 1351.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1351-52.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (2000).
101. Id.
102. Petersen Sand, 806 F. Supp. at 1352.
103. Id.
104. Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2001)
[hereinafter Carson Harbor I1].
105. Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 227 F.3d 1196, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000)
[hereinafter Carson Harbor1].
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sued Unocal, the prior owner of a leasehold interest and operator of a
petroleum production facility, for contribution after removing a slag
and tar-like material, which was a waste product or by-product from
petroleum production." 6 The Ninth Circuit found that the migration
of the sludge and tar contaminants did not fall within the statutory
definition of "disposal."' 0 7 Using the plain meaning of the terms defining "disposal," the court found that the migration of the tar-like
substance "cannot be characterized as a 'discharge, deposit, injection,
dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing.' '' 10 8 The Ninth Circuit rejected "the absolute binary 'active/passive' distinction used by some
courts."'1 9 Instead, the court examined the hazardous substance in
the case, characterized it, and then examined whether the hazardous
substance fit within any of CERCLA's defining terms.'"' The Ninth
Circuit found that the movement of the viscous tar-like material and
the slag at issue could be characterized as "'spreading,' 'migration,'
'seeping,' 'oozing,' and possibly 'leaching,"' but that none of those
terms fit within the ordinary meaning of the words CERCLA used to
define "disposal.""' As a result, the contaminants were not covered
by CERCLA." 2 While the Ninth Circuit concluded that passive soil
migration was not included in "disposal," the court also stated that
"disposal" "may include other passive migration that fits within the
plain meaning of the terms used to define 'disposal.""'
3. The Court's Reasoning.--In Crofton Ventures Ltd. Partnershipv. G
& H Partnership,the Fourth Circuit held that the term "'disposal" as
used in CERCLA should include passive as well as active "disposal."1" 4
First, the Court found that the district court read the term "disposal"
too narrowly when it required Crofton to show "that the defendants
placed or dumped TCE on the site."' 15 Second, the Fourth Circuit
found that by requiring Crofton to show evidence linking the TCE
used by the defendants on that site to the TCE that was found buried
in drums on the site, the district court departed from the strict liability
standard established by CERCLA.1" 6 To reach this conclusion, the
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Carson Harbor II, 270 F.3d at 869.
Id. at 867.
Id. at 877-78 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2000)).
Id. at 879.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 879-80.
Id. at 881.
Crofion, 258 F.3d at 299.
Id. at 300.
Id.
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Fourth Circuit relied on the plain meaning of the terms in the statute
and on its prior decisions supporting passive "disposal" and imposing

17
strict liability.'

Writing for the majority, Judge Niemeyer examined CERCLA to
determine the requirements for a plaintiff to recover contribution
from a potentially responsible party."' The court found that Congress's use of the terms "discharge," "leaking," or "placing" created a
broad definition of "disposal." '19 As a result, the court found that an
owner or operator is liable for either active "disposal" by placement of
hazardous waste or for passive "disposal" by leaking hazardous waste,
regardless of whether the owner or operator was the cause of the "disposal" or had knowledge of it. 2 ° While the court cited Nurad, it did
not provide arguments other than the plain meaning argument to
support liability for passive "disposal," nor did the court respond to
decisions in other circuits that either supported passive "disposal" or
required active "disposal."
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Michael agreed "that a number
of events or acts can constitute 'disposal' for the purposes of CERCLA
liability."' 2 ' Passive "disposal" was, however, a different theory of liability than liability based on active "disposal."' 2 2 While cases could
involve both passive and active "disposal," the dissent found that
Crofton Ventures chose to try its case based on active "disposal"
alone. 2 ' In doing so, Crofton Ventures waived the theory of passive
"disposal."' 2 4 In additionJudge Michael found that Crofton Ventures
did not produce sufficient evidence to prove that TCE leaked when
125
the defendants were the owners of the property.
4. Analysis.--Crofton Ventures is an important opinion in the
debate over landowner liability for passive "disposal" because it affirmed the Fourth Circuit's position. By defining "disposal" to include
both active and passive "disposal," the Fourth Circuit held firm against
117. Id. at 296.
118. Id. at 296-97. The court found that in order for a party who was liable under CERCLA to recover response costs, he must establish that he incurred costs which were consistent with the national contingency plan. In addition, he must show that the costs were
incurred in response to a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance and that
the defendant is also liable under CERCLA. Id. at 297.
119. Id. at 297.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 302 (MichaelJ, dissenting).
122. Id. at 301.
123. Id. at 302-03.
124. Id. at 301.
125. Id. at 303.
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a stream of decisions in other circuits requiring that a prior owner
actively dispose the "hazardous substance" in order for that owner to
be liable under CERCLA. 12 6 The court reached the correct decision
by acknowledging that passive "disposal" of "hazardous substances"
can trigger CERCLA liability, but the court's argument would have
been more persuasive if it had addressed the ongoing debate over passive "disposal" in other circuits.
A broader definition of "disposal" of "hazardous substances" that
includes both active and passive "disposal" is the correct interpretation. First, a broader definition of "disposal" is consistent with the
plain meaning of CERCLA's definition of "disposal" 127 and the events
that led to CERCLA's enactment. 128 Second, requiring active "disposal" would frustrate the purpose of CERCLA by opening a loophole in
CERCLA's liability scheme. 1 29 Landowners with a leaking "hazardous
substance" that they did not place on their property would have an
incentive to sell the property without disclosure to escape liability.13 °
Third, courts' attempts to limit the meaning of the terms in the definition of "disposal" by using the linguistic canon noscitura sociis are not
persuasive because there is nothing to indicate that courts should go
beyond the plain meaning of the terms. 1 ' Lastly, arguments in other
circuits that "disposal" should be read as active disposal because of
passive disposal's conflict with their interpretation of the innocent
owner defense are not persuasive because an alternative interpretation of the innocent owner defense avoids any conflict with a plain
meaning of "disposal."

13 2

a. A Broader Definition of "Disposal"Is Consistent with CERCLA's Text and Purpose.-A definition of "disposal" that includes both
active and passive "disposal" is consistent with the plain meaning of
the terms in CERCLA's definition. Ordinarily, a court begins its inter126. See supra notes 71-103 and accompanying text (discussing federal circuits that require active "disposal" for CERCLA liability).
127. See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir. 1992)
(objecting to a district court decision that deprived the defining terms of "disposal" of
their passive meaning); Carson Harbor l, 270 F.3d 863, 878 (9th Cir. 2001) (analyzing the
plain meaning of the terms that CERCLA uses to define "disposal").
128. Carson Harbor II, 270 F.3d at 885-86 (describing drums that leaked and spilled hazardous waste in Love Canal and the Valley of the Drums as the incidents that led to CERCIA's enactment).
129. Stempien, supra note 53, at 20.
130. Id.
131. See Carson Harbor11, 270 F.3d at 885 (concluding that a search of CERCLA's legislative history does not show congressional intent to depart from the plain meaning of the
terms in CERCLA).
132. See United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 716 n.7 (3d Cir. 1996).
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pretation of a statute by examining the language of the act and determining whether the language in the statute is plain. 133 If the statute's
134
language is plain, then a court's sole task is to enforce the statute.
In addition, if a statute includes a definition, the court's task is to
follow that definition. 3 5 In CERCLA, the term "disposal" is defined
to include "leaking" and "spilling."' 1 6 The American Heritage Dictionary defines "leak" as "to escape or pass through a breach or flaw"
or "to permit the escape or passage of something through a breach or
flaw."' 3 7 "Leaking" then includes an event that occurs without active
human conduct. The American Heritage Dictionary defines "spill" as
138
"[t]o cause or allow (a substance) to run or fall out of a container."'
So, "spill" includes both an event caused by active human conduct and
an event that occurs without active human conduct. Requiring "active
'1 3 9
human conduct" would strain the reading of "disposal."
A statute "cannot be divorced from the circumstances existing at
the time it was passed, and from the evil which Congress sought to
correct and prevent."' 40 A broader definition of "disposal" is consistent with the events leading to CERCLA's enactment and CERCLA's
legislative history. Love Canal and the Valley of the Drums were the
two most prominent incidents that led to CERCLA's enactment. 4 '
Hundreds of drums of chemical waste leaked into the soil at Love
Canal and Valley of the Drums.' 4 2 Both abandoned hazardous waste
sites "were described as spilling or leaking with no affirmative human
conduct."' 4 3 These incidents caused Congress to become aware of the
problem of leaking abandoned hazardous substances.' 4 4 When Congress enacted CERCLA, it chose to establish liability for prior owners
at the time a "hazardous substance" was placed and deposited, as well
as when it spilled or leaked. 4 5 Congress was familiar with active terms
133. Carson HarborII, 270 F.3d at 878 (citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,
485 (1917)).
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000)).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2000).
137. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 996 (4th ed. 2000); see also 8 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 758 (2d ed. 1989) (describing the origin of "leak" as a flaw or fissure in a
vessel); RANDOM HOUSE DICIONARY 762 (rev. ed. 1988).
138. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 137, at 1674.
139. See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir. 1992)
(citing United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 164-65 (4th Cir. 1984)).
140. United States v. Champlin Ref. Co., 341 U.S. 290, 297 (1951).
141. See supra note 128 (describing Love Canal as a reason for enacting CERCLA).
142. Carson Harbor I, 270 F.2d 863, 886 n.15 (9th Cir. 2001).
143. Id. at 886.
144. See id. at 886 n.15.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2000).
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like "placing." '4 6 If Congress wished to establish liability only for active "disposal," it could have established liability for placement and
not included other terms such as "leaking." CERCLA's legislative history also supports liability for passive "disposal" because "the primary
legislative sponsors and relevant committees regularly used the words
'spill' or 'leak' to describe passive events at abandoned sites."'1 7
b. Requiring Active "Disposal"Opens a Loophole in CERCLA 's Liability Scheme.-Requiring active "disposal" for liability would frustrate
the purpose of CERCLA by decreasing the incentive for owners with
leaking waste to act and creating an incentive for owners who did not
place the waste to sell.' 48 Under CERCLA, a current owner is strictly
liable, and the fact that he or she did not own the property at the time
of "disposal" does not allow that owner to escape liability.' 4 9 In contrast, a prior owner is only liable at the time of "disposal."'15 If a landowner has leaking hazardous waste on his property that the landowner
did not place and if "disposal" is interpreted narrowly, then the land15 1
owner can escape current owner liability by selling the property.
Imposing liability for both active and passive "disposal" provides a
greater incentive for landowners to clean up abandoned storage
tanks. 15 2 Owners are more likely to act before contamination spreads
further and increases their clean up costs.'

55

If the owner was truly an

innocent purchaser who was unaware of the leaking, then he could
avoid liability under the alternative construction of the innocent
owner defense.1

54

An interpretation of "disposal" that includes both active and passive disposal is more consistent with CERCLA's design as a comprehensive liability regime that encourages private party action to
"remedy environmental hazards."1 55 When interpreting a statute, the
146. Id.
147. Carson Harbor11, 270 F.3d at 886. Representative Florio stated, "Hundreds, possibly
thousands, of neglected, leaking disposal sites presently dot the country-threatening to
release their lethal contents ...." Id.
148. Stempien, supra note 53, at 20.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1).
150. Id. § 9607(a) (2).
151. Stempien, supra note 53, at 20.
152. Carson Harbor 11, 270 F.3d at 881; see also PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 41, at 265-66.
153. Stempien, supra note 53, at 4 n.13 (describing increasing clean up costs as hazardous substances spread through the environment).
154. But see United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 716 n.7 (3d Cir. 1996)
(finding that this alternative construction has only "facial appeal"). See infra notes 169-178
and accompanying text.
155. Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir. 1992)
(citing In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 951 F.2d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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court should examine the statute's text and also the "design of the
statute as a whole and to its object and policy."' 5 6 In contrast to other
environmental laws that operate based on a regulatory regime, CERCLA was designed to operate based on liability to "provide for liability,
compensation, clean up, and emergency response for hazardous substances released into the environment and the clean up of inactive
hazardous waste disposal cites."' 5 7 The liability mechanism of CERCLA is also designed to provide a deterrent effect and reduce spilling
and dumping of hazardous waste through the imposition of liability.1 5 8 Interpreting "disposal" to require active "disposal" removes
prior owners who acquired the property after the time the "hazardous
substance" was placed from the liability regime. 1 59 Removing one
class of prior owners reduces CERCLA's deterrent effect. 160 As a result, requiring active "disposal" weakens one aspect of CERCLA's liability scheme.
c. Active 'Disposal" Arguments Using Noscitur a Sociis.-The
argument used in PetersenSand & Gravel and CDMG to limit the meaning of "disposal" to active "disposal" based on the linguistic canon noscitur a sociis is not persuasive without any indication that Congress
intended the terms to be read narrowly. 16 Without a clear indication
of a contrary legislative intent, statutory language should control a
court's construction. 62 The court should only override the literal
terms of a statute "under rare and exceptional circumstances. 163
Forcing "leak" and "spill" to require recent human action departs
from the plain meaning of those terms in the statute.
A narrow reading of "disposal" also conflicts with the interpretive
canon that remedial statutes should be construed broadly.' 6 4 Under
the remedial purpose canon, judges should construe the statute
broadly to address the problem that the legislature sought to remedy.1 6 5 A remedial statute is one that is not penal, that is procedural,

156. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990).
157. CarsonHarborl,270 F.3d at 880 (quoting Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980)).
158. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 41, at 266.
159. Stempien, supra note 53, at 20.
160. See id. at 25.
161. See supra notes 71-83, 92-103 and accompanying text (discussing Petersen Sand and
CDMG).
162. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 158 n.3 (1981).
163. Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930).
164. See Carson Harbor I, 227 F.3d 1196, 1207 (9th Cir. 2000) (arguing that "disposal"
should be read broadly to be consistent with CERCLA's remedial purpose).
165. Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose Canon:
Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far, 20 HARv. ENVrL. L. REV. 199, 230 (1996).
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or that allows a cause of action to recover for injury.1 66 One commentator asserts, "CERCLA is not only more remedial than most legislative
enactments, it is arguably the most remedial of all federal environmental statutes, since its controlling focus is to remedy the harmful
effects of previously disposed hazardous wastes in order to preserve
the public health and the environment."16' 7 Given that the narrow
reading of active "disposal" conflicts with the plain meaning of "leak,"
the court should not interpret "disposal" narrowly.
The legislative history for CERCLA does not show that Congress
intended to depart from the ordinary meaning of the terms that define "disposal."16 The court should not read in a requirement for
owner or operator active "disposal" absent legislative history showing
that Congress intended "leaking" to depart from the ordinary use of
the word.
d. An Alternative Construction to the Innocent Owner Defense.Arguments in other circuits that a narrow reading of "disposal" is necessary to avoid a conflict between their interpretation of the innocent
owner defense and "disposal"' 6 9 are weak because an alternative interpretation of the innocent owner defense would avoid a conflict between the two CERCLA provisions. In CDMG, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reasoned that imposing liability for passive "disposal" of "hazardous substances" would make the innocent owner defense "basically useless."' 7 0 The innocent owner defense states that a
property owner is not liable if he can show that the contaminated
property "was acquired by the defendant after the disposalor placement of
the hazardous substance ...."171 The CDMG court reasoned that with
passive "disposal" an innocent owner who purchased property with
leaking waste would not be protected because if the waste leaked over
a long period of time, the purchaser would have difficulty proving that
he acquired the property after the disposal. 1 72 In a footnote, however,
the Third Circuit pointed out that an argument can be made for an
alternative interpretation of the innocent owner defense which allows
166. Id. at 233.
167. Id. at 286.
168. Carson Harbor I, 270 F.3d 863, 885 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that "[a]ny inquiry into
CERCLA's legislative history is somewhat of a snark hunt").
169. See, e.g., United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1352
(N.D. Il1. 1992).
170. United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 716 (3d Cir. 1996).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (2000) (emphasis added).
172. CDMG, 96 F.3d at 716; see also ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d
351, 358 (2d Cir. 1997).
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that provision to retain "significant meaning" even with an interpretation of "disposal" that includes both active and passive "disposal."' 7 3
The Third Circuit noted that a condition of the innocent owner defense is the purchase "after disposal or placement."17' 4 Even if leaking is
a continual event, placement could be interpreted as the event of
bringing the hazardous substance onto the property.1 1 5 The Third
Circuit admitted that this argument had "facial appeal," but reasoned
that "placement" was redundant of the term "disposal."1'76 However,
in the innocent owner defense, Congress used the disjunctive "or," so
that the defense applies either after the "disposal" or after the placement of hazardous material.' 7 7 Using this construction, the innocent
owner defense remains viable if the defendant can show that he pur178
chased the property after placement of the hazardous substance.
For example, if a defendant made an appropriate inquiry and purchased property that had a buried, slowly leaking drum of hazardous
waste, he would be able to assert the innocent owner defense if he
could show that he purchased the property after the drum was placed
on the property.
5. Conclusion.-In Crofton Ventures Ltd. Partnershipv. G & H Partnership, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held firm against a
stream of decisions in other circuits requiring active "disposal" for a
prior owner to be liable under CERCLA. In the Fourth Circuit, former owners and operators remain liable for both the active placement
of hazardous material on the property and for the passive leaking of
the hazardous material into the soil.' 7 9 The Fourth Circuit's analysis
would have been more persuasive if it had addressed the decisions of
other circuits requiring active "disposal" for CERCLA liability. While
the Fourth Circuit's opinion is less persuasive than it could be in this
ongoing debate, the court did reach the correct result. A broader
interpretation of "disposal" is consistent with the plain meaning of
CERCLA's text and the events leading up to CERCLA's enactment.
The arguments in other circuits to limit liability to active "disposal"
173. CDMG, 96 F.3d at 716 n.7.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. The terms are not redundant because "disposal" includes "placing" and also
"discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, [and] leaking ..
" 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3).
As a result, placement is actually a subset of "disposal" and not a redundant term. "[O]r
placement" should not be blue-penciled out.
177. Carson Harbor 1, 227 F.3d 1196, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 2000).
178. The defendant would also need to meet the other statutory requirements. See supra
notes 54-58 (describing the innocent owner defense).
179. Crofton, 258 F.3d at 296.
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based on noscitur a sociis and an alleged conflict with the innocent
owners defense are not persuasive. In the absence of any evidence
indicating that Congress intended to depart from the ordinary meaning of the language to which Congress and the President agreed, the
courts should not narrow the scope of "disposal."
CHRISTINA

K. McGARvEY

